[Cites 8, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Gordhan Ram vs Union Of India on 10 December, 2025

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

[2025:RJ-JD:52015-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                     D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 79/2022

Gordhan Ram S/o Shri Ghewar Ram, Aged About 31 Years,
Resident Of Village Tigra (Ashapur), Post Kherisalwa, Tehsil Pipar
City, District Jodhpur (Rajasthan).
                                                                       ----Appellant
                                       Versus
1.       Union Of India, Through Secretary To The Government,
         Department Of Home Affairs, Government Of India, New
         Delhi.
2.       Director    General,        Central       Industrial       Security   Force,
         C.i.s.c. Headquarter, Block No. 13, C.g.o. Complex, Lodhi
         Road, New Delhi 110003.
3.       Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, Cs
         Headquarter, Bhilai (Chattisgarh).
4.       Commandant, Office Of Deputy Inspector General, Central
         Industrial Security Force, Secl, C.s.i.f. Unit, Bilaspur, Post
         Kusmunda Colliery, District Korba (Chattisgarh).
                                                                    ----Respondents


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Ankit Choudhary
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Dilip Kawadia
                                   Ms. Nidhi Singhvi



     HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA

Judgment

1. Date of conclusion of arguments 24.09.2025

2. Date on which judgment was reserved 24.09.2025

3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced: Full judgment

4. Date of pronouncement 10.12.2025

Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:

1. The present special appeal has been preferred claiming the

following reliefs:

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"(a) That this special appeal filed by the appellant /writ-

petitioner may kindly be allowed and the impugned Order dated 18.01.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid writ petition may kindly be quashed and set aside.

(b) by an appropriate order, impugned Termination Notice dated 20.06.2018 (Annx.7 of WP) as well as consequential Orders dated 23.08.2018 (Annx.9 of WP) issued by the respondent No. 4 and dated 28.09.2018 passed by the appellate authority i.e. IG, CISF (CS) Hgrs, Bhilai may kindly be declared illegal and accordingly, be also quashed and set aside.

(c) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, respondent authorities may kindly be directed to reinstate the appellant/writ-petitioner in service on the post of Constable (G.D.) with all other consequential benefits including arrears of pay and seniority, as per rules forthwith.

(d) Any other appropriate order, which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the appellant.

(e) That cost of appeal may please be awarded in favour of the appellant."

2. The brief facts as noticed by this Court are that the appellant

applied for recruitment to the post of Constable (General Duty)

pursuant to the advertisement issued for CAPFs and Rifleman

(Assam Rifles) in the year 2015. Upon submission of his online

application and successful participation in the prescribed medical

and written examinations, he was allotted Mundali Battalion-I for

basic training and was directed to report on 04.04.2017 at

Kharavela Recruit Training Centre, Mundali (Odisha). The appellant

completed the basic training, and upon verification of his

educational documents and the character and antecedent

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certificate issued by the local police authorities, he was appointed

on 21.04.2017 and placed on probation for two years.

2.1. Prior to recruitment, FIR No. 349/2012 had been registered

against the appellant at Police Station Dangiyawas, District

Jodhpur, for offences under Section 3/6 of the Rajasthan Public

Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992, and Section

420 IPC. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed for the

offence under Section 420 IPC; however, by order dated

01.10.2014 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate No. 4,

Jodhpur Metropolitan, the appellant was discharged from the said

proceedings. The Police Verification Certificate dated 17.03.2017

issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Jodhpur, disclosed

the said FIR and the discharge order, and the appellant was

appointed thereafter.

2.2. After the appellant had served for approximately sixteen

months, a termination notice dated 20.06.2018 was issued under

Rule 25(2) of the CISF Rules, 2001, stating that the appointing

authority was of the opinion that he was not fit for permanent

appointment and, therefore, his services were liable to be

terminated upon expiry of one month. The appellant received the

notice on 24.07.2018 and submitted a representation dated

26.07.2018 seeking withdrawal of the notice. Without

consideration of the said representation, an order dated

23.08.2018 was issued terminating his services with effect from

the afternoon of the same date.

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2.3. During pendency of the writ proceedings, the respondents

rejected the appellant's representation vide order dated

28.09.2018 passed by the Inspector General, CISF, treating it as

an appeal under the CISF Rules. The appellant challenged the

termination notice and the consequential termination order in S.B.

Civil Writ Petition No. 14556/2018, which came to be dismissed by

order dated 18.01.2022, leading to the present special appeal.

3. Mr. Ankit Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant

submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the

writ petition on the ground of non-maintainability on the premise

that the appellant had not challenged the order dated 28.09.2018

passed by the Inspector General, CISF, Bhilai. It was urged that

the appellant received the termination notice dated 20.06.2018

only on 24.07.2018, whereafter he promptly submitted a

representation dated 26.07.2018. As the said representation was

neither decided nor any communication was made to him, he was

constrained to file the writ petition laying a substantive challenge

to the termination notice dated 20.06.2018 as well as the

consequential termination order dated 23.08.2018. Learned

counsel submitted that the order dated 28.09.2018 was passed

during the pendency of the writ petition and came to the

knowledge of the appellant only upon service of reply; in such

circumstances, non-amendment of the writ petition to specifically

assail the said order could not render the writ petition itself non-

maintainable.

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3.1. Learned counsel further submitted that on a true and

conjoint reading of Rules 34, 25 and 46 of the Central Industrial

Security Force Rules, 2001, the so-called "appeal" before the

Inspector General was not even a statutory appeal in the eye of

law. It was contended that Rule 46 permits an appeal only against

orders imposing penalties specified in Rule 34; Explanation (h) to

Rule 34, however, expressly clarifies that termination of service of

a probationer under Rule 25 shall not amount to a penalty. In such

a situation, no statutory appeal lay; treating the representation as

an appeal and then using absence of challenge thereto as a

ground of non-maintainability, it was argued, was wholly

misconceived.

3.2. On merits, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the appellant had throughout acted with full transparency and had

not concealed his past criminal case at any stage. FIR No.

349/2012 under Section 3/6 of the Rajasthan Public Examination

(Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992 and Section 420 IPC

resulted in filing of a charge-sheet, but by order dated 01.10.2014

passed by the competent criminal court, the appellant was

discharged of the offence under Section 420 IPC, well before the

advertisement in question. This fact, along with complete

particulars of the FIR and discharge, was specifically mentioned in

the Police Verification Certificate dated 17.03.2017. Learned

counsel submitted that only after due scrutiny of the said

certificate and other documents did the respondents issue joining

instructions and appoint the appellant as Constable (GD) on

probation; once the employer, fully aware of the antecedents,

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consciously took a decision to appoint and continued the appellant

in service for sixteen months, it was not open to turn around and

brand him "unsuitable" on the very same material without any

supervening cause.

3.3. Learned counsel also submitted that the invocation of Rule

25(2) of the CISF Rules, 2001, in the facts of the present case,

was arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. While

Rule 25 may permit discharge of a probationer on the ground of

unsuitability in a simpliciter manner, in the appellant's case the so-

called opinion of unsuitability rests squarely on an alleged act of

cheating in an examination and a prior criminal case. It was

contended that the foundation of the action was thus stigmatic,

casting a serious aspersion on the appellant's integrity; in such a

situation, an opportunity of hearing and at least a minimal inquiry

were mandatory before terminating his services. The termination

notice dated 20.06.2018 and the order dated 23.08.2018 were

said to be completely non-speaking, bereft of reasons, and passed

without affording any pre-decisional hearing, thereby offending

the audi alteram partem rule.

3.4. Assailing the reliance placed by the respondents and the

learned Single Judge on the decision of the Standing Screening

Committee, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the

order dated 14.05.2018 of the Committee is itself non-speaking

and discriminatory. It was pointed out that two cases were placed

before the Committee - including that of one Suraj Kumar and the

present appellant. In the case of Suraj Kumar, the Committee

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found him suitable for appointment in CISF, whereas the appellant

was held "unsuitable", without disclosing any distinguishing

reasons or objective criteria. Learned counsel submitted that such

a bare conclusion, unsupported by reasons and arrived at without

affording the appellant any opportunity of being heard, is

arbitrary, violative of Article 14 and contrary to basic principles of

fair play.

3.5. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents'

stand that the appellant's case was "noticed" only during training

is factually untenable, inasmuch as the Joining Details themselves

required production of a character and antecedents certificate,

which was indeed supplied, and the police verification reports of

2017 explicitly mentioned the prior FIR and discharge. It was

urged that the respondents are attempting to portray as a later

discovery what was always within their knowledge, thereby

misleading the Court.

3.6. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471 and

on the Division Bench judgment in Union of India & Ors. v.

Kamal Singh Meena (D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 990/2016),

learned counsel submitted that where an antecedent criminal case

has culminated in acquittal or discharge, especially for an offence

of a relatively less serious nature, and where the candidate has

not suppressed any material fact, the employer is required to

exercise its discretion reasonably and cannot impose a lifelong

disqualification on that basis alone. It was argued that the ratio in

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Kamal Singh Meena(supra) (as affirmed in appeal) is squarely

attracted, and the appellant, whose case stands on a better

footing - having disclosed everything and having been discharged

even prior to the advertisement - deserves reinstatement with

consequential benefits.

3.7. Learned counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court in

Arjunram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ

Petition no. 10819/2010 decided on 05.07.2011), wherein

cancellation of selection for a petty offence attracting a minor fine

was quashed, and it was held that a candidate cannot be debarred

for life for such trivial involvement. It was submitted that an

isolated case under Section 420 IPC arising out of an examination-

related allegation, in which the appellant has been discharged,

cannot be treated as a grave offence of moral turpitude so as to

permanently brand him unfit for uniformed service, particularly

after the respondents themselves have permitted him to undergo

training and serve for sixteen months without any complaint in

service.

3.8. Distinguishing the judgment in Union Territory,

Chandigarh Administration & Ors. v. Pradeep Kumar

[(2018) 1 SCC 797], heavily relied upon by the learned Single

Judge, learned counsel contended that Pradeep Kumar(supra)

proceeded on the premise of a reasoned and bona fide

assessment by the Screening Committee, whereas in the present

case the Committee's order is non-speaking, discriminatory vis-à-

vis a similarly situated candidate, and vitiated by non-observance

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of the audi alteram partem rule. It was thus urged that the

blanket deference to the Screening Committee contemplated in

Pradeep Kumar(supra) is not attracted to a fact situation where

the Committee's decision itself is arbitrary and unreasoned.

3.9. On these broad submissions, learned counsel for the

appellant prayed that the impugned order of the learned Single

Judge, as also the termination notice dated 20.06.2018, the

termination order dated 23.08.2018 and the order dated

28.09.2018 passed by the Inspector General, CISF, be quashed,

and that the appellant be reinstated on the post of Constable (GD)

with all consequential benefits.

4. Per contra, Mr. Dilip Kawadia and Ms. Nidhi Singhvi Learned

counsel for the respondents submitted that no interference with

the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is warranted

either on the ground of maintainability or on merits.

4.1. It was submitted that the appellant was only a probationer,

having been provisionally appointed as Constable (GD) in CISF on

04.04.2017 and kept on probation for a period of two years as per

CISF KRTC Mundali Service Order Part-I No.11/2017 dated

21.04.2017. In terms of Rule 25(2) of the Central Industrial

Security Force Rules, 2001, the appointing authority is expressly

empowered to terminate the services of a probationer by giving

one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof, if it forms an opinion

that such probationer is not fit for permanent appointment. It was

urged that the impugned action is a termination simpliciter of a

probationer on the ground of unsuitability and not by way of

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punishment, and therefore no detailed inquiry or prior hearing was

required.

4.2. Learned counsel submitted that during service, on receipt of

character and antecedent reports from the District Magistrate,

Jodhpur and the Commissioner of Police, Jodhpur in 2017, it

emerged that a criminal case No. 349/2012 under Section 420 IPC

and Sections 3 and 6 of the Rajasthan Public Examination

(Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992 had been registered

against the appellant at Police Station Dangiyawas, in which a

charge-sheet had been filed. Although the appellant was later

acquitted/discharged by order dated 01.10.2014, the fact

remained that he had been involved in a cheating-in-examination

case, which goes directly to his integrity and honesty. It was

submitted that in a disciplined Armed Force of the Union like CISF,

deployed at highly sensitive installations such as atomic power

projects, space establishments, airports, metro systems and

critical industrial units, the standards of integrity are required to

be of the highest order and even a past incident of examination

malpractice is a relevant and weighty factor for adjudging

suitability.

4.3. Learned counsel further submitted that in compliance with

CISF policy, the appellant's case was placed before the Standing

Screening Committee constituted at CISF Headquarters to

consider such antecedent cases. The Standing Screening

Committee, after examining the relevant material, took a

considered view that the appellant was "unsuitable for

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appointment in CISF", and its recommendation was duly approved

by the competent authority (ADG/CISF) and communicated to the

field formation. Acting on the said decision, the Sr. Commandant,

CISF Unit SECL, Bilaspur, issued termination notice dated

20.06.2018 under Rule 25(2), followed by termination order dated

23.08.2018 after expiry of the one month notice period. It was

contended that the opinion of the Standing Screening Committee

on suitability is an expert and administrative assessment, entitled

to deference and not to be lightly interfered with in writ

jurisdiction, particularly in the absence of any material to allege

mala fides.

4.4. On the issue of natural justice, learned counsel submitted

that termination of a probationer under Rule 25(2) is not by way

of penalty, and that the CISF Rules themselves, read with Rule 34

Explanation (h), make a clear statutory distinction between

punitive penalties and termination of probationary service on the

ground of unsuitability. In such a case, a full-fledged departmental

inquiry is not envisaged. It was further pointed out that the

appellant was put to notice by the termination notice dated

20.06.2018 and, in fact, availed the opportunity by submitting a

detailed representation dated 26.07.2018. The said representation

was duly considered by the Inspector General, CISF (CS)

Headquarters, Bhilai, in exercise of powers under Rule 26 of the

CISF Rules, who, by order dated 28.09.2018, found no reason to

differ with the decision of the Screening Committee and rejected

the representation as devoid of merit. It was argued that, in this

backdrop, the plea of breach of natural justice is wholly untenable.

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4.5. As regards maintainability, learned counsel for the

respondents submitted that once the competent authority had

passed a reasoned order dated 28.09.2018 on the appellant's

representation/appeal, affirming the termination and recording

that the Standing Screening Committee had acted as per

guidelines, the said order attained finality in the absence of any

challenge. It was contended that the writ petition filed by the

appellant only questioned the termination notice dated

20.06.2018 and the consequential order dated 23.08.2018,

without even laying a foundation to assail the subsequent order

dated 28.09.2018. In such circumstances, the learned Single

Judge rightly held that the writ petition was not maintainable and

could not be used to indirectly unsettle an unchallenged and

subsisting order of the competent authority.

4.6. On the legal position, learned counsel placed strong reliance

on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep

Kumar(supra), wherein it has been held that: (i) acquittal in a

criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate to

appointment; (ii) the employer is entitled to consider antecedents

and overall suitability; (iii) a person to be recruited to

police/armed forces must be of impeccable character and

integrity; and (iv) the decision of the Screening Committee on

suitability must be treated as final unless shown to be mala fide. It

was submitted that the learned Single Judge has correctly applied

this ratio to the facts of the present case, there being no material

to show mala fides or perversity in the Screening Committee's

assessment.

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4.7. Learned counsel also controverted the appellant's reliance on

Avtar Singh(supra) and Kamal Singh Meena (supra),

submitting that those decisions turn on their own facts and

primarily concern cases of alleged suppression/false declaration

and subsequent acquittal. In the present case, the issue is not

concealment but the substantive suitability of a person who has

admittedly faced a criminal case for examination cheating to

continue in a highly sensitive armed force. It was argued that

Avtar Singh (supra) itself recognizes the wide discretion of the

employer to refuse appointment even where the candidate has

made a truthful disclosure, if the antecedents are found not

compatible with the nature of post.

4.8. It was lastly submitted that the appellant cannot claim any

vested right to continue in service merely because he underwent

training and served for about sixteen months on probation. The

very concept of probation, it was urged, is to assess suitability

during this period, and once the competent authorities, on the

basis of a structured process involving the Standing Screening

Committee, have formed an opinion that the appellant is not fit for

permanent appointment, the scope for judicial review is extremely

narrow. On these premises, learned counsel prayed that the

special appeal, being devoid of merit, be dismissed and the

judgment of the learned Single Judge, as well as the orders

passed by the CISF authorities, be affirmed

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5. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the

material available on record and persued judgments citedat the

bar.

5.1. This Court first addresses the issue of maintainability

5.1.1. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, inter

alia, on the ground that the appellant had not challenged the

subsequent order dated 28.09.2018 passed by the Inspector

General, CISF, rejecting the representation.

5.1.2. This Court is of the considered view that the writ petition

could not have been dismissed as non-maintainable merely

because the appellant had not questioned the order dated

28.09.2018. The said order came into existence after the filing of

the writ petition. Thus, it would not have been possible for the

appellant to challenge the said order at the time of institution of

the writ petition. Where the foundational action--namely, the

termination notice dated 20.06.2018 and the consequential

termination order dated 23.08.2018--was already under

challenge, a subsequent order merely affirming the original action

does not defeat the maintainability of the petition.

5.1.3. Accordingly, this Court holds that the writ petition was

maintainable and that dismissal on the ground of non-

maintainability was unwarranted.

6. This Court now proceeds to examine the matter on

merits.

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6.1. It is undisputed that the appellant was appointed as

Constable (GD) on 04.04.2017 and remained a probationer at all

relevant times. His appointment, tenure, and continuation were

governed by Rule 25 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules,

2001 ("CISF Rules"). Rule 25(2) reads as follows:

"If during the period of probation the appointing authority is of the opinion that a member of the Force is not fit for permanent appointment, the appointing authority may discharge him or terminate the services from the Force after issue of notice of one month or after giving one month's pay in lieu of such notice, or revert him to the rank from which he was promoted or repatriate to his parent department as the case may be. "

6.2. This Court observes that termination under Rule 25(2) is a

termination simpliciter, based on administrative satisfaction as to

the suitability of a probationer for permanent appointment. By

virtue of the Explanation (h) to Rule 34, termination under Rule 25

does not constitute a penalty, thereby not attracting the

procedural rigours applicable to punitive action.

6.3. The material placed before the Court shows that:

• The appellant was involved in FIR No. 349/2012 for offences

under Section 3/6 of the Rajasthan Public Examination

(Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992 and Section 420 IPC.

• Although he was discharged on 01.10.2014, the incident

pertained to cheating in an examination--an act that directly

reflects upon integrity, an indispensable attribute for service

in an armed force such as the CISF.

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• The appellant's case was considered by the Standing

Screening Committee, constituted for the purpose of

evaluating suitability based on antecedents.

• The Committee found the appellant "unsuitable for

appointment in CISF", and the competent authority duly

approved the recommendation.

• Acting on such approval, the appointing authority invoked its

power under Rule 25(2).

6.4. This Court observes that the Central Industrial Security

Force is a specialized armed force of the Union, entrusted with the

protection of highly sensitive, strategic and critical infrastructure

installations, including nuclear establishments, aerospace facilities,

airports, metro systems, and major public sector undertakings. In

such a disciplined force, the attributes of integrity, honesty,

trustworthiness and unimpeachable character are not merely

desirable but are foundational. The standards of suitability for

induction and retention necessarily require a stricter and elevated

threshold in comparison to civil employment. In Union Territory,

Chandigarh Administration v. Pradeep Kumar, (2018) 1 SCC 797,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that:

"The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that

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acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide."

These observations apply with equal, if not greater, force to the

CISF, an armed force guarding sensitive national assets.

6.5. This Court notes that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in a

consistent line of judgments, reiterated that even when a

candidate truthfully discloses a prior criminal case or has been

subsequently acquitted/discharged, the employer retains an

independent right to assess antecedents and determine suitability.

The three-Judge Bench in Avtar Singh v. Union of India,

(2016) 8 SCC 471, held:

Para 34: "No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects. "

Para 38.5: "In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate."

These principles were reaffirmed in Ravindra Kumar v. State of

U.P., (2024) 5 SCC 264, where the Court reiterated that

acquittal or discharge does not create an automatic right to public

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employment and that the nature of the post and the sensitivity of

duties are determinative.

6.6. Further, in Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union of India,

(2023) 7 SCC 536, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised:

Para 93.1: "Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designated officials

-- more so, in the case of recruitment for the Police Force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society's security. "

Para 93.2: "Even in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post "

Para 93.4: "The generalisations about youth, career prospects and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders' conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict."

These principles foreclose any argument that the discharge of the

appellant or his truthful disclosure mandate the CISF to retain

him.

6.7. In the present case, the antecedent incident relates to

alleged examination malpractice, an act which, regardless of the

subsequent discharge, bears directly upon the attribute of

integrity. Integrity is the core value for induction into a uniformed

force such as the CISF. Applying Avtar Singh(supra) and Satish

Chandra Yadav(supra):

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• The antecedent was not trivial within the meaning of

Avtar Singh, para 38.4.1;

• It involved an allegation of cheating, squarely falling

within para 38.4.2, permitting the employer to treat

the candidate as unsuitable;

• Truthful disclosure does not curtail the employer's

discretion (para 38.5);

• Suitability assessment for uniformed forces requires

heightened scrutiny (para 36).

6.8. This Court further notes that appellant's case was placed

before the Standing Screening Committee, an expert

administrative body designated for such evaluation, and such

assessments must ordinarily be accorded deference unless tainted

by mala fides, bias, arbitrariness or perversity. In the present case

this Court does not find any material to suggest mala fides,

arbitrariness, or perversity in the Committee's assessment. The

nature of the antecedent, cheating in an examination, goes

directly to issues of trustworthiness and integrity. Such

considerations fall squarely within the domain of the employer's

administrative discretion under Rule 25(2).

6.9. As regards the plea of discrimination vis-à-vis one Suraj

Kumar, this Court finds that no substantial material has been

produced to demonstrate parity of facts, identity of allegations, or

similarity in antecedent nature. A bare assertion that another

candidate was favoured does not discharge the burden of proving

discrimination under Article 14.