[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State vs Shri Sataynarain (2025:Rj-Jd:53286) on 8 December, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2025:RJ-JD:53286]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 482/1996
State Of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
Sataynarain S/o Deep Lal R/o Nani Gali, Udaipur.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajesh Bhati}
Mr. Ravindra Singh} AGA
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajiv Bishnoi
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Judgment
08/12/2025
1. The present criminal appeal arises out of the judgment dated
10.06.1996 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate No.2, Udaipur, in Criminal Case No. 236A/1984
(381/88), whereby the accused-respondent, Satyanarayan, was
acquitted of the charges under Sections 467, 468, 419 and 420 of
the Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal, the
State of Rajasthan has preferred the instant appeal.
2. Leave to appeal was granted in the year 1996. The appeal,
however, has remained pending before this Court for an
inordinately long period, and it is noticed that for several years
there has been no effective representation on behalf of the
accused-respondent.
3. I have has heard learned counsel appearing for the parties
and has minutely examined the entire material available on
record.
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3.1. The prosecution case, in brief, was that the accused-
respondent was involved in the fraudulent encashment of three
forged bills dated 25.05.1976 for amounts of ₹6,500/-, ₹7,500/-
and ₹8,000/- from the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, Udaipur.
The alleged irregularities surfaced during treasury verification,
which revealed that no corresponding authorization or official
record existed for the said bills. Consequently, an FIR was
registered and, upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet
was filed, leading to the trial of the accused for offences under
Sections 467, 468, 419 and 420 IPC.
3.2. During trial, the prosecution examined as many as 31
witnesses and produced documentary evidence in support of its
case. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313
CrPC, categorically denied all allegations, pleaded false
implication, and adduced defence evidence by examining two
witnesses and producing documents in rebuttal. Upon a detailed
appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned
Trial Court recorded an order of acquittal.
3.3. On an independent and careful reappraisal of the entire
evidence, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusions drawn by
the Trial Court. While it stood established that the bills in question
were forged, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the respondent-accused was the person who had
forged the documents, appended the disputed signatures, or
fabricated the official seals and endorsements. There was no
conclusive evidence to attribute the handwriting or signatures on
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the disputed bills to the accused, nor was his direct involvement in
the act of forgery established.
3.4. The prosecution further failed to substantiate that the
accused had impersonated Mangi Lal or had personally presented
the disputed bills before the bank for encashment. Similarly, the
alleged fraudulent receipt of ₹22,000/- was not proved against
him. The recovery of ₹7,000/- from the accused's mother was
rightly discarded, as no reliable or cogent link was established
between the recovered amount and the proceeds of the forged
bills.
3.5. The Trial Court also correctly observed that there was no
trustworthy evidence to demonstrate that the accused had forged
or misused the seals or signatures of the District Education Officer,
the Treasury Office, or the concerned educational institution. In
the absence of such foundational proof, the prosecution case
rested largely on suspicion and conjecture, falling short of the
standard of proof required in criminal law. In these circumstances,
the Trial Court rightly held that the charges under Sections 467,
468, 419 and 420 IPC were not proved beyond reasonable doubt
and extended the benefit of doubt to the accused. The acquittal
thus recorded was based on a plausible and legally sustainable
view of the evidence.
3.6. This Court finds that the findings of the Trial Court suffer
from neither perversity nor illegality, nor do they reflect any
misapplication of law. The view taken by the Trial Court is not only
reasonable but is also firmly borne out from the material on
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record. Interference with such a well-reasoned acquittal would,
therefore, be wholly unwarranted.
3.7. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
presumption of innocence in favour of an accused stands
reinforced once an acquittal is recorded by a competent court. An
appellate court must exercise restraint and interfere only where
the conclusions of the trial court are manifestly perverse, patently
illegal, or based on a complete misreading of material evidence.
Where two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused
must prevail.
3.8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No.1162/2011 decided on
12.02.2024, has succinctly reiterated the governing principles for
appellate interference with an order of acquittal, emphasizing that
a legally plausible view taken by the Trial Court ought not to be
supplanted merely because another view is possible. Paragraph 36
of the said judgment encapsulates the doctrine in the following
terms:
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based
on the promise that no innocent shall be
condemned as guilty...
(i) Appreciation of evidence must be holistic and
comprehensive;
(ii) Selective or truncated evaluation may itself
occasion miscarriage of justice;
(iii) If two views are possible, the one favourable
to the accused must ordinarily prevail;
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(iv) A legally plausible view of the Trial Court
cannot be supplanted merely because another view
is possible;
(v) In reversing an acquittal, the appellate Court
must deal with all reasons assigned by the Trial
Court;
(vi) Conversion of acquittal into conviction requires
demonstration of manifest illegality, perversity, or
patent error in the Trial Court's approach."
Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, and upon an
anxious and conscientious scrutiny of the record, this Court finds
no justification to disturb the impugned judgment.
4. Consequently, the present criminal appeal is devoid of merit
and is hereby dismissed. The judgment dated 10.06.1996 passed
by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.2, Udaipur,
in Criminal Case No. 236A/1984 (381/77), acquitting the accused-
respondent, is affirmed in toto. The respondent shall not be
required to surrender, and any process issued against him shall
stand withdrawn forthwith.
5. The record of the Trial Court be transmitted back
immediately.
(FARJAND ALI),J
37-Mamta/-
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