State vs Bheemh Singh
2025 Latest Caselaw 10815 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State vs Bheemh Singh on 26 August, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

[2025:RJ-JD:36557-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 112/2004

State of Rajasthan
                                                                      ----Appellant
                                       Versus
Bheem Singh S/o Heeraji, R/o Jawai, Mount Abu, District Sirohi
                                                                    ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP
                                   Mr. Prem Singh Panwar, PP
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. R.S. Choudhary



           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA

                                        Order

ORDER RESERVED ON: 14/08/2025
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 26/08/2025

BY THE COURT: (Per Hon'ble Mr. Manoj Kumar Garg, J.)

Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the State against

the judgment dated 04.12.2002, passed by learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Abu Road, District Sirohi, in Sessions Case

No.26/2002, whereby the learned trial court acquitted the

accused-respondent from the offence punishable under Section

302 IPC.

Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the controversy

are that on 09.03.2002, complainant- Heer Singh gave a written

report at Police Station Abu Road, to the effect that his sister-

Manju was married to the respondent- Bheem Singh about fifteen

years ago. Out of their wedlock, a girl child- Meera was born.

Following the marriage, accused respondent reportedly consumed

[2025:RJ-JD:36557-DB] (2 of 7) [CRLA-112/2004]

alcohol habitually and frequently assaulted his sister. As a result,

his sister came to her parental house and resided there.

Thereafter, some members of the community intervened in the

matter, persuading her to return to her husband's house. On the

date of filing report, her brother-in-law- Nathu Singh informed the

complainant that his sister- Manju had died. Accompanied by

Daam Singh and Kalyan Singh, the complainant proceeded to

Jawai, where the dead-body of Manju was lying and the mark of

rope was also found on her neck. Furthermore, the daughter of

deceased- Meera also stated that during the previous night, a

quarrel had taken place between her parents.

On the aforesaid complaint, Police registered the case

against the accused-respondent for offence under Sections 302

IPC. On completion of investigation, Police filed challan against the

accused respondent for offence under Section 302 of IPC.

Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed, read over and

explained the charges for the offence under Section 302 IPC to the

accused respondent. He denied the charge and sought trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as sixteen witnesses and also got exhibited relevant documents in

support of its case.

The accused-respondent was examined under Section 313

Cr.P.C. and various documents were exhibited.

Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both

the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the

documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide

judgment dated 04.12.2002 acquitted the accused-respondent

[2025:RJ-JD:36557-DB] (3 of 7) [CRLA-112/2004]

from offence under Section 302 IPC. Hence this appeal preferred

by the State against the acquittal of the accused-respondent.

Learned Public Prosecutor-Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit as

well as Mr. Prem Singh Panwar has vehemently submitted that

daughter of the deceased- Meera (PW/9), aged about four years

at the time of incident, explicitly stated in her statement that

accused respondent killed her mother. But the learned trial Court

disbelieve the statement of Meera, acquitted the accused

respondent, which is per se illegal. Public Prosecutor further

argued that according to the statement of Doctor, he clearly

mentioned in his statement that the cause of death was

strangulation and three injuries were found on the body of

deceased, however, the learned trial Court has acquitted the

accused respondent. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal

being per se illegal and erroneous, deserves to be quashed and

set aside.

Per contra, counsel for the accused-respondent submits that

majority of the witnesses rendered hostile and failed to

substantiate the prosecution case. It is further submitted that

there are major contradictions, improvements and omission in the

cross examination of daughter of the deceased- Meera and she

resided with her maternal uncle i.e. complainant, raising the

possibility that she may have been a tutored witness. It is further

submitted that her statements lacks corroboration from other

material witnesses. The learned trial court has passed a detailed

and reasoned judgment of acquittal after proper appreciation of

evidence available before it, which requires no interfere from this

Court.

[2025:RJ-JD:36557-DB] (4 of 7) [CRLA-112/2004]

We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the

parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well

as record of the case.

PW/1- Keshar Singh, PW/5- Bhanwar Singh, PW/6- Keshar

Singh & PW/7- Bhanwar Singh were the motbir witness. PW/9-

Meera, the minor daughter of the deceased and the accused

respondent, along with PW/8- Daam Singh, PW/13- Shanker

Singh, and PW/15- Laxman Singh, are considered material

witnesses in this case. However, their statements do not

corroborate each other, which raises questions about their

reliability and the overall credibility of their testimonies.

Furthermore, apart from these witnesses, the majority of other

witnesses i.e. PW/3- Ram Singh, independent witness; PW/12-

Smt. Vani Bai; PW/13- Shanker Singh and PW/15- Laxman Singh

turned hostile during trial, indicating a lack of consistent support

for the prosecution's case and further undermining the

prosecution's evidence. The recovery of information under Section

27 of the Evidence Act is also found to be doubtful, as the

circumstances and manner of recovery do not inspire confidence

that the evidence was obtained properly or conclusively linked to

the offence. Given these factors, the benefit of doubt must be

given to the accused respondent, as the evidence fails to establish

guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Additionally, the prosecution was

unable to prove that the recovered rope was used in the

commission of the alleged offence; there is no direct or conclusive

evidence linking the rope to the crime, and the mere recovery of

the item does not suffice to establish such a connection.

Therefore, in light of the unreliability of witnesses, the

[2025:RJ-JD:36557-DB] (5 of 7) [CRLA-112/2004]

questionable recovery process, and the failure to prove the usage

of the recovered rope, the prosecution has not sufficiently

established the guilt of the accused, and the benefit of doubt must

be extended in favor of the accused respondent.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya

Pradesh vs. Phoolchand Rathore reported in 2023 CriLR 724,

while observing that courts are generally reluctant to interfere

with an order of acquittal, recognized that such interference is

warranted when it becomes evident that the acquittal was based

on an entirely flawed reasoning process, legally erroneous, and

involved a perverse approach to the facts of the case. In such

circumstances, where the order of acquittal has led to a grave and

substantial miscarriage of justice, the Court may reverse the

acquittal and convert it into a conviction. In support of this

principle, the Court relied upon its prior judgments, emphasizing

the exceptional nature of such interference to r ectify substantial

errors in the acquittal order. these are:-

21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah & Others, (2005) 3 SCC 169, reiterating the same view it was observed:

"8. ... This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the accused and if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court."

[2025:RJ-JD:36557-DB] (6 of 7) [CRLA-112/2004]

22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim & Others, (2020) 11 SCC 174, it was observed:

"190. ... Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court might reverse an order of acquittal if the court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be "not guilty". ..."

Similarly in the case of State of State of Uttrakhand Vs. Sanjay

Ram Tamta, reported in (2025) 2 SCC (Cri) 159,' the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed as under:--

"6. Trite is the principle that the appellate courts would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially since the presumption of innocence that is always available to the accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible from the compelling evidence is of guilt; appellate courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal.

7. Recently, in Surender Singh Vs. State of Uttrakhand, one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to various binding precedents of this Court succinctly laid down the principle in the following manner in SCC para 24:

24 It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views

[2025:RJ-JD:36557-DB] (7 of 7) [CRLA-112/2004]

are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the

opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against

the accused-respondent for offence under Section 302 IPC beyond

all reasonable doubt. The appellant/State has failed to show any

error of law or on facts on the basis of which interference can be

made by this Court in the judgment under challenge. The

judgment passed by the learned trial court is detailed, reasoned

and perfectly justified and the same does not suffer from any

infirmity and does not warrant any interference from this Court.

With these observations, the present criminal appeal has no

substance and the same is hereby dismissed.

Record of the trial court be sent back forthwith.

                                   (RAVI CHIRANIA),J                                   (MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
                                    16-Ishan/-









Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)