State vs Jetha Ram (2025:Rj-Jd:20356-Db)
2025 Latest Caselaw 11892 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State vs Jetha Ram (2025:Rj-Jd:20356-Db) on 17 April, 2025

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                         JODHPUR
             D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 397/2002

State of Rajasthan
                                                                       ----Appellant
                                       Versus
1. Jetha Ram s/o Dhanna Ram, r/o Shyam Nagar, UIT Colony,
P.S. Shri Ganga Nagar, Distt. Shri Ganga Nagar. (appeal
abated)
2. Gunshyam s/o Ameda Ram, r/o Shyam Nagar, Housing
Board, P.S. Shri Gangaganagar, District - Shri Ganganagar.
                                                                    ----Respondents



For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. C.S. Ojha, P.P.
For Respondent(s)            :           -



     HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH

Judgment

17/04/2025

1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant-

State laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated

25.08.2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.

1, District Shri Ganganagar, in Sessions Case No.27/2000 (State

of Rajasthan Vs. Jetha Ram & Anr.), whereby the accused-

respondents were acquitted of the charges under Section 302 of

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, "IPC").

2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the

year 1998 and the present appeal has been pending since the year

2002.

3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned

Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are

that on 05.06.1998, Ram Kumar (complainant) submitted a

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (2 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

written report before the Station House Officer (S.H.O.), police

station, Shri Ganganagar, stating therein that on the said date i.e.

05.06.1998, at around 5:00 p.m., the complainant was on a

morning walk, and on his way back at around 6:00 a.m., he

arrived at his younger brother Shankarlal's home to meet him.

However, just in front of Shankarlal's home one Shambhu, who

happened to be the neighbour of Shankarlal, informed him that

someone has killed Shankarlal near Shayam Nagar Puliya and

thrown his body near the bank of a canal nearby. Thereupon, the

complainant reached the spot, and found his young brother's dead

body, which had marks of a sharp-edged weapon at two places on

the abdomen; at one place at the back, at one place in the left leg

near the knee.

4. On the basis of the aforementioned report, an FIR was

registered and the investigation accordingly commenced. During

the course of investigation, both the accused-respondents, Jetha

Ram and Ghanshyam, were arrested on 01.06.2000, and at the

instance of the accused-respondents, two recoveries were made.

First recovery, made at the instance of accused-respondent Jetha

Ram, was of driving license of deceased Shankarlal from the

house of the said accused; and the second recovery was

pertaining to the knife used in incident, and the said recovery was

made at the instance of accused-respondent Ghanshyam. A Test

Identification Parade (T.I.P.) was also conducted. Thereafter, the

police filed a charge-sheet under Section 302 IPC against the

accused-respondents, and the trial commenced accordingly.

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5. During the course of trial, the evidence of prosecution

witnesses (P.W. 1 to 11) were recorded and documents (Ex.P. 1 to

34) were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence,

document (Ex.D.1) was produced; whereafter, the accused-

respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which

they pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal

case in question.

6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties

as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record,

the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused persons, namely,

Jetharam and Ghanshyam, as above, vide the impugned judgment

dated 25.08.2001, against which the present appeal has been

preferred on behalf of the appellant-State.

7. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the

appellant-State submitted that the impugned judgment of

acquittal is not in accordance with law, as the statements of Om

Prakash (PW.7), who was an independent witness, has not been

considered in the right perspective by the learned Trial Court. The

said witness, a truck driver, has categorically stated that both the

accused-respondents were with deceased Shankar Lal at the

relevant time and that they also threatened him [Om Prakash

(PW.7)]. Thus, it was submitted that the deceased was last seen

with the accused-respondents armed with weapons and the body

of the deceased was found next morning near a Bridge named

'Shayam Nagar Puliya'.

7.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that Om Prakash

(PW.7) has also identified the accused-respondents in the Test

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (4 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

Identification Parade conducted before a Magistrate. Furthermore,

Yogendra Purohit (PW. 9) vide Ex.P 22 and Ex.P. 23 (Memos of

T.I.P.) has supported and corroborated the testimony of Om

Prakash (PW.7).

7.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Mahendra

Kumar Bharadwaj (PW.10) and Khiv Singh Bhati (PW.11) have

supported the recovery of license of the deceased and that the

weapon used in the incident was also recovered at the instance of

the accused-respondents. It was submitted that first recovery

(Ex.P.22), made at the instance of accused-respondent Jetha Ram,

was of driving license of the deceased Shankarlal from the house

of the said accused; and the second recovery (Ex.P.23) was of the

knife used in incident, made at the instance of accused-

respondent Ghanshyam.

7.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that in the

present case, there was a complete chain of circumstances, as the

deceased was last seen with the accuse-respondents, followed by

aforementioned recoveries, and there was identification of the

accused-respondents in the T.I.P. Thus, as per learned Public

Prosecutor, such circumstances clearly establishes the guilt of the

accused respondents beyond all reasonable doubts.

8. Heard learned Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State as

well as perused the record of the case.

9. At the outset, the attention of this Court has been drawn

towards the order dated 17.04.2025 passed by this Hon'ble Court,

on the basis of the report submitted by the learned Public

Prosecutor to the effect that accused-respondent No.1-Jetha Ram

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (5 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

had already expired, and thus, vide the said order dated

17.04.2025, the instant appeal qua the said deceased respondent

No.1 stood abated. Accordingly, the present adjudication is made

only to the extent of the surviving accused-respondent No.2-

Ghanshyam.

10. This Court observes that the instant appeal pertains to the

incident dated 04.06.1998 wherein one Shankarlal was found

dead. The said incident was reported on 05.06.1998 before Police

Station, Sriganganagar and an FIR was registered under section

302/34 IPC. During the investigation, the accused-respondents

were arrested against whom charge sheet was framed, and

accordingly, the trial commenced. After conclusion of the trial, the

learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal,

which is under challenge in the present appeal.

11. This Court observes that the entire case of the prosecution is

based on circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to the

appreciation of evidence in cases based on purely circumstantial

evidence has been crystallized by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The

locus classicus on circumstantial evidence is Sharad Birdhichand

Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein

the five golden principles qua the cases based on circumstantial

evidence were laid down. The relevant paragraphs of the said

precedent law are reproduced as hereunder:

"...the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (6 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]

"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

154.These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence."

12. This Court observes that the factual matrix of the present case

needs to be scrutinized in light of the aforementioned principles of

circumstantial evidence.

12.1. Om Prakash (PW.7), the truck driver has deposed in his

examination-in-chief that he last saw the deceased with the

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (7 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

accused-respondents on the night of incident, and that after two-

three days he got acquainted with the fact that on the day when

he saw them together, Shankarlal got killed. However, he has

failed to provide any explanation as to the fact of his silence for

almost two years after the incident. Such a prolonged delay needs

a sufficient explanation so as to avoid any chance of concoction,

fabrication or manipulation.

12.2. As per the record, the statement of Om Prakash (PW.7) was

recorded by the investigating officer on 30.05.2000. However,

there was no explanation as to how the investigating officer got to

know that the truck driver of the truck bearing registration No.RRC

1112, Om Prakash (PW.7) was the one who saw the accused-

respondents at the night of incident. Moreover, there is also

discrepancy with respect to the date when the police got hold of

Om Prakash (PW.7). Khiv Singh Bhati (PW. 11) in his cross-

examination has stated that the acussed-respondents, after the

arrest, during interrogation, told him the number of truck,

whereupon Om Prakash (PW.7) was traced out. However, as per

the record, the arrest of accused was made on 1.06.2000 and the

statement of Om Prakash (PW.7) was recorded on 30.05.2000.

Thus, the testimony of Khiv Singh Bhati (PW. 11) was not worthy

of being believed.

12.3. Om Prakash (PW.7) identified both the respondents in the

T.I.P. conducted in front of Yogendra Kumar Purohit (P.W.9) and

there was no discrepancy in the manner of conducting the T.I.P.

However, the T.I.P. was conducted after 2 years of the incident,

when the accused-respondents were arrested. In addition to such

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (8 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

delay, the identification was done by a person who saw the

accused-respondents for the first time at the night of incident,

creates doubt with respect to the credibility of the identification so

done. In State of Maharashtra v. Syed Umar Sayed Abbas,

(2016) 4 SCC 735 the Hon'ble Apex Court in light of the factual

matrix of the said case ascertained that a 'significant gap' of time

after the happening of incident creates a doubt as to whether a

witness could remember the face of an accused. In the instant

case, the gap of two years has certainly impacted the credibility of

the identification done in T.I.P.

12.4. It was alleged that the recoveries were made of Driving

licence of the deceased and that of the knife used to commit the

crime, at the instance of the accused-respondents. The

investigating Officer Khiv Singh (P.W.11) has stated in his

testimony that the accused-respondent Jetharam (now deceased)

was arrested on 01.06.2000, thereupon he provided the

information about the driving license and certain documents

hidden in the said accused-respondent's house, and the said

information was documented under Ex.P. 32. Thereafter, as per

Khiv Singh's (P.W.11) testimony, the said accused presented

before the police the driving license and other documents hidden

his house. Two independent witnesses, Vinod Kumar (P.W. 5) and

Mahendra Bharadwaj (P.W.10) were examined, however, Vinod

Kumar (P.W. 5) has stated in his testimony that at the instance of

accused-respondent Jetharam (now deceased), a knife was

recovered and the driving license was recovered at the instance of

accused-respondent Ghanshyam. Therefore, the said witness was

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (9 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

declared hostile during the trial. Such testimonies casts a shadow

of doubt on the prosecution case.

12.5.It was contended that a 'knife' used to cause the death of

the accused, was recovered at the instance of the accused-

respondent Ghanshyam (Ex.P.33). Even if it is accepted that the

knife was recovered at the instance of the accused-respondent,

the Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ex.P. 34) of the knife

reveals that there is no blood on the knife. Thus, it is not possible

to establish that the said knife was the same knife which was used

to cause the death of Santosh.

12.6.The circumstances presented to establish the guilt of the

accused-respondents have significant discrepancies and thus, do

not fully prove the guilt of the accused. In such a situation the

chain of circumstances is not complete, leaving behind a

reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence

of the accused-respondents. Thus, the prosecution's case does not

satisfy the principles of circumstantial evidence as mentioned

herein-before.

13. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce

the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of

Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on

12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.

Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,

decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (10 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):

"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:

(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."

Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):

"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:

"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (11 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."

39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record;

(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

14. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed

the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents

under Section 302/34 IPC which in the given circumstances, is

justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid

down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned

judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can

be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (12 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such

decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before

passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every

witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the

documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the

oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned

judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as

to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.

15. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the

acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,

and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court

demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a

contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and

thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no

interference by this Court in the instant appeal.

16. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into

the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the

aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit

case warranting any interference by this Court.

17. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.

17.1. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 of

BNSS, the surviving accused-respondent No.2 is directed to

furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety

bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall

be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in

the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment

[2025:RJ-JD:20356-DB] (13 of 13) [CRLA-397/2002]

or for grant of leave, the accused-respondent No.2, on receipt of

notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as

soon as he would be called upon to do so.

17.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the

learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.

(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J

33-SKant/-

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