Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Raj.State Ind.Dev.And Inves. ... vs Rajendra Kumar (2025:Rj-Jd:17415) on 3 April, 2025
Author: Vinit Kumar Mathur
Bench: Vinit Kumar Mathur
[2025:RJ-JD:17415]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR.
S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 143/1990
Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment
Corporation, Udhyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur.
----Appellant
Versus
Shri Rajendra Kumar son of Shri Bhanwar Lal Sethiya, Resident
of Marothi Sethiyan, Gawad, Bikaner.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Falgun Buch.
Ms Simran Mehta.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ajay Kumar Vyas.
Ms Jatin Sankhla.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINIT KUMAR MATHUR
Order
03/04/2025
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The present appeal has been filed against the judgment and
decree dated 25.07.1990 passed by District Judge, Bikaner in Civil
Original Suit No.84/1986 whereby the suit preferred by the
respondent-plaintiff was decreed in his favour and the appellant-
defendant was directed to pay an amount of Rs.59,607.15.
Briefly the facts necessary to be noted are that the
respondent-plaintiff applied for allotment of an Industrial Plot
No.E-28 before the appellant-defendant for the purpose of
establishment of an Ice and Cold Storage factory on 06.03.1982.
Pursuant to the application of the respondent-plaintiff, the
appellant-defendant directed the respondent-plaintiff to deposit
the development charges amounting to Rs.16,000/-. The amount
[2025:RJ-JD:17415] (2 of 8) [CFA-143/1990]
as directed by the appellant-defendant was not deposited,
therefore, a show cause notice dated 30.04.1982 was served upon
the respondent-plaintiff by the appellant-defendant. When the
respondent-plaintiff did not respond to the said show cause notice,
once again, a notice was issued on 29.05.1982 to the respondent-
plaintiff to deposit the development charges. The respondent-
plaintiff did not deposit the amount asked for by the appellant-
defendant, therefore, ultimately the allotment was cancelled by
the appellant-defendant vide order dated 23.08.1982. The
respondent-plaintiff again approached the appellant-defendant for
allotment of plot No.E-28 vide letter dated 18.12.1982 assuring
the appellant-defendant that he will comply with all the terms and
conditions imposed upon him. In pursuance of the application
dated 18.12.1982, the respondent-plaintiff deposited the
development charges and therefore, the appellant-defendant
allotted Plot No.E-26 to the respondent-plaintiff. However, the
allotment of Plot No.E-26 was subject to deposition of Rs.2533.35
as interest, since, the respondent-plaintiff failed to comply with
the condition of depositing the interest amount, therefore, he was
served with a letter dated 15.10.1983 with request to deposit the
said amount. The appellant-defendant again informed the
respondent-plaintiff for execution of the lease agreement vide
letter dated 01.11.1983, but despite repeated communications,
the respondent-plaintiff did not deposit the requisite charges. Vide
communication dated 01.03.1984, the respondent- plaintiff sought
time to deposit second installment of the charges due to the
appellant-defendant. Finally, on 23.03.1984, a lease deed was
executed between the appellant-defendant and respondent-
[2025:RJ-JD:17415] (3 of 8) [CFA-143/1990]
plaintiff for allotment of Industrial Plot No.E-26 and possession of
the same was handed over to the respondent-plaintiff on
01.04.1984. In the lease agreement, a condition was imposed
that the respondent-plaintiff shall commence construction of his
industry within a period of six months from the date of execution
of the lease deed and start the production within a period of 24
months. The respondent-plaintiff did not start the construction
work of his industry, therefore, the appellant-defendant issued a
letter on 21.04.1984 informing the respondent-plaintiff that he
must commence the construction work within the stipulated
period. Once again, vide notice dated 08.08.1984, the appellant
reiterated the request made by it vide letter dated 21.04.1984.
Since, the respondent-plaintiff failed to comply with the
correspondences made and also failed to start the construction of
his industrial premises, the appellant-defendant cancelled
allotment of Plot No.E-26 made in favour of the respondent-
plaintiff vide order/letter dated 15.09.1984. The respondent-
plaintiff vide his letter dated 05.10.1984 filed an application for
extension of time for another six months for complying with the
condition mentioned in clause 2(d) of the lease agreement and for
furnishing the map and documents relating to the same. The
request made by the respondent-plaintiff was rejected by the
appellant-defendant vide letter dated 19.10.1984.
In these circumstances, the respondent-plaintiff instituted a
suit for claiming an amount of Rs.69, 607/- from the appellant-
defendant. In the suit proceedings, after completion of the
pleadings, 05 issues were framed. Learned trial court after dealing
with the evidence produced before it decreed the suit in favour of
[2025:RJ-JD:17415] (4 of 8) [CFA-143/1990]
the respondent-plaintiff by passing a degree of Rs.59,607.15 vide
its judgment and decree dated 25.07.1990.
Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that
since the respondent-plaintiff failed to comply with the repeated
request for depositing the amount due right from 1982 when Plot
No.E-28 & E-29 were allotted to him, therefore, the appellant-
defendant was well within its right to cancell the lease agreement
made in favour of the respondent-plaintiff for Plot No.E-26.
Learned counsel submits that all the due opportunities were
granted to the respondent-plaintiff to deposit the amount due to
the appellant-defendant, but despite having given opportunity of
hearing, he failed to deposit the amount due, therefore, the
appellant-defendant has not committed any illegality in cancelling
the lease agreement made in favour of the respondent-plaintiff.
Learned counsel further submits that there was a specific
condition in the lease agreement dated 23.03.1984 effective from
01.04.1984 that the respondent-plaintiff was required to
commence the construction of the Industry within a period of six
months from the date of execution of the lease deed and since,
the respondent-plaintiff failed to start construction activities, he
was served with two notices dated 02.04.1984 and 08.08.1984.
Since, the respondent-plaintiff did not respond to the above two
notices issued by the appellant, the appellant-defendant passed an
order on 15.09.1984 whereby the lease agreement was cancelled.
Learned counsel submits that the learned trial court has failed to
appreciate the controversy involved in the matter in a right
perspective and has committed error while recording the findings
on Issue Nos.1, 2 & 4 against the appellant-defendant. He further
[2025:RJ-JD:17415] (5 of 8) [CFA-143/1990]
submits that since the respondent-plaintiff has not commenced
the construction activities for almost five and half months from the
date of taking over possession of the leased land, therefore, there
was no reason to believe that he would commence the
construction activities within a period of fifteen days. Learned
counsel submits that the order of cancellation passed by the
appellant-defendant was just and proper, therefore, the
respondent-plaintiff was not entitled for any amount deposited by
him. Learned counsel submits that since the respondent-plaintiff
has failed to obey the condition of raising the construction within a
period of six months, the appellant cannot be burdened with the
refund of the amount deposited by the respondent-plaintiff. He,
therefore, prays that the appeal filed by the appellant-defendant
may be allowed and the judgment and decree dated 25.07.1990
passed by District Judge, Bikaner may be quashed and set aside.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff
submits that the learned trial court has considered the entire
evidence and has minutely dealt with the submissions made
before it while recording the findings on issues No.1, 2 & 4. He
submits that pith and substance of the entire case lies in a narrow
compass that the lease deed which was executed between the
parties on 23.03.1984 was having specific condition at clause 2(d)
wherein it was agreed that the appellant-plaintiff shall commence
the construction activities of his industry within a period of six
months and start the production within a period of 24 months i.e.
w.e.f. 01.04.1984. He submits that the period of six months was
coming to an end on 01.10.1984 and therefore, termination of
lease 15 days prior to the cutoff date was arbitrary and incorrect,
[2025:RJ-JD:17415] (6 of 8) [CFA-143/1990]
therefore, the respondent-plaintiff was well within his right to
commence the construction activities of his industry prior to
completion of six months and since the period of six months was
not over, the appellant-defendant terminated the lease before
expiry of that date i.e. 15.09.1984. Learned counsel submits that
the findings recorded by the trial court are just and proper,
therefore, the same do not call for any interference by this Court.
He submits that since termination of lease is dehors the law, the
respondent-plaintiff is entitled to claim the amount deposited by
him with the appellant-defendant.
I have considered the submissions made at the bar and also
gone through the relevant record of the case.
The chronology of facts mentioned above is not disputed by
the counsel for the parties. Therefore, it is clear that the lease
deed was executed between the parties on 23.03.1984 in
pursuance of which, possession of Plot No.E-26 was handed over
to the respondent-plaintiff on 01.04.1984. As per clause 2(d) of
the lease agreement, the respondent-plaintiff was to commence
the construction of Industry within a period of six months and
start the production within a period of 24 months. Since, the
respondent-plaintiff was not raising the construction despite lapse
of period of more than five months, therefore, two notices were
issued by the appellant-defendant on 21.04.1984 and 08.08.1984
requesting the respondent-plaintiff to start the construction of
industry. Since, the respondent-plaintiff did not start the
construction for about five and half months, therefore, the
appellant-plaintiff terminated the lease vide order dated
15.09.1984. For complying with the provisions of clause 2(d), the
[2025:RJ-JD:17415] (7 of 8) [CFA-143/1990]
period of six months was to complete on 01.10.1984, however,
the appellant-defendant terminated the lease deed on 15.09.1984
on the ground that the respondent-plaintiff failed to start
construction of his industry as agreed between the parties. As per
clause 2(d), the period of six months was coming to an end on
01.10.1984 and therefore, even if the appellant-defendant would
have considered that the respondent-plaintiff has failed to comply
with the condition of clause 2(d), the said decision of terminating
the lease deed was required to be taken after 01.10.1984. Since,
the construction activities were just required to be commenced,
therefore, it cannot be pre-empted that since the respondent-
plaintiff had not started the construction within a period of five
and half months, therefore, he will not start the same before
expiry of six months. It was not open for the appellant-defendant
to terminate the lease agreement prior to expiry of six months on
the ground that the respondent-plaintiff has not commenced the
construction of his industry within a period of six months. Since,
the period of six months was to expire on 01.10.1984, therefore,
the appellant was not justified in terminating the lease agreement
on 15.09.1984 on the ground that the respondent-plaintiff has
failed to start construction of his industry as agreed between them
in the lease deed. The learned trial court has elaborately dealt
with all the documents placed before it including the lease deed
executed between both the parties. The findings recorded by
learned trial court on issue No.1, 2 & 4 are perfectly justified and
do not call for any interference by this court.
In view of the discussion made above, I find no merit in the
appeal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant-defendant
[2025:RJ-JD:17415] (8 of 8) [CFA-143/1990]
is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 25.07.1990 passed
by District Judge, Bikaner in Civil Original Suit No.84/1986 is
upheld.
Since, interim order was passed by this court on 30.07.1992
and the respondent- plaintiff had deposited entire amount as
directed by this court, therefore, the respondent-plaintiff will be
free to withdraw the said amount from the court of District Judge,
Bikaner, in accordance with law.
(VINIT KUMAR MATHUR),J
298-Anil Singh/-
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