Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Gulam Sarwar Faruqui vs Khanu Khan Budhwali ... on 3 April, 2025
Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg, Praveer Bhatnagar
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Review Petition (Writ) No. 125/2023
Gulam Sarwar Faruqui S/o Shri Noor Ahmad, Aged About 71
Years, By Caste Muslim, R/o Near Van Vibhag, Nagaur District
Nagaur (Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Khanu Khan Budhwali, Chairman, Rajasthan Board Of
Muslim Walf, L.k.-1 Lalkothi Pariyojanan Jyoti Nagar,
Jaipur.
2. Mrs. Sana Sidqui, Chief Executive Officer, Rajasthan
Board Of Muslim Walf, L.k.-1 Lalkothi Pariyojanan Jyoti
Nagar, Jaipur.
3. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of
Minorities, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vijay Jain
For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAVEER BHATNAGAR
Order
03/04/2025
Instant review petition has been filed by the petitioner for
reviewing the order dated 16.05.2023 passed by co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 155/2023.
The present review petition has been listed in 'Defect'
category as the same is barred by delay of 67 days. The petitioner
had filed an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act.
Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
judgment was passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this court on
16.05.2023 but the petitioner had no knowledge about the said
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB] (2 of 8) [WRW-125/2023]
order. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the
petitioner, being an elderly and uneducated individual, lacked
awareness of the statutory limitation periods applicable to such
filings. Additionally, counsel emphasizes that the petitioner
inadvertently misplaced the requisite postal receipts, which he
traced during a routine cleaning on the occasion of the Moharram
festival in July 2023. Thereafter, the petitioner acted expeditiously
by consulting his counsel, who filed the review petition without
further delay on 22.08.2023. Therefore, it is prayed that the delay
in filing the review petition being bonafide may be condoned and
the petition may be heard on merits.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully
gone through the record.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is reproduced
hereinunder for our reference:
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain
cases. --Any appeal or any application, other than
an application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
may be admitted after the prescribed period if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period.
Explanation. --The fact that the appellant or the
applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or
computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section."
The intention in accepting the concept of limitation is
that "controversies are restricted to a fixed period of time,
lest they should become immortal while men are mortal." The
notion is that every legal proceeding should be kept alive for a
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB] (3 of 8) [WRW-125/2023]
term fixed by the Legislature. The courts are simultaneously
bestowed with the power/discretion to condone the delay if
sufficient cause is proved for not availing the remedy within
the time fixed under the given law. Although, there is no
straight-jacket formula for dealing with the applications under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the term "sufficient cause"
used under the above-mentioned Section is to be interpreted
liberally to promote substantial justice in cases where the
petitioner cannot be held accountable for any negligence,
inaction, or lack of bonafides. In the case of N. Balakrishnan
vs. m. Krishnamurthy Reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123 the
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that:-
"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter
of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation
Act does not say that such discretion can be
exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit.
Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the
explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of
the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a
want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain
other cases, delay of a very long range can be
condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient,
it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and
normally the superior court should not disturb such
finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless
the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable
grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different
matter when the first court refuses to condone the
delay. In such cases, the superior court would be
free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh
and it is open to such superior court to come to its
own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of
the lower court."
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB] (4 of 8) [WRW-125/2023]
In another decision passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court,
Pundlik Jalan Patil (D) by Lrs. vs. Exe. Jalgaon Medium
Project and another reported in 2008 (17) SCC 448 it was
observed as under:
"The law will presume that it knew of its right to
file appeal against the award. Everybody is
presumed to know law. It was its duty to prefer
appeals before the court for consideration which it
did not. There is no explanation forthcoming in this
regard. The evidence on record suggest neglect of
its own right for long time in preferring appeals.
The court cannot enquire into belated and stale
claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats
equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and
do not slumber over their rights."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathupati Subba
Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy
Collector (LA) [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 has observed as under:
"16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very
liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient
cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in
order to condone the delay to enable the courts to
do substantial justice and to apply law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and
Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors., this Court in advocating the
liberal approach in condoning the delay for 'sufficient
cause' held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand
to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not
necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the
appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone
delay may result in throwing out a meritorious
matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that
cause of substantial justice should be allowed to
prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay
is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned.
Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal
approach is adopted in condoning the delay,
existence of 'sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB] (5 of 8) [WRW-125/2023]
in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the
discretionary power to condone the delay. The
phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach'
and cause for the advancement of 'substantial
justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of
limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter
of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by
taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while
construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding application
under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the
period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal,
substantive right in favour of a decree-holder
accrues and this right ought not to be lightly
disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be
binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on
such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd
has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has
been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within
time, the said party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the
discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The
court, despite establishment of a 'sufficient cause'
for various reasons, may refuse to condone the
delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, this Court held that the discretion
to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously
based upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. The expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally
interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fide is writ large. It was also observed that even
though limitation may harshly affect rights of the
parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as
prescribed under the statute as the courts have no
choice but to apply the law as it stands and they
have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds."
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB] (6 of 8) [WRW-125/2023]
In the case of Prachin Choudhary vs State of Rajasthan
and Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12729/2020) decided
on 23.07.2024 passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court:
"8. In the case in hand, the petitioner apart from
making a bald statement that petitioner was mentally
upset and not aware of the proceedings, no evidence
was produced. The delay cannot be condoned
mechanically in absence of sufficient cause.
Considering that there is an inordinate delay of more
than three years and there is no explanation worth
acceptance for condoning the delay, no interference is
called for in impugned orders."
In the case of Harish & Anr. Vs Rajasthan Board of
Muslim waqf decided on 09.03.2017 by the co-ordinate bench of
this Court, it has been observed that:
"7. It is to be noticed that while levelling an
allegation against the counsel in not informing the
petitioner regarding the order passed by the Estate
Officer, there is no explanation set out as to why the
petitioners did not contact the counsel for the period
of 5½ years. A litigant should be vigilant enough and
should keep himself informed about the pending
proceedings and therefore, the bald assertions on the
part of the petitioner that the counsel did not inform
about the disposal of the matter, cannot be
considered to be a plausible explanation for
condonation of inordinate delay in filing the petition."
The relevant para from the case of Hussain Vs. Om
Prakash (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 75/2014) decided on
08.07.2015 is reproduced as under:
"9. While construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the
expiration of period of limitation prescribed for laying
an appeal gives rise a right in favour of the decree
holder to treat the decree as binding between
parties. In other words, on expiry of prescribed
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB] (7 of 8) [WRW-125/2023]
period of limitation the decree holder acquires a
benefit under law of limitation to construe the decree
as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should
not be light heartedly disturbed. The other
consideration, which is to be kept in mind by the
Court is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is
shown by the party, Court in its discretion may
condone the delay. It is needless to emphasize here
that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a
party, it is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the Court by Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus,
the application under Section 5 of the Act deserves
rejection."
Admittedly, the impugned order was passed by the co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in D.B. Writ Contempt No. 155/2023
which is barred by 67 days. The law states that if a case is
presented beyond limitation, the applicant must explain the
"sufficient cause" for the delay. It is against the legislative intent
and the specific language of the Act to excuse tardiness. In the
present case in hand the counsel for the petitioner contended that
the petitioner, being an uneducated individual, was not aware of
the statutory limitation periods applicable to such filings.
However, it is important to note that a lack of knowledge
regarding the law in force in India cannot, in and of itself,
constitute a valid ground for defence or excuse. As established by
the principles of jurisprudence, ignorance of the law is not an
acceptable rationale for non-compliance with statutory time limits.
Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the requisite
postal receipts were inadvertently misplaced and were only
[2025:RJ-JD:17364-DB] (8 of 8) [WRW-125/2023]
recovered during routine cleaning on the occasion of the
Moharram festival. However, this explanation, even if accepted,
does not legally justify the delay. The provisions under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963, provide for an extension of the
limitation period only when the petitioner demonstrates sufficient
cause for the delay. The reason presented in the application does
not appear to meet the threshold required by law to invoke
Section 5, as it does not reflect an event or circumstance beyond
the control of the petitioner that would have prevented timely
filing.
In light of these considerations, the claim of inadvertence
regarding the misplaced receipts does not, in legal terms,
establish sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time under
the Limitation Act. Therefore, the petitioner's plea for leniency on
said basis may not be legally tenable to condone the delay in filing
the present review petition.
The present review petition stands dismissed being barred by
limitation.
(PRAVEER BHATNAGAR),J (MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
2-BJSH/-
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