Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State Of Rajasthan vs Badri Lal And Ors ... on 24 September, 2024
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (1 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 314/1995
State Of Rajasthan.
----Appellant
Versus
1. Badrilal S/o Ramchandra, B/c Teli,
2. Nanibai W/o Ramchandra, B/c Teli,
3. Kishanlal S/o Ramchandra, B/c Teli,
All resident of Nimbaheda, Police Station Nimbaheda,
District Chittorgarh.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sameer Pareek, Public Prosecutor.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bhagat Dadhich.
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUNNURI LAXMAN
Judgment
24/09/2024
1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (3) & (1) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-State
laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 23.03.1995
passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Nimbahera in Sessions Case No. 13/94 (State of Rajasthan Vs.
Badrilal & Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted
of the charges against them under Sections 302 & 302/34 IPC.
2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the
year 1993 and the present appeal has been pending since the year
1995.
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (2 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned
Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are
that on 30.10.1993, Smt. Shakku Bai was admitted in
Government Hospital at Nimbahera in a burnt condition. At around
7:30 AM, one Shri Satyanarayan, the then A.S.I., Police Station
Nimbahera recorded her statement. In her statement, Smt.
Shakku Bai W/o Badrilal, resident of Nimbahera initially claimed
that she, of her own free will, poured kerosene and burnt herself.
She cited the reason therefor that her mother-in-law Nani Bai,
brother-in-law Kishan and other family members had severely
beaten her. In the night at 11:00 PM, she was talking to a boy
named Manoj, who worked at their place making sweets. Her
mother-in-law witnessed this interaction and proceeded to beat
her severely with a broom. At that time, her husband was also
present on the spot. Following this, in the presence of her
husband, Smt. Shakku Bai poured kerosene on herself and her
husband lit the match from behind, thereby setting her on fire. As
per the statement of Smt. Shakku Bai, she had not mentioned
using the matchstick herself. She also revealed that two years
prior, her husband had poured kerosene on her. According to the
statement given by Smt. Shakku, the said act was committed by
her husband, while saying that he had been threatened several
times by her, that she would commit suicide, and thus, her
husband set her on fire, while saying that he himself would burn
Smt. Shakku, and lit the match and set her on fire. At that time,
her father-in-law, brother-in-law, mother-in-law and other family
members were present at the site. It was not known that the
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (3 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
neighbors did not come at that time and she was beaten up from
11:00 PM to 5:00 AM, due to which, she got upset.
4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR was
registered and the investigation commenced accordingly. After
investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused
persons, and the trial commenced accordingly.
5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 15 prosecution
witnesses were recorded and 17 documents were exhibited on
behalf of the prosecution; whereafter, the accused-respondents
were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused
respondents pleaded innocence and their false implication in the
criminal case in question.
6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties
as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record,
the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondents namely
Badrilal, Nanibai and Kishanlal, vide the impugned judgment of
acquittal dated 23.03.1995, against which the present appeal has
been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State.
7. Mr. Sameer Pareek, learned Public Prosecutor submits that
the incident occurred late at night when Manoj, a worker in the
house, was talking to deceased Smt. Shakku, which led to an
altercation between deceased and her mother-in-law, when her
husband Badrilal was also standing nearby.
7.1. Learned Public Prosecutor admits that there are no
eyewitnesses or any other circumstantial evidence in the present
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (4 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
case, but principally the prosecution case rests upon the dying
declaration of the deceased Smt. Shakku Bai.
7.2. Learned Public Prosecutor has taken this Court to Exhibit P-
14, which is attested by a Junior Specialist, Referral Hospital
Nimbahera on 30.10.1993 at 7:30 am in the hospital. He further
submits that in the said dying declaration, the deceased deposed
that she voluntarily poured kerosene and has burnt herself. The
document further reflects that the mother-in-law of the deceased
was in altercation with her and was beating her because of a boy
named Manoj, who worked at the house and was talking to the
deceased. The deceased Smt. Shakku Bai subsequently deposed
in her first dying declaration that she poured kerosene on her
body, upon which, her husband lit the match.
7.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that it is apparent
on the face of the dying declaration, that the same cannot be
considered as a dying declaration supporting the voluntary suicide
by the deceased.
7.4. Learned Public Prosecutor has further taken this Court to
Exhibit P-2, the second dying declaration, which was made before
the Magistrate, in which, the deceased, at the relevant time, has
deposed that she was burnt by her husband. Learned Public
Prosecutor also submits that the allegation in this dying
declaration is that kerosene was poured upon the deceased by her
husband, who thereafter, lit the match. The motive behind the
incident in question remains consistent with the first dying
declaration i.e. she was talking to a boy named Manoj.
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (5 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
7.5. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that there might
be some improvements in the dying declaration, but the original
story of altercation being raised by the mother-in-law and the fire
having been facilitated by her husband is reflected in both the
dying declarations.
8. On the other hand, Mr. Bhagat Dadhich, learned counsel
representing the accused-respondents, while opposing the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that
there are three conflicting versions of events presented in two
dying declarations of the deceased, marked as Exhibit P-2 and
Exhibit P-14. He further submits that Exhibit P-14 begins with the
statement that the deceased voluntarily poured kerosene on
herself and set herself on fire. In the later version, in the same
dying declaration, the deceased, at the relevant time, deposed
that while she poured the kerosene on herself, it was her husband
who lit the match. In the second dying declaration, the stand of
the deceased was that her husband poured the kerosene on her as
well as lit the match, thereby setting her on fire.
8.1. Learned counsel further submits that since the dying
declaration is the sole evidence presented by the prosecution,
therefore, in these circumstances, unless a sterling worth of dying
declaration is brought on record, the same cannot be given credit
that the prosecution is trying to do.
8.2. Learned counsel also submits that the prosecution's failure is
writ large on the face of the record to the effect that Sohan Singh,
the investigating officer, was not brought in as a prosecution
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (6 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
witness. Learned counsel further submits that the burn injuries
sustained by the accused-husband reflect an attempt on his part
to save his wife, i.e. the deceased. Learned counsel also submits
that the deceased Smt. Shakku Bai was immediately hospitalized
by the husband's family and at best it was a suicidal attempt, and
thus, the learned Trial Court has rightly arrived at a conclusion of
acquittal, vide the impugned judgment.
8.3. In support of such submissions, learned counsel relied upon
the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
matter of Uttam Vs. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal
Appeal No.485 of 2012) decided on 02.06.2022. The relevant
excerpt of the said judgment is reproduced, in verbatim, as
hereunder:
"36. We are of the opinion that once the High Court
had disagreed with the Session Court and discarded
the two written dying declarations of the deceased due
to several glaring lacunae in the procedure adopted by
the SEM (PW-9) and the I.O. (PW-14) in recording the
said statement, then the appellant could not have
been indicted on the oral testimony of PW-2, father of
the deceased and PW-12, family friend, both of who
were interested witnesses and whose evidence runs
contrary to the versions of the deceased recorded by
PW-9 and PW-14. It must be remembered that all the
four dying declarations, two in writing and the other
two oral, were based on the statements given by the
deceased at different times on the very same day, i.e.,
27th March, 1995, when she had suffered 93% burn
injuries and there are serious doubt about her being
mentally and physically fit to give her statement. The
IO (PW-14) had recorded the first dying declaration at
3.20 p.m. this was followed by the SEM (PW-9) having
recorded the second dying declaration between
4.30p.m. and 5.00 p.m. It was on the very same day
that PW-2 and PW-12 had also met the deceased at
the hospital and claimed that she had informed them
as to how she had received the burn injuries and
named the appellant as the culprit."
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (7 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
38. In the light of the evidence discussed above and
being mindful of the principles governing appreciation
of the evidence related to multiple dying declarations,
we find it difficult to endorse the conclusion arrived at
by the High Court. The evidence of PW-2 and PW-12
cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the
appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife.
Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of
doubt."
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case along with the precedent law cited at the Bar.
10. This Court observes that the principal evidence relied upon
by the prosecution consists of two dying declarations, marked as
Exhibit P-14 and Exhibit P-2 respectively. Exhibit P-14 is supported
by Senior Medical Officer and Exhibit P-2 is supported by
subsequent dying declaration attested by the learned Magistrate.
11. This Court is conscious that though it is not a clear case of
contradiction, but there is certainly an improvement in the
depositions which has to be noted and undermines the credibility
of the dying declarations. The version of the first dying declaration
was that she voluntarily poured kerosene on herself and set her
on fire. In middle portion of the same statement, the deceased
has deposed that, while she poured the kerosene on herself, it was
her husband, who lit the match. The third version, which was in
the second dying declaration Exhibit P-2, as noted, was to the
effect that the deceased completely changed and attributed both
pouring of kerosene and the ignition of fire, to her husband itself.
The basic context though regarding one boy named Manoj, who
was working in the house, conversing with the deceased, which
apparently annoyed her mother-in-law and husband. If there was
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (8 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
other corroborative evidence, this Court could have gone through
the same, but the version as considered by the learned Trial Court
is correct in the present circumstances, particularly, when the sole
dependence of prosecution's case is upon the dying declarations.
12. This Court is also conscious of the fact that the husband
sustained burn injuries as evident by the medical report on record,
while attempting to save the deceased i.e. his wife. Furthermore,
the husband and his family members also facilitated the
transportation of the deceased to the hospital. Even if there could
have been two opinions, it is not sufficient to interfere in the
judgment of acquittal. Thus, considering the overall perspective,
particularly, the inconsistencies in the dying declarations and the
lack of corroborative evidence regarding husband's (accused-
respondent) role, coupled with the fact that he himself sustained
injuries while attempting to save the deceased and that, he and
his family members facilitated admission of the deceased in the
hospital.
13. Thus, in the overall factual matrix and the circumstances
surrounding the case, the impugned judgment of acquittal dated
23.03.1995 passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be
anything, which would call for intervention of this Court to reverse
the same.
14. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (9 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.
Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,
decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on
the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as
guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of
criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of
justice. The principles which come into play while
deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized
as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a
criminal trial and such appreciation must be
comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or
documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may
result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground
of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that
two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused
shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible
view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify
the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the
acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it
must specifically address all the reasons given by the
Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity
or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court
summarized the principles governing the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal
against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:
"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence;
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (10 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,
is required to consider whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view which could have
been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible."
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope
of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles: (a) That the
judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no
two reasonable views are possible and only the view
consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from
the evidence available on record."
15. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court
passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-
respondents under Sections 302, 302/34 IPC, which in the given
circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled
principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the
Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it
demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in
arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial
Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each
and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analyzed
the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (11 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned
judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as
to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
16. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the
acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,
and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and
thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no
interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
17. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into
the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the
aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit
case warranting any interference by this Court.
18. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.
18.1.Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A
Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
(B.N.S.S.), 2023, the accused-respondents are directed to furnish
a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the
like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made
effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event
of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for
grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice
thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as
she would be called upon to do so.
[2024:RJ-JD:39655-DB] (12 of 12) [CRLA-314/1995]
19. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the
learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(MUNNURI LAXMAN),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
40-Zeeshan
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