Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State vs Udai Lal And Ors (2024:Rj-Jd:38025-Db) on 12 September, 2024
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 786/1999
State of Rajasthan.
----Appellant
Versus
1. Udai Lal son of Varda, by caste Jat, resident of Aakodiya
Ka Khera, District Udaipur.
2. Nand Lal son of Chhagan Lal, by caste Jat, resident of
Aakodiya Ka Khera, District Udaipur.
3. Dhanraj son of Varda, by caste Jat, resident of Aakodiya
Ka Khera, District Udaipur.
4. Badrilal son of Varda, by caste Jat, resident of Aakodiya Ka
Khera, District Udaipur.
5. Madhulal son of Varda , by caste Jat, resident of Aakodiya
Ka Khera, District Udaipur.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Yogendra Singh Charan assisting
counsel to Mr. Neeraj Kumar Gurjar,
GA-cum-AAG.
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Dolly Jaiswal (Amicus Curiae).
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUNNURI LAXMAN
Judgment
12/09/2024
1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (3) & (1) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-State
laid a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 08.06.1999
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur in Sessions Case
No. 130/1999 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Udai Lal & Ors.), whereby
the accused-respondents were acquitted of the offences under
Sections 148, 447 & 302 IPC and in alternative under Section
302/149 IPC.
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (2 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the
year 1998 and the present appeal has been pending since the year
1999.
3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned
Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are
that an incident was reported on 07.11.1998 at about 5:45 PM at
Nimri whereby the complainant Parasram reported that his father
Khem Raj alongwith two labourer was cultivating an agricultural
field. At that time, four residents of village Akodiya namely Udai
Lal, Madhu Lal, Badri Lal and Nand Lal arrived at the location and
attempted to divert a water drain to the fields belonging to the
complainant's father. When Khemraj opposed this action, the
accused persons allegedly assailed the father of the complainant
using various agricultural instruments including spade, Khodi
(small hand-held sickles), Daranti (sickle) and Lath (wooden
stick).
4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR
No.189/1998 was registered and the investigation accordingly
commenced. After completion of investigation, the police filed the
charge-sheet against the four accused persons named in the FIR
and the fifth accused Dhanraj under Sections 147, 148, 447 & 302
IPC, and the trial commenced accordingly.
5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 16 prosecution
witnesses were recorded and 30 documents were exhibited on
behalf of the prosecution and 02 documents were exhibited on
behalf of the accused-respondents; whereafter, the accused-
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (3 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which
the accused respondents pleaded innocence and their false
implication in the criminal case in question.
6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties
as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record,
the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondents namely
Udai Lal, Nand Lal, Dhanraj, Badri Lal and Madhu Lal, vide the
impugned judgment of acquittal dated 08.06.1999, against which
the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-
State.
7. Mr. Yogendra Singh Charan, learned assisting counsel to Mr.
Neeraj Kumar Gurjar, GA-cum-AAG for the appellant-State submits
that the complainant's wife alongwith two labourer namely Nathu
Lal and Goda were present at the site and witnessed the incident
in question.
7.1 Learned counsel further submits that 16 prosecution
witnesses were examined during the trial.
7.2 Learned counsel also submits that there were five injuries
caused to the deceased i.e. on the jaw, ear, elbow, ribs and knee
and the cause of death was attributed to three ribs puncturing the
lungs, resulting in excessive bleeding.
7.3 Learned counsel further submits that the complainant's wife
PW-12 Smt. Champa, an eyewitness, has clearly deposed the
entire incident providing a detailed account of the events in
question.
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (4 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
7.4 Learned counsel drew the Court's attention to the statement
rendered by the PW-12 Smt. Champa, in which she deposed that
she was working with Khemraj, her father-in-law (the deceased),
in the fields when an altercation occurred due to the accused
persons attempting to divert a water drain, when this was
opposed, they allegedly attacked her father-in-law Khemraj,
causing his death.
7.5 Learned counsel, however, fairly submits that the FIR, which
contains the complainant's version (who is the son of the
deceased), did not mention any role or presence of the wife Smt.
Champa (PW-12).
7.6 Learned counsel further submits that the chain of evidence is
complete and there is an eye-witness, therefore, the decision
arrived at by the learned trial court has to be reversed.
7.7 Learned counsel also informed the Court that PW-9 Nathu Lal
and PW-10 Goda, who were working as labourers with the
deceased Khemraj, did not support the prosecution story.
8. On the other hand, Ms. Dolly Jaiswal, learned Amicus Curiae
representing the accused respondents, while opposing the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that
the presence of PW-12 Smt. Champa, the sole eye-witness, is
doubtful and her inclusion as an eye-witness appears to be a
subsequent development. Learned Amicus Curiae further submits
that PW-12 Smt. Champa herself has admitted that for three days
following the incident, she did not speak about it to anyone.
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (5 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
8.1 Learned Amicus Curiae also submits that the statement
rendered by the eye-witness contains discrepancies as PW-12
Smt. Champa has stated at one point that she arrived later when
her father-in-law and two labourers were working, while at
another point, she claimed to have rushed to the village from the
field, which was about 3 kms. away and took about an hour to
travel and inform about the incident in question. Learned Amicus
Curiae argued that traveling 3 km in one hour without
encountering anyone in a populated village seems implausible.
8.2 Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the
contradictions in the testimonies of PW-9 Nathulal and PW-10
Goda, who were actually the labourer assisting the deceased,
clearly reflect that the prosecution story does not have any
strength.
8.3 Learned Amicus Curiae also drew this Court's attention to the
testimonies of PW-8 Ganga Ram, PW-11 Prakash @ Pappu and
PW-14 Jagdish, who could have been credible witnesses if they
were not held to be hostile by the learned Public Prosecutor due to
their deposition. PW-13 Paras Ram, son of the deceased and the
complainant, admittedly was not present at the site, and
subsequently, upon receiving information, rushed to the deceased
(Khemraj) and then first to the Police Station then to the hospital.
8.4 Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the incident is of
the year 1998 and since then about 26 years have passed.
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (6 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case.
10. This Court observes that the key witnesses, PW-9 Nathu Lal
and PW-10 Goda, who were labourers working alongside the
deceased Khemraj, have not supported the case of the
prosecution.
11. Upon examination, this Court further finds that the testimony
of PW-12 Smt. Champa, the daughter-in-law of the deceased
Khemraj, in her version of travelling 3 kms in one hour as well as
passing on the basic information as an eye-witness is doubtful
because the version doesn't gain strength from the FIR. PW-15
Goverdhan Singh, the investigating officer, also could not explain
the same in his investigation as to in what circumstances PW-12
Smt. Champa has been treated as an eye-witness.
12. This Court, upon conjoint consideration of the testimonies of
PW-8 Gangaram, PW-9 Nathu Lal, PW-10 Goda, PW-11 Prakash @
Pappu and PW-14 Jagdish, finds that the prosecution case has
almost collapsed, which has led to the conclusion of the learned
trial court, leading to acquittal in the case. The statement
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the complainant marked as
Ex.P.-19 contains contradictions that are inconsistent with the
subsequent statements of the same witness, particularly,
regarding the information allegedly provided by the father to the
son before his death. The learned trial court has also noted that
while the testimonies of PW-9 Nathu Lal and PW-10 Goda were
initially recorded on 08.11.1998, the statement of PW-12 Smt.
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (7 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
Champa, purportedly an eyewitness, was only taken three days
later. This delay casts doubt on the credibility of PW-12, as it
would be expected that an eyewitness who was also a family
member would have given her deposition at the earliest
opportunity. The improvement in such perspective is vital for the
present case as the case if at all has to reach to a conclusion of
conviction then it has to rest upon the statement of PW-12 Smt.
Champa alone, as rest of the witnesses collapsed during trial. The
incident happened on 07.11.1998 and the aforesaid observation of
the learned trial court is significant.
13. This Court finding discrepancies in prosecution's narrative,
particularly the missing link of PW-12 Smt. Champa being on the
place of incident and the manner in which the information given
after one hour as claimed by her in the statement rendered before
the learned trial court, but not supporting in the FIR, creates
grave doubt in the story of the prosecution and the benefit of
doubt must be extended to the accused-respondents.
Furthermore, the statement of PW-15, the investigating officer,
that the soil at the spot was not stained with blood despite the
reported injuries, raises additional questions about the
thoroughness and accuracy of the investigation.
14. In overall factual matrix, the judgment of acquittal dated
08.06.1999 passed by the learned trial court cannot be said to be
anything, which would call for intervention of this Court to reverse
the same.
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (8 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
15. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on
12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.
Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,
decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on
the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as
guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of
criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of
justice. The principles which come into play while
deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized
as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a
criminal trial and such appreciation must be
comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or
documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may
result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground
of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that
two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused
shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible
view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify
the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the
acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it
must specifically address all the reasons given by the
Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity
or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (9 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court
summarized the principles governing the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal
against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:
"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,
is required to consider whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view which could have
been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible."
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope
of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles: (a) That the
judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no
two reasonable views are possible and only the view
consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from
the evidence available on record."
16. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court
passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-
respondents under Sections 148, 447 & 302 IPC and in alternative
under Section 302/149 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is
justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (10 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned
judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can
be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an
illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such
decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before
passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every
witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the
documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the
oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned
judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as
to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
17. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the
acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,
and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and
thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no
interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
18. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into
the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the
aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit
case warranting any interference by this Court.
19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.
[2024:RJ-JD:38025-DB] (11 of 11) [CRLA-786/1999]
20. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the
accused-respondent is directed to furnish a personal bond in a
sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before
the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period
of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special
Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the
accused-appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as she would be called upon
to do so.
21. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the
learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
22. This Court is thankful to Ms. Dolly Jaiswal, who has diligently
rendered her assistance as an Amicus Curiae on behalf of the
accused-respondents by preparing a well-written note/brief as well
as her assistance and exemplary efforts for the case, which has
significantly contributed to the present adjudication.
(MUNNURI LAXMAN),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J.
103-Zeeshan
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