Rajasthan High Court
Bankat Lal Gupta vs State And Ors (2024:Rj-Jp:5161) on 31 January, 2024
Author: Sameer Jain
Bench: Sameer Jain
[2024:RJ-JP:5161] (1 of 4) [CW-1188/2000]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1188/2000
Bankat Lal Gupta son of Shri Madan Lal aged 38 years Resident
of village and post Dubaliya via Sunel dist. Jhalawar
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Home Secretary Revenue (Group)
department Rajasthan Jaipur
2. District Collector, (Revenue Record) Jhalawar
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ravi Kasliwal
For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Order
31/01/2024
1. The present writ petition was filed with the following prayers:
"(i) by an appropriate writ order or direction the
Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quashed the order
dated 10.01.1997.
(ii) by an appropriate writ order or direction the
Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the non
petitioner to reinstated the petitioner in the service
with all consequential benefits."
2. The facts of the case, as per the learned counsel for the
petitioner, are as follows. The petitioner was appointed on the post
of 'Patwari' on 06.09.1986. On 10.11.1994, a FIR (being FIR No.
123/1994) was registered against the petitioner for the alleged
offence under Section 376 of IPC. Accordingly, the petitioner was
placed under suspension from 11.11.1994. The Trial Court
acquitted the petitioner vide judgment dated 02.08.1996 and
accordingly, the services of the petitioner were terminated vide
[2024:RJ-JP:5161] (2 of 4) [CW-1188/2000]
order dated 10.01.1997. The conviction of the petitioner was set
aside by this Court vide judgment dated 04.02.1999 in S.B.
Criminal Appeal No. 561/1996. Appeal against the same was also
dismissed in limine by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP
(Criminal) No. 2660/2000.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during the
currency of the petition, in 2002, the petitioner was reinstated in
service and is now seeking the limited relief of back wages. In
support thereof, reliance is placed on judgments of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh: (2004)
1 SCC 121, Raj Narain Vs. Union of India & Ors.: (2019) 5
SCC 809 and State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Mohammed
Abdul Rahim: (2013) 11 SCC 67.
4. Heard and considered.
5. As per the settled position of law, the petitioner can only
seek the relief as prayed for if his acquittal in the criminal case
was an honorable one. The mere fact of an acquittal would not
suffice but rather it would depend on whether it was a clean
acquittal based on total absence of evidence or in the criminal
jurisprudence requiring the case to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, that parameter having not been met, benefit of doubt had
been granted to the Accused. Reliance in this regard can be placed
on Hon'ble Supreme Court judgments of Avtar Singh vs Union
Of India: (2016) 8 SCC 471, The State of Rajasthan and
Ors. vs. Love Kush Meena: (2021) 8 SCC 774, and The State
Of Karnataka & Anr. Vs Umesh (2022) 6 SCC 563. However,
Court of law should not be swayed by mere terminologies of
[2024:RJ-JP:5161] (3 of 4) [CW-1188/2000]
'benefit of doubt' or 'honorable acquittal'; it has to be seen from
analysis of order of acquittal.
6. The petitioner was convicted for the heinous offence of rape
of a minor girl, aged less than 12 years. The petitioner was even
convicted by the Trial Court. It was only upon appeal, had Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court set aside the conviction. The SLP was,
admittedly, dismissed in limine by the Apex Court on the ground
of delay. The SLP, as such, was not decided on merits. Having
perused the judgment of acquittal, this Court is not convinced that
the acquittal of the petitioner was entirely clean. The Co-ordinate
Bench found the theory that the petitioner was falsely implicated,
as advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, as highly
probable and it was in this context that the Co-ordinate Bench
observed that the petitioner was falsely implicated. It was not a
case of no evidence, as is required to grant the relief as prayed
for. In these circumstances, when the petitioner has already been
reinstated in service, no interference is called for at this stage qua
back wages.
7. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Jaipal Singh (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the
petitioner, has observed and held as under:
"4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the
materials on record, including the judgment and
orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it
is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave
petition at the threshold without detailed reasons
therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by
this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per
contra, the decision relied upon by the appellant is one
on merits and for reasons specifically recorded
therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On
going through the same, we are in respectful
agreement with the view taken in Ranchhodji [(1996)
[2024:RJ-JP:5161] (4 of 4) [CW-1188/2000]
11 SCC 603]. If prosecution, which ultimately resulted
in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest
of or by the department itself, perhaps different
considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a
citizen the employee or a public servant got
involved in a criminal case and if after initial
conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on
appeal subsequently, the department cannot in
any manner be found fault with for having kept
him out of service, since the law obliges a person
convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not
to be retained in service. Consequently, the
reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the
appellants are not only convincing but are in
consonance with reasonableness as well. Though
exception taken to that part of the order
directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and
the respondent has to be reinstated in service,
for the reason that the earlier discharge was on
account of those criminal proceedings and
conviction only, the appellants are well within
their rights to deny back wages to the
respondent for the period he was not in service.
The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for
the period for which they could not avail of the
services of the respondent. The High Court, in our
view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages
also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects
and considerations. Consequently, the order of the
High Court insofar as it directed payment of back
wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside."
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically held that the
workman cannot claim back wages for the interregnum period
between conviction and acquittal.
9. In view of the foregoing analysis, the present petition stands
dismissed. Pending application(s), if any stands disposed of.
(SAMEER JAIN),J
Pooja /5
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