Rajasthan High Court
Maman Khan vs Deputy Conservator Of Forest ... on 27 February, 2024
Author: Sameer Jain
Bench: Sameer Jain
[2024:RJ-JP:9884] (1 of 4) [CW-8109/2016]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8109/2016
Mamman Khan S/o Shri Sikander, R/o Village Karani, Post
Bhiwadi, Tehsil Tijara, Distt. Alwar Rajasthan
----Petitioner
Versus
Deputy Conservator Of Forest, Naya Bas, Alwar, Distt. Alwar
Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Yashvardhan Nandwana for
Mr. Rajesh Goswami
For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Order
27/02/2024
1. By way of the present petition, a challenge is raised against
the order impugned dated 22.12.2014, whereby the statement of
claim filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Labour
Court.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
learned Labour Court, vide order impugned, dismissed the
statement of claim furnished by the petitioner primarily on the
ground of delay of 9 years in preferring the said claim. However, in
this regard, to counter the said ground of delay, learned counsel
placed reliance upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as
enunciated in Karan Singh Vs. Executive Engineer, Haryana
State Marketing Board reported in (2007) 14 SCC and the
judgment of the Division Bench as enunciated in D.B. SAW No.
[2024:RJ-JP:9884] (2 of 4) [CW-8109/2016]
469/2020 titled as State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajendra Singh
and submitted that the petitioner's claim ought to have been
considered on merits.
3. Heard and considered.
4. It is trite law that there is a limited scope of interference with
a well-reasoned order while exercising the jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5. The relevant extract of the order impugned dated
22.12.2014 is reproduced herein-under:-
"bl izdkj ls bl ekeys esa izkFkhZ eEeu [kka iq= Jh fldUnj xzke
djkuh iksLV fHkokM+h rglhy frtkjk ftyk vyoj ¼jkt-½ ;g fl)
djus esa vlQy jgk gS fd mls mi ou laj{kd ou foHkkx vyoj }
kjk fu;qDr dh xbZ Fkh ;k izkFkhZ o vizkFkhZ ds e/; fu;ksDrk o deZdkj
dk lac/a k Fkk vFkok izkFkhZ us vizkFkhZ ds ;gka dfFkr lsokeqfDr fnukad
01-04-1992 ls Bhd iwoZ 240 fnu ;k mlls vf/kd dk;Z fd;k gks]
vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ dh lsok,¡ lekIr dh xbZ gksA vr% ,slh gkyr esa
bl iz"u dk fd ÞD;k Jfed Jh eEeu [kka iq= Jh fldUnj }kjk 09
o'kZ foyEc ls fookn izLrqr djuk mfpr ,oa oS| gS\ ;fn gk¡ rks D;k
mi ou laj{kd] vyoj }kjk Jfed dh fnukad 01-04-1992 ls
lsokeqfDr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS/k gS\ ;fn ugha rks Jfed fdl
jkgr o jkf"k dks izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ß dksbZ vkSfpR; izrhr ugha
gksrk gSA bl izdkj bl ekeys esa izkFkhZ tc vizkFkhZ fu;kstd mi ou
laj{kd] ou foHkkx] vyoj }kjk izkFkhZ dh fu;qfDr fd;k tkuk ;k izkFkhZ
o vizkFkhZx.k ds e/; fu;ksDrk ,oa deZdkj dk laca/k izekf.kr gksuk ;k
izkFkhZ dk vizkFkhZ ds ;gka dfFkr lsokeqfDr ls Bhd iwoZ 240 fnu dk;Z
djuk] vizkFkhZ }kjk izkFkhZ dh lsok lekIr djuk izekf.kr ugha dj ik;k
gSA vr% izkFkhZ bl ekeys esa dksbZ vuqrks'k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha
gSA"
6. Upon a perusal of the order impugned, it is noted that the
learned Labour Court while dismissing the petitioner's statement
of claim duly took note of the fact that the order of termination
[2024:RJ-JP:9884] (3 of 4) [CW-8109/2016]
was passed on 01.04.1992, whereas, the same was challenged
with a substantial delay of 9 years i.e. in the Year 2001. Moreover,
no sufficient and appropriate explanation was furnished by the
petitioner explaining the said delay. Furthermore, even on merits,
learned Labour Court otherwise observed that no employer-
employee relationship existed between the petitioner and the
respondent. Moreover, no evidence to establish the said
relationship was furnished either.
7. In the opinion of this Court, the learned Labour Court has
passed a well-reasoned speaking order and after consideration of
material aspects, on merits and delay, arrived at a logical
conclusion, dismissing the statement of claim preferred by the
petitioner. This Court is in complete agreement with the reasoning
adopted by the learned Labour Court. There was no violation of
principles of natural justice and no palpable error has crept in the
order impugned dated 22.12.2014, warranting interference of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
8. Even the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner are distinguishable, being on wholly different factual
matrices, especially in the absence of any sufficient explanation
furnished by the petitioners explaining the substantial delay and
inaction on their part in filing of the statement of claim. Therefore,
sans appropriate explanation explaining the delay, the same
cannot be condoned, especially when the statement of claim was
filed with a substantial delay.
9. On the aspect of delay, reliance can be placed upon the
dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as enunciated in Bichitrananda
Behera vs. State of Orissa and Ors.:Civil Appeal No. 6664 of
[2024:RJ-JP:9884] (4 of 4) [CW-8109/2016]
2023, Union of India & Ors. Vs. N. Murugesan reported in
(2022) 2 SCC 45 and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply
and Sewerage Board and Ors. Vs. T.T. Murli Babu reported in
(2014) 4 SCC 108. In Chennai Metropolitan (supra), it was
held as under:
"The doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to
weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of
the same. The court should bear in mind that it is
exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction.
As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect
the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is
to keep itself alive to the primary principle that
when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure
or pleasure, the Court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it
noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in
most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the
Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on
the part of a litigant - a litigant who has
forgotten the basic norms, namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of time"
and second, law does not permit one to sleep
and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in
hazard and causes injury to the lis."
10. Therefore, upon a cumulative consideration of the
observations made herein-above, this Court is inclined to dismiss
the instant petition.
11. As a result, the instant petition is dismissed. Pending
applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(SAMEER JAIN),J
DEEPAK/35
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