Rajasthan High Court

The United India Insurance Co Ltd vs Vimla Alias Chhota And Ors on 20 February, 2024

Author: Narendra Singh Dhaddha

Bench: Narendra Singh Dhaddha

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        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                    BENCH AT JAIPUR

            S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 5981/2016

The United India Insurance Company Ltd. Through Manager,
Regional Office, Sahara Chamber, Tonk Road, Jaipur
                                                                       ----Appellant
                                         Versus
1.       Vimla @ Chhota W/o Pappu Lal @ Mohan Lal, R/o
         Bhagwanpura, Tehsil Niwai, Distt. Tonk
2.       Govind S/o Late Pappu Lal, R/o Bhagwanpura, Tehsil
         Niwai, Distt. Tonk
3.       Narmda W/o Gopal, R/o Bhagwanpura, Tehsil Niwai, Distt.
         Tonk
4.       Gopal S/o Onkar, R/o Bhagwanpura, Tehsil Niwai, Distt.
         Tonk
5.       Ramji Lal S/o Gopal Lal, R/o Bhagwanpura, Tehsil Niwai,
         Distt. Tonk
6.       Bhenru Lal S/o Chothmal, R/o Goner Road, Jaipur
                                                                    ----Respondents

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sandeep Jain, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Deepak Khandelwal, Adv.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA SINGH DHADDHA

Judgment

DATE OF JUDGMENT 20/02/2024

This Civil Misc. Appeal has been filed by the appellant-

Insurance Company (for short 'the Insurance Company') u/s 30 of

Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, the Act of 1923)

against the judgment dated 14.03.2016 and amended order dated

23.08.2016 passed by learned Workmen Compensation

Commissioner, Tonk in claim case No. E.C.A./F. 51/2012 titled as

Vimla & Ors. Vs. Ramji Lal & Ors., whereby learned Commissioner

has awarded a sum of Rs.9,89,109/- alongwith interest @ 12%

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P.A. in favour of the claimants-respondent No.1 to 4 (for short 'the

claimants').

Learned counsel for the Insurance Company submits that

learned Commissioner wrongly allowed the claim petition filed by

the claimants. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company also

submits that deceased was not employed under the non-claimant

Nos.1 and 2. Driver of the offending vehicle did not possess the

valid and effective driving license to drive the vehicle in question.

As per evidence, non-claimant No.1-Ramjilal S/o Gopal Lal was

registered owner of the offending vehicle No.RJ14-GB-0313, but

the company had issued the insurance policy in favour of Bhairu

Lal Kumawat S/o Chothmal Kumawat. So, according to the policy,

the company covers the risk of employee of insured person. As

per statement of Vimla Devi, deceased was working under the

employment of non-claimant No.1-Ramjilal. So, appeal be allowed

and judgment/order passed by learned Commissioner be set

aside.

Learned counsel for the Insurance Company has placed

reliance upon the following judgments : (1) Oriental Insurance

Co. Ltd. VS. Luni Devi & Ors. reported in 2015 (1) R.A.R. 61

(Raj.) and (2) Sanjeev Kumar Samrat Vs. National

Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2013 R.A.R. 108 (SC).

Learned counsel for the claimants has opposed the

arguments advanced by learned counsel for the Insurance

Company and submitted that no substantial question of law is

involved in this appeal. Insurance Company had not taken any

defence before learned Commissioner and had not adduced any

evidence to disprove the employment of the deceased. The appeal

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has been submitted on the findings of facts. In support of his

contentions, counsel for the claimants has placed reliance on the

judgments delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of

Golla Rajanna Etc. vs. The Divisional Manager And Anr. reported in

2017 (1) SCC 45 and North East Karnatka Transport Corporation

Vs. Smt. Sujatha reported in 2019 (11) SCC 514.

Heard counsel for the parties and perused the impugned

judgment including the documents available on the record.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the findings given by

the learned Commissioner are based on sound appreciation of

evidence and the same are not liable to be disturbed by this

Court.

In the opinion of this Court also, the learned Commissioner is

the last authority on facts as it has been held by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Golla Rajanna Etc. (supra):

"8. Section 30 of the Act provides for appeal to the High Court. To the extent, the provision reads as follows;

30. Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:

(a) an order awarding as compensation a lumpsum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;[(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty Under Section 4A;]

(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment;

(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;

(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or

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(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions:

Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b),unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees (Emphasis supplied)

10. Under the scheme of the Act, the workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial question of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-

appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.

Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in the case of North East Karnataka Transport Corporation (supra):

"9. At the outset, we may take note of the fact, being a settled principle, that the question as to whether the employee met with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the dependants of the deceased employee, the extent of disability caused to the employee due to injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and

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he/his LRs sue(s) his employer to claim compensation under the Act.

10. The aforementioned questions are essentially the questions of fact and, therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon are regarded as the findings of fact.

11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner lies only against the specific orders set out in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a further rider contained in the first proviso to the section that the appeal must involve substantial questions of law.

12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a regular first appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can he heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case. In "M/s Krishna Weaving Mills, Ajmer Vs. Smt. Chandra

Bhaga Devi wide of Mool Chand & Anr.", reported in 1985(1) WLN

455, this Court while dealing with Workmen's Compensation Act

has laid down law that unless there is a question of public

importance and there is no final interpretation available while the

substantial question of law is arising, the appeal under the

Workmen's Compensation Act cannot been entertained. Relevant

portion of the judgment reads as follows:-

"8. Moreover, under S. 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act only substantial question of law can be agitated. In the present case, I am convinced that there is no substantial question of law involved.

9. The question of public importance and question on which no final interpretation is available are known as substantial question of law. Even if this definition is further extended, it

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will have to bear in mind that there is vast difference between the question of law and substantial question of law. It is only when the question of law is not well settled and it is of importance, it would become a substantial questions of law."

It is a settled position of law that limited jurisdiction

has been given to the High Court confined to the substantial

question of law only and the High Court cannot venture and re-

appreciate the evidence and finding of fact recorded on the

evidence led by both the parties.

This Court finds no good ground to call for any interference

on any of the factual findings. None of the factual findings are

found to be either perverse or arbitrary or based on no evidence

or against any provision of law. This Court accordingly upholds

these findings.

Since the appeal is not qualifying to have a substantial

question of law, which is mandatory under Section 30 of the