Iffco Tokio General Ins. Co. Ltd vs Ganpat Ram And Ors. ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 7676 Raj

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2870/2017

Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. Through Branch Manager, First A Road, Sardarpura, Jodhpur.

----Appellant Versus

1. Ganpat Ram S/o Shri Hema Ram Ji, R/o Khariberi, Tehsil Shergarh, District Jodhpur.

2. Chananna Ram S/o Shri Girdhari Ram, R/o Khariberi, Tehsil Shergarh, District Jodhpur.

3. Khangar Singh S/o Amar Singh, R/o Village Suwala, Tehsil Shiv, District Barmer Owner Of Truck Bearing Registration No. Rj-04-2960

4. Lachha Ram S/o Ugra Ram, R/o Rampura Police Station Shiv, Tehsil Shiv, District Barmer.

5. The New India Insurance Company Ltd., Divisional Office, Abhay Chambers, Jalori Gate, Jodhpur Insurance Company Of Truck Bearing Registration No. Rj-04-2960

----Respondents

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Vinay Kothari Mr. Pradeep Khichi For Respondent(s) : Mr. Dhanpat Choudhary

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN GOPAL VYAS

Judgment

DATE OF JUDGMENT 26 /09/2023

The present civil miscellaneous appeal is listed in Defects

category.

2. As per office report, the appeal is time barred by 264 days

and the appellant has preferred an application under Section 5 of

the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

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3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the delay in

filing the appeal is not intentional. It is further submitted that the

appellant-Insurance Company does not have a legal office in

Rajasthan. The delay in filing the present appeal occurred as no

further instructions were received from the Regional Office. Also,

some delay occurred in obtaining the certified copy of the

judgment and award and other relevant documents.

4. It is also submitted that after receiving the certified copy of

the judgment, the same was sent to the Regional Office where it

got mixed with other files and thus, a lot of time was consumed in

tracing out the file. It is submitted that the delay in filing the

present appeal was bonafide and thus, it is prayed that the delay

may be condoned.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,

while opposing the prayer made by learned counsel for the

appellant-Insurance Company submits that there is a gross delay

of 264 days and there is no sufficient reason which explains the

said delay and thus, the same may not be condoned.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

7. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that the learned

Tribunal passed the impugned judgment and award on 06.10.2016

in the presence of learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance

Company. The appellant applied for the certified copy of the

impugned judgment and award on 13.09.2017 i.e. 11 months

after passing of the impugned judgment and award and it was

delivered to appellant on 18.09.2017. The present appeal was

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thereafter filed on 25.09.2017. However, no cogent reasons have

been put forth by the appellant as to why he could not get

certified copy of the judgment and award for such a long period

and file the instant appeal within the period of limitation.

8. In Basawraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Civil

Appeal No. 6974 of 2013, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:

"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Majji Sannemma @

Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi and Ors. reported in 2021 SCC

OnLine SC 1260 has discussed as under:

"17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal (supra), it is observed and held as under:--

In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the

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parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."

18. In the case ofP.K. Ramachandran(supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed as under:--

"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and

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perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.""

10. It is a settled principle of law that generally justice should

not be denied merely on technical grounds but if the filing of

appeal suffers from inordinate delay, such delay ought not to be

condoned unless the applicant is able to satisfy the court that he

was prevented by 'sufficient cause' from prosecuting the case.

Since no sufficient reasons have been put forth by the learned

counsel for the appellant to explain the delay in applying for the

certified copy of judgment after 11 months of the date of

judgment and award and thereafter in filing the present appeal

which is barred by 264 days, it appears that the appellant was

negligent in pursuing his case. Thus, in the absence of any

reasonable, satisfactory or even an appropriate explanation, the

present application for condonation of delay deserves to be

dismissed.

11. Consequently, the present application for condonation of

delay and the appeal are hereby dismissed.

12. The stay application, if any also stands dismissed.

13. No order as to costs.

(MADAN GOPAL VYAS),J 1-CPGoyal/-

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