Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 5146 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 21 September, 2023
[2023:RJ-JP:24599-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5769/2014
Alok Agarwal S/o Late Shri Shyam Sundar Agarwal, 1, Anand
Vihar, Gurjar Ki Thadi, New Sanganer Road, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan Through Sub Registrar, Jaipur-4
2. Additional Collector Stamps, Jaipur
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. S.S. Hora
For Respondent(s) : Mr. J.S. Shekhawat for Mr. R.P. Singh,
AAG
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Order
21/09/2023 (ORAL)
1. By way of the present petition, a challenge is made to the
order impugned dated 31.03.2014 passed in Case No. 267/2014
titled as State (through Sub-Registrar, Jaipur-4) vs. Alok Agarwal
& Anr. whereby stamp duty of Rs. 6,15,93,340/- along with
surcharge of Rs. 61,59,340/- and penalty of Rs. 22,47,320/-
totaling Rs.7,00,00,000 (7 crores) has been raised against the
petitioner.
2. The concise and ineluctable factual matrix, necessary for
discerning the issue at hand, is noted herein-under:-
2.1. That the petitioner is the owner of agricultural land
comprising an area of 9 Bighas and 11 Biswas.
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2.2. That on 07.06.2010, qua the said land, the petitioner
entered into a 'development agreement' with a company namely,
M/s. Sunny Arcade Private Ltd.
2.3. That the said agreement was divided into two distinct parts.
The first part of the agreement provided that the developer would
furnish a security deposit of Rs. 2 crores in favour of the petitioner
by way of post-dated cheques (PDCs). Moreover, the developer
would also initiate and complete proceedings under Section 90-B
of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act along with getting the land use
of the said property changed and thereafter, obtain the patta of
the total land within a period of 24 months from the date of
signing of the said agreement. It was only upon successfully
completing the aforementioned requisites, that the approval of
construction would be granted. In essence, the agreement
stipulated that if the preceding tasks, as noted above, were not
duly carried out within a period of 24 months, then in such an
eventuality, the agreement as entered between the parties, would
be a nullity. Whereas, if the said tasks were carried out, then the
agreement would be governed by the second part of the
agreement, providing for the development and construction on the
subject land.
3. In this background, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that though styled as a 'development agreement', the
subject agreement was divided into two distinct parts, as noted
above. Therefore, the said agreement in the first instance was not
a development agreement, but an agreement divided into two
parts wherein the fulfillment of the first part would effectuate or
[2023:RJ-JP:24599-DB] (3 of 10) [CW-5769/2014]
activate the second part, the latter wherein alone constituted the
'development agreement'. Thus, in essence, the agreement was
an agreement which was contingent and was to take effect in
future and on happening of certain contingencies as no rights were
meant to flow to the developer till the conditions of the first part
were fulfilled. Accordingly, as the first part of the said agreement
was not duly complied/completed within a period of 24 months as
required, the agreement in toto was nullified, thereby, not giving
rise to the second part, which in essence was the 'development
agreement'. The said agreement became null and void. Therefore,
there was no requirement upon the petitioner to pay stamp duty,
in the absence of any development and/or construction being
carried out on the subject land/property. In support of the said
agreement becoming a nullity, learned counsel submitted that
even the cheques (PDCs) paid as security, were returned back to
the developer, upon the lapse of the period of 24 months as
provided in the first part of the agreement.
4. Furthermore, learned counsel argued that the order
impugned dated 31.03.2014 deserves to be quashed and set
aside, as the Additional Collector (Stamps) did not consider the
nature of the document/agreement which was in fact not a
'development agreement' covered under Article 5(bbbb) or 5(e)
but an agreement otherwise covered under Article 5(c). Therefore,
the liability to pay stamp duty has been incorrectly crystallized
qua the petitioner, despite the agreement being a nullity. Lastly,
learned counsel also averred that the remedy of revision available
to the petitioner under Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act,
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1998 (hereinafter, Act of 1998) is ineffective and illusory,
especially on account of the fact that as per the said provision, a
pre-deposit is required to be made by the aggrieved party to the
tune of 25% of the total amount, for the said revision to be
entertained. In the present case, the said amount would
tantamount to Rs. 1.75 crores, which is highly excessive, thereby
frustrating the remedy in toto. In support of the contention raised
herein-above, learned counsel placed reliance upon the dictum of
the Hon'ble Apex Court as enunciated in Hardev Asnani vs.
State of Rajasthan reported in 2011 (11) SCR 599.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has raised a
preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant
petition. It is submitted that the petitioner has filed the present
petition challenging the order impugned dated 31.03.2014
whereby a stamp duty has been raised against the petitioner.
However, against the said order, a remedy of revision under
Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 before the Rajasthan
Tax Board is available to the petitioner. Furthermore, learned
counsel argued that for the maintainability of the said revision
petition, it is necessary to deposit 25% amount of the
demanded/raised stamp duty and thus, it appears that to save the
said stamp duty and cause revenue loss to the State Government,
the petitioner has attempted to bypass the said payment and
accordingly, filed the present petition invoking the extraordinary
and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, without exhausting the
statutory remedy. In this regard, learned counsel argued that
when statutory and alternative remedy of revision is available, the
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petitioner cannot be allowed to invoke the extraordinary and
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, without exhausting such
remedy. In addition to the submissions made herein-above,
learned counsel also submitted that the instant petition also
involves several disputes questions of fact, which cannot be
resolved by the writ court while exercising supervisory jurisdiction,
especially qua the determination of the nature of the agreement
dated 07.06.2010 i.e. whether the same encapsulated a
'development agreement' or not and/or qua the nature of the land
etc. Therefore, on account of the said counts alone, learned
counsel prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition. In support
of the arguments so raised, learned counsel placed reliance upon
the dictum of this Court as rendered in D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 3256/2022 titled as M/s Cosmos India Engineering Pvt.
Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties, scanned the record of
the writ petition and perused the judgments cited at Bar.
7. At the outset, this Court deems it fit to re-iterate the settled
position of the law insofar as it relates to the discretion ought to
be exercised by the writ courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, whilst entertaining a lis, for the redressal of
which, a statutory and alternative remedy is available to the
petitioner. In essence, while exercising jurisdiction under Article
226, this Court, whilst having regard to the totality of facts, has a
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. While
doing the latter, the Courts have imposed upon themselves certain
restrictions, one of which is, that if an alternative and efficacious
[2023:RJ-JP:24599-DB] (6 of 10) [CW-5769/2014]
remedy is available to the petitioner, the Courts would not
exercise their supervisory jurisdiction. In this regard, reliance can
be placed upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as
enunciated in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of
Trademarks, Mumbai reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1.
8. Upon a considered perusal of the record of the instant
petition, the following pertinent facts emerge:-
8.1. That the order impugned dated 31.03.2014 was passed by
the Additional Collector (Stamps), after duly taking into
consideration, the agreement dated 07.06.2010 as well as the
stipulations incorporated therein, read with the corresponding
provisions of the Act of 1998.
8.2. That against the order impugned, a
statutory/effective/efficacious and alternative remedy is available
to the petitioner under Section 65 of the Act of 1998. In order for
a revision petition to be entertained by the Rajasthan Tax Board
under the said provision, the petitioner would have to fulfill the
condition of pre-depositing 25% of the raised/demanded stamp
duty. Upon doing so, the petitioner can duly raise his grievance
before the learned Tax Board.
8.3. That the present petition involves adjudication upon certain
disputed questions of fact, especially qua certain instrumental
stipulations necessary for discerning the nature of the agreement
dated 07.06.2010 i.e. whether the said agreement as entered
between the petitioner and the developer was a 'development
agreement' or not, or whether the land/property in question was
agricultural in nature and if the penalty imposed and/or the
[2023:RJ-JP:24599-DB] (7 of 10) [CW-5769/2014]
amount raised was duly compliant of the provisions of the Act of
1998 etc. In this regard, it is noted that it is a settled position of
law that a High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate
upon disputed and/or wholly antithetical questions of fact, which
may warrant considerable assessment of detailed evidence by the
concerned adjudicatory authorities below. In this regard, reliance
can be placed upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as
enunciated in Civil Appeal No. 2848/2021 titled as Shubhas
Jain vs. Rajeshwari Shivam & Ors.
8.4. That the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner in Hardevi Asnani (Supra) is distinguishable in the
facts and circumstances of the present case, especially for the
following reasons, namely:
8.4.1. At the relevant time, the stipulation of pre-deposit was
as high as 50% as opposed to the present requirement of 25%,
which has been substantially reduced in terms of the Act of 1998 .
8.4.2. That no disputed questions of facts warranting
assessment of evidence were involved in the said case.
9. In this regard, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for
the respondent on the judgment of the Division Bench of this
Court in M/s Cosmos India Engineering (Supra) is squarely
applicable. The relevant extract is reproduced herein-under:-
"7. In the case in hand, the reliance placed by the petitioner upon the judgment of Hardevi Asnani (supra) is not tenable because the law was amended w.e.f. 2012and the requirement of pre-deposit has been reduced from50% to 50%. Further, the case of Hardevi Asnani (supra) was with regard to an individual not a corporation entity, i.e. builder, who
[2023:RJ-JP:24599-DB] (8 of 10) [CW-5769/2014]
can pass on the cost/taxes upon the purchaser of the flat. Further, nowhere in the writ petition it has been explained by the petitioner that how there is an undue hardship, on account of financial reasons or otherwise, to deposit a sum of 25% of the tax amount when it is statutory mandate. Rather, the Apex Court judgment of M/s Commercial Steel Ltd. (supra), relied upon by the respondents, is fairly applicable in the present case. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the above mentioned case, granted liberty to the respondent to avail alternative statutory remedy under Section 107 of Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 even when there was a condition of pre-deposit of part of demand duty.
8. Further, the petitioner has also not filed the writ petition in the name of M/s Innovative Colonisers Pvt. Ltd. who were having substantial portion of land in their name, nor have they been impleaded as necessary parties. Such practice adopted by the petitioner reflects misrepresentation.
9. Considering the fact that alternative remedy is available in terms of Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 and that there is no ground/argument of undue hardship or exorbitant demand reflected in the body of writ petition, this Court is of the view that the alternate remedy specified in the statute has to be availed before invoking writ jurisdiction, especially when petitioner has failed to establish that alternative remedy is not efficacious. Rather in the given case, looking to the disputed question of facts, issues like whether MOU was rightly treated as development agreement or not; where there was concealment or not; whether penalty was rightly imposed or not etc. are to be decided by the appellate authority as per the record.
10. In light of above observations and discussions, this Court is of the view that the writ petition is liable to be disposed. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to avail alternative statutory remedy, under Section 65 of Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998, within a period of 15 days. If the petitioner chooses to avail the alternative remedy, the appellate authority/revision authority is directed to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from filing. It is made clear that the petitioner will have to deposit 25% of demand in question, as required in law, when filing revision application under Section 65 of Rajasthan Stamps Act, 1998."
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10. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has through a series of
judgments, time and again held that once a statute has fixed the
condition of pre-deposit before filing an appeal, such a condition
must be satisfied. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court as enunciated in Civil
Appeal No. 3464/2022 titled as The Director, Employees
State Insurance Health Care & Ors. vs. Maruti Suzuki India
Limited & Ors.
11. Therefore, considering the observations made herein-above
and especially considering the fact that an alternative remedy is
available in terms of Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998
and that the instant petition involves several disputed questions of
fact, this Court is of the view that the alternate remedy specified
in the statute has to be availed before invoking writ jurisdiction,
especially when the petitioner has failed to establish that the
alternative remedy is not efficacious. Rather, in the facts and
circumstances of the given case, looking to the disputed facts
especially qua the determination of the nature of the agreement
between the petitioner and the developer as well as the nature of
the land/property which constituted the subject matter of the said
agreement, are to be decided by the appellate authority, as per
the record/evidence.
12. In light of the preceding observations and discussions, this
Court is of the view that the writ petition is liable to be disposed
of. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to avail the alternative
statutory remedy, under Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act,
[2023:RJ-JP:24599-DB] (10 of 10) [CW-5769/2014]
1998, within a period of six weeks. If the petitioner chooses to
avail the alternative remedy, the appellate authority/revision
authority is directed to dispose of the matter within a period of
three months from filing. It is made clear that the petitioner will
have to deposit 25% of the demand in question, as required in
law, when filing the revision application under Section 65 of the
Rajasthan Stamps Act, 1998.
13. It is made clear that during the pendency of the appeal
before the authorities below, the petitioner will not be entitled to
alienate with the immovable property to give surety/personal bond
for meeting out the liability, if the same arises in the future, in
accordance with law.
14. With the observations made herein-above, the writ petition is
disposed of. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(SAMEER JAIN),J (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH),CJ
ANIL SHARMA /45
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