R.S.R.T.C vs Raghu Nath (2023:Rj-Jp:16585)
2023 Latest Caselaw 2934 Raj/2

[2023:RJ-JP:16585]

        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                    BENCH AT JAIPUR

                 S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 91/1996

1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation through Its
Chairman, Parivahan Marg, Jaipur
2. The Divisional Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation Jodhpur Division Jodhpur
                                                       ----Appellant/Defendant
                                      Versus
Raghu Nath Kurdia S/o Shri Heera Lal R/o C/o Surya Udai
Panters, Laxmi Bazar Barmer, Ex-Conductor RSRTC
                                                        ----Respondent/Plaintiff

For Appellant(s)           :     Mr. Rajpal Dhankar for
                                 Mr. Pratap Singh
For Respondent(s)          :



       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL

                           Judgment / Order

02/08/2023

This civil second appeal has been preferred against the

judgement and decree dated 18.10.1995 passed by the learned

Additional District Judge No.5, Jaipur City, Jaipur (for brevity, "the

learned appellate Court") in Regular Civil Appeal No.139/1990

whereby, while dismissing the appeal preferred by the

appellants/defendants (for brevity, "the defendants"), the

judgement dated 25.03.1989 passed by the learned Upper Munsif

Magistrate No.3, Jaipur City, Jaipur (for brevity, "the learned trial

Court") decreeing the Civil Suit No.524/88 (548/86) filed by the

respondent/plaintiff (for brevity, "the plaintiff") for declaration, has

been affirmed.

The relevant facts in brief are that the plaintiff filed a suit for

declaration against the defendants stating therein that while

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working as a permanent conductor with the defendants, he was

served upon with a charge-sheet dated 30.03.1981 leveling

allegation that he was found carrying 14 passengers without ticket

and was issued another charge-sheet dated 27.05.1982 with

similar allegation for different route. It was averred that without

giving him proper opportunity of hearing and defence, vide order

dated 19.02.1983, his services were terminated and the appeal

preferred thereagainst has also been dismissed vide order dated

03.01.1984. Alleging that the enquiry against him was conducted

in violation of the principles of natural justice, the decree as

aforesaid was prayed for.

The defendants in their joint written statement submitted

that enquiry against the plaintiff was conducted in accordance with

the Standing Order. In the additional plea, it was stated that since,

the plaintiff is a workman, only the Industrial Tribunal/Labour

Court has jurisdiction to hear the dispute and not the Civil Court.

On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial

Court framed five issues including relief. Issue no.3 pertained to

as to whether the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the suit.

After recording evidence of the plaintiff as the defendants did not

lead any evidence despite opportunities, the learned trial Court

decreed the suit vide judgement dated 25.03.1989. The civil first

appeal preferred thereagainst by the defendants has been

dismissed by the learned appellate Court vide judgement and

decree dated 18.10.1995.

While admitting the appeal, this Court framed following

substantial question of law:-

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"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the

Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the

plaintiff/respondent".

Learned counsel for the defendants submits that since the

enquiry was conducted as per the Standing Order, the Civil Court

did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute which could be

entertained only by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. He

further submits that since, the plaintiff was on probation, his

services could have been terminated even without holding any

enquiry. He, therefore, prays that the civil second appeal be

allowed, the judgement and decree dated 18.10.1995 be quashed

and set aside and the suit be dismissed.

Heard. Considered.

It is a well settled legal principle that if order of punishment

passed in a departmental enquiry is sought to be challenged

alleging violation of the principles of natural justice, the Civil Court

has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. A Larger Bench of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has, in the case of Rajasthan

State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. Vs. Bal Mukund

Bairwa-(2009) 4 SCC 299, held as under:-

"36. If an employee intends to enforce his constitutional rights or a right under a statutory Regulation, the civil court will have the necessary jurisdiction to try a suit. If, however, he claims his right and corresponding obligations only in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the sister laws so called, the civil court will have none. In this view of the matter, in our considered opinion, it would not be correct to contend that only because the employee concerned is also a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the 1947 Act or the conditions of his service

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are otherwise governed by the Standing Orders certified under the 1946 Act, ipso facto the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. This aspect of the matter has recently been considered by this Court in Rajasthan SRTC vs. Mohar Singh-(2008) 5 SCC 542. The question as to whether the civil court's jurisdiction is barred or not must be determined having regard to the facts of each case.

37. If the infringement of the Standing Orders or other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are alleged, the civil court's jurisdiction may be held to be barred but if the suit is based on the violation of principles of common law or constitutional provisions or on other grounds, the civil court's jurisdiction may not be held to be barred. If no right is claimed under a special statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred, the civil court will have jurisdiction.

38. Where the relationship between the parties as employer and employee is contractual, the right to enforce the contract of service depending on personal volition of an employer, is prohibited in terms of Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It has, however, four exceptions, namely, (1) when an employee enjoys a status, i.e., his conditions of service are governed by the rules framed under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India or a statute and would otherwise be governed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India; (2) where the conditions of service are governed by statute or statutory Regulation and in the event mandatory provisions thereof have been breached; (3) when the service of the employee is otherwise protected by a statute; and (4) where a right is claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act or sister laws, termination of service having been effected in breach of the provisions thereof.

39. The appellant-Corporation is bound to comply with the mandatory provisions of the statute or the regulations framed under it. A subordinate legislation when validly framed becomes a part of the Act. It is also bound to follow the principles of natural justice. In the event it is found that the action on the part of the State is violative of the constitutional

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provisions or the mandatory requirements of a statute or statutory rules, the civil court would have the jurisdiction to direct reinstatement with full back wages."

Indisputably, the suit was filed seeking a decree of

declaration as to the order of punishment dated 19.02.1983 and

the appellate order dated 03.01.1984 being nullity having been

passed in violation of the principles of natural justice; therefore,

this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Civil Court had

jurisdiction. Even otherwise also, while deciding the issue no.3,

the learned trial Court has held that this issue was already decided

vide order dated 24.08.1987 in favour of the plaintiff and against

the defendants. The order-sheet dated 24.08.1987 records that

since, the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court vide order dated

03.04.1987 held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to hear the

matter, a fact admitted by the learned counsel for the defendants,

issue no.3 is decided in terms that the Civil Court has jurisdiction

to hear the matter. The learned counsel for the defendants did not

dispute that the aforesaid finding attained finality. The learned

trial Court has, vide judgement dated 25.03.1989, while deciding

the issue no.1 as to validity of the order dated 19.02.1983,

recorded a categorical finding appreciating the evidence on record

that enquiry against the plaintiff was conducted in violation of the

principles of natural justice. It was held that despite request by

the plaintiff, the documents pertaining to departmental enquiry

were not furnished to him. It was further held that neither the

statements of the departmental witnesses were recorded in his

presence nor, he was given an opportunity to cross examine them

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nor, he was given an opportunity to lead his evidence. As a matter

of fact, no evidence was led by the defendants to show that the

plaintiff was given an opportunity to defend himself during the

course of departmental enquiry or the principles of natural justice

were followed before terminating his services vide order dated

19.02.1983. These findings have been affirmed by the learned

appellate Court re-appreciating the evidence on record. Learned

counsel for the defendants could not demonstrate that these

concurrent findings of facts recorded by the learned Courts suffer

from any illegality, infirmity or perversity.

Contention of the learned counsel for the defendants with

regard to the plaintiff being on probation, is wholly misconceived

and misplaced. Neither any such plea was taken in the written

statement nor, any evidence was led before the learned trial Court

to show that the plaintiff was appointed on probation. Even

otherwise also, it is not a case of termination simplicitor; but,

services of the plaintiff were terminated after conducting the

departmental enquiry.

In view of the aforesaid findings, the substantial question of

law framed by this Court is answered in affirmative. Since, no

other substantial question of law is involved in the instant second

appeal, the same is dismissed being devoid of merit.

(MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J

PRAGATI/203

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