Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Narpat Singh @ Narayan Singh vs State Of Rajasthan on 21 October, 2022

Bench: Dinesh Mehta

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 7073/2022

1. Narpat Singh @ Narayan Singh S/o Devi Singh, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Samrau Lohawat Jodhpur Rural Dist. Jodhpur Raj.

2. Mahendra Singh S/o Narpat Singh, Aged About 37 Years, R/o Samrau Lohawat Jodhpur Rural Dist. Jodhpur Raj.

----Petitioners Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp

2. Mangilal S/o Tikuram, R/o Lal Sagar Samrau Lohawat Jodhpur Rural Dist. Jodhpur Raj.

                                                                ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)        :     Mr. J. S. Rathore
For Respondent(s)        :     Mr. Gaurav Singh, P. P.
                               Mr. Chiranji Lal for the complainant



                    JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA

                                    Order

21/10/2022

1. By way of this criminal misc. petition under Section 482 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused-petitioners have

approached this Court with a prayer to quash the proceedings in

Sessions Case No.107/2021 pending before the Court of Special

Judge SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Cases), Jodhpur seeking

petitioners' prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections

427, 447, 384 of IPC and under Sections 3(1)(f), 3(1)(g), 3(2)

(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'SC/ST Act').

2. The brief facts are that on the First Information Report

lodged by the complainant-respondent, after investigation charge-

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sheet for the aforesaid offences was filed against the accused-

petitioners and on that basis above said criminal proceedings in

Case No.107/2021 were initiated.

3. During the trial, both the parties filed an application under

Section 320 of Cr.P.C. to permit compounding of the aforesaid

offences.

4. The trial Court partly allowed the application and permitted

to compound the offences under Sections 447 & 427 of IPC vide

order dated 11.10.2022 but the prayer in respect of offences

under Section 384 IPC and Sections 3(1)(f), 3(1)(g), 3(2)(va) of

SC/ST Act was refused, as the same are not compoundable.

5. Learned counsel for the complainant while accepting the

factum of compromise submits that the complainant has no

objection if the proceedings in question are quashed.

6. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that since the FIR has

been registered under the provisions of SC/ST Act, the

FIR/proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise.

He, however, accepts the factum of compromise having been

entered into without coercion and duress.

7. In order to support his contention that FIR/proceedings

under the provisions of SC/ST Act can be quashed, learned

counsel for the petitioner invites Court's attention towards the

order dated 25.10.2021 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

case of Ramawatar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in

AIR 2021 SC 5228.

8. In the above referred case of Ramawatar (supra), Hon'ble

the Supreme Court has observed thus :

"12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra)

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and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused.

13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in postconviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court's plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/ compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).

14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that ven though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court's power to do "complete justice". However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express

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prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr. has eloquently clarified this point as follows: "48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice "between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it". The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and 6 (1998) 4 SCC 409, 48 ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only disputesettling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely disputesettling. It is a "problem solver in the nebulous areas" (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subjectmatter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject."

15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the

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Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper- castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twinfold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of castebased atrocities.

16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C."

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9. The aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court settles

the legal position so far as this Court's power to quash the

proceedings/FIR (in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Code

of Criminal Procedure) is concerned, in cases where the parties

have entered into compromise in the cases involving offences

under the provisions of SC/ST Act, the only caution which is to be

borne in mind is, that the compromise must be with free will.

10. It is to be noted that complainant - Mangilal himself has

moved an application under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. requesting for

compounding of the offences. A perusal of the said application so

also consideration of the arguments made by learned counsel for