Mahendra Yadav S/O Late Shri ... vs Bhagwan Devi W/O Late Shri Krishan ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 3541 Raj/2

          HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                      BENCH AT JAIPUR

                   S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 680/2004

    1.     Mahendra Yadav S/o Late Shri Ghasiram Yadav, R/o 308,
           Arya Nagar, Jaipur
           (Since deceased during pendency of First Appeal)
    2.     Smt. Uma Yadav W/o Late Shri Ram Singh Yadav, R/o
           S.R.-1, JDA Shopping Centre, Bajaj Nagar, Jaipur
                                                                      ----Appellants
                                       Versus
    1.     Bhagwan Devi W/o Late Shri Krishan Sharan Sharma, R/o
           Govind Devji Ka Mandir, Mahal Chowk, Alwar
           (Since deceased during pendency of First Appeal)
    2.     Bijendra Sharma S/o Late Shri Krishan Sharan Sharma,
           R/o Sethi Colony, Jaipur
                                                                    ----Respondents


    For Appellant(s)         :     Mr.M.M. Ranjan, Senior Advocate with
                                   Mr. Aman Pareek
    For Respondent(s)        :     Mr. R.K. Mathur, Senior Advocate with
                                   Mr. Aditya Kiran Mathur
                                   And Mr. Kritin Sharma



               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL

                                    Judgment

    JUDGMENT RESERVED ON                                     : 27/04/2022
    JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON                                   : May _5th_, 2022
    BY THE COURT:

REPORTABLE

1. Appellant-defendants-tenant (hereinafter referred as

"tenant") have preferred this first appeal under Section 96 CPC,

assailing judgment and decree dated 17-8-2004 in Civil Suit

No.2/2003 passed by Additional District Judge (Fast Track), No.2,

Alwar whereby and whereunder suit for eviction and recovery of

rent has been decreed.

2. The facts of the case are that rented premises a house

No.308, Arya Nagar measuring 761 Sq. Yards comprising of four

(2 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

rooms, kitchen, toilet, 2 warrandah, gallary etc., was let out by

original plaintiff Krishan Sharan Sharma to original tenant Ghasi

Ram Yadav way back in July, 1967 at the rate of Rs.140/- per

month for the purpose of residence. Since the original tenant

committed default in payment of rent and the original plaintiff

landlord required the house for his own family hence a civil suit for

eviction invoking the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) and (h) of the

Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950

(hereafter `the Rent Act') was filed on 25-11-2000. At the time of

institution of suit for eviction the original tenant Ghasi Ram Yadav

had passed away hence the suit was filed against (i) Mahendra

Yadav (younger son) and (ii) Uma Yadav (widow of elder son Ram

Singh Yadav), impleading them as defendants No.1 and 2, who

were stated to be in possession of the rented house. During

pendency of suit, the original plaintiff Krishan Sharan Sharma also

passed away, hence his wife and son were allowed to continue

proceedings of the suit for eviction. The trial court after recording

evidence of both parties and holding a full fledged trial recorded

findings of fact that the tenant has committed default in payment

of rent for more than six months, however, the benefit of first

default was extended. The trial court found that the rented house

is required to plaintiff landlord for residence of his own family and

the need of plaintiff is bonafide and reasonable, hence, the suit for

eviction was decreed on ground of personal and bonafide

necessity of the plaintiff landlord vide judgment dated 17-8-2004.

3. Before entering into merits of the judgment of trial court on

grounds challenged by appellants, since some subsequent

developments have occurred during pendency of first appeal,

(3 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

which are undisputed and in the opinion of this court have

material bearing on merits of appeal hence it is necessary to

consider the effect of these undisputed subsequent facts first.

Since appellant No.1 Mahendra Yadav passed away on 29-

10-2019, thereafter, the appellant No.2 Uma Yadav is pursuing the

first appeal. After going through the entire pleadings, facts and

circumstances of the case and hearing the arguments of counsel

for both parties, this court is prima facie of the opinion that the

pursuation of first appeal by appellant No.2 is unwarranted, rather

it can be assumed that it is just to gain ulterior motive and is

malafide. There is no hesitation to observe that the pursuation of

the first appeal by appellant No.2 is superfluous and can be

termed as unscrupulous litigation. There seems no bonafide on the

part of appellant No.2, what to say for protection of her right as

tenant under the provisions of the Rent Act. The aim an object of

the rent control legislation is intended to save harassment of

tenant, but it does not deprive the landlord of their properties for

good. For such reasons, this court is first dealing with subsequent

events coupled with basic pleadings of parties, which are

undisputed, to show that appellant No.2 seems to be desperate

not to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of rented

house to respondent voluntarily and adament to pursue the first

appeal stacking the high court to pass judgment on merits:-

(i) It is an admitted fact that the rented house was let out to

original tenant Gahsi Ram Yadav in July,1967, and after his

death the eviction suit was filed on 25-11-2000 against

appellants No.1&2 impleading them as defendants No.1&2

in suit stating that both defendants No.1&2 are legal heirs

(4 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

and in possession of rented house. The tenancy in the name

of Ghasi Ram Yadav is not in dispute, similarly, his death

prior to filing of suit is also not in dispute.

(ii) Appellant No.1 (defendant No.1) Mahendra Yadav

happens to be son of deceased original tenant Ghasi Ram

Yadav, and appellant No.2 (defendant No.2) Uma Yadav

happens to be widow of elder son Ram Singh Yadav of the

original tenant and daughter-in-law of deceased tenant

Ghasi Ram Yadav,

(iii) Appellant No.1 (defendant No.1) Mahendra Yadav

submitted his written statement on 5-7-2001 stating that he

alone acquires tenancy right of his deceased father as he

has actual possession of the rented house as a whole. It was

contended in para No.3 of the written statement in explicit

and clear terms that the appellant No.2 (defendant No.2)

Uma Yadav is not in possession of rented house as she lives

with her husband at Jaipur. It was further contended that

after death of her husband in the year 1990, she got

compassionate appointment and reside at SR-1, JDA

Shopping Centre, Bajaj Nagar, Jaipur. Thus the status of

Appellant No.2 (defendant No.2) Uma Yadav as having

devolved tenancy rights of deceased original tenant Ghasi

Ram Yadav was disputed by appellant No.1 (Defendant

No.1) himself, rather it was admitted that even during life

time of original tenant Ghasi Ram Yadav, she was living at

Jaipur with her husband prior to 1990 and thereafter also.

On the date of filing the suit for eviction dated 25-11-2000,

though the plaintiff claimed that defendant No.2 Uma Yadav

(5 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

has also possession of rented house being one of natural

heir of deceased tenant, however, in the written statement

filed by defendant No.1 Mahendra Yadav was categorically

denied and contended that she does not have any

possession over the rented house, much prior to filing of

suit and as a natural corollary consequence is that

defendant No.2 (appellant No.2) Uma Yadav does not fall

within the purview of tenant. It is worth to mention that in

special plea of the written statement of defendant No.1, he

specially contended that his three sisters and Bhabhi

(defendant No.2) visit at Alwar in rented house for

temporary stay on few occasions of family's sorrow and

happy events.

(iv) It is more important to note that the appellant No.2

(defendant No.2) Uma Yadav herself adopted the written

statement of defendant No.1, as transpired from order-

sheet of trial court dated 13-8-2001. This fact itself leads to

a conclusion rather admission by defendant No.2 that she,

although was made party being one of surviving legal heir of

deceased original tenant, but indeed she did not reside or

possess over rented house as admittedly she resided at

Jaipur prior to 1990 with her husband and continuously

resided at Jaipur post 1990 after death of her husband. It

may also be noticed that appellant No.2 (defendant No.2)

Uma Yadav did not appear as a witness and nowhere she

stated that she acquired tenancy rights in rented house

after or prior to death of original tenant Ghasi Ram Yadav

and that she has possession over rented house.

(6 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

(v) During pendency of the first appeal the respondent-

plaintiff filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for

taking on record subsequent facts of rented house. The

Appellant No.1 (defendant No.1) Mahendra Yadav filed reply

to the application on 29-4-2011 and in para No.4 he

admitted that he alone reside in the rented house as he is

issueless. Thus as per pleadings of both defendants

(appellants herein) it is clear position of fact, as reveals

from the record, that appellant No.2 (defendant No.2) does

not have possession of rented house from prior to filing of

eviction suit. She was impleaded as defendant No.2 just

being daughter-in-law and wife of deceased elder son of the

original tenant, being a natural heir.

(vi) It is an admitted fact that during pendency of first

appeal the appellant No.1 (defendant No.1) Mahendra Yadav

passed away on 29-10-2019. It is not in dispute that the

appellant No.1 died issue less without leaving any natural

heir. Though by way of application under Order 22 Rule 3

CPC an attempt was made to claim that appellant No.1 had

entered into second marriage, but this fact was not

substituted in any manner, hence such application was

dismissed by this court on 9-3-2022, and thus, no legal

representative of deceased appellant No.1 Mahendra Yadav

have come on record of the first appeal.

(vii) This first appeal remain alive on board for the reason

that appellant No.2 (defendant No.2) Uma Yadav is party in

the appeal.

(7 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

(viii) In such backdrop of facts, when appellant No.2

(defendant No.2) in her written statement, while adopting

written statement of defendant No.1, as per order-sheet

dated 13-8-2001 has admitted that she does not have

possession over the rented house right from prior to

institution of the suit, she could have made a voluntary offer

to vacate the rented house, more particularly after death of

the appellant No.1 Mahendra Yadav, who is stated to be in

actual possession after death of original tenant. But, it

appears that the appellant No.2 (defendant No.2) instead of

showing her bonafides, wanted to continue the litigation and

made a vague statement in the application under Order 22

rule 3 CPC that after her retirement from service she left

Jaipur and has started to reside at Alwar in rented house.

But, surprisingly in amended cause title of the first appeal,

she continued to mention her address of Jaipur itself.

Otherwise also, such bald statements without any detail and

substantive evidence is not believable, more particularly

when such statement is contradictory to her own pleadings.

This court prima facie is of the opinion that (in view of

aforesaid facts) at least after death of appellant No.1

Mahendra Yadav, who died leaving behind no legal heir,

continuation of first appeal at the behest of appellant No.2 is

a sheer misuse of process of law. The present litigation at

the behest of appellant No.2 can be termed as superfluous,

unscrupulous and unwarranted litigation.

(ix) Be that as it may, the appellant No.2 (defendant No.2)

has opted to pursue the first appeal on merits, and her

(8 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

counsel has argued the first appeal on merits to contend

that the decree for eviction passed against appellants on the

ground of bonafide and reasonable necessity is bad on facts

and law, therefore, this court is dealing with the first appeal

on merits as well.

4. Relevant facts of the present appeal are, which may be

recapitulated, as under:

(i) The original plaintiff Krishan Sharan Sharma filed a suit

for recovery of due rent and eviction on 25-11-2000 claiming

that the rented house was let out to tenant Gashi Ram Yadav

in July, 1967. He claimed that monthly rent of rented house

was agreed to be Rs.2,500/- with effect from 1-4-1999 and

prior to that the rent was Rs.2000/- per month. It was

claimed that the original tenant Gahsi Ram Yadav passed

away and after his death defendants No.1&2 (appellants in

first appeal) are in possession of the rented house.

(ii) It was contended that rent of the rented house was not

paid for many years, however, he claimed arrears of only for

three years preceding to the date of filing the suit i.e. for 17

months Rs.2000/- prior to 1-4-1999 and for 19 months after

1-4-1999 to 31-10-2000 at the rate of Rs.2,500/- per

month. Thus, total due arrears Rs.81,500/- were claimed

alleging to be due against defendants as they committed

default in payment of rent for more than six months.

(iii) It was further claimed that he plaintiff landlord required

the rented house for residence of his family, as the plaintiff

has no other residential house of his own in Alwar and his

family members are facing hardship. Whereas the rented

(9 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

house usually remain closed and unused. The plaintiff

landlord has also issued legal notice dated 6-7-2000 to

defendants for vacating the rented house and to pay due

arrears.

(iv) The defendant No.1 filed written statement and admitted

the fact that house in question was let out to his father in

July, 1967. he stated that at that time the monthly rent was

Rs.140/- per month, which was increased in 1969 to

Rs.150/-. It was further increased in 1971 to Rs.160/- per

month, in the year 1973 to Rs.170/- per month, in the year

1976 to Rs.190/-, in the year 1981 Rs.220/-, in the year

1990 Rs.250/-, and in the year 1993 Rs.270/- per month. He

denied the monthly rent to be Rs.2000/- or Rs,2,500/-.

(v) He contended that till October, 1998 his father Ghasi

Ram Yadav paid rent, thereafter the rent was paid by him in

presence of Jagdish Prasad, Rajesh Kumar and Pramod

Kumar. He further contended that since the plaintiff wanted

to increase rent Rs.1000/- per month, for which defendant

did not agreed, hence, present suit creating false ground of

default in payment of rent and necessity has been filed.

(vi) He contended that plaintiff does not require the rented

house for residence of his family as the plaintiff has his own

house at Sethi Colony Jaipur and a big building of Govind

Dev ji temple in Alwar.

(vii) The defendant No.1 further contended that he alone is

in possession of the rented house after death of his father.

The defendant No.2 is not in possession of the rented house,

as she resided at Jaipur with her husband (elder brother of

(10 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

defendant No.1) and after death of her husband the

defendant No.2 got job in Jaipur and resided at Jaipur. As

such possession of defendant No.2 in rented house was

denied by defendant No.1 himself.

(viii) The defendant No.1 denied any arrears of rent and

claimed that the plaintiff has no bonafide necessity of the

rented house, rather the suit has been filed with oblique

motive to create pressure upon defendant No.1 for

increasing the rent.

(ix) The defendant No.2 did not file her own separate written

statement and adopted the written statement filed by

defendant No.1, as transpires from order-sheet dated 13-8-

2001.

5. During the course of trial, the trial court on 10-10-2001

determined the provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the

Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950

(hereafter `the Rent Act') as Rs.2000/- per month and directed

the tenant to deposit Rs.1,02,350/-. The said order was

challenged by the tenant by filing Misc. Appeal No.2173/2001

before the High Court, which was allowed on 4-1-2002 and the

tenant was directed to pay Rs.1000/- per month and to deposit

50% of arrears of rent, which order has been complied with by the

tenant.

6. It is also worth to take note of the fact that during pendency

of first appeal the defendant committed default in depositing rent

for three months and the same was deposited after delay.

(11 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

Therefore, the High Court vacated the stay vide order dated 9-7-

2012. However, appellants approached the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, who vide order dated 14-8-2014, while staying the

execution of eviction decree, asked the High Court to decide the

first appeal within six months.

7. The trial court on the basis of rival pleadings of both parties

framed following issues:-

1.Whether the defendants have committed default in payment of rent for the rented house?

2. Whether the plaintiff has reasonable and bonafide need of the rented house for residence of his family?

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of Rs.81,500/- as arrears of rent?

4. Whether the plaintiff would suffer more hardship in comparison to defendant in case of not vacation of rented house?

5. Whether the plaintiff's need can be satisfied by partial eviction of defendants from the rented house?

6. Relief?

8. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the impugned

judgments and other material available on record.

Issues No.1&3:

9. Issues No.1&3 pertaining to default in payment of rent.

During course of arguments it has not been disputed that in view

of default committed by defendants benefit of first default has

already been extended to defendants and no decree on the ground

of default has been passed against defendants. Hence, it is not

required to discuss findings of default on these issue and same are

affirmed.

a) Claiming arrears of rent Rs.81,500/- the plaintiff

claimed that the rent prior April,1999 was Rs.2,000/- per

month for 17 months and from April,1999 to 31-10-2000

Rs.2,500/- for 19 months. In counter, the defendant No.1

(12 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

claimed the last paid rent Rs.270/- per month. In the

present case neither any rent note nor any rent receipts

were issued. The plaintiff and his witnesses have stated that

rent agreed to pay at the rate of Rs.2,500/- after 1-4-1999,

has not been paid. In rebuttal, the defendant produced

document of house-tax (Ex.A-1) to show that in the year

1979-80 the monthly rent was Rs.150, whereas in written

statement itself the defendant admitted that in the year

1981 the monthly rent was Rs.220/-. Thus, the document of

House-tax was not treated as conclusive evidence to

determine the correct rent. One of the witnesses of

defendant Dw.2 Girraj Prasad in his evidence stated that in

October, 1998 the monthly rent was Rs.800/- per month.

Therefore, the trial court considering overall evidence of both

the parties and the area and rooms of rented house assessed

the monthly rent as Rs.1000/- per month.

b) It may be noticed that during course of trial when

provisional rent was determined by the trial court at the rate

of Rs.2,000/-, however, the High Court interfered with the

said order and directed defendant to pay Rs.1000/- per

month. Since trial court in its final judgment assessed the

monthly rent as Rs.1,000/- per month, which was being paid

by defendant, hence, the decree for recovery of Rs.81,500/-

was not passed and defendant has been directed to pay

Rs.1000/- per month as mesne profits until vacation of

rented house.

(13 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

This court is of the opinion that decision of issue No.3, in

aforesaid manner is just, proper and reasonable and do not

call for any interference.

c) Here it may be noticed that counsel for appellant

defendant attempted to argue that the plaintiff arbitrarily

claimed monthly rent as Rs.2,500/-, whereas the trial court

has assessed the monthly rent as Rs.1000/- per month,

therefore, the suit could not have been decided by the court

of Additional District Judge as it was not having pecuniary

jurisdiction. This court finds that firstly the court of

Additional District Judge has the jurisdiction to entertain,

hear and decide the suit and on the issue of pecuniary

jurisdiction, no such objection was raised by the defendant in

the written statement. Secondly, as per valuation assessed

by the plaintiff the suit was well within pecuniary jurisdiction

of the court of District Judge. Thus, the argument raised by

counsel for appellant defendant cannot be appreciated in the

backdrop facts of the case, more particularly at the appellate

stage.

In such view of the matter, findings of issues No.1& 3

do not call for any interference and the same are affirmed.

Issue No.2:

10. Issue No.2 pertains to bonafide and reasonable necessity of

rented house to plaintiff for his family. The plaintiff appeared as

Pw.1 and stated that he has retired from service and has no house

in Alwar except the rented house. He stated that in Alwar there is

a temple of Govind Dev ji, wherein he and his wife reside along

(14 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

with his brother. He stated that in temple the residence is at first

floor, where he and his wife face great hardship and inconvenience

to step up and down the stairs. He stated that the rented house is

required for residence of his family. In cross examination he

admitted that he has another house at Sethi Colony, Jaipur, where

his son resides. He admitted that for some times he and his wife

also reside at Jaipur and for some time, they reside in Alwar in the

temple premises. In his cross examination he admitted that there

is no other residential house in Alwar other than the rented house.

He stated that because of good relations with the original tenant,

who was ex-MLA, Ex.MP from Alwar Constituency, during his life

time he did not file the suit for eviction, and after his death when

his son Mahendra Yadav did not reside in rented house nor paid

rent, he filed the present eviction suit. Statements of Pw.1 have

been corroborated by Pw.2 Shubh Ram, Pw. 3 Ram Sharan and

Pw.4 Brijendra Sharan Sharma, son of plaintiff. These witnesses

have also stated that plaintiff and his wife face great hardship in

residing in temple at the first floor. They further stated that

plaintiff and his wife usually visit and stay in Alwar as well.

a) In rebuttal the defendant No.1 has stated that he

reside in the rented house after death of his father. He

admitted that defendant No.2 reside in Jaipur in her own

house. He admitted that the plaintiff is bonafide resident of

Alwar, but he reside at Jaipur and when come to Alwar, he

reside in Temple, which is his personal premises. He further

admitted that the plaintiff has no other house in Alwar

except the rented house. The Defendant No.1 claimed that

he is an Advocate and reside in rented house. He admitted

(15 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

that although he completed his degree of LLB in the year

1978, but he got himself enrolled as an Advocate in the year

1995 and became member of Alwar Bar in the year 2000.

However, he did not contest any legal case of any client.

Defendant's witnesses Dw.2 Girraj Prasad, Dw.3 Pramod

Kumar and Dw.4 Jagdish Prasad supported statements of

Dw.1 Mahendra Yadav that he has no house to reside in

Alwar except the rented house.

b) During course of trial the original plaintiff passed away,

hence his wife and son were substituted as his legal

representative. And during pendency of first appeal, the wife

of plaintiff also has passed away. Counsel for defendant-

appellant tried to make out a case that since original

plaintiff and his wife have passed away, therefore, the

bonafide need of rented house has come to an end in view

of subsequent event and decree for eviction be quashed.

c) On perusal of findings of issue No.2, it transpired that

the trial court after considering statements of plaintiff and

his witnesses has concluded that plaintiff needed the rented

house for his family and the he has no residential house

other than the rented house and the temple. The premises

of temple is neither suitable, nor plaintiff can be forced to

live in the temple despite having his own house which is the

rented house. The trial court on the strength of judgments

of Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that the landlord is free

to seek his comfort and has a choice to live in his own

house. Even if, the original landlord has passed away, the

need of residence in rented house for his family does not

(16 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

adversely affect. Reliance was placed on Shantilal Vs.

Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala [AIR 1976 SC 2358]

wherein this court held that "after the death of original

landlord, the senior member of his family takes his place

and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his

occupation and the occupation of other members of his

family." In Kamleshwar Prasad Vs. Pradumanju

Agarwal [1997 DNJ (SC) 196] wherein it was held that

"on death of landlord bonafide necessity does not stand

lapse on death of landlord and the same would be of widow

and children. The crucial date is of filing the application".

The trial court concluded that the plaintiff cannot be

compelled to live either at Jaipur or in the temple premises,

when he wants to live in his own house in Alwar.

d) This court firstly finds that the trial court has not

committed any jurisdictional error in appreciation of

evidence on record to conclude the issue of bonafide and

reasonable necessity in favour of plaintiff. It is settled

proposition of law in umpteen number of judgments of

Hon'ble Supreme Court that the landlord is the best judge

for his need and neither the tenant nor the court can compel

the landlord to compromise with his comfort. It is open for

the landlord to look for his comfort and need not any

sacrifice. In the instant case the plaintiff had no other house

other than the rented house. The house at Jaipur and the

temple in Alwar may not be termed as alternative premises

available to plaintiff. Undisputedly the plaintiff's house on

rent was needed for residence of his family. The need of the

(17 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

rented house by the plaintiff landlord has not been found to

be malafide or with oblique motive.

e) It is no more res integra that need of plaintiff landlord

has to be examined on the date of institution of the suit and

although subsequent events may be taken into

consideration but mere death of plaintiff landlord and his

wife does not lead to inference that need of plaintiff for

residence of his family would come to an end particularly

when the original tenant and his legal representative, the

appellant No.1, determining rights of the tenant, who

resided in the rented house have passed away.

f) In Mahendra K. Agarwal Vs. Vinay Kumar Gupta

[(2010)15 SCC 574] The Apex Court observed that need

of family members of landlord is included the bonafide need

of landlord and no distinction can be made between

residential and non residential premises in that regard.

g) In D. Sasi Kumar Vs. Soundararajan [(2019)9

SCC 282] the Apex Court held that "once landlord

established bonafide requirement of rented premises on the

institution of case, it subsists irrespective of the time lapse

in the judicial process coming to an end. The landlord

should not be penalised for the slowness of the legal system

and the crucial date for deciding the bonafide requirement

of landlord is the date of application for eviction, which were

hereby reiterate."

h) Landlord relied on Pratima Devi Vs. T.B. Krishnan

[(1996)5 SCC 353] to content that the landlord is best

(18 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

judge of his residential requirement. Judgment in case of

Atma S.Berar Vs. Mukhtiar Singh [AIR 2003 SC 624]

has been relied to contend that the landlord for his own

occupation of property is entitled to eviction decree. Anil

Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja [2014 SAR (Civil) 660] has been

relied to contend that doing business from other premises

cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted

premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted

premises for his own business. Kamleshwar Prasad Vs.

Pradumanju Agarwal (AIR 1997 SC 2399] has been

relied to contend that bonafide need for starting business

does not lapse on death of landlord, as business can be

carried on by his widow.

i) In counter to aforesaid factual and legal proposition

the contention of counsel for appellant is that once the

plaintiff had alternative premises in temple of Govind Dev ji

his need for residence of his family in rented house cannot

be treated as bonafide, does not have any importance in

view of judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court. The trial

court has rightly declined such contention and this court

also does not find any force in such arguments. The

premises of temple firstly cannot be treated as alternative

premises for residence. Secondly, the plaintiff and his

witness have stated that there was discomfort for plaintiff

and his wife to reside in temple at the first floor.

(19 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

j) As far as subsequent events of death of plaintiff and

his wife are concerned, the need for the rented house for

plaintiff's family includes for his son also. Hence, the need

as existed on the date of filing the suit cannot be treated as

extinguished by subsequent events. The defendant cannot

be allowed to take advantage of slowness of legal process,

more particularly, in the present case when in fact the

appellant- defendant No.1 has passed away. And the

appellant- defendant No.2 did not have possession of rented

house, as discussed, hereinabove.

Thus, the outcome of the aforesaid discussion is that the

decree for eviction passed by the trial court on the ground of

bonafide and reasonable necessity of plaintiff landlord for his

family is just and proper and the same requires no interference.

The same are affirmed.

Issue No.4:

11. Issue No.4 pertaining to comperative hardship has been

decided by the trial court in favour plaintiff landlord. It has come

on record that defendan No.1 Mahendra Yadav's wife was in job at

Uttar Pradesh, and defendant No.1 also reside with his wife. The

defendant No.1 tried to justify his need of rented house by

claiming that he is Advocate at Alwar, but such fact was not

proved as he admitted that he did not contest any case of any

client in Alwar. On the contrary it has come on record that plaintiff

has no other alternative house in Alwar except the temple

premises, where he and wife reside at first floor. That apart, it is

also relevant factor that the defendant No.1 did not reside in

rented house for long time and had not cared to look after the

(20 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

rented house. Once the need of plaintiff has been found bonafide

and reasonable, comparative hardship is also stand in favour of

plaintiff in backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case. The

trial court has not committed any illegality or jurisdictional error

while deciding this issue in favour of plaintiff. The same are

affirmed.

Issue No.5:

12 Issue No.5 pertains to partial eviction of defendant from the

rented house. Firstly the plaintiff landlord adduced evidence to the

effect that the partial eviction of defendant from the rented house

would not meet the need of the plaintiff. Secondly, the defendants

have not adduced any evidence to rebut plaintiff's contention. It

has come on record that though there were good relations

between original plaintiff and the original tenant, however,

initiation of legal proceedings the bitterness may be assumed to

cropped up between parties. There is one common entrance to

residential house and according to size of the residential house the

trial court has rightly declined the partial eviction to meet the

needs of the plaintiff. More so, in view of subsequent events that

defendant No.1 has passed away, and defendant No.2 does not

reside in the rented house, the issue of partial eviction becomes

redundant. In view of holding the need of plaintiff as bonafide and

reasonable and comparative hardship in favour of plaintiff, the

issue of partial eviction also decided in favour of the plaintiff.

13. From the record it transpires that respondent plaintiff filed an

application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to place on record

additional documents i.e. photo copy of reading of electricity

(21 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

meter of rented house and photographs of rented house to show

that the rented house was not used for long and it reached to a

dilapidated condition. Although the application has been replied by

appellant defendant denying averments of the application,

however, the defendant has not produced any counter document

to prove consumption of electricity or to prove that the rented

house was in use and in proper useable condition. The defendant

No.1 Mahendra Yadav has passed away, and although in written

statement the defendant No.2 Uma Yadav admitted that she does

not reside in rented house and was not in possession of the same

as she reside at Jaipur, however, in her application under Order 22

Rule 3 CPC she claimed that after retirement she had started to

reside in rented house, same cannot be believed without

particulars and substantive facts. The plea taken by defendant

No.2 Uma Yadav contrary to her written statement is not

acceptable. Thus, after death of defendant No.1 Mahendra Yadav,

there are circumstances to assume that residential house is lying

closed without any use. As far as additional documents produced

by plaintiff landlord are concerned the same cannot be treated as

admissible in evidence, however, in the present case there is no

issue of non user of rented house, the issue of comparative

hardship has already been discussed and decided in favour of

plaintiff landlord. The additional documents are not admissible in

evidence primarily. Looking to the inadmissibility of documents,

this court is not inclined to allow the application under Order 41

Rule 27 CPC and the same is dismissed.

(22 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

14. At this juncture this court intends to discuss the aim and

object of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction)

Act, 1950, which was promulgated as a piece of social legislation

with the aim to protect tenant from frivolous eviction. At the same

time in order to do justice to landlord and to avoid restriction on

their right to eviction of tenant as to dispute on legal right to

certain salutary provisions have been made by the legislation

which give relief to landlord. The Rent Control legislation was

intended to strike a reasonable balance between requirements of

tenants for adequate protection against the aggressive designs of

greedy landlord to evict the tenant or to increase rates of rent to

an exorbitant limit.

In case of Shakuntala Bai Vs. Narayan Das [(2004)5

SCC 772] while dealing with Madhya Pradesh Accommodation

Control Act, 1961 observed that there is no warrant for

interpreting the Rent Control legislation in such a manner, the

basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from

unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the landlords

of their properties for all times to come.

In Satyavati Sharma Vs. Union of India [(2008)5 SCC

287] the Apex Court observed that "it is trite to say that a

legislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time

of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/ or due to change

of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of

the doctrine of equality and even if the validity of such legislation

may have been upheld at a given point of time, the court may, in

subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the

(23 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

rationale of classification has become non-existent". In para 12 of

the judgment the Apex Court observed thus:-

"12. Before proceeding further we consider it necessary to obsrve that there has been a definite shift in the court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislation. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant--Mohinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana [(1985)4 SCC 221] Prabhakaran Nair Vs. State of T.N. [(1987)4 SCC 238], D.C. Bhatia Vs. Union of India [(1995)1 SCC 104] and C.N. Rudramurthy Vs. K. Barkathulla Khan [(1998)8 SCC 275]. In these and other cases, the court consistently held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide safeguard for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments."

Aforesaid judgment has been followed in State of

Maharashtra Vs. Super Max International Private Limited

[(2009)9 SCC 772] and it has been held that "we reaffirm the

views expressed in Satyawati Sharma (supra) and emphasise

the need for a more balanced and objective approach to the

relationship between the landlord and tenant. This is not to say

that the Court should lean in favour of the landlord but merely

that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all

tenants, as a class, are in dire circumstances and in desperate

need of the Court's protection under all circumstances."

15. Having considered the aim and object of the Rent Act, this

court finds that in given facts and circumstances of the case the

appellant No.2 (Defendant No.2) Uma Yadav, who admitted in her

written statement that she does not reside in the rented house

and not in possession, need no protection of the Rent Act. This

(24 of 24) [CFA-680/2004]

court deprecates her pursuation of first appeal on merits. There is

nothing wrong to have a legitimate expectation from the learned

Members of the Bar to convince such type of litigants not to

pursue the unwarranted litigation before any court of law. If any

litigation, with passage of time or due to prolonged life of the

litigation have lost its merits, the parties should be advised not to

pursue such lumber litigation unwarrantedly on merits, taking

immense judicial time of courts for no good results. Prestigious

and valuable time of judicial courts should be utilized for deciding

bonafide and legitimate disputes instead of deciding superfluous

litigation like present one. Although, this present first appeal

deserves to be dismissed with costs, however, being the present

appeal in the nature of first appeal, this court is refraining itself to

impose any costs.

16. As a result of discussion made hereinabove, this present first

appeal is without any force and devoid of any merit, as such the

same is dismissed without any order to cost.

17. Stay application and any other pending application(s), if any,

also stand(s) disposed of.

18. Record of the court below be sent back forthwith.

(SUDESH BANSAL),J

Arn/77

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