The State Of Rajasthan vs Sang Singh
2022 Latest Caselaw 3445 Raj

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 62/2022

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary Department Of Rural Development And Panchayati Raj, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur

2. The Secretary, Department Of Education, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

3. The Director, Elementary Education, Bikaner, District-

Bikaner, Rajasthan.

4. Zila Parishad, Through The Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jaisalmer.

5. District Establishment Committee, Through Its Chairman Zila Parishad Jaisalmer.

6. The District Education Officer, Elementary Education, District Jaisalmer, Rajasthan

----Appellants Versus Sang Singh S/o Dhan Singh, Aged About 28 Years, U/c Rajput (U/c), R/o Village - Sagara, Tehsil - Jaisalmer, District - Jaisalmer

----Respondent

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sunil Beniwal, AAG with Mr. Utkarsh Singh For Respondent(s) : Mr. Kailash Jangid

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AKIL KURESHI HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA

Order

05/03/2022

This appeal arises out of the judgment of the learned Single

Judge dated 17.02.2021 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1277/2021.

Brief facts of the case are that the State Government had

issued an advertisement in the year 2013 for appointment of

Teacher Grade-III by direct recruitment. Educational qualifications

(2 of 3) [SAW-62/2022]

were prescribed in the advertisement. The respondent-original

petitioner had applied for the post. He was selected and appointed

under an order dated 18.03.2015. He joined the duties and

successfully completed the period of probation on 27.06.2017.

Nearly two and a half years thereafter, the employer issued an

order dated 13.01.2021 cancelling the petitioner's appointment.

This order the petitioner has challenged before the learned Single

Judge. The State had taken a stand that in view of the judgment

of the Supreme Court dated 12.09.2019 in the case of State of

Rajasthan Vs. Trilok Ram, the petitioner was not eligible for

appointment. Acting on such judgment, his services came to be

terminated. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment

quashed the termination order and allowed the writ petition on the

ground that at the time of appointment, the petitioner's

documents were scrutinized by the department and only

thereafter, appointment was offered. Terminating services of such

an employee long after his appointment without any further

enquiry was therefore impermissible, particularly since the order

of termination was passed without following the principles of

natural justice. It is this judgment the State has challenged in this

appeal.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the documents on record, we do not find that the learned

Single Judge has committed any error. As noted, the petitioner

was appointed after selection through regular recruitment process

and the offer of appointment was made on 18.03.2015. The

petitioner joined the duty and successfully completed the period of

probation on 27.06.2017. Nearly 6 years after his initial

appointment, his services were sought to be terminated on

(3 of 3) [SAW-62/2022]

13.01.2021. This was only on the basis of subsequent

development of law relying on the judgment of the Supreme

Court. Quite apart from the action of the employer to reopen such

an issue of validity of qualification of an appointee several years

after appointment only on the basis of the judgment of the

Supreme Court, which was rendered later on, no such step could

have been taken without following the principles of natural justice.

For all these reasons, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

Learned counsel for the respondent-original petitioner stated

that despite no stay granted by the Division Bench of this Court

pursuant to the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated

17.02.2021, the petitioner is not allowed to resume his duty.

It is thus provided that if the petitioner is allowed to join his

duty within a period of 7 days from today, he will not claim wages

for the period during which he has not rendered actual services. If

this condition is not fulfilled, the petitioner would be entitled to

wages for the entire period. In either case the intervening period

would be counted for all other purposes including seniority.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

                                   (REKHA BORANA),J                                           (AKIL KURESHI),CJ
                                    9-jayesh/-









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