Bank Of India vs Latoor Lal And Ors
2022 Latest Caselaw 1194 Raj/2

       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                   BENCH AT JAIPUR

                 S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 305/2000

Bank Of India, a Banking Company duly registered under the
Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)
Act No.5 of 1970 having its registered office at Express Towers,
Nariman Point, Bombay-400021 and branches all over India and
one situated at Rampura Bazar, Arya Samaj Road, Kota,
Rajasthan.
                                                           ----Plaintiff-Appellant
                                    Versus
1. Shri Latoor Lal Raigar Son of Shri Ghasi Lal Raigar, resident of
Kewal Nagar, Tehsil, Ladpura, District Kota, Rajasthan
2. Shri Kamleshwar Sen Son of Shri Dhanna Lal Sen, resident of
Village Ranipur, Tehsil, Ladpura, District Kota, Rajasthan
3. Shri Mohan Lal Sen Son of Shri Nathu Lal, resident of House
No.362, Kotri Gordhanpura, Kota having barber shop at Bari
Kotri Gordhanpura Chauhara, Kota, Rajasthan
                                                ----Defendants-Respondents

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ajay Shukla through VC For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rinesh Gupta through VC

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR VYAS

Judgment

02/02/2022

This civil first appeal has been preferred against the

judgment and decree dated 10th July 2000 passed by the learned

trial court (Additional District Judge, Court No.4, Kota), by which

the plaintiff-appellant's Civil Suit No.06/1996 filed against the

defendant-respondents for the recovery of loan amount was

dismissed.

(2 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

The plaintiff-appellant-Bank had filed the civil suit

alleging the fact that defendant No.1 was carrying on the business

of passenger transport in Kota and defendants No.2 and 3 were

his sureties. At the request of defendant No.1, a term loan

amount of Rs.79,770/- was sanctioned to him for purchase of

Matadore (Diesel Mini Bus) and the rate of interest was fixed as

mentioned in para-3 of the plaint. Defendant No.1 and sureties

exhibited the documents detailed in para-3 of the plaint. Further

admissions of loan were made by defendants No.1 & 2 on different

dates as mentioned in para-6 of the plaint. Defendant No.1 failed

in the payment of installments of rent. Therefore, this suit was

filed for recovery of Rs.2,07,738/- from the defendants jointly and

severally with further interest @ 15.5% per annum on quarterly

basis. Defendants No.1 & 2 filed the written statement, wherein

in para-3 they have admitted the receiving of loan amount from

the plaintiff-appellant, but the rate of interest was not admitted.

Further the defendant denied the execution of documents

acknowledging the loan amount on different dates. Thus, it was

submitted that the suit was barred by limitation as the loan was

sanctioned in the year 1983 whereas the civil suit for the recovery

of loan amount was filed in the year 1994.

Learned trial court framed following issues on the basis

of pleadings of the parties:-

^^1- vk;k Jh xksiky ljhu dks oknh dh vksj ls nkok nk;j djus o nkos ij gLrk{kj djus o nkos dks lR;kfir djus dk vf/kdkj gSA &&& oknh 2- vk;k izfroknh ua0 1 }kjk fy;s x;s _.k ij C;kt nj 2-5 izfr"kr vf/kdre cSad nj ls mij ftldk U;wure 12-50 izfr"kr izfro"kZ o =Sekfld fojke ls ns;

Fkk o ,slh gh "krZ oknh o izfrokn ua01 ds e/; r; gqbZ FkhA &&&oknh

(3 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

3- vk;k oknh ds i{k esa izfroknh ua0 1 us izfroknh ua0 1 }kjk fy;s x;s _.k dh ,ot esa okn i= ds pj.k Øe&3 o 4 esa of.kZr nLrkost fu'ikfnr fd;sA &&oknh

4- vk;k izfroknh ua0 1 ls mDr okni= ds pj.k Øe&6 esa of.kZr vuqlkj izfroknh ua0 1 }kjk fy;s x;s _.k dh le; le; ij vfHkLohÑfr dhA &&oknh 5- vk;k 3&7&94 dks izfroknhx.k esa oknh dh 2] 07] 738 :0 24 iSls jde cdk;k FkhA &&oknh 6- vk;k nkok fe;kn esa gSA &&oknh 7- vuqrks'kA^^

On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, witness PW-1

Maheshwar Dayal Gupta was examined and on behalf of

defendant-respondent DW-1 Mohan Lal (surety) was examined.

Learned trial court dismissed the suit of plaintiff-appellant after

coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff-appellant was not able

to prove issues No.1 to 4, 5 and 6 in their favour. Therefore, the

suit was dismissed.

Aggrieved by this judgment and decree the present

appeal has been preferred. It has been submitted on behalf of

learned counsel for appellant that the learned trial court has failed

to consider the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. The plaintiff-appellant-bank had filed a suit for

recovery of loan amount from defendants no. 1 to 3. The

defendant-respondents had categorically admitted the sanctioning

and receiving of the loan amount. Thus, as per the provisions

contained in Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the

suit was liable to be decreed on the basis of those admissions of

the defendant respondents. Apart from this, sufficient evidence

was adduced by the plaintiff-appellant in support of the plaint. All

the relevant documents executed in the course of loan agreement

were proved by the plaintiff-appellant. There was no evidence of

(4 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

the defendant-respondents which could contradict the evidence of

plaintiff-appellant. In support of arguments, following judgments

have been relied upon by the appellant :-

1. Charanjit Lal Mehra & Ors. v. Smt. Kamal Saroj Mahajan & Anr.

(2005) 11 SCC 279

2. Karam Kapahi & Ors v. M/s. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust & Anr (2010) 4 SCC 753

Learned counsel appearing for respondents has

submitted that the plaintiff-appellant had not produced the power

of attorney which could prove that the suit was presented by an

authorised person. Therefore, the suit was not maintainable at

all. It was further submitted that it was not a case of admission

on the part of defendant respondents. The defendant-respondents

denied the rate of interest as well as the acknowledgment of loan

amount on various dates. Therefore, the suit was clearly not

maintainable for want of production of power of attorney by the

plaintiff-appellant and due to insufficiency and inadmissibility of

the plaintiff's evidence on those grounds. Thus, Order XII Rule 6

of the Code of Civil Procedure had no application in this case and

the learned trial court had rightly dismissed the suit and no

interference is called for in the judgment and decree of the

learned trial court.

Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides

as under :-

"6. Judgment on admissions.-(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.

(5 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced."

Hon'ble apex court has held in Charanjit Lal Mehra v.

Smt. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (supra) as under :-

"(8) Learned counsel made an alternative submission that the revision petition was not maintainable and the lease deed is not registered one and therefore, it is not maintainable. None of these objections were raised by the defendants before the learned Single Judge. Even before the trial court, the non- registration of lease deed (which did not prescribe any term) was not put in issue. It is only devised now to some how defeat and delay the eviction and possession of the premises to the landlady. In fact, Order XII Rule 6, C.P.C. is enacted for the purpose of and in order to expedite the trials if there is any admission on behalf of the defendants or an admission can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case without any disputed; then, in such a case in order to expedite and dispose of the matter such admission can be acted upon. In the present case, looking at the terms of lease deed, there can be no two opinions that the tenancy was joint/composite and not individual one. Therefore, on these admitted facts the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court appears to be justified. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India & Ors. reported in (2000) 7 SCC 120. Their Lordships have held as follows:

"In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending Rule 6 of Order 12 CPC it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled."

The Supreme Court should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment."

(6 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

Therefore, in the present case, as appearing to us, there is a clear admission on behalf of the defendants that there existed a relationship of landlord and tenants, the rent is more than Rs.3500/- and the tenancy is joint and composite one. As such on these admitted facts, there is no two opinion in the matter and the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere in this Special Leave Petition and the same is dismissed."

Similarly in Karam Kapahi & Ors v. M/s. Lal Chand

Public Charitable Trust & Anr (supra), it has been observed as

under :-

"46. The principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about 'which there is no controversy' [See the dictum of Lord Jessel, the Master of Rolls, in Thorp versus Holdsworth in (1876) 3 Chancery Division 637 at 640.] In this connection, it may be noted that order 12 Rule 6 was amendment by the Amendment Act of 1976.

49. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by 'pleading or otherwise in writing' but in Order 12 Rule 6 the expression 'or otherwise' is much wider in view of the words used therein namely: 'admission of fact.......either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing'.

50. Keeping the width of this provision in mind this Court held that under this rule admissions can be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case [See Charanjit Lal Mehra and others v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt.) and another, (2005) 11 SCC 279 at page 285 (para 8)]. Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered under this Rule [See Mullas's commentary on the Code, 16 th Edition, Volume II, page 2177]."

In the light of those provisions of the Code of Civil

Procedure and principles laid down by Hon'ble apex court in

Charanjit Lal Mehra (supra) and in Karam Kapahi (supra), the

(7 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

plaintiff had filed this suit for recovery of the loan amount with

interest sanctioned to defendant no. 1 in which transaction,

defendants no. 2 and 3 were sureties. Defendants no. 1 and 2 in

their written-statement clearly admitted the factum of sanction

and receiving of loan amount from plaintiff-appellant. The only

dispute which remains was relating to rate of interest. The

plaintiff-appellant came with the specific case that a fixed rate of

interest was determined by way of agreement between plaintiff

and defendant and has also got examined PW1 (bank officer) in

evidence who has stated that loan amount was sanctioned to

defendant no. 1 and there was an agreement with defendant to

repay the loan with interest on the terms and conditions

mentioned in the loan agreement. Though the defendant had

denied the rate of interest in the written-statement but admittedly

no witness had been produced by the defendant during the course

of evidence.

DW-1 (surety) was examined in the learned trial court

but even he had not deposed on the point of interest that was

agreed between the plaintiff and defendant. DW-1 (surety) has

only stated that he had written to the Bank that they may recover

the loan amount by way of seizure, attachment and sale of the

vehicle, which was purchased from the loan amount. Apart from

this, no other material statement had been made by DW-1. Thus,

DW-1 had not denied the rate of interest as claimed by the

plaintiff-appellant (Bank) and neither had he denied the execution

of acknowledgments of loan by defendant No.1. Further

defendant No.1, the loanee, had not even appeared in the

(8 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

witness-box. Thus, there is no evidence of the loanee denying the

rate of interest and execution of acknowledgment of debt (loan).

Thus, the plaintiff-Bank has categorically proved the

issues by way of oral and documentary evidence produced on its

behalf and on the basis of admission and absence of denial on the

part of the defendants about the loan agreement,

acknowledgment of debts and rate of interest. Further, the

documents got exhibited by the bank in evidence are the

documents which are maintained in usual course of business by a

public sector bank and thus, those documents are reliable and it

can not be presumed that they have been falsely prepared.

This is true that the power of attorney was not placed

on record by the plaintiff-appellant during the course of evidence

in the trial court but nonetheless there are express and implied

admissions of the defendant in the matter. Further, the written

statement of defendant denying the rate of interest and the

execution of acknowledgments, have not been proved by sufficient

evidence on the part of defendants. Thus, those mere denials of

the defendant cannot be accepted in view of want of any

supporting evidence. Thus merely on technical grounds, the suit

was not liable to be dismissed. Particularly, in view of the specific

provision of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Thus, the learned trial court has erred in dismissing the

suit. The suit is liable to be decreed with further interest from the

date of suit to the realization of the decretal amount with simple

interest @ 6% per annum.

Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and

decree of learned trial court dated 10.07.2000 are hereby set

(9 of 9) [CFA-305/2000]

aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant is allowed. The

plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to receive Rs.2,07,738.24/-

from the defendant-respondents. The plaintiff-appellant would

also be entitled to receive simple interest @ 6% per annum from

the date of the suit till the realization of the decretal amount.

Decree be drawn accordingly.

(MANOJ KUMAR VYAS), J.

Sunita/19

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