Ranjeet Singh vs State
2022 Latest Caselaw 5092 Raj

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 5092 Raj
Judgement Date : 5 April, 2022

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Ranjeet Singh vs State on 5 April, 2022

Bench: Dinesh Mehta

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 3553/2019

Ranjeet Singh S/o Sh Kheem Singh, Aged About 33 Years, By Caste Raona Rajput R/o Chatri Wali Gali, Main Bazar Beda Tehsil Bali Dist. Pali

----Petitioner Versus

1. The State of Rajasthan.

2. Puran Kanwar D/o Sh Tej Singh Parihar, By Caste Raona Rajput R/o Tehsil And Dist. Sirohi

----Respondents

For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Yogita Mohnani For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.K. Bhati, Public Prosecutor Mr. Jaidev Singh Bhati for complainant

JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA

Order

05/04/2022

1. Challenging the FIR No.17/2019, registered at P.S. Mahila

Police Station, District Sirohi, seeking petitioner's prosecution for

offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 376(2)(n) of the

Indian Penal Code, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that

the complainant has lodged a false case against the petitioner and

no offence much less the offence under Section 376, 420 and 468

of the IPC is made out from bare look at the contents of the FIR.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in light of the

various decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court and the decision

of this Court rendered in the case of Radhakrishan Meena Vs.

State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition

(2 of 5) [CRLMP-3553/2019]

No.4952/2020), the FIR in question deserves to be quashed

and set aside.

3. Learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand opposed

petitioner's prayer and argued that the petitioner has deceived

the complainant and in the guise of assurance of marriage,

exploited her.

4. Mr. Bhati, learned counsel for the complainant, on the other

hand submitted that the allegations levelled in the FIR are

required to be believed and whether they are false and whether

the petitioner has exploited the complainant on the false promise

of marriage with her are subject to trial, but the FIR cannot be

quashed at this stage.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available.

6. In the opinion of this Court, it is not even a case of sexual

exploitation on the basis of promise to marry.

7. It is the admitted case of the complainant that the petitioner

had contracted marriage with the complainant in the year 2013.

8. The relevant part of the FIR which was lodged by none other

than the complainant herself, who was 30 years of age at the

relevant time reads thus:-

"1- ;g gS fd eq> izkFkhZ;k dh lxkbZ vkt ls djhc 8 o'kZ iwoZ vFkkZr lu~ 2011 esa eqfYte j.kthrflag iq= [kheflag iaokj tkfr jko.kk jktiwr fuoklh xzke Nrjhokyh xyh eSu cktkj csMk rglhy ckyh ftyk ikyh lkFk gq;h FkhA ftl dkj.k ls eq> izkFkhZ;k rFkk j.kthrflag vkil ckrphr djrs jgrs Fks rFkk o'kZ 2011 ls o'kZ 2013 ds chp j.kthrflag dbZ ckj eq> izkFkhZ;k dks ehyus ds fy, cqyk;k djrk FkkA ;k eq>ls feyus ds fy, vk tk;k djrk ftl ij eSa izkFkhZ;k vius eaxsrj j.kthrflag ls feyus tk;k djrh Fkh rFkk j.kthrflag us bl nkSjku eq> izkFkhZ;k dks "kknh dk >kalk nsdj eq> izkFkhZ;k ds bPNk ds fo:) esjs lkFk "kkjhfjd laca/k cuk;s rFkk "kknh dk dgus ij eqfYte

(3 of 5) [CRLMP-3553/2019]

j.kthrflag us fnukad 10-02-2013 dks eq> izkFkhZ;k ds lkFk guqeku eafnj] vuknjk pkSjkgk fljksgh esa isze fookg fd;k ftldk fookg vfHkys[k fu'ikfnr dj uksVsjh ls rLnhd dj eq> izkFkhZ;k ds gd esa rdehy djok;kA rFkk eq> izkFkhZ;k dks dgk fd og ckn esa lkekftd fjfr fjokt ls /kqe /kke ls "kknh dj eq> izkFkhZ;k dks vius lkFk xkao csMk ysdj tk;sxkA ysfdu eq> izkFkhZ;k dks vius lkFk ysdj ugha x;k rFkk eqfYte }kjk "kknh dk badkj djus ij eq> izkFkhZ;k us 05 ebZ 2013 dks iqfyl Fkkuk fljksgh esa vkjksih j.kthrflag ds fo:) fjiksVZ izLrqr dj eqdnek ntZ djok;k FkkA ftl ij fnukad 07 ebZ 2013 dks eqfYte j.kthrflag rFkk mldh ekrk foeyk mQZ calrh daoj ifRu [kheflag iokaj tkfr jko.kk jktiwr o mldk cM+k HkkbZ Jo.kflag iq= iokaj tkfr jko.kk jktiqr fuoklh xzke Nrjhokyh xyh eSu cktkj csMk rglhy ckyh ftyk ikyh rhuksa efgyk iqfyl Fkkuk fljksgh vkdj ,d fyf[kr jkthukek eq> izkFkhZ;k ds gd esa bl vk"k; dk fu'ikfnr djk;k fd eqfYte j.kthrflag vDVqcj 2013 dks fnokyh ij /kqe /kke ls eq> izkFkhZ;k ds lkFk fgUnq fjfr fjokt vuqlkj vfXu ds le{k lIrinh ysdj "kknh dj eq> izkFkhZ;k dks mlds ?kj ysdj tk;sxkA"

9. Hence, complainant's accusation that he made physical

relation on the promise of marriage is an after thought,

particularly when they got married and more so because of the

fact that the FIR came to be lodged after seven years of

continued relationship. The petitioner who had contracted another

marriage with one Namrata, may be guilty of other offences

including bigamy, but not the offences under Sections 376 & 420

of the Indian Penal Code.

10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Pramod

Suryabhan Pawar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. :

Criminal Appeal No.1165/2019 [@ SLP(Crl.) No.2712 of

2019] has held as under:-

"18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active

(4 of 5) [CRLMP-3553/2019]

and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

11. The Jaipur Bench of this Court in Radhakrishan Meena Vs.

State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition

No.4952/2020) has held as under:

"In every case of rape, the act of sexual intercourse must be forcible and without consent of the woman/lady. However, the consent obtained by fraud amounts to no consent and therefore, if the intercourse is done with consent but obtained by fraud, it would amount to rape. If an illiterate woman is given promise to marry and under that promise, her consent is obtained for sexual intercourse, then, it can be said that the consent is obtained by fraud. Here, in this case, the prosecutrix is an educated lady and serving as a lady jail guard. Another instance would be that if consent is obtained by hiding the identity or impersonation, then it is a fraud. If a married man obtains consent of an unmarried girl under the false pretext that he will marry her by concealing the fact of his previous marriage, then the consent given by the young girl shall be construed to be a consent obtained fraudulently and (10 of 20) [CRLMP-4952/2020] thus it is no consent. Here, in this matter, both the parties are not previously married.

(5 of 5) [CRLMP-3553/2019]

This court is of the considered view that when a woman is married and educated, then, depending on facts of each case, she is supposed to be well aware of the consequences of having sexual intercourse with a man prior to solemnizing of the marriage. In the event of a consent obtained by fraud, inducement is a necessary ingredient. There must be some material on record to hold prima facie that the girl was induced by the accused to such an extent that she was in agreement to have sexual intercourse with him."