Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 2799 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 1 April, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 394/2018
1. State of Rajasthan through District Collector Bharatpur,
Bharatpur Rajasthan.
2. Zila Parishad Bharatpur, through Chief Executive Officer,
Zila Parishad Bharatpur Rajasthan.
3. Panchayat Samiti Kumher, through Development Officer,
Panchayat Samiti Kumher District Bharatpur Raj.
----Appellants
Versus
Mahesh Chand Sharma S/o Jamuna Prasad Sharma, R/o Abar
Tehsil Kumher District Bharatpur Raj.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pradeep Kalwania, GC
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manoj Kumar Bhardwaj
Mr. Rajesh Chaturvedi
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
Judgment
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 22/03/2022
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : April _1st, 2022
BY THE COURT:
1. Appellants-defendants State of Rajasthan through District
Collector Bharatpur (hereinafter referred as "State") has preferred
this second appeal under Section 100 CPC, assailing judgment and
decree dated 8-5-2018 in appeal No.66/2010, passed by
Additional District Judge, No.1, Bharatpur allowing appeal and
setting aside the judgment and decree dated 5-7-2010 passed by
Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) No.3, Bharatpur, in Civil
Suit No.91/2002, the termination order dated 1-12-1992 has been
declared null and void and plaintiff has been held entitled for
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reinstatement in service with a direction to release all
consequential benefits after conducting enquiry. Simultaneously,
right to initiate fresh enquiry was given to the department.
2. Facts of the case are that respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter
`the plaintiff') having acquired qualification of Graduation in the
year 1981 and passing B.Ed. Course from Dayanand Subhash
National College, Unnao (UP) in 1986-87 affiliated to Kanpur
University, was appointed on the post of Teacher Grade-III on 10-
4-1990 in Panchayat Samiti Kumer, Zila Parishad Bharatpur, and
on 12-10-1992, the petitioner was confirmed on the post. After
the appointment and confirmation of plaintiff, appellant State
sought verification of respondent-plaintiff's certificates. On
verification of certificate of B.Ed. Course from the University, the
concerned University vide letter dated 19-11-1992 informed
respondents that the plaintiff did not pass B.Ed. Examination. On
the basis of letter dated 19-11-1992, appellant State immediately
terminated services of plaintiff vide order dated 1-12-1992. Again
on approaching the University, vide subsequent letter dated 21-
12-1992 it was informed by the University that the letter dated
19-11-1992 was wrongly sent and that the plaintiff had validly
passed B.Ed. Course. However, pursuant to previous letter dated
19-11-1992, services of the plaintiff were remained terminated.
The termination order dated 1-12-1992 was challenged by the
plaintiff by filing writ petition No.1055/1993, which came to be
dismissed vide order dated 5-10-1993 on ground of availing the
alternative remedy before civil court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed
civil suit challenging his termination order dated 1-12-1992 that
his termination has been made on the basis of wrong information,
(3 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
against the principles of natural justice and he prayed for quashing
the same and for reinstatement with all consequential benefits and
arrears of salary due. It was stated by the plaintiff that vide order
dated 1-12-1992 the plaintiff was informed that his B.Ed.
Certificate was alleged to be forged by the University, therefore,
his services were terminated with immediate effect and without
providing any opportunity of hearing. When plaintiff approached
the Kanpur University, the plaintiff was informed vide letter dated
21-12-1992 that letter dated 19-11-1992 was wrongly issued.
Simultaneously, for the same dispute, one FIR No.33/1993 was
lodged at Police Station Kumher. On enquiry by the Investigating
Officer, Kanpur University informed vide letter dated 25-6-1993
that plaintiff had validly passed B.Ed. Course and the letter 21-12-
1992 was correct. It was stated that plaintiff's services were
terminated against principles of natural justice. It was also
pleaded in plaint that principle of estoppel applied against
defendant No.3 the Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti
Kumher, since it had enquired about the marksheet and degree of
plaintiff for B.Ed. prior to appointment of the plaintiff and later on
he had been confirmed also.
3. The appellants defendants filed written statement denying
contentions of plaintiff. The trial Court settled issues and recorded
evidence of both parties. Plaintiff appeared as witness and
produced documents Exhibit-1 to 24. Defendants examined one
witness Dw.1 Brijlal and exhibited documents Ex.A-1 to A-3.
Considering evidence of both parties the trial court dismissed
plaintiff's suit.
(4 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
4. On filing appeal, the first appellate court re-appreciated oral
and documentary evidence of both parties and reversed findings
of the trial court, having concluded that plaintiff had validly passed
B.Ed. course from the University. The first appellate court apart
from other evidence, relied upon letters issued by the concerned
University first letter dated 21-12-1992, and second letter dated
25-6-1993, which was given to the Investigating Officer, and it
was observed that the veracity of certificates of B.Ed. course was
also checked by defendant No.3 prior to appointing the plaintiff on
the post of Teacher. The first appellate court concluded that the
plaintiff's services were confirmed on 12-10-1992, however, he
was terminated on 1-12-1992 without providing any opportunity
of hearing. Consequently, the first appellate court decreed the
plaintiff's suit by setting aside the judgment of trial court dated 5-
7-2010 and declaring the termination order dated 1-12-1992 as
null and void. Arrears of salary were also directed to be paid.
Hence, defendants have preferred this second appeal.
5. This court on 27-5-2019 issued show cause notice as to why
appeal should not be admitted on substantial questions of law,
propounded by appellant State in its memo of appeal, which are
as under:-
a) Whether finding of the impugned judgment and Decree of the Appellate court suffers from gross misreading of evidence of plaintiff as well as defendants?
b) Whether findings of the First Appellate Court with regard to issue No.1,2 and 3 are perverse in the eye of law?
c) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case appellate court has rightly reversed the judgment
(5 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
and decree of the trial court by exercising its appellate jurisdiction?
d) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court while decreeing the suit is bad in law?
e) Whether Appellate Court has misinterpreted misread the evidence available on record while reversing the fact finding given by the trial court?
f) Whether the Appellate Couirt is justified in granting the relief beyond the pleadings, relief, and scope of the plaint?
g) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get decree of declaration of his removal as illegal whereas from his own admission and other overwhelming evidence it is proved that Degree of the B.Ed. Obtained by the plaintiff is forged and on the basis of forged decree the plaintiff is not entitled for appointment?
h) Whether a decree for declaration can be granted specifically when the averments of the plaint stands not proved?
i) Whether the decree for declaration can be granted specifically when the plaintiff's case pleaded in the plaint is found to be untrue?
j) Whether the decree of declaration granted by the first appellate court is vitiated being contrary to evidence available on record?
6. After service of notices, respondent plaintiff has put in
appearance. The second appeal has not been admitted and heard
for admission.
7. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused impugned
judgment passed by the first appellate court, record of the case,
written submissions filed by plaintiff as also by defendants.
8. Counsel for appellant State has argued that in fact the
plaintiff was given appointment subject to verification of
documents submitted by him. After his appointment on 10-4-1990
(6 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
and confirmation on 12-10-1992, when the State received letter
dated 19-11-1992 from the Kanpur University that plaintiff did not
pass B.Ed. Examination from that University, the plaintiff was
removed from service immediately vide order dated 1-12-1992.
he argued that plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to
prove his marksheet and degree of B.Ed. as genuine and valid. He
submitted that the first appellate court committed jurisdictional
error in upsetting findings of trial court and holding that
marksheet and degree of B.Ed. of plaintiff are valid. The reversal
findings of appellate court suffers from misreading/ non-reading of
evidence. Counsel for State has also argued that civil suit filed by
plaintiff is barred by limitation as per Section 109 of the Rajasthan
Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. he submitted that services of plaintiff
were terminated on 1-12-1992. The first appellate court vide
judgment dated 8-5-2018, set aside the termination order dated
1-12-1992, thereafter, the plaintiff has attained the age of
superannuation on 30-11-2020, therefore, now it is not possible to
reinstate the plaintiff in service. He submitted that allowing back
wages to plaintiff for the period, during which he did not render
any service, is bad in law. Counsel for appellant State prayed to
admit the appeal for hearing by formulating substantial question
of law as suggested in memo of appeal and by allowing second
appeal the judgment of first appellate court dated 8-5-2018 be
quashed and set aside.
9. Per contra, counsel for respondent plaintiff submitted that
the plaintiff was a confirmed employee and was working under the
Rajasthan Panchayati Raj department. Before termination, neither
any notice was issued nor any enquiry was conducted nor any
(7 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
opportunity of hearing was accorded, thus, the order of
termination dated 1-12-1992 is bad in law being contrary to
principles of natural justice. He submitted that as per Rule 300 of
the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, Rajasthan Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1958 have been made
applicable on employees of Panchayati Raj department. Since
penalty of removal from service is a major penalty, the
termination order of plaintiff, without following the procedure
prescribed under the CCA Rules, cannot be countenanced and
upheld. Counsel for respondent plaintiff submitted that the first
appellate court re-appreciated evidence available on record while
upsetting findings of the trial court and recorded valid reasons in
the judgment to quash the termination order. The judgment of the
first appellate court is well reasoned, based on evidence and
within its jurisdiction. He submitted that as per Article 58 of the
Limitation Act, civil suit for declaration assailing termination order
was filed within a period of three years, which is well within
limitation. Section 109 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
has no application to the present case. He submitted that it is true
that now the plaintiff has attained the age of superannuation and
his reinstatement is not possible, however, since his termination
from service was arbitrary, illegal and violative of principles of
natural justice, therefore, the first appellate court has not
committed any illegality in setting aside the same. He submitted
that no substantial question of law, as suggested in memo of
appeal, are based on reappreciation of evidence, which is not
permissible within the scope of Section 100 CPC and none of the
questions of law is in the nature of substantial question of law, as
(8 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
such the second appeal deserves to be dismissed at this stage
itself.
10. Having heard counsel for both parties and on perusal of
judgments of both courts below, this court finds that this second
appeal is not worth for admission as there is no involvement of
any substantial question of law, for following reasons:
11. As per factual matrix and record of the present case, it is not
in dispute that plaintiff was appointed on the post of Teacher
Grade-III vide order dated 10-4-1990 (Ex.8), thereafter his
services were confirmed vide order dated 12-10-1992 (Ex.24) and
plaintiff's services were terminated vide order dated 1-12-1992
(Ex.11), but before termination of services of plaintiff, neither any
show cause notice was issued, nor any enquiry was conducted,
nor any opportunity of hearing was provided to plaintiff. Thus, the
first appellate court found the termination order to be in violation
of principles of natural justice. That apart, termination of services
of plaintiff is a major penalty, at least an enquiry according to the
procedure prescribed in CCA Rules was warranted. Plaintiff's case
finds support by the judgment of the Apex court in Deepali
Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya
[(2013)10 SC 324], which has been relied upon by plaintiff,
wherein the Apex Court in para No.38.5 held that "cases in which
the competent court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted
in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/ or principles of
natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman,
then the concerned court or Tribunal will be fully justified in
directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior
(9 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the
Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour
Court etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a
different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/ workman to
get full back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same.
The courts must always be kept in view that in cases of wrongful/
illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and
sufferer is the employee/ workman and there is no justification to
give premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him
of the burden to pay the employee/ workman his dues in the form
of full back wages"
12. In case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India [(2016)8 SCC
471], the Apex Court in para No.38.9 held that "In case the
employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry
would be necessary before passing order of termination/ removal
or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false
information in verification form".
13. This court in case of Nand Kishore Acharya Vs. Vikas
Adhikari [2003 WLC (UC) 99] set aside the termination order
passed against the delinquent for having a forged degree on the
ground that termination order of employee passed without
providing an opportunity of hearing would be illegal.
14. Thus, this court of the considered opinion that the first
appellate court has not committed any illegality or jurisdictional
error in quashing the termination order of plaintiff finding the
same to be violative of principles of natural justice.
(10 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
15. Having considered the appeal on the issue of appreciation of
evidence by appellate court and reversing findings of trial court
whether the first appellate court has misread evidence led by
parties. It appears from perusal of impugned judgment dated 8-5-
2018 that the first appellate court exercised its powers under
Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and re-heard/ re-appreciated entire
material available on record. The first appellate court in its
judgment, more particularly in paras No.12 and 13, re-appreciated
evidence and concluded that marksheet and degree of B.Ed.
procured by plaintiff from Kanpur University are genuine and valid.
The first appellate court has assigned reasons to set aside findings
of the trial court. The trial court extended undue advantage to
letter dated 24-6-1993 (Ex.A1), whereas, the first appellate court
considered other documents also viz. Letter dated 21-12-1992
(Ex.10), subsequent letter dated 25-6-1993 (Ex.18), B.Ed.
marksheet and provisional certificate of B. Ed. (Ex.5 and 6), as
well as investigation conducted by police and information received
from Kanpur University, then concluded that marksheet and B.Ed.
degree of plaintiff may not be treated to be forged, merely on the
basis of a letter dated 19-11-1992 issued by Chief Executive
Officer of University, more particularly, when the said officer has
not come in witness box to verify and substantiate his letter.
Further, the same person has issued subsequent letter dated 25-
6-1993 to Investigating Officer acknowledging marksheet and
B.Ed. degree as valid and genuine. Reasons recorded by the first
appellate court may be perused in paras NO.12 & 13 of the
judgment. Although, counsel for appellant State has made a
persuasive attempt to argue that findings recorded by the first
(11 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
appellate court are perverse, but on appreciation of such findings
with evidence available on record, this court does not find any
perversity in the same. It cannot be said that findings recorded by
the first appellate court are suffering from misreading/ non-
reading of evidence. Otherwise also, the first appellate court is the
final court of fact findings, and unless findings are find to be
perverse, it is not required for this court, while exercising powers
under Section 10 CPC, to re-appreciate the evidence to have a
different findings/ conclusion of his own. Second appellate court
should honour findings of fact based on due appreciation of
evidence as recorded by the court below.
16. As far as the judgment passed by first appellate court
reversing the judgment of trial court is concerned, the first
appellate court has not committed any illegality in passing
the impugned judgment while reversing the judgment of the
trial court. In the case of Arumugham Vs. Sundarambal
[JT 1994 (4) SC 464] the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that
the first appellate court is entitled to consider the evidence
adduced by parties and give its own reasons for accepting
that of on one side or the other, and that it is not permissible
for the second appellate court to interfere with such findings
of facts by the first appellate court.
17. As far as the issue of limitation is concerned, firstly the trial
court found the suit for declaration to be within limitation and
decided the issue No.5 in favour of plaintiff. Appellant State in first
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appeal did not assail findings of issue No.5 relating to limitation.
However, counsel for appellant State has raised argument during
course of arguments on second appeal. This court finds that
initially the plaintiff assailed termination order dated 1-12-1992,
by filing SBCWP No.1055/1993, which was dismissed on 5-10-
1993 on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to
challenge termination order before the Civil Court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff served legal notice on 13-1-1994, as required under
Section 80 CPC, and then filed the civil suit on 19-5-1994. As per
Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the limitation for suit for
declaration is three years. Thus, the plaintiff's suit is well within
limitation of three years assailing termination order dated 1-12-
1992, by way of civil suit filed on 19-5-1994. The limitation as
provided under Section 109 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act,
1994, does not apply to the present case. Otherwise also, in the
present case, the issue of limitation appears to be mixed question
of facts and law. Once the trial court has concluded the issue of
limitation in favour of plaintiff, which remained unchallenged
before the first appellate court, such issue is not open to be
challenged at the stage of second appeal. Thus, the argument of
counsel for appellant State that suit should have been dismissed
being barred by limitation, this court is not impressed by such
argument of counsel for appellant State.
18. As far as the issue of grant of back wages is concerned, the
first appellate court has assigned valid reasons to set aside the
termination order. Once the order of termination has been found
illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice, in the factual
(13 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
scenario that plaintiff was a confirmed employee of the State, the
first appellate court has not committed any illegality or
jurisdictional error in holding the plaintiff entitled for back wages
from the date of termination. The issue of grant of back wages has
been dealt with by the Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation Vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa [(2009)4 SCC
299] and case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidhyalaya (supra). The ratio as propounded
in aforesaid cases is squarely applicable to the present case. Thus,
in the opinion of this court, the first appellate court has not
committed any illegality or jurisdictional error in awarding
backwages to plaintiff from the date of his termination and
decreeing his suit as a whole. Thus, this question of law is
answered in negative.
19. There is no substance in question of law as raised by
defendants. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in case of Kondiba
Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [(1999)3 SCC
722] that question of law which has already been decided by a
larger Bench of the High Court concerned, or by the Privy Council,
or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, mere wrong
application on facts of a particular case does not create another
substantial question of law. In such view of the matter there is no
substantial question of law in instant matter.
20. In case of Umerkhan Vs. Bismillabi [(2011)9 SCC 684]
Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded that if a second appeal is
admitted on substantial question of law, while hearing second
(14 of 14) [CSA-394/2018]
appeal finally, can re-frame substantial question of law or can
frame substantial question of law afresh or even can hold that no
substantial question of law involved, but the High Court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction of Section 100 CPC without formulating
substantial question of law.
21. In the present case substantial questions of law as proposed
in memo of appeal have been considered and this court is of the
opinion that all questions of law raised are essentially either
question of facts or have already been settled by way of judicial
precedents. Thus, in this second appeal, no substantial question of
law involved. Accordingly, the second appeal is not liable to
succeed. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed.
22. Stay application and any other pending application(s), if any,
also stand(s) disposed of.
23. Record of courts below be sent back forthwith.
(SUDESH BANSAL),J
Arn/71
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