Rupa Ram And Anr vs State
2021 Latest Caselaw 9294 Raj

                                         (1 of 17)                 [CRLA-540/2017]


       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                        JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No.540/2017

1. Rupa Ram S/o Ramu Ram, by caste Jat,
2. Sugna Ram S/o Ramu Ram, by caste Jat
     Both residents of Village Kahira, P.S. Panchu, District Bikaner.
     (Presently lodged at Central Jail, Bikaner.)


                                                                  ----Appellants
                                    Versus
The State of Rajasthan.
                                                                 ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)          :     Mr. Nishant Bora.
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Farzand Ali, AAG-cum-GA
                                Mr. R.R. Chhaparwal, PP.



            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVENDRA KACHHAWAHA

                              JUDGMENT

Judgment pronounced on                   :::             29/04/2021
Judgment reserved on                     :::             04/03/2021



BY THE COURT : (PER HON'BLE MEHTA, J.)

1. The appellants herein have been convicted and sentenced as

below vide Judgment dated 21.02.2017 passed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities Cases), Bikaner in

Sessions Case No.59/2013:

Offences             Sentences                 Fine              Fine   Default
                                                                 sentences
Section 498A IPC 2        years' Rs.1,000/-                      2 Months' S.I.
                 imprisonment
Section      302/34 Life                       Rs.10,000/- 6 Month's S.I.
IPC                 Imprisonment

All the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

(2 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

2. Being aggrieved of their conviction and sentences, the

appellants have preferred the instant appeal under Section 374(2)

Cr.P.C.

3. Facts relevant and essential for disposal of the appeal are

noted hereinbelow:

4. The appellant Rupa Ram was married to Smt. Geeta for

about six years before the incident took place. It is alleged that

Smt. Geeta was maltreated in the matrimonial home on numerous

occasions and being fed up of such cruel behaviour, 2-3 days

before the incident, she walked out of her matrimonial home and

went straight to her parental house on foot. Thereafter, her

parental relatives convinced her to reconcile the differences with

her husband and in-laws and accordingly, she was sent back to

her matrimonial home on the evening of 05.09.2011. On

06.09.2011 at about 06.00 a.m., Smt. Geeta went to the kitchen

for preparing tea. Her husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law

quarreled with her owing to an incident of previous night following

which, they brought a canister full of kerosene. Her husband

poured kerosene on her while her mother-in-law instructed that

Geeta should be set on fire whereafter, her brother-in-law lit the

matchstick and set her afire. She screamed on which, neighbours

Tejaram and Hemaram came around and doused the fire by

putting a rug around her. Lalaram, Kundan and Sugnaram took

her to the Nokha Hospital where her maternal relatives also

arrived. From Nokha Hospital, the doctor referred her to PBM

(3 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

Hospital, Bikaner. A Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) of Geeta with the

above narrative was recorded by the SHO, Police Station Panchu

at the PBM Hospital, Bikaner on 06.09.2011 at 12.45 p.m. on the

basis whereof, an FIR No.81/2011 (Ex.P/13) came to be registered

at the Police Station Panchu, District Bikaner for the offences

under Sections 498A, 307 and 324 IPC and investigation was

commenced. Smt. Geeta passed away at the PBM Hospital on

25.09.2011 upon which, offence under Section 302 IPC was added

to the file. After concluding the investigation, a charge-sheet was

filed against the appellants herein and Kani Devi (in abscondance)

in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Nokha for the offences

under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. It may be stated here that the

investigating agency did not find the offence under Section 302

IPC proved against the appellants herein.

The learned Judicial Magistrate, Nokha however, proceeded

to take cognizance for the offences under Sections 498A, 304B

and 302 IPC and committed the case to the Court of the Sessions

Judge, Bikaner from where, the same was transferred to the Court

of the Additional Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities Cases),

Bikaner for trial where, Sessions Case No.59/2013 came to be

instituted. Charges were framed and were read out to the accused

for the offences under Sections 498A and 302/34 IPC. They were

discharged from the offence under Section 304B IPC. The accused

pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined as

many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 20 documents in support of

its case. Upon being questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the

accused denied the prosecution allegations and claimed to be

(4 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

innocent. The accused appellant Sugnaram stated that the

deceased got burnt accidentally while preparing tea. No witness

was examined in defence. After hearing the arguments advanced

by the prosecution and the defence and, appreciating the evidence

available on record, the learned trial court, proceeded to convict

and sentence the appellants in above terms. Hence this appeal.

5. Learned counsel Shri Nishant Bora representing the

appellants, urged that the trial court discharged the accused

appellants from the offence under Section 304B IPC and that there

is no material whatsoever on the record of the case to show that

the appellants ever harassed or humiliated Smt. Geeta on any

account whatsoever. He urged that the evidence of material

prosecution witnesses gives a strong indication that there was a

grave doubt on the conduct of the deceased who was suspected to

be talking to some unknown man on phone. Serious disputes

arose between the spouses as a result of her misdeeds and as a

result, Geeta was sent back to her father's house. However, the

maternal relatives, did not keep her there and she was sent back

to her matrimonial home a day before the incident. He urged that

no such dispute had occurred between the appellants and Geeta

which could have spurred them to set her afire. He contended that

appellants sent the deceased back to her father's house on

suspicion of her being in touch with an unknown man but she was

not allowed to stay there and was sent back to the matrimonial

home. Being frustrated and out of despondency, she set herself to

fire. Thereafter, in order to wreak vengeance on the appellants,

she gave a totally cooked up Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) alleging that

(5 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

she had been set on fire by the appellants herein. He contended

that neither the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) recorded by the SHO

Police Station Panchu nor the dying declaration (Ex.P/16) recorded

by the Judicial Magistrate Deeksha Sood (PW-16) are reliable

because Geeta was not at all familier with Hindi language and

knew only Marwari language, whereas both these statements were

recorded in pure Hindi language. He submitted that other than

these two statements, there is no evidence whatsoever on the

record of the case to show that the appellants herein poured

kerosene on Geeta and then set her on fire. He submitted that

Tejaram (PW-1) and Hemaram (PW-2), the two neighbours, who

admittedly reached the spot on hearing the screams of Geeta,

clearly stated that she did not divulge that she had been set on

fire by the accused. He further contended that these two

witnesses may have been declared hostile but Laluram (PW-3),

who also reached the spot just after the incident, categorically

stated in his examination-in-chief that when he reached the place

of incident, Ruparam's wife (Geeta) was shouting that she was

trying to alight the hearth and she got burnt during the process.

Shri Bora also referred to the statement of Babulal (PW-6), who

also stated that he transported Geeta to the Nokha Hospital in his

vehicle and on the way, he asked Geeta how she got burned upon

which, she stated that her in-laws were maligning her character

by imputing that she was talking to some unknown man and thus,

while she was preparing tea, she poured kerosene on her body

and set herself on fire. Shri Bora submitted that even Padmaram

(PW-7) uncle of the deceased, and her mother Kunni Devi (PW-8),

when examined during investigation, gave statements Ex.D/1 and

(6 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

Ex.D/2 respectively, divulging therein that Geeta had set herself

on fire. He submitted that these two witnesses are the only

persons who alleged in their testimony that Geeta was being

harassed and humiliated in the matrimonial home, but the reason

for such harassment, as per the witnesses, was alleged demand

for dowry. However, this theory of harassment of the lady for

demand of dowry was not accepted by the trial court because the

accused were discharged from the offence under Section 304B

IPC. He submitted that the fact mentioned in the Parcha Bayan

(Ex.P/12) that the appellant Sugnaram was associated in taking

Geeta to Nokha Hospital, gives a strong indication of his

innocence. He raised the following contentions for criticizing the

dying declaration (Ex.P/16) and urged that the said statement is

totally unreliable and inadmissible in evidence:-

(i) that Krishnaveer Singh Choudhary, the doctor who certified

that patient was fit for giving statement, was not examined as a

witness to prove the fitness certificate;

(ii) that the note of warning appended on the document just

below the certificate of the doctor is a subsequently inserted

interpolation as is visible to the naked eye;

(iii) that the Judicial Magistrate Deeksha Sood (PW-16) herself

did not state in the evidence that she was satisfied regarding the

injured being in a fit condition, mental and physical, to give such

statement;

(iv) that the dying declaration has been recorded in pure Hindi

language whereas the evidence of material witnesses clearly

(7 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

establishes that Geeta had no familiarity with Hindi language and

used to converse in pure Marwari language; and

(v) that Padmaram (PW-7) admitted in his cross-examination that

Geeta was conversant only with Marwari language and had no

knowledge of Hindi and when her statement was recorded by the

Magistrate, he and Omprakash were present there. Shri Bora thus

urged that the dying declaration (Ex.P/16) is tainted as the same

was recorded in the presence of maternal relatives of the

deceased and the possibility of tutoring cannot be ruled out. He

offered same criticism for the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12).

In support of his contentions, Shri Bora placed reliance on

the following judgments:-

(i) Kashi Vishwanath vs. State of Karnataka, reported in

(2013)7 SCC 162; and

(ii) Shrawan Ram & Ors. vs. The State of Rajasthan (D.B.

Criminal Appeal No.394/2012) decided on 21.10.2019

and urged that the prosecution failed to bring home the charges

against the appellants beyond all manner of doubt by leading

satisfactory evidence and implored the Court that the appellants

deserve to be acquitted by giving them the benefit of doubt.

6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor vehemently and

fervently opposed the submissions advanced by the appellants'

counsel. He submitted that Sunil Charan (PW-14) SHO Police

Station Panchu, who recorded the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) and the

Judicial Magistrate Deeksha Sood (PW-16), who recorded the

(8 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

dying declaration of Geeta (Ex.P/16), neither had any animosity

with the accused nor did they have any affinity with the

complainant party so as to record the statement of Geeta

unfaithfully or to twist or modulate the version given out by her.

He urged that merely because the Medical Officer, who gave the

fitness certificate, was not examined, these two statements of the

injured cannot be thrown out entirely as the Police Officer as well

as the Judicial Magistrate recorded these statements after being

duly satisfied that the injured was in a fit condition to give such

statement. He further urged that Marwari and Hindi languages are

almost similar in script and pronunciation and thus, no benefit can

be claimed by the accused by the mere fact that the Parcha Bayan

(Ex.P/12) and the dying declaration (Ex.P/16) were recorded in

Hindi language. He further pointed out that the close maternal

relatives of the deceased namely Padmaram (PW-7) (Uncle) and

Kunni Devi (PW-8) (Mother) have categorically stated that the

husband and his relatives used to harass and humiliate Smt.

Geeta on account of demand for dowry and it was for this reason

that she was turned out of the matrimonial home. Geeta's

maternal relatives sent her back to the matrimonial home and on

the very next morning, the accused set her on fire because their

demands were not met. He thus urged that the impugned

Judgment does not warrant any interference by this Court and the

appeal deserves to be dismissed.

7. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the

submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the material

available on record.

(9 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

8. From an overall appreciation of the material available on

record, it is apparent that other than the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12)

and the dying declaration (Ex.P/16), there is hardly any evidence

on record of the case which can be considered relevant or bearing

on the case so as to bring home the charges against the accused.

It is relevant to note here that the Investigating Officer did not

find the offence under Section 302 IPC proved against the

appellants and therefore, charge-sheet was filed against them

only for the offences under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. The

prosecution witnesses Padmaram (PW-7) uncle of the deceased,

and Kunni Devi (PW-8) mother of the deceased, are the only two

maternal relatives who stepped up in the witness box to prove the

prosecution theory of harassment meted out to Smt. Geeta by the

matrimonial relatives. Both of them stated that the Geeta's

husband, brother-in-law and mother-in-law used to quarrel with

her on account of demand for dowry. There is no other allegation

whatsoever in the statements of these witnesses which can

impute motive to the accused so as to commit the offence. Both

the witnesses were pertinently cross-examined on the aspect of

the allegation of demand for money/dowry, but they could not

withstand the cross-examination, as this allegation was apparently

made as a sheer improvement from their previous statements

recorded during investigation (Padmaram - Ex.D/1 and Kunni Devi

- Ex.D/2). In his cross-examination, Padmaram (PW-7) was

confronted with the following parts of his previous statement

recorded during investigation under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D/1):-

(10 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

"A :ikjke ;k lqxukjke us ges dgk fd xhrk eksckbZy ij xSj enZ ls Nqi dj ckrs djrh gS gekjh cnukeh gksrh gSA ge bls ugha j[ksaxsA rks geus mudks le>k;kA ok esjs Hkrhts vkseizdk"k us eksckbZy ys fy;kA B

C mudks le>k;k vkbZUnk fdlh ls ckr ugha djsxhA D

E fnukad 6-9-11 dks lqcg 7&8 cts ykywjke Hkw'k.k us eksckbZy ls Fkkus ij crk;k dh xhrk cy xbZ gSA F

G vU; vkl iM+ksfl;ksa ls iwNrkN dh rks mUgksaus xhrk }kjk [kqn gh tyuk crk;kA H

I <k.kh ij xhrk ,dsyh gh gksuk crk;kA J

K ges irk ugha esjh Hkrhth xhrk [kqn tyh ;k mls tyk;k x;k gSA L

M exj esjh Hkrhth xhrk dks mldk ifr :ikjke tsB lqxukjke lkl dkuh nsoh] rax ijs"kku ok yM+kbZ >xM+k djrs Fks ok eksckbZy ij xSj enZ ls ckrs djus dk ykUNu yxk dj gekjs lkeus cnuke fd;k FkkA mlh ls vkgr gksdj dSjkslhu rsy Mky dj vkx yxk dj tyh gSA N"

Padmaram did not allege in this statement that Geeta was

harassed or humiliated in her matrimonial home on account of

demand for dowry. In portion 'M to N', Padmaram clearly divulged

that Geeta's husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law used to

quarrel with her by casting an aspersion that she was talking to

some unknown man on mobile and that being hurt by this

imputation, she ended her life by setting herself afire.

Likewise, Kunni Devi (PW-8) also stated to the Investigating

Officer in portion 'A to B' of her statement under Section 161

Cr.P.C. (Ex.D/2) that Geeta was frustrated with the behaviour of

her husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law and ended her life

by pouring kerosene and setting herself on fire. Even Kunni Devi

did not state during investigation that any dowry demands were

made from the deceased by her matrimonial relatives or that she

was harassed or humiliated on this count.

(11 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

Considering these shortcomings in the prosecution case, the

trial court exonerated the accused from the charge under Section

304B IPC. Thus, manifestly, there is no evidence on the record of

the case to establish motive against the accused for committing

the offence. The entire prosecution case revolves only around the

Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) and the dying declaration (Ex.P/16). In

this regard, it may be stated here that the SHO Sunil Charan (PW-

14) who took down the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) of Geeta, did not

record his satisfaction that the burned victim was in a fit condition

to give such a statement. Sunil Charan, when examined on oath

as PW-14, did not utter a single word that he satisfied himself

regarding the victim being in a mentally or physically fit condition

to give the statement. He stated that on reaching the PBM

Hospital at about 12.00 p.m., he took the permission/opinion of

the duty doctor regarding the burn victim Geeta being in a

position to give the statement and then the Parcha Bayan

(Ex.P/12) was recorded by him. However, no such written

permission/opinion was proved/brought on record by the

prosecution during the trial. Thus, the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) is

not a reliable document as there is no evidence to satisfy the

Court that Smt. Geeta, who had sustained almost 60 per cent

superficial to deep burn lesions all over her body and was semi-

conscious when she was brought to the hospital (as per the injury

report Ex.P/10), was in a fit condition to give such statement.

Hence, the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) has to be discarded. The dying

declaration (Ex.P/16) was proved by the Judicial Magistrate

Deeksha Sood (PW-16). It bears a note 'E to F' (dated 06.09.2011

at 03.45 p.m.) appended by Dr. Krishnaveer Singh Choudhary,

(12 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

regarding the fit condition of the patient (Geeta) to give the

statement. However, Dr. Krishnaveer Singh Choudhary was not

examined as a witness during the trial so as to prove the fitness

certificate. The following observations of Hon'ble the Supreme

Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dal Singh &

Ors. reported in (2013)14 SCC 159:-

"9. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0707/2002 : AIR 2002 SC 2973, this Court held, that a dying declaration can either be oral or in writing, and that any adequate method of communication, whether the use of words, signs or otherwise will suffice, provided that the indication is positive and definite. There is no requirement of law stating that a dying declaration must necessarily be made before a Magistrate, and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate, there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, the evidentiary value or weight that has to be attached to such a statement, necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. What is essentially required, is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, and where the same is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate, to the extent that the declarant was in fact fit to make the statements, then even without examination by the doctor, the said declaration can be relied and acted upon, provided that the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and definite. Certification by a doctor is essentially a rule of caution, and therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can also be established otherwise.

10. In Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0624/1999 : AIR 1999 SC 3695, this Court held, that the ultimate test is whether a dying declaration can be held to be truthfully and voluntarily given, and if before recording such dying declaration, the officer concerned has ensured that the declarant was in fact, in a fit condition to make the statement in question, then if both these aforementioned conditions are satisfactorily met, the declaration should be relied upon. (See also: Babu Ram and Ors. v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0229/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 2808).

11. In Laxmi v. Om Prakash and Ors.

MANU/SC/0353/2001 : AIR 2001 SC 2383, this Court held, that if the court finds that the capacity of the maker of the statement to narrate the facts was impaired, or if the court

(13 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

entertains grave doubts regarding whether the deceased was in a fit physical and mental state to make such a statement, then the court may, in the absence of corroborating evidence lending assurance to the contents of the declaration, refuse to act upon it.

...

14. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that law does not provide who can record a dying declaration, nor is there any prescribed form, format, or procedure for the same. The person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making such a statement. Moreover, the requirement of a certificate provided by a Doctor in respect of such state of the deceased, is not essential in every case..."

The Magistrate Deeksha Sood, did not record her own

satisfaction on the dying declation regarding the fit condition of

the patient for giving such statement. Even when examined on

oath, the Judicial Magistrate did not utter a single word regarding

she being satisfied that the patient was in a fit condition to give

the dying declaration. Thus, the dying declaration (Ex.P/16)

cannot be considered to be a reliable document.

9. It may be stated here that there is another significant

shortcoming in the dying declaration (Ex.P/16) which casts a

doubt on its reliability. The prosecution witness Padmaram (PW-7)

admitted in his cross-examination that Geeta knew only Marwari

Language and had no knowledge of Hindi Language. Even the

Judicial Magistrate Deeksha Sood (PW-16) admitted in her cross-

examination that the deceased was speaking in mixed Marwari-

Hindi language but she did not record the Marwari words spoken

by the burn victim as she herself (the Magistrate) was not

conversant with the Marwari language. In this background, a

(14 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

doubt is cast upon the reliability of the dying declaration (Ex.P/16)

as a proof of the circumstances in which, Geeta was burnt.

Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Kashi Vishwanath

(supra), considered this issue and held as below:-

"25. Apart from the contradictions, the credibility of three dying declarations (Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29) is to be doubted. In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12) dated 14th January, 2000 the thumb impression of victim has been shown. Whereas in the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22) taken on the same day, i.e, 14th January, 2000 and the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29) given on the next day, i.e., 15th January, 2000, the victim had stated that she had not given her signatures since her hand was completely burnt. Dr. Bhimappa (PW-22), who signed the Ex.P.22, in his cross- examination stated that he was not aware whether Neelamma (deceased) was talking in Telugu. Dr. Dhanjaya Kumar (PW-20), who signed Ex.P.12, in his cross- examination specifically stated that he can understand Kannada but does not know Telugu language and that Neelamma was talking in Telugu language. Padmavathi (PW-

8), mother of the deceased, in her cross- examination stated that Neelamma (deceased) was not knowing the correct writing the Telugu. But she was writing some Telugu.

26. The prosecution has failed to state as to why three dying declarations were recorded in Kannada, if the deceased, Neelamma was talking in Telugu. It has also not made clear as to who amongst the Tehisldar, PSI or SI or the Doctors who has signed in Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29 had knowledge of Telugu and translated the same in Kannada for writing dying declarations in those exhibits and that in the bottom of three dying declarations it has not been mentioned that they were read over in Kannada and explained in Telugu that the deceased understood the contents of the same. The above mentioned facts create doubt in our mind as to the truthfulness of the contents of the dying declarations as the possibility of she being influenced by somebody in making the dying declarations cannot be ruled out."

10. There are more circumstances that raise a doubt on the

truthfulness of the versions as set out in the dying declaration

(Ex.P/16) and the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12). Shri Laluram (PW-3),

admittedly reached the place of the incident on receiving the

information from Ruparam that Geeta had been burned. He stated

(15 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

even in his examination-in-chief that when he reached the place of

occurrence, Geeta was shouting that she was trying to alight the

fireplace during which, she got burnt. Babulal (PW-6), who took

Geeta to Nokha Hospital in his vehicle, stated that he asked the

injured lady as to how the incident happened, to which, she stated

that an aspersion was cast upon her character by making an

imputation that she was talking to another man and thus, she

poured kerosene on her body and then burnt herself. Padmaram

(PW-7), uncle of the deceased, and Kunni Devi (PW-8), mother of

the deceased, when examined during investigation, stated in their

statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D/1 and

Ex.D/2 respectively) that Geeta had set herself on fire.

11. In this background, the version as set out in the Parcha

Bayan (Ex.P/12) and the dying declaration (Ex.P/16), does not

appear to be truthful and reliable enough so as to convict the

appellants solely on the basis thereof. There is no other

corroborative evidence on the record of the case to support these

two statements and rather, they are contradicted by the other

independent pieces of evidence which we have discussed supra.

12. These important facts and circumstances extracted from the

prosecution evidence, raise a doubt in the mind of this Court as to

the truthfulness of the contents of the Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/12) and

the dying declaration (Ex.P/16). The possibility of the deceased

having set herself on fire is imminent. She walked out of the

matrimonial home as she was perturbed by the aspersion cast

upon her character by the accused persons. Rather than giving

solace to her, she was forced by the maternal relatives to go back

(16 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

to her matrimonial home, and being totally frustrated by this turn

of event, she set herself afire and then implicated the accused for

the incident. This conclusion is supported from the facts emerging

from the prosecution evidence as discussed above.

13. In wake of a threadbare analysis of the prosecution

evidence, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has

failed to lead cogent and clinching evidence, sufficient to bring

home the guilt of the appellants for the offences punishable under

Sections 498A and 302 IPC. The exercise of evaluation of evidence

undertaken by the trial court and the conclusions drawn in the

impugned Judgment for convicting the appellants herein, are not

based on an apropos appreciation of the evidence available on

record. Hence, the impugned Judgment cannot be sustained.

14. As an upshot of the above discussion, the appeal deserves to

be accepted. The impugned Judgment dated 21.02.2017 passed

by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities

Cases), Bikaner in Sessions Case No.59/2013, is hereby quashed

and set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges.

They are in custody. They shall be released from prison forthwith if

not wanted in any other case.

The appeal is allowed accordingly.

15. However, keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A

Cr.P.C., each of the appellants is directed to furnish a personal

bond in the sum of Rs.15,000/- and a surety bond in the like

amount before the learned trial court, which shall be effective for

a period of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of a

(17 of 17) [CRLA-540/2017]

Special Leave Petition against the present judgment on receipt of

notice thereof, the appellant shall appear before the Supreme

Court.

16. Record be returned to the trial court forthwith.

                                   (DEVENDRA KACHHAWAHA),J                                  (SANDEEP MEHTA),J



                                    Tikam Daiya & Devesh Thanvi/-









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