[Cites 20, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Sagar vs Union Of India And Others on 30 April, 2026

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                                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                                                       CHANDIGARH

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                                                         CRM-M-8455-
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                     Sagar
                                                                                           ....Petitioner
                                                                                             Petitioner
                                                                versus
                     Union of India and others
                                                                                         ....Respondentss
                     Date of Decision: April 30,
                                             30, 2026
                     Date of Uploading: April 30,
                                              30, 2026

                     CORAM:               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

                     Present:-
                     Present:             Mr. Arnav Ghai, Advocate for the petitioner.

                             Mr. H.S. Sullar, Special Public Prosecutor with
                             Mr. Haneesh Kumar, Advocate for the respondents - NCB.
                                                   *****
                     SUMEET GOEL,
                            GOEL, J. (ORAL)

Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') for grant of

regular bail to the petitioner, petitioner in Criminal Complaint No. No.VIII/22/DZU/2025, 2025,

under Sections 8, 20, 21 & 22 of the NDPS Act Act, registered as NDPS-226--

2025 dated 01.12.2025 titled as NCB versus Aayushman Bhadauria and

others".

2. The gravamen of the criminal complaint in question is that the

petitioner is an accused of being involved in an Criminal Complaint

pertaining ning to NDPS Act involving alleged recovery of 90 grams

Amphetamine, 29 grams Cocaine, ocaine, 8 grams Ganja Ganja,, 15 grams Pink Cocaine &

124 grams MDMA tablets from the co--accused, accused, namely, Aayushman

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Bhadauria, and on the basis of disclosure of the said co-accused, the

petitioner has been implicated in this case.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner

is in custody since 17.07.2025. Learned counsel has further submitted that

mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not scrupulously been

complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects.

Learned counsel has iterated that the trial is delayed and the liability thereof

cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has argued that the

petitioner has been implicated into the FIR in question primarily on the basis

of disclosure statement of co-accused, namely, Aayushman Bhadauria and

the said disclosure is not tenable in law. Learned counsel has further iterated

that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 08 months. Thus,

regular bail is prayed for.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents - NCB, while raising

submissions in tandem with the reply dated 01.04.2026, has opposed the

present petition by arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner

are serious in nature and, thus, the petitioner does not deserve the concession

of the regular bail. Learned counsel has further submitted that the instant bail

plea is barred by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the

same ought to be dismissed. Learned counsel seeks to place on record

custody certificate dated 21.03.2026, in the Court today, which is taken on

record.

5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through

the available records of the case.

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6. The petitioner is in custody since 17.07.2025, whereinafter

investigation was carried out and the challan has been presented on

01.12.2025. Total 15 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which,

none has been examined till date. Indubitably, conclusion of the trial will

take its own time. The petitioner has been implicated as an accused in the

FIR in question solely on the basis of disclosure statement of co-accused. As

per prosecution version, there is no other material available to connect the

petitioner with the contraband except for the said disclosure statement. It is

pertinent to note that such disclosure statements, in the absence of

corroborative evidence hold limited evidentiary value and cannot be sole

basis for implicating the petitioner. The reliance on this unsubstantiated

statement raises serious doubts about the fairness and objectivity of the

investigation. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not present at the

spot. The veracity and weightage required to be attached to the disclosure

statement made by the co-accused will be fully tested at the time of trial. The

rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall be

ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it

appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it

may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to

indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of

justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.

6.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to a judgment

Punjab, passed in passed by this Court in Anshul Sardana versus State of Punjab

CRM--M-65094 CRM 65094--2024 (2025: PHHC:004198), wherein, after relying upon

the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tofan

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Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 Supreme Court 5592; Smt.

Najmunisha, Abdul Hamid Chandmiya @ Ladoo Bapu versus State of

Gujrat, Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 INSC 290; State by (NCB)

Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr.', 2022 (1) RCR

(Criminal) 762; and Vijay Singh vs. The State of Haryana, bearing Special

Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 1266/2023, decided on 17.05.2023, has held

thus:

"6.3 It is a well established principle of law that a confession made by a co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a very weak piece of evidence. Such statement(s), by themselves, cannot form the sole basis for the conviction of an individual and must be scrutinized with utmost caution in conjunction with other substantive evidence. Moreover, no recovery has been effected from the possession of the petitioner, who has been subsequently implicated as an accused solely on the basis of disclosure statement of the co-accused. However, as regular bail pertains to life and liberty of individual, Courts are obligated to strike a balance between safeguarding personal liberty and ensuring the effective administration of justice as also investigation. The final evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement made by a co-accused fall within the domain of the trial Court and are to be adjudicated during the course of the trial in accordance with established principles of law. However, while adjudicating a plea for regular bail, this Court cannot remain oblivious to the circumstances under which the petitioner has been arraigned or implicated, including the nature of the allegations, the evidence linking the petitioner to the offence as well as the specific role attributed to the petitioner in the commission of the alleged offence. A prima facie examination of these factors is essential to ensure that the process of law is not misused, abused or misdirected."

6.2. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be

saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 21.03.2026 filed

by the learned counsel for the respondents - NCB, the petitioner has already

suffered incarceration for a period of 08 months and 04 days, & is not shown

to be involved in any other FIR(s).

6.3. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of

Punjab passed in CRM CRM--M-64074 64074--2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying

upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

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Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul

Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi

Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494;

Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC

311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta

Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal"; "Nitish Adhikary @

Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal", Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)

No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as "Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh

vs. The State of Gujarat"; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated

05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India,

and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR

(Criminal) 172; has held, thus:

"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court's judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre- trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and

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public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.

Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985."

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In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37

of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution

of India.

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an

undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed.

allowed Petitioner is

ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on

his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial

Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be

imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall

remain bound by the following conditions:

(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.

(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.

(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.

(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.

(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.

(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.

(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail.

In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.

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8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those

which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed

hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the

State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the

petitioner.

9. Ordered accordingly.

10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of

opinion on the merits of the case.

11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous