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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Binod Kumar Yadav vs State Of Haryana And Another on 30 April, 2026
1
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRR-
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2274-2025 (O&M)
Binod Kumar Yadav
....Petitionerss
versus
State of Haryana and another
....Respondentss
Date of Decision: April 30,
30, 2026
2026
Date of Uploading: April 30,
30, 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:-
Present: Mr. Parveen Kumar Rohilla, Advocate and
Mr. Deepak Kumar Rohilla, Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Priyanka Sadar Thakur, Senior DAG Haryana.
Ms. Shreya B. Sarin, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*****
SUMEET GOEL,
GOEL, J. (ORAL)
The present criminal revision petition has been filed seeking
setting aside of the impugned order dated 21.08.2025, vide which, the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar (for short 'Sessions Judge') has
dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner
petitioner, as well as the judgment of
conviction/ order of sentence dated 28/29.05.2018 passed by learned Judicial
Magistrate Ist Class, Hisar (for short 'JMIC')
'JMIC'), whereby the petitioner was
convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous
igorous
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Imprisonment for 01 year and to pay compensation of Rs.8,00,000/-, to the
complainant.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during the
pendency of proceedings, the petitioner and respondent No.2/ complainant
have entered into a compromise deed dated 01.04.2026 (copy whereof
appended at Flag 'Q') before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this
Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in pursuance of the aforesaid
compromise deed, has also handed over a demand draft bearing No.301783
amounting to Rs.4,00,000/- dated 17.04.2026 drawn in the State Bank of
India, in favour of respondent No.2, to learned counsel for respondent No.2
for its onward transmission to respondent No.2. A photocopy thereof has
been kept on record and is marked as 'X' for reference. Learned counsel for
the petitioner has further submitted that since the parties have amicably
settled their dispute(s), the matter may be compounded and the petitioner be
acquitted of the charge(s) framed against him.
3. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 has ratified the
factum of settlement/ compromise having been arrived at between the parties
and has further vouched the genuineness of the compromise deed dated
01.04.2026 stated to be arrived between the parties. Accordingly, he has
iterated that respondent No.2-complainant has no objection, in case, the
offence is permitted to be compounded and the petitioner is ordered to be
acquitted.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have
perused the available record.
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5. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by
three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Damodar S.
Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H., AIR 2010(SC) 1907, relevant whereof reads
thus:
"15. With regard to the progression of litigation in cheque bouncing cases,
the learned Attorney General has urged this Court to frame guidelines for
a graded scheme of imposing costs on parties who unduly delay
compounding of the offence. It was submitted that the requirement of
deposit of the costs will act as a deterrent for delayed composition, since at
present, free and easy compounding of offences at any stage, however
belated, gives an incentive to the drawer of the cheque to delay settling the
cases for years. An application for compounding made after several years
not only results in the system being burdened but the complainant is also
deprived of effective justice. In view of this submission, we direct that the
following guidelines be followed:-
THE GUIDELINES
(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:
(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be
suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could
make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or
second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made,
compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any
costs on the accused.
(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding
as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made
before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be
allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required
to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for
compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority
as the Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before
the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such
compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused
pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the
Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque
amount.
Let it also be clarified that any costs imposed in accordance with
these guidelines should be deposited with the Legal Services Authority
operating at the level of the Court before which compounding takes place.
For instance, in case of compounding during the pendency of proceedings
before a Magistrate's Court or a Court of Sessions, such costs should be
deposited with the District Legal Services Authority. Likewise, costs
imposed in connection with composition before the High Court should be
deposited with the State Legal Services Authority and those imposed in
connection with composition before the Supreme Court should be
deposited with the National Legal Services Authority.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
17. We are also conscious of the view that the judicial
endorsement of the above quoted guidelines could be seen as an act of
authenticity of this order/ judgment
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judicial law-making and therefore an intrusion into the legislative domain.
It must be kept in mind that Section 147 of the Act does not carry any
guidance on how to proceed with the compounding of offences under the
Act. We have already explained that the scheme contemplated
under Section 320 of the CrPC cannot be followed in the strict sense. In
view of the legislative vacuum, we see no hurdle to the endorsement of
some suggestions which have been designed to discourage litigants from
unduly delaying the composition of the offence in cases involving Section
138 of the Act. The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to
encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo,
valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the
parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the proceedings are
governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of
the offence is largely confined to the private parties. Even though the
imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the
scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The
competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific
facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for
such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings
to their logical end. Even in the past, this Court has used its power to do
complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution to frame guidelines
in relation to subject-matter where there was a legislative vacuum."
5.1. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as M/s
New Win Export &Anr. vs. A. Subramaniam 2024 INSC 535 : 2024(3) Law
Herald (SC) 2098, relevant whereof reads as under:
"6. At this juncture, we would also like to reiterate a few words
regarding the principles of compounding of offences in the context of NI
Act. It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory
offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that
the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A large number of
cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is a
serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the
'compensatory aspect' of remedy shall have priority over the 'punitive
aspect', courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI
Act if parties are willing to do so. (See: Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed
Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 (Para 18),, Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj
Goel (2022) 1111 SCC 705 (Para 29),, Meters And Instruments Private
Limited And Anr. v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560560(Para 18.2)"
5.2. More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled
as Sanjabij Tari vs. Kishore S. Borcar and another = 2025 INSC 1158, has
held as under:
"38. Since a very large number of cheque bouncing cases are still pending
and interest rates have fallen in the last few years, this Court is of the view
that it is time to 'revisit and tweak the guidelines'. Accordingly, the
aforesaid guidelines of compounding are modified as under:-
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(a) If the accused pays the cheque amount before recording of his evidence
(namely defence evidence), then the Trial Court may allow compounding
of the offence without imposing any cost or penalty on the accused.
(b) If the accused makes the payment of the cheque amount post the
recording of his evidence but prior to the pronouncement of judgment by
the Trial Court, the Magistrate may allow compounding of the offence on
payment of additional 5% of the cheque amount with the Legal Services
Authority or such other Authority as the Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the payment of cheque amount is made before the
Sessions Court or a High Court in Revision or Appeal, such Court may
compound the offence on the condition that the accused pays 7.5% of the
cheque amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the cheque amount is tendered before this Court, the figure
would increase to 10% of the cheque amount."
5.3. The statutory provision of Section 359 of BNSS, 2023 (Section
320 of Cr.P.C., 1973) and Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
when examined alongwith Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 in the guiding light
of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of Damodar S.
Prabhu (supra), M/s New Win Export (supra) and Sanjabij Tari (supra), lead
to the unequivocal conclusion that the offence under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be compounded at all stages of
litigation, including when the matter has reached the High Court after having
been conclusively dealt with by the Magisterial as also the Sessions Court.
In other words, such an offence can be compromised/compounded even after
the petitioner-accused has been convicted by the Court of learned Magistrate
and his appeal against the same has been dismissed by the learned Sessions
Court.
5.4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Damodar S.
Prabhu (supra) has also enunciated that, ordinarily, costs ought to be
imposed when the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act
of 1881 is compounded at a stage when substantial proceedings have already
been undertaken by the Courts so as to dissuade the unscrupulous litigant
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from unduly delaying the compounding of such offences. However,
discretion has been reserved in favour of the concerned Court to
reduce/waive such costs, in case facts/circumstances of a given case so
warrant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sanjabij Tari (supra) has
revisited the guidelines, insofar as it relates to the quantum of imposition of
costs upon the accused, but has not modified the leeway granted in the
judgment of Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) which permits reduction or waiver
of costs based on the factual milieu of a particular case albeit subject to the
recording of reasons for such variance. For the sake of clarity it is reiterated
that liberty reserved in favour of the courts to waive the imposition of costs
may be exercised by any of the courts seized of the matter--be it the High
Court, the Sessions Court or the magisterial Court conducting trial. It is,
however, imperative to bear in mind that discretion to waive the imposition
of costs is not to be invoked as a matter of ordinary course. The exercise of
such discretion must be predicated upon exceptional, compelling and
accentuating circumstances which, in the considered opinion of the
concerned Court seized of the matter, warrant deviation from the general
rule of imposition of cost. The Court, while invoking such discretion, must
record clear, cogent and reasoned findings delineating the special factors that
justify the waiver. This requirement is in consonance with the legislative
intent and the underlying purpose sought to be achieved by the
criminalization of the act of dishonor of cheque, i.e. to inculcate financial
discipline and uphold the credibility and sanctity of negotiable instruments.
5.5. Still further, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 528 BNSS, 2023 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial
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process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, where the dispute is
essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached,
the High Court may intervene to quash the conviction, recognizing that
continued proceedings would be non-productive and unjust in the given
circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are incidental replete
powers, in the absence of which, the Court would be obliged to sit still and
helplessly witness the process of law being abused for the purposes of
injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to the High Court,
forming its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without
such power(s), a High Court would retain form but lack substance. These
powers of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest
possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature
of a High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with
power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts from
being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though
laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of
circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make it
impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which in
fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an
indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal
with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to
be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law and
Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact
the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect
and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance
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with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words; Section
528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless and inherent powers, of a High Court
which may be invoked whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in
particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent
vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between the
parties and to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, the High Court, in the
exercise of its inherent power under section 528 BNSS, 2023 has the
discretion to quash a conviction where the parties have reached an amicable
settlement, provided that such compromise neither impinge upon the public
interest nor undermine the cause justice, as well as the substantial justice.
6. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, it is not disputed by
the concerned rival parties that an amicable settlement has been arrived at
between them and, therefore, compounding of the offence and necessary
further directions have been sought from this Court. A perusal of the
compromise/settlement dated 01.04.2026 stated to be arrived between the
parties reflects that the parties have sought to resolve their dispute(s) in toto
and bury the hatchet. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court,
the factual matrix of the case requires that the offence(s) ought to be
permitted to be compounded and the petitioner deserves to be acquitted.
6.1. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts/
circumstances of the case, the petitioner having faced the wrath of criminal
litigation since about the year 2016; this Court does not deem it appropriate
to saddle the petitioner with costs.
7. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
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(i) The impugned judgment of conviction/ order of sentence dated
28/29.05.2018 passed by learned JMIC, as also the impugned
order dated 21.08.2025 passed by learned Sessions Judge, are
set-aside and the petitioner is acquitted.
acquitted
(ii) The rival parties shall remain bound by the terms of the
settlement/compromise dated 01.04.2026 entered into between
the parties before the Mediation and Conciliation Center of this
Court. In case of non-compliance thereof, the aggrieved party
shall be at liberty to seek recall of this order, albeit upon
showing sufficient cause. It is clarified that in case non-
compliance is found to be shown, the erring party may be
saddled with exemplary punitive measure(s).
(iii) Disposed of,
of accordingly.
(iv) No order as to costs.
(v) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
GOEL)
JUDGE
April 30,
30, 2026
mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
authenticity of this order/ judgment
