[Cites 4, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Balbir Kaur And Ors. vs Satinderpal Singh And Ors. on 29 April, 2026
RSA-1332-1996 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-1332-1996 (O&M)
Reserved on :- 21.04.2026
Date of Pronouncement:-29.04.2026
Uploaded on:-30.04.2026
Balbir Kaur and Others
... Appellants
Versus
Satinderpal Singh and Others
... Respondents
****
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Argued by :-
Mr. Avnish Mittal, Advocate
for the appellants.
Mr. A.S. Manaise, Advocate
for the respondents No.1 to 4.
****
VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J.
1. The present Regular Second Appeal (hereinafter to be referred
as "RSA") is instituted by the appellants/plaintiffs, being aggrieved by the
judgment and decree dated 27.01.1996 passed by the learned Additional
District Judge, Hoshiarpur, whereby the well-reasoned judgment and
decree dated 03.10.1994 of the learned Sub-Judge IInd Class, Hoshiarpur
was set aside. It is respectfully submitted that the impugned judgment
suffers from perversity, misapplication of settled legal principles, and
erroneous appreciation of evidence on record, resulting in grave
miscarriage of justice, and thus deserves to be set aside with restoration of
the decree passed by the learned Trial Court.
2. The brief factual background is that the plaintiff, Smt. Pritam
Kaur, claimed to be the widow of late Jagat Singh, who died in June 1984,
having four daughters from the said wedlock. It was pleaded that upon his
death, the estate was mutated in her and her daughters' names, and that her
son Balbir Singh had predeceased Jagat Singh in 1972, whereupon his
estate also devolved upon her.
2.1. It was further alleged that, under undue influence of Smt.
Parsin Kaur and her sons, defendants No.1 to 3 procured a Will in 1985,
later revoked by a subsequent Will dated 02.01.1989. The plaintiff further
averred that defendant No.1 induced her to execute a General Power of
Attorney, but instead, in collusion with defendants No.4 and 5, got a sale
deed executed by misrepresentation at the office of the Sub-Registrar,
Hoshiarpur, without disclosing its true nature, by obtaining her thumb
impressions on blank/unknown documents.
2.2. The plaintiff asserted absence of consideration, non-delivery
of cheque of ₹46,000/-, and subsequent dispossession from her house,
which led her to discover the alleged fraud upon verification of revenue
records, culminating in the filing of the suit.
3. The defendants, in their written statement, denied all
allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence, asserting that
the plaintiff voluntarily executed the sale deed after understanding its
contents. It was pleaded that she herself purchased stamp papers, the
document was scribed by a licensed deed writer, and duly registered
before the Sub-Registrar, where she admitted execution and affixed her
signatures/thumb impressions on the relevant registers.
3.1. It was further pleaded that the sale consideration was initially
tendered by cheque at the plaintiff's request, but subsequently received in
cash at her own volition against a duly executed receipt witnessed by
independent persons. The defendants maintained that the plaintiff is a
literate and capable person, fully aware of the transaction, and the
allegations of fraud are baseless. Accordingly, dismissal of the suit was
sought.
4. The plaintiff filed a replication, reiterating the averments made
in the plaint and controverting the assertions contained in the written
statement. Upon a careful and comprehensive appraisal of the pleadings,
documentary record, and rival submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties, the Court framed the following issues for adjudication, so
as to ensure a clear, precise, and complete determination of the respective
claims and defences:-
1. Whether the registered sale deed dated 16.9.87 alleged to have
been made by Pritam Kaur in favour of Satinder Pal Singh and
Maninderpal Singh and Tejinderpal Singh, defendants nos.1 to 3 in
respect of the land detailed in the headnote of the plaint is illegal,
null and void ab initio being a sham transaction?OPP
2. Whether the sale deed dated 16.9.87 is without consideration and
thus ineffective qua the rights of the plaintiff in suit land? OPP
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a declaration as prayed for?
OPP
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree for possession of the
suit land in the alternative? OPP
5. Relief.
5. Both parties were afforded full and fair opportunity to lead
evidence in support of their respective claims and defences. Upon
conclusion of the trial and after hearing learned counsel for both sides, the
learned Trial Court proceeded to decree the suit, recording the following
findings and observations:-
"As a sequitur to the findings returned on the issues framed, the
learned Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff with costs, holding
that the sale deed dated 16.09.1987 is void ab initio, a sham
transaction, and wholly inoperative in law. It was further declared that
the said instrument does not affect the rights or title of the plaintiff in
any manner, and consequently, the plaintiff was held entitled to a decree
for possession of the suit property."
6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned
Trial Court, the respondents/appellants preferred an appeal before the
learned First Appellate Court, which, upon reappraisal of the entire
evidence on record, allowed the same and reversed the findings, inter alia
observing that the learned First Appellate Court, upon reappraisal of the
entire evidence on record, arrived at a contrary conclusion. It held that the
execution of the sale deed dated 16.09.1987 by Pritam Kaur in favour of
the defendant-appellant stood duly proved and that the same was
supported by valid consideration. Consequently, the findings recorded by
the learned Trial Court on all the issues were found to be unsustainable
and were accordingly set aside. The appeal was thus allowed, and the suit
of the plaintiff seeking a declaration that the sale deed dated 16.09.1987 is
without consideration, illegal, void, and ineffective in conveying valid title
was dismissed. The consequential relief of possession, being predicated
upon the said declaration, was also declined. No other contention having
been raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant, the appeal stood allowed
in the aforesaid terms.
6.1. Assailing the findings recorded by the learned First Appellate
Court, the appellants/plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. Upon
admission, notice was issued, pursuant whereto the respondents entered
appearance through counsel and contested the same. The record of the
Courts below was requisitioned for a comprehensive examination and due
adjudication.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length and have given anxious and thoughtful consideration to their rival
submissions, in the light of the pleadings, the evidence on record, and the
concurrent findings recorded by the courts below.
8. As regards the scope of second appeal, it is now a settled
proposition of law that in Punjab and Haryana, second appeals preferred
are to be treated as appeals under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act,
1918 and not under Section 100 CPC. Reference in this regard can be
made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pankajakshi
(Dead) through LRs and others V/s Chandrika and others, (2016)6 SCC
157, followed by the judgments in the case of Kirodi (since deceased)
through his LR V/s Ram Parkash and others, (2019) 11 SCC 317 and
Satender and others V/s Saroj and others, 2022(12) Scale 92. Relying
upon the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, no question of law is
required to be framed.
9. During the pendency of the present appeal, the respondents-
defendants instituted an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "CPC") seeking permission to adduce
additional evidence by way of copies of Jamabandis for the years 1982-83
to 1992-93 and mutation No. 5874, appended as Annexures 'A-1' to 'A-
4'. The application is premised on the assertion that, during the trial, the
appellant-plaintiff had tendered a copy of the Jamabandi for the year
1982-83 (Ex. PW5/B), which bore reference to mutation No. 8574, while
the subsequent Jamabandi for the year 1987-88 (Ex. DX) was produced by
the respondents. It is contended that in both these revenue records, Khasra
No. 444/3 (0-5), Barani, was erroneously recorded as 443/3 (0-5) Barani
and 344/3 (0-5) Barani respectively, whereas the correct Khasra number is
444/3 (0-5) Barani. The said fact, according to the applicants, finds due
reflection in the headnote of the plaint, the registered sale deed dated
16.09.1987, and the subsequent writing dated 30.12.1988 evidencing
exchange of a portion of non-cultivable land between the parties.
10. It is further averred that the aforesaid clerical inaccuracies in
Jamabandis Ex. PW5/B and Ex. DX came to the knowledge of the
respondents only recently. Consequently, the production of certified copies
of the Jamabandis for the relevant years, along with mutation No. 8574
reflecting the correct Khasra No. 444/3 (0-5) Barani, is sought to rectify
the inadvertent error. It is contended that such evidence could not be
adduced earlier despite due diligence, as the discrepancy in the revenue
entries had escaped the notice of all concerned, including the Courts
below.
10.1. The application has been vehemently opposed by the appellant
through a detailed reply supported by affidavit, raising preliminary
objections as to its maintainability. It is contended that the application is a
belated attempt to fill lacunae in the case and constitutes an abuse of the
process of Court. It is further asserted that additional evidence under Order
41 Rule 27 of the CPC is permissible only where the applicant
demonstrates that, despite due diligence, such evidence could not have
been produced at the appropriate stage.
10.2. It is specifically urged that the Jamabandi in question had
already been tendered in evidence as Ex. DX, and any alleged discrepancy
therein arises from erroneous transcription by the Patwari. The document,
having been exhibited after due verification in accordance with law,
cannot now be characterized as evidence that could not be produced
despite due diligence.
10.3. It is further contended that the documents now sought to be
introduced require formal proof through proper verification and
examination, which is impermissible at the appellate stage. Moreover,
mutation No. 8574 (Annexure A-4) was never produced before the Courts
below and cannot be permitted to be introduced at this belated juncture. It
is also asserted that the property reflected in Ex. PW5/B pertains to a
distinct Khata and Khatauni and, therefore, is unrelated to the present
controversy. On these premises, dismissal of the application is sought.
10.4. On merits of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has
assailed the impugned judgment of the learned First Appellate Court as
being vitiated by misappreciation of pleadings and evidence, and founded
upon conjectures and surmises. It is contended that the well-reasoned
findings of the learned Trial Court have been reversed without any cogent
or legally sustainable basis.
10.5. It is further urged that the learned First Appellate Court failed
to appreciate that the parties to the impugned sale transaction stood in a
fiduciary relationship, with defendants No. 1 to 3 being in a dominant
position vis-à-vis the plaintiff, an elderly and unsophisticated villager. It is
argued that the defendants exploited this position to procure execution of
the sale deed without full disclosure, thereby vitiating the transaction.
10.6. Learned counsel has emphasized that, in such circumstances,
the burden squarely lay upon the respondents-defendants to establish that
the sale deed was executed voluntarily, for valid consideration, and with
due understanding. It is contended that this burden has not been
discharged, particularly in view of the admitted financial incapacity of
defendants No. 1 to 3, whose bank account reflected a balance of merely
₹362.10/- at the relevant time, notwithstanding the issuance of a cheque
towards the alleged sale consideration.
10.7. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly
drawn adverse inference from the suspicious circumstances surrounding
the transaction, including the fact that the sale deed and the receipt were
scribed by two different deed writers. It is argued that, had the transaction
been bona fide, there was no plausible reason for such an anomaly,
particularly when the same scribe could have prepared both documents.
10.8. Additionally, it is contended that the alleged receipt
evidencing sale consideration for a tempo is inherently unreliable, as the
sale of the said vehicle is shown to have occurred in 1989, whereas the
receipt is dated 10.09.1987, thereby rendering the document manifestly
doubtful and unworthy of reliance.
10.9. Lastly, it is urged that the document dated 30.12.1988 (Ex. P-
12-88), purportedly evidencing a partition or arrangement concerning
immovable property exceeding ₹100 in value, is compulsorily registrable.
In the absence of registration, the same is inadmissible in evidence, and
the reliance placed thereon by the learned First Appellate Court constitutes
a grave legal infirmity.
11. It is further contended on behalf of the appellants that the
application for additional evidence preferred by the respondents is liable to
be rejected in limine, being manifestly belated and devoid of any
satisfactory explanation demonstrating that, despite the exercise of due
diligence, such evidence could not have been produced at the stage of trial.
It is urged that documents Ex. PW5/A and Ex. DX were duly admitted into
evidence after proper verification in accordance with law, and, therefore,
any subsequent plea alleging clerical inaccuracies in the Khasra numbers
is wholly untenable. On these premises, it is prayed that the appeal be
allowed and the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC be dismissed.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has contended
that the application for additional evidence has been necessitated solely to
rectify an inadvertent clerical discrepancy in the description of Khasra No.
444/3 (0-5) Barani, the ownership whereof is not in dispute between the
parties, and which stands duly reflected in the impugned sale deed as well
as in the writing dated 30.12.1988. It is submitted that, in the Jamabandis
exhibited as Ex. PW5/A and Ex. DX, the said Khasra number has been
erroneously recorded as 443/3 (0-5) Barani and 344/3 (0-5) Barani
respectively, and the proposed additional evidence is intended merely to
correct this inadvertent error. It is further contended that the respondents
have duly established the execution of the sale deed by the appellant-
plaintiff in their favour, and that the passing of consideration stands
conclusively proved through the receipt evidencing payment to Smt.
Pritam Kaur, the appellant-plaintiff.
13. It is further urged that the learned First Appellate Court has
undertaken a proper and comprehensive appreciation of the pleadings and
evidence on record, and has rightly reversed the findings of the learned
Trial Court, which were predicated upon conjectures and surmises. The
impugned judgment and decree, it is submitted, do not warrant any
interference in the present appeal.
14. Elaborating further, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that it has been their consistent case from the inception that they
were possessed of sufficient cash at the time of execution of the sale deed.
However, Smt. Pritam Kaur declined to accept the consideration in cash at
the office of the Sub-Registrar, citing impracticality in carrying a
substantial sum, and instead insisted upon payment by way of cheque.
14.1. In compliance therewith, a cheque towards the sale
consideration was issued in the presence of the Sub-Registrar, and the
particulars thereof, including the cheque number and amount, were duly
incorporated in the endorsement of registration of the sale deed,
evidencing its delivery to the appellant-plaintiff.
14.2. It is clarified that it was never the case of the respondents that
the requisite funds were already available in their bank account; rather, it
was conveyed to Smt. Pritam Kaur that the amount would be deposited for
encashment of the cheque. Subsequently, upon her insistence on payment
in cash, the consideration amount was paid in cash on the following day,
the cheque was returned, and a receipt acknowledging such payment was
duly executed, which stands proved on record through the testimony of the
marginal witnesses. The execution of the sale deed itself has been duly
established through the evidence of the deed writer and attesting
witnesses.
14.3. It is further contended that the witnesses examined on behalf
of the appellants-plaintiffs are closely related and interested, and their
testimonies were rightly disbelieved by the learned First Appellate Court
for want of credibility.
14.4. With regard to the alleged sale of the tempo, it is submitted
that the same, along with payment evidenced through receipt Ex. D2, has
been duly proved by the testimony of Jaswant Singh, and the learned First
Appellate Court has correctly placed reliance thereon. As regards the
writing dated 30.12.1988, it is contended that even if the same is assumed
to be compulsorily registrable, it remains admissible for collateral
purposes. Accordingly, it is prayed that the application for additional
evidence be allowed and the present appeal be dismissed.
14.3. Insofar as the prayer for adducing additional evidence is
concerned, it is not in dispute that the appellant-plaintiff is the owner of
Khasra No. 444/3 (0-5) Barani. Although the said Khasra number has
been variously and erroneously described in certain documents already
forming part of the record, the identity and ownership thereof remain
unequivocally admitted between the parties in the present lis. In such
circumstances, the proposed additional evidence, sought merely for the
purpose of rectifying a clerical inconsistency, does not bear any material
significance for the adjudication of the controversy. The issues arising in
the present appeal can be effectively and conclusively determined without
recourse to the Jamabandis Ex. PW5/A and Ex. DX, clarification whereof
is sought. Accordingly, the application filed by the respondents-defendants
under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC is devoid of merit and stands
dismissed.
15. With regard to the contention advanced by learned counsel for
the appellant-plaintiff that the respondents-defendants stood in a fiduciary
relationship with the appellant and were, therefore, in a position to
dominate her will, it is contended that the burden of proving the due
execution of the sale deed and the passing of valid consideration rested
upon the defendants. Though the respondents have refuted the existence of
any such fiduciary relationship and have sought to establish that they were
not residing with Smt. Pritam Kaur at the time of execution of the sale
deed, and that their residence in her village commenced subsequently,
even assuming, arguendo, that such a relationship did exist and that the
onus lay upon the respondents-defendants, the entirety of the evidence
adduced by them must nonetheless be evaluated in its proper perspective.
16. The learned First Appellate Court has, upon a meticulous
appraisal of the evidence, recorded a categorical finding that the execution
of the sale deed stands duly proved through the testimonies of the marginal
witnesses, namely Piara Singh and Lambardar Arjun Singh. It has been
observed that no animus or enmity whatsoever has been alleged or
established against Arjun Singh vis-à-vis Smt. Pritam Kaur. Similarly,
Piara Singh, though related to Smt. Pritam Kaur as the son of the brother
of her husband, has not been shown to be inimically disposed towards her.
In contrast, the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff,
namely Amrik Singh and Chanan Singh, were found to be closely related
and interested witnesses. The learned First Appellate Court, for cogent and
convincing reasons, discarded their testimonies as unreliable, particularly
noting their selective and improbable recollection of dates and events.
17. The learned First Appellate Court has rightly observed that
Amrik Singh's ability to precisely recall the date of his alleged visit to the
Court on 16.09.1987 an event occurring more than five years prior to his
deposition while simultaneously failing to remember the date of his
father's death, which had occurred merely two years earlier, renders his
testimony inherently unreliable and indicative of a tutored or procured
witness. A similar infirmity was found in the testimony of the other
witness, who, despite being unable to recall the date of a significant
national event, namely the assassination of the then Prime Minister,
claimed to remember with exactitude the date of his casual visit to the
Court complex. Furthermore, both witnesses were found to have
contradicted in stating the name of the counsel engaged in the proceedings,
and no evidence was led to substantiate that any litigation involving them
was actually pending, necessitating their presence in the Court complex on
the said date.
17.1. In view thereof, the learned First Appellate Court rightly
concluded that the testimonies of the appellant's witnesses were unworthy
of reliance, and that the learned Trial Court had erred in placing reliance
thereon. Conversely, the exclusion of the testimonies of the deed writer,
Surjit Singh, and the marginal witnesses, Piara Singh and Arjun Singh, by
the learned Trial Court was found to be unsupported by any cogent
reasoning. The deed writer, an independent and professional scribe, duly
proved the execution of the sale deed by producing the relevant register
entries bearing the signatures of the appellant-plaintiff, and categorically
deposed that the contents of the document were read over and explained to
her, whereupon she admitted the same and appended her signatures
thereto.
18. It is the specific case of the appellant-plaintiff that she never
executed the impugned sale deed and that her signatures were obtained
thereon under the pretext of executing a general power of attorney. In
paragraph 7 of the plaint, the plaintiff has averred as under:-
"That after about two years, the defendant No.1-Satinder Pal Singh,
approached the plaintiff that the plaintiff should give a general power of
attorney in his name so that he could effectively look after the manager
her property. With this understanding, he brought the plaintiff to
Hoshiarpur. At that time the defendants No.4 and 4 had also come to
Hoshiarpur. In the Courts, they were stealthily got the sale deed in
respect of the property mentioned in the head note of the plaint from the
plaintiff. At that time neither of the defendants had told the plaintiff that
they want to get the sale deed registered from her in respect of the
property mentioned in the head-note of the plaint. It was rather told to
her that Satinder Pal Singh-defendant is getting only the power of
attorney for management of the property. The plaintiff was made to sit
outside the office of Sub-Registrar, Hoshiarpur, and there her thumb
impressions were obtained on certain papers. It seems that the defendants
No.1, 4 and 5 had connived among themselves and wanted to forge a
registered sale deed dated 16.09.1987, copy of which is attached
herewith. Defendant No.1, who had signed the sale deed in
question, on his own behalf as well as on behalf of defendants No.2 and
3, did not pay even a single penny to the plaintiff. The defendant No.1
also did not hand over any cheque number PYR-709674 account payee
of Punjab National Bank, Railway Road Hoshiarpur dated 16.09.1987 of
an amount of `46,000/-. t may be mentioned here that this cheque was
never got encashed by the plaintiff from the said bank, as the same had
never been handed over to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has now come to
know that even at the time of issuing the said cheque, there was no
money in the bank in the name of defendants No.1 to 3. The sale deed
being without consideration, is illegal, null and void, and void ab initio
and is ineffective qua the rights of the plaintiff in the suit land and is a
sham transaction."
19. A plain and meaningful reading of the aforesaid averments in
the plaint unequivocally demonstrates that the categorical case set up by
the plaintiff is that the impugned sale deed was procured by way of
misrepresentation and that no valid consideration ever passed in respect
thereof. The foundation of the plaintiff's challenge, therefore, rests upon
allegations of vitiating factors affecting the execution of the instrument,
coupled with a denial of the essential element of consideration.
19.1. In response thereto, defendants No. 1 to 3, in para No.7 of the
written statement, have traversed the said allegations and pleaded as
under:-
"This para is wrong and is denied. The story propounded in this para of
the plaint is totally false and baseless. No question of executing any
power of attorney even arose. The plaintiff purchased the stamp for
execution of the sale deed. She herself got the same scribed, signed the
same after hearing it and admitting it as correct. She even signed the
register of the scribe. It was she who showed her intention to execute the
sale deed and have the same registered. There never arose any question
of misleading or misrepresentation. She presented the sale deed before
the Sub Registrar. It was read over to her. She admitted the same as
correct and signed the same. It was then that it was attested. She
voluntarily signed the same. There is no question of any connivance or
forgery. The witnesses were of the choice of the plaintiff. So was the
scribe. Before execution of the sale deed plaintiff wanted and indicated
that the sale money should be given to her by cheque as she did not want
to have the same in cash in the office of Sub Registrar. It was so done
though defendants had cash money with them. They told her that money
will be deposited in the bank to enable her to encash the cheque. It is the
very next day that she changed her mind and returned the cheque to the
answering defendants and got the sale price in cash and executed a
receipt for the same duly scribed and witnessed by two respectables.
Photocopies of the sale deed and receipt dated 17.09.1987 duly signed
by the plaintiff are attached. The cheque was handed over to the plaintiff
before the Sub Registrar. It was not encashed under above
circumstances. The plaintiff very well knew above facts even before
execution of the sale deed. The sale deed is for consideration, legal and
not at all null and void. The plaintiff is bound by the same and
answering defendants are now owners in possession of the land in
dispute. No part of this para of the plaint to the contrary is admitted."
20. When the plaintiff entered the witness box in substantiation of
her case, she deposed in detail with respect to the circumstances allegedly
culminating in the execution of the impugned sale deed, stating as under:-
"Satinder Singh, defendant No.1, represented to me that in old
age it is difficult for him to go to Girdawars and Patwari for managing
the property. Therefore, I should give a power of attorney to him. The
defendant No.1 brought me to Tehsil complex for the purpose of getting
power of attorney executed from me. In the tehsil complex, I met Amrik
Singh and Jarnail Singh of my parental village Benchha, they inquired
from me the purpose of my coming to tehsil complex. I told them that I
have come for giving power of attorney to my daughter's son. I was not
disclosed about the contents of the documents which was got executed
by defendant No.1 to me. I was only represented that a power of
attorney is going to be taken from me. No cheque or cash amount was
given to me at the time of execution of the said power of attorney. The
defendants No.1 to 3 lived with me even after getting the power of
attorney from me and has been going to their village also about one and
a quarter years after the alleged power of attorney, I demanded money
for my personal expenditure from defendant No.1 and he then asked me
that she was nothing to get from him as she is no longer owner of
anything."
21. A careful juxtaposition of the pleadings and the testimony of
the plaintiff reveals material inconsistencies which go to the root of her
case. In paragraph No. 7 of the plaint, as reproduced here-in-above, the
plaintiff has averred that she was made to sit outside the office of the Sub-
Registrar, Hoshiarpur, where her signatures were allegedly obtained on
certain documents. However, during her cross-examination, she materially
deviated from this stand and deposed that Amrik Singh and Chanan Singh
met her while she was seated at the desk of the deed writer. She further
stated that she was unaware as to whether the scribe was a Sikh or a Hindu
and, although she did not categorically deny having signed the register of
the deed writer, she feigned ignorance in that regard.
21.1. Significantly, both the witnesses, namely Chanan Singh and
Amrik Singh, have also deposed that they met the plaintiff while she was
seated at the desk of the deed writer. This version is in direct contradiction
to the plaintiff's pleaded case that she was made to sit outside the office of
the Sub-Registrar and that her signatures were obtained thereon under
deceptive circumstances.
21.2. In contradistinction, the respondents-defendants have adduced
cogent and convincing evidence to establish the due execution of the sale
deed by Smt. Pritam Kaur. The deed writer has unequivocally deposed that
the sale deed was scribed at her instance, was read over and explained to
her, and that she, after admitting the contents thereof to be correct,
appended her signatures thereto.
21.3. The marginal witnesses have also consistently supported the
case of the defendants by affirming the execution of the sale deed by the
plaintiff. Furthermore, the sale deed being a registered instrument carries
with it a statutory presumption of due execution. In the present case, the
endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar on the reverse of the sale deed
explicitly records the receipt of consideration by way of cheque, including
the particulars thereof, by the appellant-plaintiff.
21.4. In light of the aforesaid evidence, it cannot be said that the
learned First Appellate Court committed any error, much less a perversity,
in its appreciation of the pleadings and evidence. The conclusion arrived at
by the learned First Appellate Court--that the sale deed was duly executed
by Smt. Pritam Kaur upon receipt of the cheque towards sale consideration
is both plausible and legally sustainable.
21.5. Insofar as the passing of sale consideration is concerned, the
learned First Appellate Court has accepted the version of the respondents-
defendants, notwithstanding the finding that the defendants did not have
sufficient funds in their bank account at the relevant time and that the
receipt was scribed by a different deed writer, namely Dilbagh Singh, who
was not examined.
22. The learned Trial Court, however, appears to have misdirected
itself by overlooking the specific pleadings in the written statement. A
perusal thereof makes it abundantly clear that it was never the case of the
respondents-defendants that the consideration amount was lying in their
bank account at the time of execution of the sale deed. Rather, their
consistent stand has been that they were possessed of the requisite cash and
had assured the appellant-plaintiff that the amount would be deposited in
the bank account for the purpose of honouring the cheque.
22.1. The respondents-defendants have further substantiated their
case by examining the marginal witnesses to the receipt, who have deposed
that on 17.09.1987, Smt. Pritam Kaur, after initially accepting the cheque,
received the sale consideration in cash and, in acknowledgment thereof,
executed a receipt. The learned Trial Court disbelieved the said receipt
primarily on the grounds that the signatures of Smt. Pritam Kaur were not
affixed across the revenue stamp and that the receipt had been scribed by a
different deed writer.
23. The said reasoning, in the considered view of this Court, is
unsustainable. The receipt stands duly proved on record through the
testimony of its marginal witnesses. The fact that it was scribed by a
different deed writer does not, by itself, constitute a suspicious
circumstance. On the contrary, it lends credence to the authenticity of the
transaction. Had there been any intention to perpetrate fraud or
misrepresentation, it would have been far more convenient to incorporate a
recital within the sale deed itself indicating prior receipt of consideration,
or to have the receipt scribed by the same deed writer so as to limit external
involvement. Human conduct, in matters involving illegality or fraud,
ordinarily tends towards minimizing the number of persons privy to such
acts.
23.1. Thus, the mere factum of the receipt having been prepared by
a different scribe cannot be construed as indicative of any infirmity. The
learned First Appellate Court has, therefore, rightly reversed the findings of
the learned Trial Court on this aspect.
23.2. With regard to receipt Ex. DW-7/A, the learned Trial Court
disbelieved the same on the premise that the vehicle in question was
transferred in the records of the District Transport Officer (DTO) in the
year 1989, thereby rendering it improbable that a receipt could have been
issued in the year 1987.
23.3. However, Jaswant Singh, an independent witness having no
animus against the appellant-plaintiff, has categorically deposed that he
purchased the tempo bearing registration No. PBH-3090 for a sum of
₹48,750/- from Satinder Pal Singh and that a receipt (Ex. DW-7/A) was
issued upon payment of the said amount.
23.4. It is a matter of common knowledge that transactions
involving sale of vehicles are often effected through private arrangements
between the parties, and the formal transfer of registration in official
records is frequently undertaken at a later stage, sometimes after
considerable delay. The statutory requirement of effecting transfer within a
stipulated period is, in practice, not always strictly adhered to.
25. The Court must remain cognizant of such prevailing societal
practices while appreciating evidence. Consequently, receipt Ex. DW-7/A
cannot be discarded solely on the ground that the formal transfer of the
vehicle in official records took place at a later point in time.
26. In view of the foregoing analysis, the receipt dated 10.09.1987
sufficiently establishes that Satinder Pal Singh possessed adequate
financial capacity to meet the sale consideration. The learned First
Appellate Court has rightly appreciated this aspect, and no illegality,
infirmity, or perversity can be discerned in the findings so recorded.
27. With regard to the contention advanced by learned counsel for
the appellants that the writing dated 30.12.1988 is inadmissible in evidence
on the ground that it constitutes an exchange deed relating to immovable
property of a value exceeding Rs.100/-, the same is devoid of merit.
28. A careful consideration of the record reveals that the said
writing was not adduced in evidence with a view to asserting or
establishing title over immovable property. Rather, it was tendered for the
limited and collateral purpose of demonstrating that Smt. Pritam Kaur had
due knowledge of the execution of the sale deed in favour of the
respondents-defendants, and that the property comprised in Khasra
No.444/3 (0-5) had already stood transferred to them. This inference is
fortified by the fact that, under the said writing, land forming part of the
aforesaid khasra number was subsequently exchanged with other land
owned by Smt. Pritam Kaur.
28.1. In this backdrop, the document is clearly admissible for
collateral purposes in terms of Section 49 of the Registration Act. The
learned First Appellate Court has, therefore, rightly relied upon the said
writing for the limited purpose of establishing the knowledge and conduct
of Smt. Pritam Kaur with respect to the prior transaction, and no illegality
can be attributed to such reliance.
29. As regards the submission that the writing dated 30.12.1988
reflects an exchange of six marlas of land in Khasra No.444, whereas the
impugned sale deed pertains to five marlas in Khasra No.444/3, it is to be
noted that even if such discrepancy is assumed, the same does not advance
the case of the appellants.
29.1. Be that as it may, the present lis does not pertain to the
enforcement or validity of the writing dated 30.12.1988. It is also not in
dispute between the parties that the area of Khasra No.444/3 sold vide sale
deed dated 16.09.1987 measures 05 marlas. Consequently, any minor
inconsistency in the area mentioned in the subsequent writing does not
impinge upon the validity or effect of the sale transaction in question. This
writing was proved in evidence just to show that Smt. Pritam Kaur was
having knowledge that she has transferred ownership of land in Khasra
No.444/3 (0-5).
29.2. Learned First Appellate Court has properly appreciated
evidence and pleadings and by recording well reasoned findings has rightly
allowed the appeal. Findings no merits in appeal, appeal stands dismissed
and decree and judgments of learned First Appellate Court stand
confirmed.
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, and consequent upon the
final adjudication of the principal controversy, all pending miscellaneous
or interlocutory applications, if any, arising out of or connected with the
present proceedings, shall stand disposed of by necessary implication. No
separate orders are warranted in respect thereof, the same having been
rendered infructuous.
( VIRINDER AGGARWAL)
29.04.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
