[Cites 12, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Binnu Singh vs State Of Punjab on 23 April, 2026

                     CRM-M--10334-2026                                                                    1




                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                                              CHANDIGARH

                     120                                                      CRM-M-10334-2026


                     Binnu Singh
                                                                                         ....Petitioner
                                                               V/s
                     State of Punjab
                                                                                         ....Respondent
                     Date of decision: 23.04.2026
                     Date of Uploading : 24.04.2026
                                         2

                     CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
                     Present:      Mr. R.S. Thakur, Advocate for the petitioner.
                                   Mr. Adhiraj Singh Thind, AAG Punjab
                                                                Punjab.
                                                              *****
                     SUMEET GOEL,
                            GOEL J. (Oral)

1. Present second petition has been filed under Section 483 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') for grant of

regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No. No.9 9 dated 14.01.2023, 14.01.2023

registered for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 384, 120-B, B, 34 of

IPC and Section 25, 27, 54, 59 of the Arms Act at Police Station Talwandi

Sabo, District Bathinda.

The petitioner has earlier applied for grant of regular bail

before this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.03.2025. The

relevant part of said order reads as under:--

" After arguing for some time, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks withdrawal of the present petition at this stage.

2. Dismissed as withdrawn at this stage"

Thereafter, the present petitio petition n i.e. the second petition for grant

2026.04.24 09:57 of regular bail, has been preferred by the petitioner on 18.02.2026.

2. As per the prosecution case, the FIR was registered on the

statement of complainant Chaman Lal, a retired Lecturer, who stated that

on the day of occurrence at about7:30 PM, while he and his son namely Dr.

Dinesh Bansal were present at Raj Nursing home, two unknown young men

entered the hospital on the pretext of obtaining an OPD slip. Thereafter,

they entered the room of the doctor and shortly thereafter, upon hearing a

bell, the complainant alongwith staff rushed inside and found both persons

engaged in a scuffle with Dr. Dinesh Bansal. It has been alleged that one of

them took out a pistol and fired at Dr. Dinesh Bansal with an intention to

kill him, causing a gunshot injury on his leg. Both the assailants fled from

the spot thereafter and the injured was immediately shifted to hospital for

medical treatment. On these set of allegations, the FIR in question has been

registered. Subsequently, during the course of investigation, the present

petitioner was nominated as one of the accused.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the

petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question as he was not

named in the FIR which was initially registered against unknown persons.

Learned counsel has further iterated that there is no identification of the

petitioner in the FIR and no recovery has been effected from him. It has

been further contended that the alleged injury is on the leg which prima

facie does not indicate any intention to kill. According to learned counsel,

the petitioner has been in custody since 25.01.2023 and the trial is

progressing at a snail's pace with only 01 witness partially examined out of

27 witnesses cited by the prosecution. It has, thus, been submitted that the

continued incarceration of the petitioner particularly in the absence of any

substantive or direct evidence linking him to the alleged offence would

serve no useful purpose. Learned counsel has emphasized that the co-

accused has already been granted the concession of regular bail by this

Court vide order dated 11.03.2025 and, therefore, on the principle of parity

the petitioner is also entitled to the similar relief. Furthermore, the

petitioner has clean antecedents and there is no likelihood of his absconding

or tampering with the prosecution evidence. Moreover, the petitioner shall

undertake to abide by all conditions that may be imposed by this Court,

including not tampering with the prosecution evidence or influencing

witnesses and not leaving the country without prior permission of the Court.

On the strength of aforesaid submissions, the grant of petition in hand is

entreated for.

4. Per contra, learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the

grant of bail to the petitioner by arguing that the petitioner is the main

accused who has actively participated in the commission of offence and has

fired the gunshot at the victim. Learned State counsel has iterated that the

offence is grave and serious in nature involving an attempt to murder inside

a hospital. It has been further contended that the petitioner is associated

with criminal elements and has been convicted in another FIR registered

shortly thereafter which reflects his conduct. Learned State counsel has

pointed out that the earlier petition of the petitioner for grant of regular bail

has already been dismissed and there is no substantial change in

circumstances. Considering the gravity of the offence and the specific role

attributed to the petitioner, learned State counsel has prayed for the

dismissal of the instant petition.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have

perused the available record.

6. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by

this Court in Rafiq Khan vs. State of Haryana and another: 2024:

PHHC:054064; relevant whereof reads as under:-

9. The paramount issue, in any plea for grant of regular bail, is the liberty of an individual. Indubitably, within our society and jurisprudence, liberty is a cherished foundational principle and has fundamental ascendency over all other attributes of social order. Even within the framework of Constitution, this principle is made conspicuous, inter alia, in Article 21 of our Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Cr.P.C., 1973 is one such procedural law which permits curtailment of liberty of anti-social and anti-national elements. Yet, liberty of an individual, the accused, must not transgress the rights of another individual, the victim, in terms of right to dignified everyday life without any imminent fear or threat. Additionally, the rights of the collective of individuals viz. the State/Society at large, also cannot be neglected. Therefore, while countenancing the facts for considering the bail, the rights of the triad of accused, victim and the State (Society at large) ought to be entailed. Ergo, while considering a bail plea, the Court ought to take into account this core concept(s). 9.1 An analytical perusal of Cr.P.C. explicates that this statute does not contain any provision relatable to maintainability or otherwise of second/successive bail petitions, including one(s) seeking regular bail. Once there is no statutory prohibition provided for in law, a Court is not logically empowered to import into it such prohibitions, especially in case of codified and legislated law. It is trite law that Courts ought not to read a provision in codified law which has not been specifically provided for by the legislature especially when such reading results into deprivation of rights. The bar contained in Section 362 of Cr.P.C. can, by no stretch of legal imagination, be said to be barring the filing of second/successive regular bail petition.

9.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Babu Singh case (supra) has held that rejection of a bail petition does not, by itself, forbid a Court from considering another one, later in point of time.

Similar is the ratio decidendi of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (supra). Ergo, it can be safely inferred that the decision of a Court qua regular bail petition is essentially an interlocutory order and hence the postulation of res AJAY KUMAR 2026.04.24 09:57 I attest to the accuracy and judicata does not apply to its realm. integrity of this document

9.3 The issue that next craves attention is as to what are the factors/parameters for consideration of second/successive regular bail petition(s).

9.4. The concordant legal position is that the essential pre- requisite for consideration of second/successive regular petition is the material/substantial change in circumstances and factors of alike nature. Indubitably, the further period of incarceration suffered by the petitioner-accused after rejection/withdrawal of first/earlier plea for bail, pace of trial, the witnesses turning hostile or not supporting prosecution case and changed medical condition(s) of accused would be pertinent factor(s). It goes without saying that these factors are only illustrative in nature and cannot by any means be said to be exhaustive.

9.5 No rigid or universal criterion can possibly be delineated to conclusively govern the exercise of judicial discretion, in determining, as to what would constitute as the above stated substantial change in circumstances. Factual flexibility, one additional or different fact, may cause a sea of difference. There is no gainsaying that each case has its own distinct and unique facts and, hence, exercise of such judicial power is best left to the judicial discretion of a Court, in accordance with the settled norms of our jurisprudence.

10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge:

I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.

II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances.

IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what

would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has

its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).

V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed."

7. The present petition is a second petition for grant of regular

bail by the petitioner. A second regular bail petition is indeed maintainable

under law; however, it requires demonstration of a substantial change in

circumstances since the earlier petition. It is a settled proposition of law

that such a change must be significant and not merely superficial or

technical to warrant reconsideration. This standard ensures that the remedy

of successive bail petitions is not misused through repeated filings but is

available when new and material factors arise that alter the initial

assessment of the case. The first regular bail filed by the petitioner was

dismissed as withdrawn on 11.03.2025. The instant petition i.e. second

petition for grant of regular bail has been filed thereafter on 18.02.2026.

However, since the first regular bail petition was dismissed as withdrawn

without adjudication on merits, this Court deems it appropriate to also

examine the petition on merits.

8. The grant of bail falls within the discretionary domain of the

Court; however, such discretion must be exercised in a judicious and

principled manner, ensuring it aligns with established legal precedents and

the interests of justice. While considering a bail application, the Court must

2026.04.24 09:57 evaluate factors such as the existence of prima facie evidence implicating

the accused, the nature and gravity of the alleged offence and the severity of

the likely sentence upon conviction. The Court must also assess the

likelihood of the accused absconding or evading the due process of law, the

probability of the offence being repeated and any reasonable apprehension

of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

Additionally, the character, antecedents, financial means, societal standing,

and overall conduct of the accused play a crucial role. Furthermore, the

Court must weigh the potential danger of bail undermining the

administration of justice or thwarting its due course. A profitable reference

in this regard is made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

titled as State through C.B.I. vs. Amaramani Tripathi, 2005 AIR Supreme

Court 3490, relevant whereof reads as under:

"14. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i)whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted bygrant of bail (see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 377 (SC) :2001(4) SCC 280 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 Supreme Court 179). While a vague allegation that accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, 2004(2) RCR (Criminal) 254 (SC) :2004(7) SCC 528 :"The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of AJAY KUMAR course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of

evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

a. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.

b. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension ofthreat to the complainant.

c. Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (see Ram GovindUpadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, 2002(2) RCR (Criminal) 250 (SC) : 2002(3) SCC 598 andPuran v. Ram Bilas, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 801 (SC) : 2001(6) SCC 338."

This Court also in specific terms held that :

"the condition laid down under section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under section 439 of the Code. In the impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail."

In Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra, 2005(1) Apex Criminal 319 : 2005(1) RCR(Criminal) 712 (SC) : 2005(3) SCC 143, this Court observed :

"The object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty by the bail order from tampering with the evidence in the heinous crime..... It hardly requires to be stated that once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent, the

2026.04.24 09:57 accused in order to get away from the clutches of the same indulge

in various activities like tampering with the prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased victim and also create problems of law and order situation."

9. Indubitably, the allegations against the petitioner are grave in

nature. The allegations in the present case pertain to a serious offence

wherein the assailants allegedly entered a hospital and fired at a doctor

inside his chamber. The petitioner alongwith co-accused is alleged to have

entered Raj Nursing Home, Talwandi Sabo, under the pretext of seeking

medical consultation. After entering into the chamber of Dr. Dinesh Bansal,

both the accused allegedly engaged in a scuffle with him. It has been

specifically attributed to the petitioner that he took out a pistol during the

course of the incident and fired a gunshot at Dr. Dinesh Bansal with the

intention to kill him. The bullet is stated to have struck the victim on his leg

and immediately thereafter, the petitioner alongwith his co-accused

allegedly fled the spot while pushing aside the complainant and other

persons present at the scene. The plea that the petitioner was not named in

the FIR and has been nominated subsequently during investigation does not,

at this stage, dilute the specific role attributed to him, particularly when the

act of firing has been directly ascribed to him. The nature and gravity of

allegations as well as the role assigned to the petitioner cannot be lightly

brushed aside at this stage. The plea of the petitioner that the injury has

been caused on the non-vital part of the body i.e. leg and, therefore, no

intention to kill is absent, is a fact which can only be ratiocinated upon

during the course of trial and cannot be conclusively determined at the stage

of consideration of plea for grant of regular bail. The seriousness of the

allegations, coupled with the specific role attributed to the petitioner, weighs

heavily against the grant of bail. Though the petitioner has been in custody

since 25.01.2023 and the challan has already been presented but these

factors by themselves are not sufficient to dilute the gravity of the offence

alleged against him.

9.1. The plea of parity raised by the petitioner is also misconceived

and does not merit acceptance as the case of the petitioner stands on a

different footing inasmuch as a specific and active role, particularly of firing

the gunshot, has been attributed to him. It is well settled that the principle

of parity is not absolute and is subject to the individual role and

circumstances of each accused. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim the

benefit of parity in the factual milieu of the case in hand.

10. At this stage, no accentuating circumstances have been made

which may prima facie constitute a compelling ground for the grant of

regular bail to the petitioner, especially in light of the gravity of the

allegations and the evidence on record. It is also to be borne in mind that

offences of this nature strike at the very root of public order and societal

conscience. Granting bail in such cases would not only undermine the

gravity of the offence but may also embolden the accused. Further, there

exists a strong likelihood that if enlarged on bail the petitioner may abscond

to evade trial or attempt to influence, threaten, or intimidate prosecution

witnesses. The contention of learned counsel that the name of the petitioner

does not find mention in the initial FIR and he has been subsequently

nominated does not, by itself, create a ground for grant of regular bail, as it

is well settled that an accused can be arrayed during the course of

investigation if sufficient material surfaces against him. Moreover, such

submissions would require deeper appreciation of evidence, which cannot

appropriately be undertaken at the stage of consideration of a bail petition.

Furthermore, the petitioner has also sought bail on the ground of prolonged

custody and snail pace of the trial. Though it is true that the petitioner has

been in custody for a considerable period but the seriousness of the

allegations and his criminal antecedents weigh heavily against him. The

material which has been placed on record does not show that the delay in

trial is solely attributable to the prosecution. In such circumstances, long

custody, by itself, cannot be treated as a ground for grant of bail.

11. Considering the gravity of the offence, the stage of the trial and

the overall facts and circumstances emerging from the record, this Court

finds no merit in the present petition. Accordingly, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of

regular bail in the factual milieu of the case in hand.

12. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:

(i) The petition in hand is devoid of merits and is hereby

dismissed.

(ii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove

shall not have any effect on merits of the case and the investigating agency

as also the trial Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without

being influenced with this order.