[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Manjit Singh @ Mani vs State Of Punjab on 23 April, 2026
1
CRM-
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-
CRM-M-16503-
16503-2026
Manjit Singh @ Mani
....Petitioner
Petitioner
versus
State of Punjab
....Respondent
Date of Decision: April 23,
23, 2026
Date of Uploading: April 24,
24, 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:-
Present: Mr. Prateek Pandit, Advocate for the petitioner
petitioner.
Mr. Baljinder Singh Sra, Additional AG Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL,
GOEL, J. (ORAL)
Present petition is the second attempt filed under Section 483 of the
BNSS, 2023 seeking grant of regular bail to the petitioner
petitioner, in case bearing FIR
No.231 dated 29.11.2022, registered for the off
offences punishable under Sectionss
15, 25, 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, at Police Station Dhakha District Ludhiana.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an
accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involved alleged
recovery of 700 kgs of Poppy Husk from the petitioner and his co
co-accused,
accused,
namely,
mely, Sunita and Ranjit Singh.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner is in
custody since 13.09.2024. Learned counsel has argued that the petitioner has been
falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel has further submitted
that mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not scrupulously been complied
with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned counsel
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has iterated that the trial is delayed and the liability thereof cannot be fastened
upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has submitted that co-accused of the
petitioner, namely, Sunita has been afforded concession of regular bail, vide order
dated 04.11.2024 passed in CRM-
CRM-M-36890-
36890-2024.
2024 Learned counsel has argued that
the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 01½ years. Thus, regular
bail is prayed for.
4. On the other hand, learned State counsel has filed status report by
way of an affidavit dated 22.04.2026, in the Court today, which is taken on record.
Raising submissions in tandem with the said status report, learned State counsel
has opposed the present petition by arguing that the allegations raised against the
petitioner are serious in nature and, thus, the petitioner does not deserve the
concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel has further submitted that the
instant bail plea is barred by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus,
the same ought to be dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record
custody certificate dated 22.04.2026, in the Court today, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the
available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 13.09.2024, whereinafter
investigation was carried out and challan qua the petitioner was presented on
21.09.2024. Total 16 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which, only 03
have been examined till date. It is, thus, indubitable that conclusion of the trial will
take long time. Co-accused of the petitioner, namely, Sunita has been granted
concession of regular bail. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to
debatable issues, which shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This
Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at
this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought
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forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of
justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 22.04.2026 filed by
the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a
period of 01 year, 07 months and 09 days.
6.2. Further, as per the said custody certificate, the petitioner is stated to
be involved in other FIR(s). However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by
itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in
question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question
by ratiocinating upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this
regard can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maulana
Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a
Division Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in case of Sridhar
Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this Court in CRM-M
Haryana
No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana, decided on
29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191.
In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
6.3. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of Punjab
passed in CRM 64074--2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying upon the ratio
CRM--M-64074
decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon
vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S.
Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and
another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT
of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated
07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal";
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"Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal", Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as "Mohammad Salman
Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat"; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated
05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and
Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has
held, thus:
"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a
vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any
impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an
overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has
been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the
above-referred to Supreme Court's judgments have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings
consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The
overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant
pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the
criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The
guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent
delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to
proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-
trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and
public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects
against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the
passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend
himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention
are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are
subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually
under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of
such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his
family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
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rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985
must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's
fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty
cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor
justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual
cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking
refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The
legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of
the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts
under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's
eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does
not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail
petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused
to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable
cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment,
an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life
and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985."
6.4. Indubitably, the present petition is the second attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The first bail plea was dismissed as
withdrawn on 12.11.2025. Keeping in view the entirety of the factual matrix
of the case in hand; especially, factum of the petitioner having suffered
extended incarceration & pace of trial; this Court is inclined to affirmatively
consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this regard, can
CRA--S-2332
be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA 2332--2023 titled as
another
Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and an other; relevant whereof reads as
under:
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"10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following
principles emerge:
I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected
solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution
or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently
required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing
of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The
metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s)
ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without
substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances.
IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every
case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an
attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is
best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing
with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).
V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular
bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to
be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being
second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court
having successfully countenanced/entertained such
second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly
decipherable from the said order passed."
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is
not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed.
allowed Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on his
furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial
Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed
by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by
the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the
trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial
Court.
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(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and
shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every
month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the
effect that he has not been involved in commission of any
offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is
found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged
on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or
otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for
cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be
ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which
may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove
or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at
liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
GOEL)
JUDGE
April 23,
23, 2026
mahavir/ashwani
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
authenticity of this order/ judgment
