[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Tarun Kalra vs State Of Haryana on 22 April, 2026
CRM-M-20395-2026 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
248
CRM-M-20395-2026
Date of decision : 22.04.2026
Date of uploading:23.04.2026
Tarun Kalra .............Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana .......Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Sirat Sapra, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Vishal Singh, AAG, Haryana.
---
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
1. Present 2nd petition has been filed under Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') for grant of
regular bail to the petitioner in case FIR No.293 dated 19.09.2025, under
Sections 21(c) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
registered at Police Station Rewari City, District Rewari.
2. The gravamen of the allegations against the petitioner is that the
petitioner is an accused of being involving in an FIR pertaining to NDPS
Act involving alleged recovery of 38 vials of 100 ML each of Narcotic
Drugs were recovered from the petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner
is in custody since 19.09.2025. Learned counsel has further submitted that
the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have scrupulously not been
complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent
defects. Learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to the attention of
this Court the difference between the FIR in question and the search
option memo to argue that it is not absolutely clear whether the concerned
Investigating Officer had given an option to the petitioner to be searched
before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. Learned counsel has further
urged that this aspect is a matter for trial and, thus, the rigour contained
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands complied with. Thus, regular
bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record custody
certificate dated 21.04.2026. Learned State counsel has opposed the
present petition by arguing that allegations raised against the petitioner
are serious in nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the
regular bail. Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant
bail plea is barred by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus,
the same ought to be dismissed.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 19.09.2025 wherein after
investigation was carried out and challan qua the petitioner stands
presented on 17.12.2025. Total 18 prosecution witnesses have been cited
but none has been examined till date. Culmination of the investigation as
also trial, in case occasion so arises, will take long. This Court in a
judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of Punjab passed in CRM-M-
64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying upon the ratio decidendi
of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon
vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay
JATIN vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of
Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @
Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal
Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal"; "Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs.
The State of West Bengal", Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022
dated 22.08.2022 titled as "Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The
State of Gujarat"; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022
titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and
Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal)
172; has held, thus:
"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard
to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern
accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of
an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving
way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past
and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court's judgments have
laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The
concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at
the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which
continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal
and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible
and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the
criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy
trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal
jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the
resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused
for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice
system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial
is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and
the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable
dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the
accused against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the
accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges
and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories
dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to
defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention
are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to
psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous
conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration
at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved
in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act,
1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity,
the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS
Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after
hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions
which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be
meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a
speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory
by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is
neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by
cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate
period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely
disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special
Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's
eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not
become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition
in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court
must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace
of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial.
Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial
detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of
justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to
conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates
against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and,
as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section
37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In
other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground
of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985."
The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues,
which shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court
does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at
this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been
brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding
from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1 As per the custody certificate dated 21.04.2026 the petitioner
has already undergone a total custody period of 7 months and 1 day & is
not shown involved in any other FIR.
7. Indubitably, the present petition is the 2nd attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the
petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 22.01.2026. Keeping in view
the entire factual milieu of the case in hand, the extended incarceration of
the petitioner, and the snail pace of the trial, this Court is inclined to
favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this
regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-2332-
2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant
whereof reads as under:
"10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the
following principles emerge:
I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be
rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-
prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently
required to show substantial change in circumstances and
showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not
suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive
bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of
petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
change in circumstances.
IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as
every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such
an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this
issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the
Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail
petition(s).
V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular
bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently
required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a
plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the
cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained
such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and
clearly decipherable from the said order passed."
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on
his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned
CJM/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be
imposed by the concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall
remain bound by the following conditions:-
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before
the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial
Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cell-phone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall
not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of
the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to
the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any
offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is
found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on
bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise,
the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his
bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits
thereof.
9. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
10. Ordered accordingly.
11. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
22.04.2026
ja
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
