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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Som Nath vs State Of Haryana And Another on 22 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
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Som Nath
.Petitioner
....Petitioner
versus
State of Haryana and another
....Respondentss
Date of Decision: April 22,
22, 2026
Date of Uploading: April 23,
23, 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:-
Present: Ms. Deify Jindal, Advocate for the petitioner
petitioner.
Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana.
Ms. Anju Bansal,, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*****
SUMEET GOEL,
GOEL, J. (ORAL)
The substantive prayer made in the petition in hand reads thus:
"i. quash
uash the impugned FIR No.174 dated 18.04.2025, Annexure P P-2,
2,
registered against the petitioner under Section 174
174-A IPC at Police Station
Civil Lines, Karnal, and all consequential proceed
proceedings
ings arising therefrom,
in the interest of justice;
ii. quash the impugned order dated 02.09.2019, Annexure P P-1,
1, passed
by the Ld. Judicial Magistrate, Karnal, in complaint no. 6912/2018 dated
26.11.2018 whereby the petitioner was declared as a proclaimed person,
along with all proceedings initiated under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C.;
iii. set aside all further proceedings, actions and consequences
emanating from the aforesaid FIR and proclamation proceedings."
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that pursuant to the
order dated 02.11.2019 passed by the learned JMIC, Karnal
Karnal, FIR in question
has been registered against the petitioner since he has been declared as P.O.
vide order dated 02.09.2019 passed by the said Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
impugned FIR, has its genesis, in a criminal complaint filed against the
authenticity of this order/ judgment
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petitioner (herein) under Section 138 of the NI Act, in proceedings whereof
the petitioner was declared as a proclaimed person & hence the impugned
FIR came to be got registered against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has argued that in the said case under Section 138 of the NI Act,
due to non-appearance of the petitioner, he was declared as proclaimed
person, vide order dated 02.09.2019 (Annexure P-1). Learned counsel has
further argued that, pursuant to the said order, FIR in question under Section
174-A of IPC has been registered against the petitioner. Learned counsel has
submitted that the aforesaid complaint filed by respondent No.2 against the
petitioner has been disposed of, vide order dated 17.11.2025 (Annexure P-4)
as out of agreed amount of Rs.2,00,000/-, the petitioner had made part
payment to the tune of Rs.40,000/- to the complainant, and had undertaken
to pay the balance amount of Rs.1,60,000/- to the complainant. Learned
counsel has further submitted that now pursuant to the aforesaid settlement,
the petitioner has paid the entire amount to the complainant, and a
compromise deed dated 30.03.2026 (Annexure P-5) has been effected
between the petitioner and the complainant.
3.1. It has been further iterated that since the criminal complaint
under Section 138 of NI Act, has already been disposed of as the rival
parties had entered into a settlement, therefore, no useful purpose would be
served by continuation of the proceedings qua the impugned FIR. To
buttress this aspect of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has
relied upon the order dated 17.11.2025 passed by the Presiding Officer,
Daily Lok Adalat, Karnal, which reads thus:
"Today the case was fixed for arguments on compromise.
However, accused Somnath as well as complainant Rishi Pal have
appeared and submitted that they have arrived at a compromise for an
amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. Accused Somnath vide separately recorded
authenticity of this order/ judgment
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statement stated that as per the compromise he has paid an amount of Rs.
20,000/- out of Rs.2,00,000/- on 14.10.2025 and amount of Rs. 20,000/-
has been paid to the complainant today. Complainant Rishipal has suffered
a statement to the effect that he has reached at compromise with the
accused in the mediation centre and received the amount of Rs. 40,000/-
from the complainant. Accused and complainant also requested that as per
the compromise award may be passed for the remaining amount of Rs.
1,60,000/-. Accused has acknowledged his liability to pay the aforesaid
amount to the complainant. Now the accused shall make the payment of
amount of Rs.1,60,000/- to the complainant in installments of Rs.20,000/-
each commencing from November 2025 to July 2026 as per the settlement
deed. If the accused fails to make such payment, then the complainant
shall have the right to recover the same through execution petition.
2. Keeping in view the request of both the sides as well as in the light
of observations made in case law titled as K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon
Vs. C.D.Shaji 2012(1) RCR (Crl.) 102(SC), the matter has been taken up
in Daily Lok Adalat. Considering the statement of accused that he has
undertaken to pay an amount of Rs.1,60,000/-, as well as the statement of
the complainant, it appears that complainant is concerned with his
payment only and will be satisfied if the same is made by the accused as
undertaken by him vide his statement and compromise deed. Hence,
keeping in view the statements of parties and the compromise deed, as the
accused has acknowledged his liability to pay Rs.1,60,000/-, the complaint
in hand is hereby disposed of without any order as to costs as the present
settlement arrived at between the parties is likely to curb the litigation and
delay. The Award is passed to the effect that accused is directed to make
the payment as per his even dated statement and compromise deed and is
bound by his statement and the terms of the compromise deed. The
complainant is also bound by his statement.
3. Before parting with present award, it is made clear that if the
accused fails to make the payment as per today's compromise/settlement,
then in view of the case law cited as K.N. Govindan Kutty Mennon's Case
(Supra), the complainant will be at liberty to file the exec ution qua
payment undertaken by the accused today in the Court i.e. Rs.1,60,000/-,
in the competent Court. It is also made clear that in case the payment, as
undertaken by the accused, is not made by the accused within the time
undertaken by him and if the complainant is constrained to initiate
proceedings against the accused in the execution proceedings, then the
accused shall be liable to pay the cheque amount to the complainant and
and 10% of the cheque amount will also be recovered from the accused as
costs to be paid with D.L.S.A., Karnal. Accused stands acquitted of the
notice of accusation served upon him. His bail/surety bonds also stand
discharged accordingly. File be consigned to Record Room after due
compliance.""
On the strength of above arguments, learned counsel for the
petitioner has pressed for grant of petition in hand.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the petition in hand. He,
however, does not dispute the fact that the parties have amicably resolved
the matter and the main complaint stands disposed of.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 - complainant appears
and ratifies the factum of compromise having been effected between the
authenticity of this order/ judgment
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parties as well as the complaint in question having been disposed of before
the Court below.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have
perused the paper-book.
7. The seminal question that arises for consideration in the present
petition is as to whether the impugned FIR (as also proceedings arising
therefrom) under Section 209 of BNS (erstwhile Section 174-A of the IPC)
deserves to be quashed in the factual matrix of the present case.
8. At this juncture; it would be apposite to refer herein to a
CRM--M-51049
judgment of this Court passed in CRM 51049--2019 titled as Mohammad
Hanif Attari vs. State of Haryana, decided on 06.07.2023; relevant whereof
reads as under:
"3. In view the fact that after the principle proceedings in which the petitioner
was declared Proclaimed Offender stand concluded, the question would arise
is: 'whether in the given circumstances, proceedings under Section 174A of
the IPC pursuant to FIR No.425 dated 17th of November, 2017 can be
allowed to continue.
4. The question framed ibid is no more res integra and already stands
answered by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CRM-M-43813-2018 titled
as "Baldev Chand Bansal v. State of Haryana and another" vide order dated
29.01.2019, which held as under:
"Prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No.64 dated
15.02.2017 filed under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code
registered at Police Station Sector-5, Panchkula and all other
subsequent proceedings arising thereof as well as order dated
24.10.2016 passed by the trial Court vide which a direction was
issued to register the aforesaid FIR."
XX XXX XXXX
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions
rendered by this Court in "Vikas Sharma v. Gurpreet Singh Kohli
and another (supra), 2017, (3) L.A.R.584, Microqual Techno
Limited and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2015 (32)
RCR (Criminal) 790 and "Rajneesh Khanna v. State of Haryana
and another" 2017 (3) L.A.R. 555 wherein in an identical
circumstance, this Court has held that since the main petition filed
under Section 138 of the Act stands withdrawn in view of an
amicable settlement between the parties, therefore, continuation of
proceedings under Section 174A of IPC shall be nothing but an
abuse of the process of law.
XX XXX XXXX
In view of the same, I find merit in the present petition and
accordingly, present petition is allowed and the impugned order
dated 24.10.2016 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class,
Panchkula as well as FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017 registered under
authenticity of this order/ judgment
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Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector-5,
Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof, are
hereby quashed."
5. Same is the view of another Co-ordinate Bench in the "Ashok Madaan v.
State of Haryana and another" reported as 2020 (4) RCR (Criminal) 87,
wherein it has been held that:
"No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently
argued that the offence under Section 174A I.P.C. is independent
of the main case, therefore, merely because the main case has been
dismissed for want of prosecution, the present petition cannot be
allowed, however, keeping in view the fact that the present FIR
was registered only on account of absence from the proceedings in
the main case which had been subsequently regularised by the
court while granting bail to the petitioner, the default stood
condoned. In such circumstances, continuation of proceedings
under Section 174A LP.C. shall be abuse of the process of court.
7. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR No. 446 dated
21.08.2017, registered under Section 174A I.PC. at Police Station
Kotwali, District Faridabad, as well as consequential proceedings
shall stand quashed."
8.1. More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled
Haryana
as Daljit Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another, Criminal Appeal No.4359
of 2024 decided on 02.01.2025; has held that:
"7.3 Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is
nullified i.e., the person subjected to such proclamation, by virtue of
subsequent developments is no longer required to be presented before a
Court of law. Then, can the prosecution still proceed against such a person
for having not appeared before a Court during the time that the process
was in effect. The answer is in the affirmative. We say so for the following
reasons:-
(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says "whoever fails to
appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by
proclamation...". This implies that the very instance at which a
person is directed to appear, and he does not do so, this Section
comes into play;
(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that the
instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of the Section,
and therefore, prosecution therefor would be independent
of Section 82, Cr.P.C. being in effect;
(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot be
initiated independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C., i.e., can only be
started post the issuance of proclamation, they can continue if the
said proclamation is no longer in effect.
(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view, i.e.,
that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in Mukesh Bhatia
v.State (NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023; Divya Verma
v. State 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619; Sameena & Anr. v. State
GNCT of Delhi & Anr. Crl. M.C. No.1470 of 2021, Dated 17th
May, 2022 For the reasons afore-stated, we agree with the findings
made in these judgments/orders. At the same time, it stands
clarified that we have not commented on the merits of the cases.
(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A IPC is
indeed stand-alone, given that it arises out of an original offence in
connection with which proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is
initiated and in the said offence the accused stands, subsequently,
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acquitted, it would be permissible in law for the Court seized of the
trial under such offence, to take note of such a development and
treat the same as a ground to draw the proceedings to a close,
should such a prayer be made and the circumstances of the case so
warrant.
8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an independent,
substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation
under Section 82, Cr.P.C. is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence.
xxxxxxxxx"
However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the impugned
FIR (therein) under Section 209 of the BNS (erstwhile Section 174-A of the
IPC) since, inter alia, the original offence in the form of criminal complaint
under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881 in the said case had been settled and
withdrawn by the rival parties.
9. It is for the High Court, while exercising its innate plenary
powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023/ 428 of Cr.P.C., 1973, to
ratiocinate that it should not apply the law in an austere, academic and
exacting technical manner, without considering its practical implications.
The Law is not merely a set of programmed, nailed-to-the-ground rules, to
be applied without context. It must be enforced, while bearing in mind, that
its purpose is to ensure substantive justice between the parties. The statutory
provision of Section 174-A of IPC, when perused in the light of ratio
decidendi of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daljit Singh's
case (supra), unequivocally shows that an FIR under Section 174-A of the
IPC does not proprio vigore become liable to be quashed, in case the rival
parties have entered into a compromise and such criminal complaint/FIR has
been compromised and quashed/withdrawn accordingly. However, at the
same time, the factum of the criminal complaint/FIR (in furtherance of
proceedings whereof) having been compromised/settled, is indubitably, a
relevant factor to be considered while dealing with a plea for quashing of an
FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 174-A of IPC.
authenticity of this order/ judgment
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This fact assumes greater significance considering that the initial
proceedings pertain exclusively to a private criminal complaint under
Section 138 of NI Act, 1881, which the legislature has expressly classified
as a compoundable offence. Such litigation, especially in the backdrop of
original offence having been compromised will have an adverse impact on
the overburdened Court-dockets. Allowing such prosecution, when initial
complaint has been settled/withdrawn would undermine the legislative intent
and distort the remedial nature of Section 138 of NI Act of 1881. It would
tantamount to contravening the principles of fairness, proportionality, and
justice in criminal proceedings. A literal interpretation may sometimes lead
to unjust outcomes that also contradict the law's underlined purpose.
Therefore, the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction must balance the
letter of Law with its spirit, ensuring fair and equitable results. This
approach underscores Law's role as an apparatus for fostering societal
harmony and addressing the real-world complexities, efficaciously as also
effectively, rather than mere literal/technical compliance.
10. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, 2023/
Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial
process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, when the dispute is
essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached,
the High Court may intervene to quash the criminal proceedings,
recognizing the continuation thereof would be non-productive and unjust in
the given circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are powers
which are incidental replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court
would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the process of law and Courts
being abused for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is
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intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its
immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a High Court would have form
but lack the substance. These powers of a High Court hence deserve to be
construed with the widest possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in
consonance with the nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in
fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the
process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posits of
jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise,
the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the
imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down provisions
capable of governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court which
exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should
therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not
expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice
or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these
plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and responsibility
of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of
administering justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and
effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects
peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever
it is just and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the
due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay
substantial justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.
11. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts and
circumstances of the case in hand; especially the original offence being an
offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the
authenticity of this order/ judgment
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original offence alleged to have been committed in the year 2018, the subject
matter of the original offence having been settled amicably between the
parties and the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act having
been disposed of on the basis of such settlement/compromise; this Court
deems it appropriate that the impugned FIR as also all proceedings
emanating therefrom deserve to be quashed.
12. It is, hence, directed as under:
(i) Instant petition is allowed;
allowed
(ii) The impugned FIR No.174 dated 18.04.2025, Annexure P-2,
registered against the petitioner under Section 174-A IPC at Police Station
Civil Lines, Karnal and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom,
including impugned order dated 02.09.2019, whereby the petitioner was
declared as a proclaimed person along with proceedings initiated under
Sections 82 & 83 Cr. P.C., stand quashed;
quashed
(iii) All pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
April 22,
22, 2026
mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
authenticity of this order/ judgment
