[Cites 27, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Parveen Kumar vs Deepak Sharma And Ors on 21 April, 2026
Author: Sudeepti Sharma
Bench: Sudeepti Sharma
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M)
PARVEEN KUMAR ......Appellant
Vs.
DEEPAK SHARMA AND ORS. ......Respondents
Reserved on: 16.03.2026
Pronounced on: 21.04.2026
Uploaded on:- 27.04.2026
Whether only the operative part of the judgment is pronounced? No
Whether full judgment is pronounced? Yes
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA
Present: Mr. Sanjeev Kodan, Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. Rajesh Punj, Advocate
Mr. Sahaj Punj, Advocate
Mr. Vijaya, Advocate
for respondent Nos.1 and 2.
Mr. D.K. Dogra, Advocate
for respondent No.3-Insurance Company.
****
SUDEEPTI SHARMA J.
1. The present appeal has been filed by the claimant who, owing to a
motor vehicular accident, has been rendered nearly 80% permanently disabled
and has consequently lost his means of livelihood. Having suffered such grave
physical and financial hardship, he had approached the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Ambala (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), seeking
compensation for the injuries sustained by him. However, the learned Tribunal
dismissed his claim petition vide Award dated 07.03.2012, compelling him to
seek redress before this Court.
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -2-
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The brief facts of the case are that on 31.01.2010, he, with his wife
Monika was going from Ambala Cantt Mullana on his motorcycle bearing
registration No. HR-01W-4847. One Sanjeev Kumar, with his wife Poonam was
also following the petitioner on his motorcycle. At about 6.30 PM, when they
crossed a Poultry Farm, near Kalpi crossing, the car in question driven by the
respondent No.1 rashly, negligently and at a very high speed came from the side
of Yamuna Nagar. The respondent No.1 tried to over the said car. take a
However, truck going ahead on seeing of from the traffic coming opposite
direction, he could not control the car in question and lost its balance due to the
high speed. In that process, the respondent No.1 came on the wrong side of the
road and truck against the motorcycle of the petitioner. Resultantly, the petitioner
and his wife Monika fell down on the road. The petitioner suffered serious and
multiple injuries. His wife Monika also suffered injuries. With the help of some
passers by, the said Sanjeev Kumar stopped the car driver. The car driver
disclosed his name as Deepak Sharma son of Shri Jawahar Lal Sharma, Sanjeev
Kumar and his wife noted down the number of the car in question and took the
petitioner and his wife to M.M.College & Hospital, Mullana. Since injuries on
the leg of the petitioner were serious, he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh.
Therein his leg was amputated. His wife remained admitted to MM College &
Hospital, Mullana. The petitioner remained admitted to GI, Chandigarh till
9.3.2010. Thereafter, he was attending OPD, when ever he was called. He had
already spent more than Rs. 5 lacs on his treatment and was expecting to incur
more expenses on further treatment. Due to the accident in question and injuries
in question, he has become permanently disabled and confined to bed. He cannot
do his routine work and is unable to look after his business. His shop is lying
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -3-
closed till the date of filing of the petition. He has suffered great financial loss.
He has not recovered from his injuries. He cannot move without an attendant.
The accident has caused great mental pain and agony to him. An FIR No.19
dated 12.2.2010, was registered against the respondent No.1 under Sections
279/337/338 IPC at PS Mullana, although the police had received information
regarding the accident in question on 31.1.2010 itself. During the said period,
police visited the Hospital number of occasions but did not meet the petitioner as
he was not in a position to make the statement. Ultimately, the said Sanjeev
Kumar was asked to make the statement and upon his statement. FIR was
registered on 12.2.2010. Further more, owner and driver of the car in question
were pressing upon the relatives of the petitioner to enter into an out of court
settlement. However, on seeing the condition of the petitioner, they withdrew
their offer. At the time of the accident in question, the petitioner was aged 30
years. He was self employed, earning Rs. 10,000/- to 12,000/- per month.
3. Upon notice of the claim petition, respondents therein appeared and
contested the claim petition by filing separate written statement denying the
factum of accident/compensation.
4. From the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following
issues:-
1. Whether the accident in question causing injuries to
claimant Parveen Kumar took place due to rash and
negligent driving of car No.CH-01Z-1557 by respondent No.1
as alleged? OPP
2. If issue No.1 is proved, to what amount of compensation
the claimant is entitled to and from whom? OPP
3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in view of
the preliminary objections raised by the respondents no.1 & 2
in their written statement? OPR-2 & 3
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -4-
4. Whether the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any
compensation in view of the preliminary objections raised in
the written statement and whether there has been a breach of
terms and conditions of the policy of insurance? OPR-3
5. Relief.
5. After taking into consideration the pleadings and the evidence on
record, the learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition of the appellant. Hence
the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSELS FOR THE PARTIES
6. Learned counsel for the appellant-claimant contends that the
impugned award is legally unsustainable, as the learned Tribunal has erroneously
dismissed the claim petition on the ground that negligence of respondent No.1
was not proved. He further submits that undue weight has been given to 13 days
delay in lodging the FIR. He further contends that in FIR, the number of
offending vehicle was categorically found mentioned. Moreover, he contends
that the claimant had suffered 80% permanent disability. Therefore, he prays that
the present appeal be allowed and compensation be awarded as per settled law.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company contends that
the learned Tribunal after appreciating the fact, has rightly dismissed the claim
petition of the claimant-appellant. Therefore, he prays that the present appeal be
dismissed.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the whole
record of this case.
9. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to reproduce the relevant
portion of the award, which reads as under:-
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -5-
"ISSUE NO.1
15. In order to prove this issue, the petitioner has
examined PW-1 Sanjeev Kumar, with his deposition
Ex.PW1/A. In such deposition, he has reiterated the
contents of the petition, qua the manner of the accident in
question and lodging of the FIR No.19 dated 12.2.2010 at
PS Mullana, against the respondent no.1. He has also
tried to explain the delay in lodging the FIR. In his cross-
examination, he has deposed that the petitioner is his
friend and they both are residing in village Mullana; that
on the date of the alleged accident, they both had started
from Ambala Cantt separately but met incidentally and
started moving towards Mullana; that during those days,
it was winter season and sun sets earlier as compared to
summer timings; that he had accompanied the petitioner
to M.M.College and Hospital, Mullana and the petitioner
remained admitted therein for a long time, where after, he
was referred to PGI Chandigarh; that he is business man
and after the accident in question, he joined his business
as per routine; that police had visited the Hospital but
due to his condition, the statement of the petitioner was
not recorded; that he narrated the whole story to the
police but he does not know as to whey the police was
adamant to get the statement of the petitioner.
16. The petitioner Parveen Kumar has entered the witness
box as PW2, with his deposition Ex.PW2/A. In his such
deposition, he has also reiterated the contents of the
petition, qua the manner of the accident in question. In
his cross-examination, he has inter-alia deposed that
Ambala Cantt-Jagadhri Road is a State Highway and
heavy traffic moves on the said road all times; that the
time of the alleged accident was 6.30 PM and it was
winter season; that at that time also usual traffic was
plying on the road; that his statement was recorded by the
authenticity of this order/judgment.
police on 12.2.2010; and that he was not permitted to
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -6-
make the statement by the doctors as he was unfit to make
the statement as advised by the doctors.
17. The petitioner has also produced PW3 Dr. Sant Ram
Gupta. He has deposed that as per record, the petitioner
was admitted to emergency of M.M. Medical College and
Hospital, Mullana on 31.1.2010 with a history of road
side accident. In his cross- examination, he has deposed
that the petitioner was neither entertained nor treated by
the said witness.
18. In documentary evidence, the petitioner has produced
copy of the FIR Ex.P1 dated 12.2.2010 lodged at the
instance of PW1 Sanjeev Kumar. The said document also
re-iterates the manner of the accident as given in the
petition. The petitioner has also produced the admission
file Ex.P2 showing his date of arrival in the M.M.
Medical College & Hospital, Mullana on 31.1.2010 at
about 7.45 PM. The petitioner also produced his
treatment record Ex.P4. The documents contained in the
said exhibit demonstrate the admission of the petitioner in
PGIMER Chandigarh.
19. As against the said evidence, the respondents have
produced document Ex.R2 showing that the petitioner
was taken to M.M. Medical College & Hospital, Mullana
by his brother Amit Malik. They have also produced the
MLR EX.R3 of the petitioner showing that Shri Vinod
Kumar son of Brij Lal Malik (brother of the petitioner)
had taken the petitioner to the said Hospital. They have
also produced the statement Ex.R5 of PW1 Sanjeev
Kumar, recorded by the police on 12.2.2010.
20. Having summed up the evidence of the parties on
issue no.1, I may state that the occurrence in question is
alleged to have taken place on 31.1.2010 at about 6.30
PM. The petitioner says that when he was going on his
motorcycle and crossed Poultry Farm situated near Kalpi
crossing, the car in question driven by the respondent
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -7-
no.1 rashly and negligently hit his motorcycle. Evidence
of PW1 Sanjeev Kumar is also to that effect. The
petitioner also says that immediately after the accident,
he was shifted to M.M. Medical College & Hospital,
Mullana, where after he was shifted to PGIMER
Chandigarh. The petitioner has appended the document
Ex.P2 showing that he was admitted to M.M. Medical
College & Hospital, Mullana on 31.1.2010 at about 7.45
PM. As against the said document, the respondents have
produced the ruqa Ex.R2. The said document shows that
intimation that the petitioner had suffered injuries in a
road side accident at Kalpi was given to the police on
31.1.2010. Both the said documents do not contain the
description or registration number of the vehicle causing
the accident in question. Although the intimation of the
alleged accident had been received by the police
telephonically on 31.1.2010 itself, no FIR regarding the
alleged accident was registered. The document Ex.P1
shows that one out of the petitioner and his wife, was fit
to make the statement on 31.1.2010 itself. Wife of the
petitioner was discharged from M.M. Medical College &
Hospital, Mullana on 4.2.2010. She was accompanying
the petitioner at the time of the alleged accident.
However, she did not get her statement recorded even
after her discharge from the said Hospital. It was only on
12.2.2010 that PW1 Sanjeev Kumar came up with the
stand taken in the petition. Hence, lodging and
registration of FIR is delayed by at least 11 days.
21. I may also state that the respondent no.1 and 2 have
not entered the witness box to depose their case. Despite
that, this Tribunal has to peruse the evidence on record,
to reach a right conclusion.
22. I may also state that in the FIR Ex.P1 and statements
of PW1 Sanjeev Kumar, as well as PW2 Parveen Kumar,
it has been set forth that the accident in question was
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -8-
caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the
respondent no.1 while driving the car in question. A
perusal of the treatment record Ex.P4 produced by the
petitioner, at its page no.6, shows that the petitioner was
admitted to PGI MER Chandigarh with a history of road
side accident on 31.1.2010 at about 7.00 PM at Mullana
Road, Ambala, when the petitioner was driving his bike
and was hit by an Indica car, where after, he was taken to
M.M. Medical College & Hospital, Mullana and was then
referred to PGI MER Chandigarh. Similar is the position
mentioned by the concerned doctor at page No.25 of the
document Ex.P4. As against the said document, the
insurance policy Ex.R1 shows that the car in question is a
Maruti 800 car. It being so, car in question cannot be
determined as an offending vehicle of the accident in
question. The deposition of PW1 Sanjeev Kumar and
PW2 Parveen Kumar, therefore, is not probable and
rather is falsified by the said documents. Delay in lodging
the FIR, in the said factual back drop, is material and
fatal to the case set up by the petitioner. The reports cited
by the learned counsel for the petitioner, with utmost
respects to the law declared therein, are different on facts.
Therefore, issue no.1 is decided against the petitioner and
in favour of the respondents."
Analysis of the Record
10. A perusal of the impugned award reveals that the learned Tribunal
has dismissed the claim petition primarily on the premise that the claimant failed
to establish the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident in question.
This Court finds such a conclusion to be legally unsustainable and contrary to the
material available on record.
11. From the evidence adduced, it stands established that the accident
2026.04.27 18:00 occurred on 31.01.2010 at about 6:30 PM. The record further demonstrates that
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -9-
the claimant was admitted shortly thereafter, at about 7:45 PM, in Maharishi
Markandeshwar Medical College & Hospital, Mullana, with a clear history of a
roadside accident. The medical ruqa (Ex. R2) also corroborates the factum of the
accident on the very same day, thereby lending contemporaneous support to the
version of the claimant.
12. The testimony of PW-1 Sanjeev Kumar, eye-witness, assumes
considerable significance. He has consistently deposed with regard to the manner
of the accident and has unequivocally attributed the occurrence to the rash and
negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Despite being subjected to detailed
cross-examination, nothing material could be elicited to discredit his testimony.
His evidence, therefore, inspires confidence and cannot be discarded lightly.
13. Similarly, PW-2, the claimant himself, has reiterated the manner of
the accident in clear and cogent terms, attributing negligence to the driver of the
offending vehicle. His testimony is in consonance with the version put forth in
the claim petition as well as the statement of PW-1.
14. Further corroboration is forthcoming from PW-3 Dr. Sant Ram
Gupta, who, in his capacity as In-charge, Emergency, deposed on the basis of
hospital record that the claimant was admitted on 31.01.2010 with a history of a
road side accident. The medical record (Ex. P2), duly proved, reflects that the
claimant was examined by attending doctors and treated accordingly. This
medical evidence substantiates the occurrence of the accident and the injuries
suffered therein.
15. At this stage, it is apposite to reiterate the settled position of law that
proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act are summary in nature and the
standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The Tribunal, therefore, was required to assess the
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -10-
evidence in a pragmatic and holistic manner, rather than adopting a hyper-
technical approach.
16. The Tribunal appears to have been unduly influenced by the delay of
13 days in lodging the FIR. However, the record clearly indicates that the
information regarding the accident had reached the police on the very day of
occurrence. The delay in formal registration of the FIR stands satisfactorily
explained by the fact that the claimant was under medical treatment and was not
in a fit condition to make a statement. It is well settled that delay in lodging the
FIR, by itself, cannot be treated as fatal in motor accident claim cases,
particularly when satisfactorily explained. In Ravi v. Badrinarayan, (2011) 4
SCC 693, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that such delay
should not weigh with the Tribunal to deny just compensation, as these
proceedings are not strictly governed by the rigours of criminal jurisprudence.
17. Equally significant is the fact that the respondent-driver chose not to
step into the witness box to rebut the allegations or to present an alternative
version of events. In such circumstances, an adverse inference is liable to be
drawn against the said respondent.
18. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in disbelieving the claimant's
case on the ground of variance in the description of the vehicle is also misplaced.
Minor discrepancies in records, particularly when recorded in emergency
situations, cannot override consistent ocular testimony and contemporaneous
documentary evidence pointing towards the occurrence of the accident.
19. This Court is constrained to observe that the learned Tribunal has
failed to appreciate the evidence in its correct perspective and has overlooked the
benevolent object of the legislation. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece
of legislation intended to provide expeditious relief to victims of road accidents.
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -11-
The approach of the Tribunal, in the present case, defeats the very purpose of the
enactment.
20. It is indeed a matter of concern that the accident occurred in the year
2010 and, owing to an erroneous approach adopted by the Tribunal, the claimant
has been deprived of just compensation for over a decade. The present case
exemplifies how a claim petition ought not to be adjudicated.
21. Be that as it may, in view of the foregoing discussion and the settled
legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the claimant has
successfully established, on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities,
that the accident in question occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the
offending vehicle by the respondent-driver.
22. Consequently, the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal on Issue
No.1 are hereby set aside. The claimant is held entitled to compensation in
accordance with law.
SETTLED LAW ON COMPENSATION
23. Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the law regarding grant of
compensation with respect to the disability. The Apex Court in the case of Raj
Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Another (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 343, has
held as under:-
General principles relating to compensation in injury cases
5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('Act' for short)
makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that
compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately
restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object
of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of
wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and
equitable manner. The court or tribunal shall have to assess the
damages objectively and exclude from consideration any
speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the
nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is
not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the
loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he
MOHD AYUB is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -12-
to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but
for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn
or could have earned. (See C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan
Nair, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 376, R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control
(India) Ltd., 1995 (1) SCC 551 and Baker v. Willoughby, 1970 AC
467).
6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal
injury cases are the following :
Pecuniary damages (Special Damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines,
transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have
made had he not been injured, comprising :
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent
disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General
Damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of
the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only
under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury,
where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence
of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the
heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on
account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of
amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of
expectation of life.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above :
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do
not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the
whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of
loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss
of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent
disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of
evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is
the same as percentage of permanent disability).
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined
him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can
give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The
loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed
by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different
percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons,
depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age,
education and other factors.
20. The assessment of loss of future earnings is explained below
with reference to the following
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -13-
Illustration 'A' : The injured, a workman, was aged 30 years and
earning Rs. 3000/- per month at the time of accident. As per
Doctor's evidence, the permanent disability of the limb as a
consequence of the injury was 60% and the consequential
permanent disability to the person was quantified at 30%. The loss
of earning capacity is however assessed by the Tribunal as 15% on
the basis of evidence, because the claimant is continued in
employment, but in a lower grade. Calculation of compensation will
be as follows:
a) Annual income before the accident : Rs. 36,000/-.
b) Loss of future earning per annum
(15% of the prior annual income) : Rs. 5400/-.
c) Multiplier applicable with reference to age : 17
d) Loss of future earnings : (5400 x 17) : Rs. 91,800/-
Illustration 'B' : The injured was a driver aged 30 years, earning
Rs. 3000/- per month. His hand is amputated and his permanent
disability is assessed at 60%. He was terminated from his job as he
could no longer drive. His chances of getting any other employment
was bleak and even if he got any job, the salary was likely to be a
pittance. The Tribunal therefore assessed his loss of future earning
capacity as 75%. Calculation of compensation will be as follows :
a) Annual income prior to the accident : Rs. 36,000/- .
b) Loss of future earning per annum
(75% of the prior annual income) : Rs. 27000/-.
c) Multiplier applicable with reference to age : 17
d) Loss of future earnings : (27000 x 17) : Rs. 4,59,000/-
Illustration 'C' : The injured was 25 years and a final year
Engineering student. As a result of the accident, he was in coma for
two months, his right hand was amputated and vision was affected.
The permanent disablement was assessed as 70%. As the injured
was incapacitated to pursue his chosen career and as he required
the assistance of a servant throughout his life, the loss of future
earning capacity was also assessed as 70%. The calculation of
compensation will be as follows :
a) Minimum annual income he would
have got if had been employed as an
Engineer : Rs. 60,000/-
b) Loss of future earning per annum
(70% of the expected annual income) : Rs. 42000/-
c) Multiplier applicable (25 years) : 18
d) Loss of future earnings : (42000 x 18) : Rs. 7,56,000/-
[Note : The figures adopted in illustrations (A) and (B) are
hypothetical. The figures in Illustration (C) however are based on
actuals taken from the decision in Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra)].
24. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance
2026.04.27 18:00 Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. [(2017) 16 SCC 680] has clarified the
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -14-
law under Sections 166, 163-A and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on the
following aspects:-
(A) Deduction of personal and living expenses to determine
multiplicand;
(B) Selection of multiplier depending on age of deceased;
(C) Age of deceased on basis for applying multiplier;
(D) Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of
estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses, with escalation;
(E) Future prospects for all categories of persons and for different
ages: with permanent job; self-employed or fixed salary.
The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:-
" Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It
seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads,
namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral
expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000
respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an
acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric
or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that
the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on
percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement
should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are
disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in
respect of those heads."
25. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Erudhaya Priya Vs. State
Express Tran. Corpn. Ltd. 2020 ACJ 2159, has held as under:-
" 7. There are three aspects which are required to be examined by
us:
(a) the application of multiplier of '17' instead of '18';
The aforesaid increase of multiplier is sought on the basis of
age of the appellant as 23 years relying on the judgment in National
Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 ACJ
2700 (SC). In para 46 of the said judgment, the Constitution Bench
effectively affirmed the multiplier method to be used as mentioned in
the table in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi
Transport Corporation and Another, 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC) . In the
age group of 15-25 years, the multiplier has to be '18' along with
factoring in the extent of disability.
The aforesaid position is not really disputed by learned
counsel for the respondent State Corporation and, thus, we come to
the conclusion that the multiplier to be applied in the case of the
appellant has to be '18' and not '17'.
(b) Loss of earning capacity of the appellant with permanent
disability of 31.1%
In respect of the aforesaid, the appellant has claimed
compensation on what is stated to be the settled principle set out in
Jagdish v. Mohan & Others, 2018 ACJ 1011 (SC) and Sandeep
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -15-
Khanuja v. Atul Dande & Another, 2017 ACJ 979 (SC). We extract
below the principle set out in the Jagdish (supra) in para 8:
"8. In assessing the compensation payable the settled
principles need to be borne in mind. A victim who suffers a
permanent or temporary disability occasioned by an accident
is entitled to the award of compensation. The award of
compensation must cover among others, the following
aspects:
(i) Pain, suffering and trauma resulting from the accident;
(ii) Loss of income including future income;
(iii) The inability of the victim to lead a normal life together
with its amenities;
(iv) Medical expenses including those that the victim may
be required to undertake in future; and
(v) Loss of expectation of life."
[emphasis supplied]
The aforesaid principle has also been emphasized in an
earlier judgment, i.e. the Sandeep Khanuja case (supra) opining
that the multiplier method was logically sound and legally well
established to quantify the loss of income as a result of death or
permanent disability suffered in an accident.
In the factual contours of the present case, if we examine the
disability certificate, it shows the admission/hospitalization on 8
occasions for various number of days over 1½ years from August
2011 to January 2013. The nature of injuries had been set out as
under:
"Nature of injury:
(i) compound fracture shaft left humerus
(ii) fracture both bones left forearm
(iii) compound fracture both bones right forearm
(iv) fracture 3rd, 4th & 5th metacarpals right hand
(v) subtrochanteric fracture right femur
(vi) fracture shaft femur
(vii) fracture both bones left leg
We have also perused the photographs annexed to the
petition showing the current physical state of the appellant,
though it is stated by learned counsel for the respondent State
Corporation that the same was not on record in the trial
court. Be that as it may, this is the position even after
treatment and the nature of injuries itself show their extent.
Further, it has been opined in para 13 of Sandeep Khanuja
case (supra) that while applying the multiplier method, future
prospects on advancement in life and career are also to be
taken into consideration.
We are, thus, unequivocally of the view that there is
merit in the contention of the appellant and the aforesaid
principles with regard to future prospects must also be
applied in the case of the appellant taking the permanent
disability as 31.1%. The quantification of the same on the
basis of the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. case
(supra), more specifically para 61(iii), considering the age of
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -16-
the appellant, would be 50% of the actual salary in the
present case.
(c) The third and the last aspect is the interest rate claimed
as 12%
In respect of the aforesaid, the appellant has watered
down the interest rate during the course of hearing to 9% in
view of the judicial pronouncements including in the
Jagdish's case (supra). On this aspect, once again, there was
no serious dispute raised by the learned counsel for the
respondent once the claim was confined to 9% in line with the
interest rates applied by this Court.
CONCLUSION
8. The result of the aforesaid is that relying on the settled
principles, the calculation of compensation by the appellant,
as set out in para 5 of the synopsis, would have to be adopted
as follows:
Heads Awarded
Loss of earning power Rs. 9,81,978/-
(Rs.14,648 x 12 x 31.1/100
Future prospects (50 per cent Rs.4,90,989/-
addition)
Medical expenses including Rs.18,46,864/-
transport charges,
nourishment, etc.
Loss of matrimonial prospects Rs.5,00,000/-
Loss of comfort, loss of Rs.1,50,000/-
amenities and mental agony
Pain and suffering Rs.2,00,000/-
Total Rs.41,69,831/-
The appellant would, thus, be entitled to the compensation of
Rs. 41,69,831/- as claimed along with simple interest at the rate of
9% per annum from the date of application till the date of payment.
26. So far as the determination of compensation is concerned, the same
is required to be assessed in the light of the settled principles governing award of
"just compensation" under the Motor Vehicles Act.
27. From the record, it transpires that the claimant was about 31 years of
age at the time of the accident, as reflected in the disability certificate (Ex. P4). A
2026.04.27 18:00 perusal of the said certificate reveals that he has suffered 80% permanent
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -17-
disability on account of amputation of the right lower limb above the knee,
coupled with fracture of the shaft of femur and stiffness of the right hip joint. The
said disability certificate stands duly proved on record through the testimony of
PW-5, Dr. Vikash Paul. The medical evidence, thus, conclusively establishes that
the claimant has suffered severe and permanent physical impairment, including
amputation of his leg.
28. It is the specific case of the claimant that prior to the accident, he
was a healthy individual engaged in running a kiryana (grocery) shop, earning
approximately ₹12,000 per month. It has further been asserted that, on account of
the injuries sustained, he has been rendered incapable of carrying on his business
or performing even routine activities, and that his shop has remained closed ever
since the accident, resulting in substantial financial loss. On this basis, learned
counsel for the claimant has contended that, notwithstanding the assessed
physical disability of 80%, the functional disability ought to be taken as 100%,
having regard to the nature of his avocation.
29. This Court finds considerable merit in the aforesaid submission. It
cannot be overlooked that the claimant, due to the unfortunate accident, has
suffered not only grave physical disability but also a complete loss of his earning
capacity. The nature of his occupation, being self-employment in a grocery
business, necessarily involved substantial physical activity, mobility, and
sustained effort. In such circumstances, the amputation of a leg and the
associated complications effectively render him incapable of pursuing his
vocation.
30. At this juncture, it is apposite to reiterate that the Motor Vehicles Act
is a beneficial legislation intended to provide fair, adequate, and just
compensation to victims of road accidents. The concept of "just compensation"
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -18-
has been authoritatively explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Haryana and another v. Jabir Kaur and others, AIR 2003 SC 3696, wherein it
was held that compensation must strike a balance--it should neither be a
windfall nor a pittance, but must be fair, reasonable, and commensurate with the
loss suffered. The determination, though not susceptible to precise mathematical
calculation, must be based on a judicious and rational assessment of the facts and
circumstances of each case.
31. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court is of
the considered view that although the claimant has been certified to have suffered
80% permanent physical disability, the impact of such disability on his earning
capacity is far more severe. Having regard to the nature of injuries and the
avocation of the claimant, he is, for all practical purposes, rendered wholly
incapable of earning his livelihood as before. Consequently, his functional
disability is assessed at 100% for the purpose of computation of compensation.
32. So far as the monthly income of the claimant is concerned, this
Court, having regard to the prevailing economic conditions at the relevant time
and the surrounding evidence on record, deems it appropriate, in the interest of
justice, to assess his notional income at ₹12,000/- per month.
33. Learned counsel for the appellant-claimant has further contended
that, on account of the injuries sustained in the accident, the claimant's leg stands
amputated and he is necessarily required to use an artificial limb. It is submitted
that the claimant has placed on record Bill No. 75730 dated 12.10.2011 (Ex. P5),
evidencing payment of ₹1,45,000/- towards procurement of a prosthetic limb. It
is further urged that such prosthetic aid is not a one-time requirement, but entails
periodic replacement and regular maintenance throughout the claimant's lifetime.
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -19-
34. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.3-Insurance
Company has argued that the said bill has not been proved in accordance with
law and that there is no specific medical testimony on record to the effect that the
claimant would require a prosthetic limb in future.
35. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the record, this
Court finds substance in the contention advanced on behalf of the claimant. The
nature of injuries, particularly amputation of a lower limb, stands conclusively
established from the medical evidence on record. In such circumstances, the
requirement of an artificial limb is not merely incidental but inevitable. The
absence of a specific medical opinion regarding future replacement cannot be
viewed in isolation so as to deny a just claim, especially when the need for
prosthetic assistance flows naturally and directly from the nature of disability
suffered.
36. This Court can also take judicial notice of the fact that prosthetic
limbs require periodic replacement and maintenance due to wear and tear, as well
as physiological changes in the body. Typically, such replacement may be
necessitated every few years, thereby imposing a recurring financial burden on
the injured.
37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Kumari Laxmisree v. Managing
Director, KSRTC Depot, Bengaluru, 2025 (2) TAC 475, while considering a
similar situation, has recognized the necessity of awarding adequate
compensation towards not only the initial cost but also the future maintenance
and replacement of prosthetic limbs, and has accordingly granted substantial
compensation under that head.
38. More recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Prahlad Sahai v.
Haryana Roadways, 2026 INSC 396, has delivered a highly erudite judgment
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -20-
addressing the jurisprudential basis for the computation and award of
compensation under the head of "prosthetic limb" in motor accident cases.
39. The relevant extract of the same is reproduced as under:-
"18. For the compensation of prosthetic limb(s), no amount
has been awarded by the Tribunal or the High Court. It is
undisputed among all parties that the appellant is entitled to
be compensated towards the cost of purchase of prosthetic
limb(s) and its maintenance. The only question is, what should
be the compensation which is payable.
19. Under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the
mandate is to determine a 'just compensation'. Pasayat J.,
speaking for this Court in State of Haryana and Another v.
Jasbir Kaur and Others, (2003) 7 SCC 484 held as under:-
"7. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal
constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is
required to make an award determining the amount of
compensation which is to be in the real sense
"damages" which in turn appears to it to be "just and
reasonable". It has to be borne in mind that
compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be
weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has
to be borne in mind that the compensation is not
expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory
provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must
be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of
profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The courts
and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors
and quantify the amount of compensation, which should
be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed
question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all
cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb.
Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the
particular facts and circumstances, and attending
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -21-
peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or
mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be
considered in the background of "just" compensation
which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of
the expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide
discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination
has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach
and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and
arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes
equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-
arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C.
Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC [(1999) 1 SCC 90]."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. As rightly held in Jasbir Kaur (supra) compensation for
loss of limbs can hardly be weighed in golden scales and one
cannot expect a mathematical exactitude in arriving at a just
and reasonable recompense.
21. This Court in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport
Corpn., (1992) 2 SCC 5676 regarding assumed life span of a
claimant held as under:-
"6. This Court in Jyotsna Dey v. State of Assam, 1987
ACJ 172 has observed that the span of life should be
taken to be 70 years in view of the high rise in life
expectancy. It is specially so in the case of Army
officers who are disciplined to live an active and
energetic life. The courts below were not justified in
taking the normal span of life to be 60 years and that
of an Army officer 56 years."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Further, this Court in Md. Shabir (supra) dealing with
compensation for purchase and maintenance of prosthetic
limb held as under: -
"23. As per the current compensation given for the
prosthetic limb and its maintenance, it would last the
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -22-
Appellant for only 15 years, even if we were to assume
that the limb would not need to be replaced after a few
years. The Appellant was only 37 years at the time of
the accident, and it would be reasonable to assume
that he would live till he is 70 years old if not
more. We are of the opinion that the Appellant must be
compensated so that he is able to purchase three
prosthetic limbs in his lifetime and is able to maintain
the same at least till he has reached 70 years of age.
For the Prosthetic limbs alone, the Appellant is to be
awarded compensation of Rs. 7,80,000 and for
maintenance of the same he is to be awarded an
additional Rs. 5,00,000/-."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. What is crucial to note is, this Court fixed the assumed life
span of claimant as seventy years and also awarded
maintenance cost. This Court also held that average life of a
prosthetic limb would be a few years.
24. Our research led us to a web hosted PowerPoint
presentation titled "Prosthetic Claims - restitutio in
integrum?" by Mr. Steve Love, KC. We have found the
presentation, especially the case law referred to therein which
we have examined, very useful for the adjudication of the
present case.
Are Courts Bound By The Governmental Rates Under The
Notification? :-
25. In David Pinnington (supra), recognizing the entitlement
of the disabled individual to opt for a prosthetic limb from a
Private Centre and recognizing the legitimacy of computing
that amount as a reasonable compensation, it was held: -
"49. Again it seems to me to be very much a matter for
the judge to assess. There was not the evidence, as there
just might have been in Woodrup, to entitle the judge to
indulge in the kind of speculation that Mr. Cotter urged
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -23-
on us. This was a case in which, bearing in mind what
he is entitled to do under the 1948 Act, the judge was
entitled to find that it was reasonable for Mr.
Pinnington to acquire this range of devices and renew
them once every five years. He would be acting
reasonably in acquiring them from a private centre
which would provide him properly for his needs in
what is very much a very personal affair....."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. In similar vein, Lloyd Jones J. A (suing by her litigation
friend Mrs H) v. Powys Local Health Board, [2007] EWHC
2996 (QB) held that if the treatment claimed by the claimant
is reasonable, it is no answer for the defendant to point to
cheaper options. This principle was extended to assessment of
damages in respect of aids and equipment, as is clear from the
following extracts from Powys (supra).
"94. The basis of assessment is the test of
reasonableness as stated in Rialis v. Mitchell, (Court of
Appeal, 6 July 1984) and Sowden v. Lodge [2004]
EWCA Civ 1370, [2005] 1 All ER 581, [2005] 1 WLR
2129. The Claimant is entitled to damages to meet her
reasonable requirements and reasonable needs arising
from her injuries. In deciding what is reasonable it is
necessary to consider first whether the provision
chosen and claimed is reasonable and not whether,
objectively, it is reasonable or whether other provision
would be reasonable. Accordingly, if the treatment
claimed by the Claimant is reasonable it is no answer
for the Defendant to point to cheaper treatment which
is also reasonable. Rialis and Sowden were concerned
with the appropriate care regime. However, the
principles stated in those cases apply equally to the
assessment of damages in respect of aids and
equipment. In determining what is required to meet
authenticity of this order/judgment.
the Claimant's reasonable needs it is necessary to
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -24-
make findings as to the nature and extent of the
Claimant's needs and then to consider whether what
is proposed by the Claimant is reasonable having
regard to those needs. (Massey v. Tameside and
Glossop Acute Services NHS Trust [2007] EWHC 317
(QB), Teare J at para 59; Taylor v. Chesworth and
MIB [2007] EWHC 1001 (QB) Ramsay J at para 84."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the rates
prescribed in the Government Notification relied upon by the
Insurance Company which, in any event, are abysmally low.
28. P. Ramanatha Aiyar in his "Advanced Law Lexicon" (3rd
Edition 2005) defines restitutio in integrum as follows:-
"To restore parties to their original position restitution
to the original condition".
Extending the principle of restitutio in integrum to cases of
provision for prosthetic limbs after holding that claimants are
entitled to their own choice of procuring a prosthetic limb
without relying on the National Health Service, and
recognizing the right of periodic replacement, it was held
in Kerry Donnelly v. Fas Products Ltd 2004 S.CLR 678 UK,
as under: -
"41. .....She is not obliged to use the National Health
Service in order to acquire a prosthesis: Law Reform
(Personal Injuries) Act 1948, section 2(4). While I
cannot be certain that the pursuer will in fact choose to
replace her prosthesis every year, I consider that she is
entitled to be put into such a position that she is able to
do so. A prosthesis is a poor substitute for lost fingers
but it is the only substitute that is available. The
principle of restitutio in integrum applies. If it is
necessary for the pursuer to succeed in recovering the
whole life cost of replacement that I find that
she probably will replace the prosthesis each year by
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -25-
private purchase (assuming that she is placed in such a
financial position as to allow her to do so), then I make
that finding......"
(Emphasis supplied)
The only caveat is that the claim should be reasonable. What
is also significant to note is the entitlement of the claimant to
replacement cost has been recognized.
29. Nearer home, in the case of Chandra Mogera (supra),
Sanjay Karol J. speaking for this Court said: -
"10. The appellant, on account of the amputation above
knee would require a prosthetic limb. It is a fact that a
prosthetic limb, which is an aid for mobility, is not
permanent in nature. It generally has a limited span of
usability and usually requires replacement once every
5 years in order to function effectively. The appellant
was aged 29 years at the time of filing of the present
appeal, and it would be reasonable to assume that he
would live at least till the age of 70 years, as a
conservative estimate, if not more. Therefore, he
would require prosthetic replacement at an interval of
every 5 years until he attains the age of 70
years..........."
11. We find that in recent cases the claim for
compensation against the head of prosthetic limb has
often come up for consideration before this Court.
Almost in every case, no estimate for cost is provided,
either as the basic cost of procurement or for periodic
maintenance thereof. It is, as such we direct that
henceforth whenever a claim for grant of
compensation under the head of Prosthetic
Limb/Artificial Limb is filed, then the same shall be
accompanied with requisite quotations from at least
two or three service providers, enabling the Tribunal
to make an informed assessment of the actual cost
authenticity of this order/judgment.
which may be incurred in the future."
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -26-
(Emphasis Supplied)
This Court in Chandra Mogera (supra), held that the life
span as five years for an artificial limb and the age up to
which compensation for artificial limb is to be computed as
seventy years. Most importantly, this Court also laid down
that henceforth whenever a claim for grant of compensation
under the head of prosthetic limb/artificial limb is filed the
same shall be accompanied with requisite quotations from at
least two or three service providers enabling the Tribunal to
make an informed assessment. We concur with the said view
and reiterate the said holding.
30. As would be clear from the discussion hereinabove, our
Court has recognized a block of five years as the reasonable
replacement period for a prosthetic limb, and we have
followed the same.
31. The appellant was thirty-two years in 2007. Applying an
assumed life span of seventy years as the maximum for which
as a standard formula compensation for prosthetic limb is
awarded and calculating the life of one prosthetic limb as five
years, the appellant will need seven prosthetic limbs. Insofar
as the price is concerned, the appellant has claimed the 2007
price for the first block with interest @ 9 per cent. Though he
has claimed for eight limbs the correct proportion to award
would be seven limbs, since the amputation happened on
17.07.2009.
32. We are inclined to award, like in Md. Shabir (supra), a
consolidated amount towards the price. We are inclined to
grant Rs. 3,00,000/- per limb on a standard basis for seven
limbs. In view of the fact that a consolidated amount is being
paid, no interest from the date of the accident is awarded.
Considering that the price has been arrived at by broadly
applying the case Md. Shabir (supra), which we find
reasonable, we are not inclined to proceed on the basis of the
notification relied upon by the Insurance Company.
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -27-
33. We are also inclined to award cost of maintenance of
prosthetic limb at Rs.15,000/- annually. For a block of five
years, it would work out to approximately Rs. 75,000/-. We
award a consolidated sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- till the assumed
life span of seventy years."
40. In view of the aforesaid facts and above referred to judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the nature of permanent disability suffered by the
claimant, and the settled legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion
that a consolidated amount of ₹23,00,000/- would be just, fair, and reasonable
compensation towards the cost of procurement, maintenance, and future
replacement of the artificial limb.
Pain and suffering
41. So far as compensation towards pain and suffering is concerned, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in K.S Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi and another,
2024INSC 886 held as under: -
"12. It is to be noted that both the Tribunal and the High Court
have taken the disability suffered by the claimant-appellant to be
at 100%. We find no ground to take a different view.
13. While acknowledging that 'pain and suffering', as a concept
escapes definition, we may only refer to certain authorities,
scholarly as also judicial wherein attempts have been made to set
down the contours thereof.
13.1 The entry recording the term 'pain and suffering' in P.
Ramanatha Iyer's Advanced Law Lexicon[9] reads as under:-
'Pain and suffering. The term 'Pain and suffering' mean
physical discomfort and distress and include mental and
emotional trauma for which damages can be recovered in an
accident claim.
This expression has become almost a term of art, used without
making fine distinction between pain and suffering. Pain and
2026.04.27 18:00 suffering which a person undergoes cannot be measured in terms
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -28-
of money by any mathematical calculation. Hence the Court
awards a sum which is in the nature of a conventional award
[Mediana, The (1900) AC 113,116]"
13.2 Eric Cassell[10], an American Physician and Bioethicist,
defines 'pain' not only as a sensation but also 'as experience
embedded in beliefs about causes and diseases and their
consequences', and 'suffering' as 'the state of severe distress
associated with events that threaten the intactness of person'.
13.3 In a recent article[11] published in the journal of the
International Association for the Study of Pain, it has been
recorded that there is no consensus on what exactly the concept
of pain-related suffering includes, and it is often not precisely
operationalised in empirical studies. The authors in their
systematic review analysed 111 articles across a variety of
disciplines such as bioethics, medical ethics, psycho-oncology,
anaesthesiology, philosophy, sociology etc., we may refer to few of
them:
13.3.1 Eugene v. Boisaubin, who is currently a Professor at the
University of Texas, at Houston, in a 1989 article defined it as
"Suffering is experienced by individual and arises from threats to
the integrity of the individual as a complex social and
psychological entity. "
13.3.2 Andrew Edgar, who is currently a Reader Emeritus in
Philosophy at Cardiff University at UK has defined, in a 2007
article suffering as an "experience of life never getting better,
revealing in the sufferer only vulnerability, futility, and
impotence. "
13.3.3 Arthur W. Frank[13], Professor Emeritus, Department of
Sociology, University of Calgary in his well-known article "Can
We Research Suffering?", published in 2001, observed that "at the
core of suffering is the sense that something is irreparably wrong
with our lives, and wrong is the negation of what could have been
right. Suffering resists definition because it is the reality of what
is not. "
13.3.4 Daryl Pullman[14] who currently serves as University
2026.04.27 18:00 research Professor, Bioethics at the Memorial University of
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -29-
Newfoundland, Canada in his 2002 article defined suffering as the
''product of [physical], psychological, economic, or other factors
that frustrate an individual in the pursuit of significant life
projects. "
13.4 The Judicial Studies Board, now known as the Judicial
College in the United Kingdom, produced guidelines in 1992 to
produce greater consistency of awards and make the judicial
scale of values more easily accessible. They have been deduced
from a study of past cases, examining the range of awards
therein. The latest edition of these guidelines was published in
2021(15). They record the difficulty of computing 'pain and
suffering' as under :-
[(15) See: Hassam and Anr. v. Rabot and Anr. (2024) UKSC11]
"It is widely accepted that making of an award of general
damages for pain and suffering is a somewhat artificial task. It
involves the Judge seeking to convert the pain and suffering of a
given claimant into a monetary award which he or she considers
to be reasonable by way of compensation. That is a difficult task
and one which has historically led to judges making widely
varying awards of damages in respect of relatively comparable
injuries a result which not only offends the principle of equality
before law but results in unnecessary appeals and the incurring
of additional cost, apart altogether from the burden that such
appeals place on the Court's own scarce resources."
13.5 In determining non-pecuniary damages, the artificial nature
of computing compensation has been highlighted in Heil v.
Rankin [2001] QB 272, as referred to in Attorney General of
St. Helena v. AB & Ors. Privy Council Appeal No. 0034 of
2018 as under:-
"23. This principle of 'full compensation' applies to pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage alike. But, as Dickson J indicated in the
passage cited from his judgment in Andrews v. Grand & Toy
Alberta Ltd, 83 DLR (3d) 452, 475-476, this statement
immediately raises a problem in a situation where what is in
issue is what the appropriate level of 'full compensation' for non-
pecuniary injury is when the compensation has to be expressed in
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -30-
pecuniary terms. There is no simple formula for converting the
pain and suffering, the loss of function, the loss of amenity and
disability which an injured person has sustained, into monetary
terms. Any process of conversion must be essentially artificial.
Lord Pearce expressed it well in H West & Son Ltd v. Shephard
[1964] AC 326, 364 when he said:
'The court has to perform the difficult and artificial task of
converting into monetary damages the physical injury and
deprivation and pain and to give judgment for what it considers
to be a reasonable sum. It does not look beyond the judgment to
the spending of the damages.'
24. The last part of this statement is undoubtedly right. The
injured person may not even be in a position to enjoy the
damages he receives because of the injury which he has
sustained. Lord Clyde recognised this in Wells v. Wells [1999] 1
AC 345, 394H when he said: 'One clear principle is that what the
successful plaintiff will in the event actually do with the award is
irrelevant. "
13.6 In the context of the United States, the most important piece
of legal literature regarding 'pain and suffering' is an article titled
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering,
published in the year 1989. Relevant extracts thereof read as
under :
'Pain and suffering and other intangible or non-economic losses
are even more problematic. Physical pain and attendant suffering
have for centuries being recognised as legitimate elements of
damages, and 'modern' tort law has seen a marked expansion of
the rights to recover for forms of mental anguish. Some Courts
have even permitted recovery for emotional trauma
unaccompanied by physical injury, including derivative losses
stemming from injuries to family members. The precise elements
of compensable non-economic loss vary by jurisdiction. Pain and
suffering may be used as a catch-all category for the jury's
consideration of all non-pecuniary losses in a case of a nonfatal
injury, subsuming other qualitative categories such as mental
2026.04.27 18:00 anguish and humiliation. More commonly, though, other non-
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -31-
economic elements - such as 'loss of enjoyment of life" are
accorded independent standing..."
Another important observation is that:
"Whatever the categories of non-economic damages allowed in a
given jurisdiction, the law provides no objective benchmarks
valuing them. As one commentator notes, 'Courts have usually
been content to say that pain and suffering damages should
amount to 'fair compensation', or a 'reasonable amount', 'without
any definite guide'.
" 13.7 Consideration of the above, underlines that while each
discipline has its own conception of the meaning of
pain/suffering, within its confines, the commonality that emerges
is that a person's understanding of oneself is shaken or
compromised at its very root at the hands of consistent suffering.
In the present facts, it is unquestionable that the sense of
something being irreparably wrong in life, as spoken by Frank
(supra); vulnerability and futility, as spoken by Edgar, is present
and such a feeling will be present for the remainder of his natural
life.
14. In respect of 'pain and suffering' in cases where disability
suffered is at 100%, we may notice a few decisions of this Court:-
14.1 In R.D Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India ) (P) Ltd. (1995)
1 SCC 551. It was observed :
"17. The claim under Sl. No. 16 for 'pain and suffering' and for
loss of amenities of life under Sl. No. 17, are claims for non-
pecuniary loss. The appellant has claimed lump sum amount of
Rs.3,00,000 each under the two heads. The High Court has
allowed Rs.1,00,000 against the claims of Rs.6,00,000. When
compensation is to be awarded for 'pain and suffering' and loss of
amenity of life, the special circumstances of the claimant have to
be taken into account including his age, the unusual deprivation
he has suffered, the effect thereof on his future life. The amount of
compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but
the award must reflect that different circumstances have been
taken into consideration. According to us, as the appellant was
2026.04.27 18:00 an advocate having good practice in different courts and as
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -32-
because of the accident he has been crippled and can move only
on wheelchair, the High Court should have allowed an amount of
Rs.1,50,000 in respect of claim for 'pain and suffering' and
Rs.1,50,000 in respect of loss of amenities of life. We direct
payment of Rs.3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs only) against the
claim of Rs.6,00,000 under the heads "'pain and suffering'" and
"Loss of amenities of life".
(Emphasis Supplied)
14.2 This Judgment was recently referred to by this Court
in Sidram v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (2023) 3
SCC 439 reference was also made to Karnataka SRTC v.
Mahadeva Shetty (2003) 7 SCC 197 (irrespective of the
percentage of disability incurred, the observations are
instructive), wherein it was observed :
"18. A person not only suffers injuries on account of accident but
also suffers in mind and body on account of the accident through
out his life and a feeling is developed that his no more a normal
man and cannot enjoy the amenities of life as another normal
person can. While fixing compensation for pain and suffering as
also for loss of amenities, features like his age, marital status and
unusual deprivation he has undertaken in his life have to be
reckoned. "
14.3 In Kajal v. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC 413 considering
the facts of the case, i.e., 100% disability, child being bedridden
for life, her mental age being that of a nine-month-old for life - a
vegetative existence, held that "even after taking a conservative
view of the matter an amount payable for the 'pain and suffering'
of this child should be at least Rs.15,00,000/-. "
14.4 In Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance (2022) 7 SCC
738 relying on Kajal (supra) the amount awarded in 'pain and
suffering' was enhanced to Rs.10,00,000. The child who had
suffered the accident was five years old and the Court noted in
paragraph 2 that:
"As per the discharge certificate, the appellant is not able to move
both his legs and had complete sensory loss in the legs, urinary
incontinence, bowel constipation and bed sores. The appellant
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -33-
was aged about 5 years as on the date of the accident, hence has
lost his childhood and is dependent on others for his routine
work."
14.5 In Lalan (supra) cited by the claimant-appellant, the
Tribunal awarded Rs.30,000/- which was enhanced to Rs.40,000/-
by the High Court. Considering the fact that the appellant therein
has suffered extensive brain injury awarded compensation under
'pain and suffering' to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/-.
15. Keeping in view the above-referred judgment, the injuries
suffered, the 'pain and suffering' caused, and the life-long nature
of the disability afflicted upon the claimant-appellant, and the
statement of the Doctor as reproduced above, we find the request
of the claimant-appellant to be justified and as such, award
Rs.15.00.000/- under the head 'pain and suffering', fully conscious
of the fact that the prayer of the claimant-appellant for
enhancement of compensation was 22 (2022) 7 SCC 738, 15\ SLP
(C) NO. 18337 OF 2021 by a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, we find the
compensation to be just, fair and reasonable at the amount so
awarded.
42. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Baby Sakshi
Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and another, 2025(1) RCR (Civil) 238, where
the injured was a female child aged 7 years and had suffered grievous injuries,
learned Tribunal awarded Rs.50,000/-towards pain and suffering, but the same was
enhanced by the Hon'ble High Court to Rs. 12,00,000/-. When the matter reached to
the Hon'ble Apex Court, the same was enhanced to Rs. 15,00,000/-.
43. In view of the settled law by Hon'ble Apex Court, since in the present
case as well, the functional disability is 100% by applying the same parameters a
compensation of 12 lakhs is hereby awarded to the appellant-claimant towards
pain and sufferings.
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -34-
Attendant Charges
44. So far as attendant charges is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court
in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and others, 2020(2)RCR (Civil) 2 has held as under:
"22. The attendant charges have been awarded by the High Court
at the rate of Rs.2,500 per month for 44 years, which works out to
Rs. 13,20,000. Unfortunately, this system is not a proper system.
Multiplier system is used to balance out various factors. When
compensation is awarded in lump sum, various facts are taken
into consideration. When compensation is paid in lump sum, this
court has always followed the multiplier system. The multiplier
system should be followed not only for determining the
compensation on account of loss of income but also for
determining the attendant charges, etc. This system was
recognized by this Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v.
R.M.K. Veluswami, 1958-65 ACJ179 (SC). The multiplier system
factors in the inflation rate, the rate of interest payable on the
lump sum award, the longevity of the claimant, and also other
issues such as the uncertainties of life. Out of all the various
alternative methods, the multiplier method has been recognized
as the most realistic and reasonable method. It ensures better
justice between the parties and thus results in award of just
compensation within the meaning of the Act.
23. xxxxx
24. xxxxx
25. Having held so, we are clearly of the view that the basic amount taken
for determining attendant charges is very much on the lower side. We must
remember that this little girl is severely suffering from incontinence meaning
that she does not have control over her bodily functions like passing urine and
faeces. As she grows older, she will not be able to handle her periods. She
requires an attendant virtually 24 hours a day. She requires an attendant who
though may not be medically trained but must be capable of handling a child
MOHD AYUB
2026.04.27 18:00
I attest to the accuracy and who is bedridden. She would require an attendant who would ensure that she
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -35-
does not suffer from bed sores. The claimant has placed before us a notification
of the State of Haryana of the year 2010, wherein the wages for skilled
labourer is Rs.4,846 per month. We, therefore, assess the cost of one attendant
at Rs.5,000 and she will require two attendants which works out to Rs. 10,000/-
per month, which comes to Rs. 1,20,000/- per annum, and using the multiplier
of 18 it works out Rs. 21,60,000 for attendant charges for her entire life. This
take care of all the pecuniary damages.
45. In view of the above referred to judgment passed by the Apex Court in
Kajal's case (Supra) as well as the Disability Certificate, for 80% disability, it
would be appropriate to grant lumpsum amount of Rs.3,00,000/- under the head of
attendant charges.
Transportation
46. Considering the injuries suffered by the appellant-claimant and the
requirement for special transportation arrangements, an amount of 1 lakh is
hereby awarded to the appellant-claimant on account of the transportation.
RELIEF
47. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and award dated
07.03.2012 is set aside. Accordingly, as per the settled principles of law as laid
down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as mentioned above, the appellant-claimant is
held entitled to the amount of compensation as calculated below:-
Sr. No. Heads Compensation Awarded
1 Income Rs.12,000/-
2 Loss of future prospects (40%) Rs.4800/-
(40% of Rs.12,000/-)
3 Annual Income Rs.2,01,600/-
(Rs.16800/- X 12)
4 Loss of future earning on account of Rs.2,01,600/-
100% functional disability (Rs.2,01,600 /- X 100%)
5 Multiplier of 16 Rs.32,25,600/-
(Rs.2,01,600/-X 16)
6 Medical Expenses Rs.2,00,000/-
7 Pain and suffering Rs.12,00,000/-
authenticity of this order/judgment.
FAO-2862-2012 (O&M) -36-
8 Attendant Charges Rs.3,00,000/-
9 Transportation Charges Rs.1,00,000/-
10 Loss of amenities of life Rs.3,00,000/-
11 Special Diet Rs.1,00,000/-
12 Future Medical expenses and Rs.23,00,000/-
prosthetic leg
13 Total compensation awarded:- Rs.77,25,600/-
48. So far as the interest part is concerned, as held by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Dara Singh @ Dhara Banjara Vs. Shyam Singh Varma 2019 ACJ
3176 and R.Valli and Others VS. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation
(2022) 5 Supreme Court Cases 107, the amount so calculated shall carry an
interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition, till the date
of realization.
49. So far as liability to pay compensation is concerned, insurance
policy (Ex.R-1) reveals that the offending vehicle was duly insured with
respondent No.3-Insurance Company.
50. Furthermore, a perusal of the record reveals that driving licence of
respondent No.1-Deepak Sharma was valid at the time of accident.
51. Consequently, respondent No.3-Insurance Company is directed to
deposit the amount of compensation along with interest at the rate of 9% within a
period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The
Tribunal is directed to disburse the amount of compensation along with interest
to the appellant-claimant in the account of appellant-claimant. The appellant-
claimant is directed to provide his bank details to the learned Tribunal.
52. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
21.04.2026 (SUDEEPTI SHARMA)
Ayub/Saahil JUDGE
Whether speaking/non-speaking : Speaking
Whether reportable : Yes
authenticity of this order/judgment.
