Union Territory Of Chandigarh And ... vs Karamjit Kaur
2024 Latest Caselaw 9052 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Union Territory Of Chandigarh And ... vs Karamjit Kaur on 29 April, 2024

Author: G.S.Sandhawalia

Bench: G.S.Sandhawalia

                                  Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:058500-DB

LPA-991-2024 (O & M)                                                               1

                                                           2024:PHHC:058500-DB

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                     AT CHANDIGARH

107                                                        2024:PHHC:058500-DB

                                                           LPA-991-2024 (O & M)
                                                       Date of Decision: 29.04.2024

Union Territory of Chandigarh and others
                                                                    .....Appellant(s)


                                       Versus

Karamjit Kaur                                                     ....Respondent(s)

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SANDHAWALIA, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI

Present: Mr. Lokesh Chander Aggarwal, Sr. Panel Counsel, for the appellants.

Ms. Divya Sharma, Advocate, for the caveator-respondent.

G.S.SANDHAWALIA, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE (Oral)

CM-2399-LPA-2024

1. Application for condonation of delay of 62 days in filing the appeal is

allowed, in view of averments made in the application supported by affidavit of

the official of the appellant-U.T, Chandigarh.

2. Delay condoned.

3. CM stands disposed of.

LPA-991-2024 (O & M)

4. In the present appeal, the appellant-U.T. Administration has sought to

challenge the decision dated 05.01.2024 of the learned Single Judge passed in

CWP-37947-2018, Karamjit Kaur vs. U.T., Chandigarh and others vide which the

writ petition of the respondent-writ petitioner was allowed and the order dated

13.07.2018 (Annexure P-3) was quashed. Resultantly, the respondent-writ

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petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service forthwith in continuity and

entitled to all consequential benefits except for the financial benefits prior to the

date of acquittal i.e. 20.10.2018 in the FIR which was registered against her. The

learned Single Judge primarily relied upon the judgment passed by the co-ordinate

Bench in Didar Singh vs. U.T., Chandigarh and others, 2020 (3) PLR 31. It is

brought to the notice of this Court that we have already upheld the said decision in

LPA-1193-2011, U.T., Chandigarh and others vs. Didar Singh on 07.02.2024.

5. The reasoning which had prevailed with us was that the discharge

from the post of Home Guard due to the wrong absence from duties without any

leave/intimation was without giving the employee opportunity of defending

himself and it was violative of the principles of natural justice. We had fallen

back on Rule 27 of the Punjab Home Guard Rules, 1963 (in short 'the 1963 Rules')

to uphold the order of the learned Single Judge. We had also noticed that in the

said case, there was 16 years of service. In the present case, the service is 22

years.

6. The factum that the absence was on account of an involvement in

matrimonial dispute of the son of the writ petitioner has also been discussed by the

learned Single Judge. It was, thus, on that account the writ petitioner could not

apparently join her duties from 11.11.2017 to 04.06.2018. She apparently

remained in custody from 05.02.2018 to 30.04.2018. Had she been given any

opportunity as such, she would have put forth her case, as such. Apparently, after

being released on bail, the writ petitioner wished to join her duties as Home

Guard, Volunteer but she was not allowed to do so and she had also filed a

representation dated 24.05.2018 (Annexure P-2) and instead of acting on the same,

the order of discharge was passed by the District Commandant, Home Guard, U.T.

7. A perusal of her representation would also go on to show that the writ

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petitioner was candid enough to give the details of the criminal proceedings as

such and, therefore, at the time of passing of the discharge order, the punishing

authority was well aware of the background which has led to the absence as such.

However, apparently without holding any inquiry, the extreme order of

punishment was passed by discharging the writ petitioner without keeping in mind

the long years of service of 22 years which she had put in. We have already

earlier relied upon the judgment in Davinder Singh and others vs. State of

Punjab, (2010) 13 SCC 88 wherein, in similar circumstances, the Home Guards

were terminated on account of the acts of indiscipline committed at Amritsar

Railway Station while travelling in connection with election duty. We have also

noticed the judgment of the Apex Court in Grah Rakshak, Home Guards Welfare

Association vs. State of H.P. and others, (2015) 6 SCC 247 that the Home Guards

as such had been directed to be paid duty allowances at such rates, total of which

30 days (a month) to come to minimum of the pay, to which the police personnel

were entitled and the State Governments were directed to pass appropriate orders.

8. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the

argument which is now sought to be raised and not raised earlier that the 1963

Rules have not been adopted by U.T. is without any justification. The defence as

such taken in the reply was that the order dated 13.07.2018 was passed by

exercising powers vested under Section 14.4 of the Compendium of Instructions

issued by the Directorate General Civil Defence, MHA, Government of India,

New Delhi. No such defence was taken that the Rules would not be applicable

which would give the vested right as such of being heard before the impugned

order was passed.

9. Even otherwise, we are of the considered opinion that it was for the

State as such to act on the representation before dispensing with 22 years of

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service after giving opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner and the same

having not been done, the principles of natural justice had been violated and the

order as such cannot be sustained. State is supposed to be a model employer and

not a draconian one. In such circumstances, we do not find any valid reason to

interfere in the order of the learned Single Judge. We are further of the considered

opinion that the matter squarely stands covered.

10. The argument raised that during the pendency of the writ petition, a

Committee was constituted of similarly situated persons and even the case of the

writ petitioner was considered in which the pendency of the writ petition was also

noticed, would go on to show that it was noticed that the writ petitioner has been

acquitted of the charges framed against her under Sections 406, 498-A IPC in FIR

No.116 dated 23.07.2013, P.S. City Kharar, by giving her the benefit of doubt.

The said order also, thus, being of the Committee is not sustainable as apparently

perusal of the order of the criminal Court would go on to show that the writ

petitioner was tried alongwith her son and after examining the evidence in detail

of the prosecution witnesses, the trial Court on 20.10.2018 (Annexure P-1) came

to the conclusion that any gifts given to the bride-groom or his parents, whether in

accordance with any custom or otherwise at the time of marriage, do not constitute

an offence under Section 406 IPC as they would not constitute part of her Istri

Dhan. Therefore, the articles gifted as such did not amount to any demand made

by the accused persons and, therefore, offence under Section 406 IPC was not

made out. Similarly, finding recorded under Section 498-A is that there is no

specific date and incident had been given and only vague statements of the

complainant as such had been made and there is no evidence that the complainant

was ever beaten up by the accused on the pretext of demand of dowry. Thus, the

acquittal apparently is on merits and only on account of the niceties of legal

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terminology as such that the words have been used that prosecution has not been

able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Apparently, the said judgment

was not even examined in detail by the Committee and, therefore, the argument

which has now been raised that the Committee had given post decisional hearing

was not approved of by the learned Single Judge while relying upon the judgment

of the Apex Court in K.I. Shephard vs. UOI, (1987) 4 SCC 431. The said finding

is well justified since the Committee having not looked into the judgment of

acquittal in detail, the order passed by the Committee regarding the case of the

writ petitioner also cannot be sustained, in the peculiar facts and circumstances.

11. Resultantly, finding no merit in the present appeal, the same stands

dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed accordingly.

                                                           (G.S. SANDHAWALIA)
                                                          ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE



29.04.2024                                                   (LAPITA BANERJI)
shivani                                                           JUDGE

Whether reasoned/speaking                      Yes
Whether reportable                             No




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