Patna High Court
Pulak Chandra Das vs The State Bank Of India And Ors on 14 February, 2025
Author: P. B. Bajanthri
Bench: P. B. Bajanthri
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.11961 of 2010
======================================================
Pulak Chandra Das, S/O Late Kanti Chandra Das, R/O Mohalla- High School
Para, Near East Bang Bhawan, P.S.Katihar, District-Katihar
... ... Petitioner.
Versus
1. The State Bank of India through its Chief General Manager, 7th Floor, Local
Head Office, State Bank of India, West Gandhi Maidan, Patna.
2. The Deputy General Manager O and C (NW-I)-cum-Appellate Authority
Disciplinary Proceeding Cell, State Bank of India, Administrative Building,
J.C. Road, Patna.
3. The Assistant General Manager (Administration)-cum-Disciplinary
Authority Disciplinary Proceeding Cell, State Bank of India, Administrative
Office, Purnia.
4. The Assistant General Manager Region III, State Bank of India Zonal
Office, Purnia.
5. The Deputy Manager-cum-Enquiry Officer, State Bank of India
Administrative Office, Purnia Region III, Purnia.
6. The Deputy Manager-cum-Presenting Officer, State Bank of India Region
III, Administrative Office, Purnia.
7. The Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Forbesganj Branch, District-
Araria
... ... Respondents.
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner : Mr. Aditya Narain Singh, Advocate.
Mr. Kundan Kumar Sinha, Advocate.
For the Respondent-SBI : Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, Senior Advocate.
Mr. Anjani Kumar Mishra, Advocate.
Mr. Akshansh Ankit, Advocate.
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P. B. BAJANTHRI
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 14-02-2025
In the instant writ petition, petitioner has prayed for
the following relief(s):
"For issuance of a writ in the nature of
certiorari for quashing of the order dated
14.11.2009
, passed by the Assistant General
Manager (Admn.)-cum-Disciplinary
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
Authority, Disciplinary Proceeding Cell,
State Bank of India, Administrative Office,
Purnia, whereby and whereunder, the
Disciplinary Authority has imposed a penalty
upon the petitioner of "Removal from Bank's
Service with superannuation benefits i.e.
pension and/or provident fund and gratuity as
would be due otherwise under the Rules and
Regulations prevailing at the relevant time
and without disqualification from future
employment under the Clause 6(b) of the
Memorandum of Settlement dated
10.04.2002. The period of suspension will be
treated as such i.e. not on duty".
As well as for quashing of the order
passed by the Deputy General Manager
O & C (NW-I) (Appellate Authority)
State Bank of India Administrative
Building J.C. Road, Patna dated 19 Feb.
2010 confirming the penalty of removal
of the petitioner from the Bank services
by the Disciplinary Authority.
Both the order one being passed by the
Disciplinary Authority on 14.11.2009
and other by the Appellate Authority
dated 19 Feb. 2010 supported by the
speaking order of the respective dates."
2. The petitioner while working as a Senior Assistant
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
in the Respondents-Bank, he was subjected to disciplinary
proceedings. Alleged to be preliminary charges were framed on
13.03.2007. Petitioner submitted his reply on 17.04.2007.
Thereafter, alleged stated to be final charges have been framed
on 22.08.2007. Petitioner had submitted his reply on
05.09.2007. Disciplinary Authority not satisfied with the
petitioner's explanation proceeded to appoint inquiring officer.
The inquiring officer submitted his report on 26.12.2008,
holding that the charges levelled against the petitioner were
proved. Resultantly, second show cause notice dated
05.11.2009 was issued by the Disciplinary Authority.
Thereafter, Disciplinary Authority proceeded to impose penalty
of removal from service on 14.11.2009. Feeling aggrieved by
the order of punishment, petitioner preferred an appeal before
the Appellate Authority on 26.12.2009 in which petitioner
suffered an order on 19.02.2010. Hence, the present writ
petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
petitioner is governed by the Bipartite Settlement dated
10.04.2002 in respect of disciplinary action against workmen
Staff and Procedure. It is submitted that along with the charge-
memo, list of documents and list of witnesses and statement of
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
imputation was not provided. For the first time, the inquiring
officer taken note of certain list of documents. None of the
witnesses have been examined like author of the documents,
which were taken note of for the purpose of proving the
charges. The same has not been appreciated by the Disciplinary
and Appellate Authority. Removal punishment is a major
penalty. In not following the Bipartite Settlement dated
10.04.2002 violates the petitioner's right and so also it is in
violation of principles of natural justice. Non-examination of
witnesses in support of alleged charges are sufficient to set
aside the impugned orders of removal and its affirmation by the
Appellate Authority in the light of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
decision in the case of Roop Singh Negi Versus Punjab
National Bank and others, reported in (2009) 2 Supreme
Court Cases 570 read with principles laid down in the case of
Union of India and Others Versus P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2
SCC 610, and State of Karnataka and Another Versus
Umesh, reported in (2022) 6 Supreme Court Cases 563
insofar as judicial review in a disciplinary proceedings.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents
vehemently contended that the petitioner has been provided all
opportunity. Even though there is no provision under Bipartite
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
Settlement dated 10.04.2002 insofar as issuance preliminary
charges and seeking reply. Thereafter, proceeded to issue one
more charge-sheet and obtained reply. Such proceedings have
been adopted by the Disciplinary Authority only to provide
ample opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is also
submitted that the petitioner has admitted the alleged charges,
which is pointed out by the respondents insofar as paragraph-23
of the writ petition and so also petitioner's representation. It is
further submitted that the present matter is squarely covered by
the decision of the Division Bench of this Court insofar as
admission of the charges in L.P.A. No.297 of 2019 (Santosh
Kumar Paswan Versus State Bank of India and others)
dated 20.02.2024.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the respective
parties.
6. Dates and events are not disputed by either of the
parties. The respondents have clearly admitted that list of
documents and list of witnesses have not been provided to the
petitioner along with the charge-memo and they have also
admitted that none of the witnesses have been examined in
support of the documents which were relied on by the inquiring
officer. In other words, author of the documents, which have
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
been taken into consideration for the purpose of proving the
charges, have not been examined or cross-examined. On these
counts, petitioner is entitled to have benefit of interference with
the impugned decisions of the Disciplinary and Appellate
Authority in the light of principles laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Karnataka
and Another Versus Umesh, reported in (2022) 6 Supreme
Court Cases 563. Paragraph-22 of the aforesaid Judgment
reads as under:
"22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court
does not act as an appellate forum over the findings
of the disciplinary authority. The court does not
reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the
finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the
course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the
exercise of judicial review must restrict its review
to determine whether:
(i) the rules of natural justice have been
complied with;
(ii) the finding of misconduct is based on
some evidence;
(iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct
of the disciplinary enquiry have been
observed; and
(iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
authority suffer from perversity; and
(v) the penalty is disproportionate to the
proven misconduct. [State of Karnataka v.
N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 : (2020) 1
SCC (L&S) 547; Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC
(L&S) 1806; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
80; R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8
SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424 and CISF v.
Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507 : (2018) 1 SCC
(L&S) 310]."
7. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on
stated to be admission of the petitioner at paragraph-23 of the
writ petition and it read as under:
"23. That moreover all the allegations
leveled in the charge memo of year
2006 in which year the father of the
petitioner died, his father-in-laws died
after a serious illness and his wife
suffer a major heart attack and treated
in Patna for quite a long time and
therefore there was some short of
imbalance of his mind which may be
the reason for slight deviation from
the fixed norms of working in the
bank. Even the Enquiry Officer in his
enquiry report has found that the bank
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
has suffered no loss at all."
8. The aforementioned pleadings in the writ petition
does not amount to admission of the charges. He has only
expressed what was the issues faced by him at the relevant
point of time. On the other hand, charges are serious in nature
insofar as alleged to have temporary misappropriated money
and it is required to be proved in the manner known to the law.
The cited decision in the case of Santosh Kumar Paswan
Versus State Bank of India and others, on factual aspects, it
is distinguishable and would not assist the respondents-Bank.
9. In the case of Roop Singh Negi Versus Punjab
National Bank and Others, reported in (2009)2 SCC 570, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs-14 and 23 has held as
under:
"14. Indisputably, a departmental
proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial
function. The charges levelled against the
delinquent officer must be found to have
been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty
to arrive at a finding upon taking into
consideration the materials brought on record
by the parties. The purported evidence
collected during investigation by the
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
investigating officer against all the accused
by itself could not be treated to be evidence
in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness
was examined to prove the said documents.
The management witnesses merely tendered
the documents and did not prove the contents
thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by
the enquiry officer on the FIR which could
not have been treated as evidence.
Underline Supplied.
23. Furthermore, the order of the
disciplinary authority as also the appellate
authority are not supported by any reason. As
the orders passed by them have severe civil
consequences, appropriate reasons should
have been assigned. If the enquiry officer
had relied upon the confession made by the
appellant, there was no reason as to why the
order of discharge passed by the criminal
court on the basis of selfsame evidence
should not have been taken into
consideration. The materials brought on
record pointing out the guilt are required to
be proved. A decision must be arrived at on
some evidence, which is legally admissible.
The provisions of the Evidence Act may not
be applicable in a departmental proceeding
but the principles of natural justice are. As
the report of the enquiry officer was based
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and
conjectures, the same could not have been
sustained. The inferences drawn by the
enquiry officer apparently were not
supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is
well known, however high may be, can
under no circumstances be held to be a
substitute for legal proof."
Underline Supplied.
10. In the case of Union of India and Others
Versus Gyan Chand Chattar, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs-20, 22 and 30 has
held as under:
"20. So far as Charge 6 i.e. asking for
1% commission for making the payment of pay
allowances is concerned, the learned Single Judge
has appreciated the evidence of all the witnesses
examined in this regard and came to the conclusion
that not a single person had deposed before the
enquiry officer that the respondent employee had
asked any person to pay 1% commission for
making payment of their allowances. It was based
on hearsay statements. All the witnesses stated that
this could be the motive/reason for not making the
payment.
22. Witnesses were examined before the
enquiry officer that they have heard that the said
respondent was asking but none of them was able
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
to point out who was that person who had been
asked to pay 1% commission. One of such
witnesses deposed that some unknown person had
told him. Learned Single Judge came to the
conclusion that the knowledge of the witnesses in
this regard was based on "hearsay statement of
some unknown persons whom they did not know".
This was certainly not legal evidence to sustain
such a serious charge of corruption against an
employee.
30. Charge 6 was basically based on
hearsay statement and it is difficult to assume as to
whether enquiry could be held on such a vague
charge. Charge 6 does not reveal as to who was the
person who had been asked by the respondent to
pay 1% commission for payment of pay
allowances. It is an admitted position that if a
charge of corruption is proved, no punishment
other that dismissal can be awarded."
11. In the case of Union of India and Others
Versus P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs-12, 13, 14, 15 and 16
has held as under:
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it
is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court
has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on
Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority
and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act
as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can
only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent
authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of
natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves
to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
failed to admit the admissible and material
evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no
evidence.
Underline Supplied.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted
in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of
punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v.
S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] , many of
the above principles have been discussed and it has
been concluded thus : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7).
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
"7. ... The High Court is not
constituted in a proceeding under Article 226
of the Constitution as a court of appeal over
the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant
: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in
that behalf, and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated.
Where there is some evidence, which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
enquiry has accepted and which evidence
may reasonably support the conclusion that
the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge,
it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to
review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The
High Court may undoubtedly interfere where
the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on
similar grounds. But the departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise
properly held, the sole judges of facts and if
there be some legal evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed
before the High Court in a proceeding for a
writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."
15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2
SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349 : AIR 1975 SC
2151] , the principles have been further discussed
at paras 21-24, which read as follows : (SCC pp.
561-63)
"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before
this Court. Two propositions were laid down
by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] . First, there is no
warrant for the view that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of
misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is
not established unless proved by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
of the Court must be applied. If that rule be
not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry
the High Court in a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution is not competent to
declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High
Court is not a court of appeal under Article
226 over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a
public servant. The Court is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and
according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Second, where there
is some evidence which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is
not the function of the High Court to review
the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. The High Court
may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against
the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of
the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
decision by some considerations extraneous
to the evidence and the merits of the case or
by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion. The departmental authorities are,
if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the
sole judges of facts and if there is some legal
evidence on which their findings can be
based, the adequacy or reliability of that
evidence is not a matter which can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article
22. Again, this Court in Railway
Board v. Niranjan Singh [(1969) 1 SCC
502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] said that the High
Court does not interfere with the conclusion
of the disciplinary authority unless the
finding is not supported by any evidence or it
can be said that no reasonable person could
have reached such a finding. In Niranjan
Singh case [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3
SCR 548] this Court held that the High Court
exceeded its powers in interfering with the
findings of the disciplinary authority on the
charge that the respondent was instrumental
in compelling the shutdown of an air
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31-5-1956.
This Court said that the Enquiry Committee
felt that the evidence of two persons that the
respondent led a group of strikers and
compelled them to close down their
compressor could not be accepted at its face
value. The General Manager did not agree
with the Enquiry Committee on that point.
The General Manager accepted the evidence.
This Court said that it was open to the
General Manager to do so and he was not
bound by the conclusion reached by the
committee. This Court held that the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary
authority should prevail and the High Court
should not have interfered with the
conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory
jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an
appellate court. The findings of fact reached
by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of
the appreciation of evidence are not
reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law which is apparent on the face
of the record can be corrected by a writ, but
not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact
recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if
it is shown that in recording the said finding,
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence
which has influenced the impugned finding.
Again if a finding of fact is based on no
evidence, that would be regarded as an error
of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground
that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or
inadequate to sustain a finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a
point and the inference of fact to be drawn
from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (See Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC
477] .)
24. The High Court in the present
case assessed the entire evidence and came
to its own conclusion. The High Court was
not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect
that the High Court does not correct a
finding of fact on the ground that the
evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the
evidence in the present case which was
considered by the Tribunal cannot be
scanned by the High Court to justify the
conclusion that there is no evidence which
would justify the finding of the Tribunal that
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
the respondent did not make the journey. The
Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It
is not possible for the High Court to say that
no reasonable person could have arrived at
these conclusions. The High Court reviewed
the evidence, reassessed the evidence and
then rejected the evidence as no evidence.
That is precisely what the High Court in
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari should not do."
16. These principles have been succinctly
summed up by the living legend and
centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in State of
Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 :
1977 SCC (L&S) 298] . To quote the
unparalleled and inimitable expressions :
(SCC p. 493, para 4)
"4. ... in a domestic enquiry the
strict and sophisticated rules of evidence
under the Indian Evidence Act may not
apply. All materials which are logically
probative for a prudent mind are permissible.
There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reasonable nexus and
credibility. It is true that departmental
authorities and administrative tribunals must
be careful in evaluating such material and
should not glibly swallow what is strictly
speaking not relevant under the Indian
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not
necessary to cite decisions nor textbooks,
although we have been taken through case
law and other authorities by counsel on both
sides. The essence of a judicial approach is
objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials
or considerations and observance of rules of
natural justice. Of course, fair play is the
basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias
or surrender of independence of judgment
vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,
even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot
be held good."
12. In the case of S.C. Girotra Versus United
Commercial Bank (UCO Bank) and Others, reported in 1995
Supp (3) SCC 212, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs-
3 and 5 has held as under:
"3. Admittedly, the disciplinary authority
while making the order of dismissal stated
as under:
"The presenting officer has submitted
28 exhibits, most of which are in the
form of certificates of Shri Rajinder
Paul and B.B. Bhatia, Officer and the
then Assistant Manager of the branch,
while one document (PEX-26) is in
the form of inspection/ investigation
report of Shri V.P. Jindal and Shri J.R.
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
Sharma. The certificates and
inspection-cum-investigation report
are most comprehensive documents.
Inspection-cum-Investigation report
has been prepared by two senior
officers of the then Division Office,
Punjab Division, Chandigarh, after
their painstaking efforts of about two
months. This has been substantiated
by various certificates of the two
officers of the branch.
All the four officers appeared before
the Enquiry Officer and testified to
their authorship of the documents.
Their certificates/Inspection-cum-
Investigation Report comprehensively
cover all the allegations/charges
made/levelled in the charge-sheet.
They have also been supported by
other documents."
From the above extract it is clear that the
report on which reliance was placed by the
disciplinary authority was a comprehensive
document in which conclusions were reached
against the appellant on the basis of materials
including the books and records of the bank
as well as some certificates issued by officers
of the bank which constituted evidence in
support of the charges levelled against the
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
appellant. It is also clear that no opportunity
was given to the appellant to cross-examine
either the makers of that report, Mr V.P.
Jindal and Mr J.R. Sharma or the officers
who had granted such certificates which
formed evidence to prove the charges which
led to the order of dismissal passed by the
disciplinary authority, even though those
persons were examined for the purpose of
proving the documents relating to them. In
our opinion, the grievance made by the
appellant that refusal of permission to cross-
examine these witnesses was denial of
reasonable opportunity of defence to the
appellant, is justified.
Underline Supplied.
5. In view of the infirmity in the inquiry indicated
earlier, it is appropriate that the inquiry proceedings
are set aside from the stage of the enquiry report
and the respondent-bank is directed to conduct the
inquiry afresh from that stage giving the appellant
due opportunity to defend himself. For this purpose
the appellant should be given the opportunity to
cross-examine V.P. Jindal, J.R. Sharma, Rajinder
Paul and B.B. Bhatia who were examined by the
management in support of the charges. The Enquiry
Officer must then conclude the inquiry and make
the report on the entire materials before him.
Further action must then be taken in accordance
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
with law based on the finding given by the Enquiry
Officer. In the circumstances of the case, we also
direct that the appellant shall remain under
suspension from today and he be dealt with
according to the rules and regulations applicable to
him in this behalf. The appellant, during the period
of his suspension commencing from today shall be
paid subsistence allowance at the current rates in
accordance with the rules. The appellant shall
report to the Zonal Manager, Chandigarh Zone of
the respondent-bank on 1-3-1994 for taking further
directions in this behalf and he shall fully cooperate
with the authorities to enable completion of the
inquiry as early as possible and preferably by the
end of May 1994."
13. In the light of these facts and circumstances,
petitioner has made out a case so as to interfere with the
impugned orders. Accordingly, impugned orders dated
14.11.2009 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and dated
19.02.2010 passed by the Appellate Authority are set aside.
14. Instant writ petition stands allowed.
15. The concerned respondents are hereby directed
to extend 50% of monetary benefits to the petitioner during the
intervening period from the date of removal from service till
attaining the age of superannuation and retired from service and
other retiral service benefits viz., monetary benefits. The above
Patna High Court CWJC No.11961 of 2010 dt.14-02-2025
exercise shall be completed within a period of six months from
the date of receipt of this order.
(P. B. Bajanthri, J)
P.S./-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 22.02.2025.
Transmission Date NA
