Dr. Ram Bilash Singh vs The State Of Bihar, Through The ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 4548 Patna

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                   Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1875 of 2018
      Arising Out of PS. Case No.-72 Year-2005 Thana- BHABHUA District- Kaimur (Bhabua)
     ======================================================

Dr. Ram Bilash Singh Son of Late Sukhdeo Singh, Resident of Village- Mahendrapur, P.S.- Matihani, District- Begusarai. ... ... Petitioner Versus

1. The State Of Bihar, Through The Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government Of Bihar, Patna

2. The Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna.

3. The Director General of Police, Vigilance Department, Bihar, Patna.

4. The Superintendent of Police-cum-Officer-in-Charge, Vigilance Police Station, Patna.

5. The Station House Officer, Bhabhua Police Station, Kaimur at Bhabhua.

... ... Respondents ====================================================== Appearance :

     For the Petitioner/s    :          Mr. S.K. Lal, Advocate
                                        Mr. Pritish Kumar Lal, Advocate
     For the Respondent/s    :          Mr.Md. Nasrul Huda Khan Sc-1
     For the Vigilance       :          Nr. Anil Singh, Advocate

====================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD CAV JUDGMENT Date : 18-08-2022

This writ application has been preferred on behalf of the

sole petitioner seeking the following reliefs:-

"(I) An appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s) quashing the first information report of Bhabua P.S. Case No. 72 of 2005 dated 19.03.2005 for offences under Sections 7 & 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short "the Act, 1988") giving rise to Special Case No. 04 of 2005 in the court of Special Judge, South Bihar, Patna.

In alternative for issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) terminating the further Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

investigation in Bhabhua P.S. Case No. 72 of 2005 (Special Case No. 04 of 2005).

(ii) To any other relief(s) to which the petitioner is found entitled for giving complete justice to the petitioner."

2. Brief facts of the case as discussed in the writ

application are as follows:-

3. The petitioner was the Medical Officer at Sadar

Hospital, Bhabhua, Kaimur. On 19.03.2005, the Collector Bhabhua

was informed by one Bharat Singh that for preparing an injury report

the petitioner was demanding a bribe and he has been asked to pay a

sum of Rs.5,000/- by evening in Sadar Hospital Campus. The

complainant Bharat Singh submitted his complaint to the Collector,

Kaimur whereupon the Collector called the Block Development

officer, Bhabhua and deputed him as Magistrate to take action. It is

alleged that the Block Development officer (the informant) together

with Shri Pankaj Das the Officer-Incharge of Bhabhua Police Station

went to Sadar Hospital in civil dress thereafter the trap was

conducted and the petitioner was trapped accepting tainted money

from one Shri Paras Nath Singh. It was the said Paras Nath Singh

who had handed over the money to the petitioner. The tainted money

was recovered from possession of the petitioner, he was arrested on

the spot and the FIR was lodged giving rise to Bhabhua P.S. Case No.

72 of 2005 dated 19.03.2005 under Sections 7/9 of the Act, 1988. At Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

this stage, the case has been investigated and finally a chargesheet

has been submitted in the learned court below during pendency of

this application on 24.01.2022.

4. Mr. S.K. Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner has

submitted that the First Information Report is fit to be quashed taking

into consideration the inordinate and huge delay in completion of

investigation. It is submitted that after about 17 years of lodging of

the FIR, only after this Court called upon the respondents to show as

to why the investigation is not being completed, in a hurry

chargesheet has been filed, very recently even as no sanction for

prosecution has been granted by the competent authority on the

proposal sent by the SDPO as back as on 09.07.2019 vide memo no.

1651. It is submitted that till date cognizance has not been taken by

the learned jurisdictional court.

5. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was earlier

suspended from service and he reached his age of superannuation in

the year 2019 whereafter the departmental proceeding pending

against him was converted in a proceeding under Rule 45(b) of the

Bihar Pension Rules in which the punishment for forfeiture of

pension (including gratuity) has been imposed depending upon the

result of the criminal case. It is his submission that the petitioner has

already suffered in his life in many ways, he is almost 70 years of age

and at this stage asking him to face the criminal case after 17 years of Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

lodging of the FIR and 3 years after retirement from service will only

be an abuse of the process of court.

6. In the supplementary affidavit filed on or about

05.11.2019 this petitioner has disclosed his age about 67 years

showing his date of birth as 07.08.1952. It is stated that on

completion of 67 years he has superannuated from service on

31.08.2019.

7. It is his submission that the FIR in the present case may

be quashed keeping in view the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Bishwanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar

reported in 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 97, Vakil Prasad Singh Vs. State

of Bihar reported in (2009) 3 SCC 355 and Mahendra Lal Das Vs.

State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 2989.

8. To strengthen his submission learned counsel for the

petitioner submits that all the above cited cases relate to a charge of

corruption but in the given facts of those cases the Hon'ble Supreme

Court found that further continuation of criminal case would only be

an abuse of the process of the court.

9. Per-contra, Mr. Anil Singh, learned counsel for the

Vigilance Investigation Bureau has argued that in a case of

corruption mere delay in submission of the chargesheet is not a good

ground to quash the first information report. Learned counsel has Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

taken this Court through the order dated 17.12.2013 passed in CWJC

No. 23538 of 2013 (Ram Bilash Singh Vs. The State of Bihar &

Ors.). The said Civil Writ was filed by this petitioner in the matter of

the departmental proceeding initiated against him and dealing with

the contention of the petitioner learned writ court refused to grant

relief to the petitioner. A direction was issued in the said case to the

concerned criminal court to ensure that the trial of the petitioner must

be expedited and conducted on day-to-day basis.

10. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner had moved

the writ court for revocation of his suspension but did not disclose

correctly that the investigation in the case was still pending. Despite

the observation of the court to expedite the trial, the petitioner only

moved this Court only after 5 years of the said observation in the

civil writ jurisdiction. It is, thus, his submission that the petitioner

having failed to raise his grievance at the earliest opportunity against

the delay in completion of investigation cannot be allowed to take

benefit of the said delay at this stage when the chargesheet has

already been filed.

11. Learned counsel for the State has endorsed the

submission of the learned counsel for the Vigilance Investigation

Bureau and it is submitted that the police has already submitted

chargesheet in this case which is pending consideration in the learned

court below.

Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

Consideration

12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on

perusal of the records, this Court finds that the main contention

raised for purpose of quashing of the first information report is the

delay in completion of investigation which has resulted in the

infringement of fundamental right of the petitioner to get speedy

trial. This argument is to be tested on the touch stone of Article 21 of

the Constitution of India with reference to the judicial

pronouncements on the subject. It is no longer res-integra that right

to speedy trial is implicit in broad sweep content of Article 21 of the

Constitution of India.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in the case of

Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar, reported in

(1980)1 SCC 81 observed thus: "We think that even under our

Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a

fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of

Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union

of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248]. We have held in that case that Article

21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of

his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed

by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the

requirement of that article that some semblance of a procedure

should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

"reasonable, fair and just". If a person is deprived of his liberty under

a procedure which is not "reasonable, fair or just", such deprivation

would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he

would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his

release..........."

14. In the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S.

Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225 the Constitution Bench of

the Apex Court while taking note of the judgment in Hussainara

Khatoon (I) noticed as follows:-

"The learned Judge, however, posed a question which he left to be answered at a later stage. The question posed was: What is the consequence of denial of this right? Does it necessarily entail the consequence of quashing of charges/trial? That question we shall consider separately but what is of significance is, this decision does establish the following propositions: (1) Right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21.

(2) That unless the procedure prescribed by law ensures a speedy trial it cannot be said to be reasonable, fair or just. Expeditious trial and freedom from detention are part of human rights and basic freedoms and that a judicial system which allow incarceration of men and women for long periods of time without trial must be held to be denying human rights to such undertrials."

15. The Bishwanath Prasad Singh (Supra) went to the

Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order of the Patna High Court in

dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant-accused seeking to

have the criminal proceedings launched against him quashed on the

ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. In the said case the Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

appellant was suspended pending inquiry due to allegation of

shortage of fertilizer worth Rs. 1,15,000/- during his posting as

Depot Manager under the Bihar State Cooperative Marketing Union

at Sitamarhi, he was suspended on 2-7-1977 and later he was

dismissed from service and the provident fund and gratuity due to

him was also forfeited. The appellant had crossed the age of

superannuation when the Special Leave Petition was filed and the

investigation remained pending for more than five years but

chargesheeet had been filed on 09.02.1983 and thereafter, the

prosecution evidence was adduced and charges were framed by the

court under Sections 408 and 428 of the Indian Penal code and

Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. In these backgrounds

the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the fact that there was no

explanation coming for the extra ordinary delay of more than five

years in completion of investigation. The Hon'ble Apex Court

observed: "Maybe, this being a case of misappropriation of public

funds, the investigation may have taken a longer time but it cannot

certainly take more than five years, having regard to the facts and

circumstances of the case." The Apex Court took a view that calling

upon the appellant now to enter upon defence, after 16 years is bound

to cause prejudice to him.

16. In the case of Vakil Prasad Singh (supra) which

again went to the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision of this Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of right to

speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in

the matter of quashment of the criminal proceeding due to delay

even in serious cases. The Apex Court having discussed the case laws

on the subject recorded in paragraph "19", "20" and "24" as under:-

"19.The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon (1) case5 was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak6. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines." "20. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are: (A.R. Antulay case6, SCC pp. 270-73, para 86)

(i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily;

(ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;

(iii) in every case, where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is

-- who is responsible for the delay?;

(iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-- what is called, the systemic delays;

(v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage.

However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, 5 [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] 6 [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

the fact of incarceration of the accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case;

(vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors--'balancing test' or 'balancing process'--and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied;

(vii) ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to a conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial;

(viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint;

(ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in the High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis."

"24. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions) is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case."

(underline is mine)

17. In the case of Vakil Prasad Singh (supra) the

allegation against the appellant was that of demanding of a sum of

Rs. 1000/- as illegal gratification for release for the civil work

executed by him and in the trap laid to catch the culprit chemically

treated currency notes are said to have been recovered from

appellant's pocket. The FIR was lodged on or about 08.04.1981

and the chargesheet was filed on 28.02.1982 whereupon the

learned Magistrate took cognizance on 09.12.1982 but thereafter

nothing substantial happened till 06.07.1987 except for dismissal

of an application filed by the prosecution for re-investigation of

the case. This Court vide it's order dated 07.12.1990 had quashed

the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance with a

direction to the prosecution to complete the investigation within a

period of three months but thereafter no progress was made in the

case till the year 1998. Under these circumstances the appellant

had moved application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High court

seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceeding against him on

the ground that the re-investigation in the matter had not been

initiated even after a lapse of seven-and-half years. It is only when

the matter was called out for final hearing in the High Court after Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

nine years i.e. on 11.05.2007. The High Court dismissed the

petition acknowledging that there had been substantial delay in

conclusion of proceedings against the appellant and some

prejudice may have been caused to the appellant in his

professional career on account of continuance of criminal case

against him but the learned Judge concluded that this reason by

itself was not sufficient to quash the entire criminal proceedings

against him, particularly keeping in view the seriousness of the

allegations.

18. In Mahendra Lal Das (supra) the appellant was an

Executive Engineer, Public Engineering Department, Mechanical

Division, Ranchi. He was being prosecuted for the offence under

Sections 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 wherein it was alleged that the appellant was

in possession of disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs

50,600/-. The FIR was sought to be quashed mainly on the ground

that despite expiry of over 12 years, the respondent State had not

granted the sanction which amounted to the violation of his right

of life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of

India. The High Court dismissed the petition seeking quashing of

the FIR, on the ground that mere delay in granting the sanction has

not prejudiced the appellant in any manner particularly when he is Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

already on anticipatory bail. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held

that in this case the prosecution has miserably failed to explain the

delay of more than 13 years in granting sanction for prosecution of

the appellant and keeping in view the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the case, permitting further prosecution would

be a travesty of justice and a mere ritual or formality so far as the

prosecution agency is concerned, and unnecessary burden as

regards the court.

19. In the case of Superintendent of Police, Karnataka

Lokayukta and Another versus B. Srinivas reported in (2008) 8

SCC 580, the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again observed in

paragraph '10' as under:-

"10. There is no general and wide proposition of law formulated that whenever there is delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such a delay can be a ground for quashing the FIR. It would be difficult to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles in determining as to whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of delay or protracted investigation; it would depend on various factors including whether such a delay was reasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether the delay was inevitable in the nature of things or whether it was due to dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. It would depend upon certain peculiar facts and circumstances of each case i.e. the volume of evidence collected by the investigating agency, the nature and gravity of the offence for which the accused has been charge-sheeted in a given case. The nexus between whole and some of the above factors is of considerable relevance.

Therefore, whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of protracted investigation has to Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

come on facts. He has also to establish that he had no role in the delay. Every delay does not necessarily occur because of the accused."

20. What is culled out from the aforementioned

judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court is that the right to speedy

trial is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution

and this right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in

court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police

investigations as well. It is also not confined to any particular

category of cases, this right extends equally to all criminal

prosecution.

21. In the light of the order dated 28.07.2022 directing

the respondents to file an affidavit showing as to why an

appropriate enquiry be not ordered for inordinate delay in

conducting investigation of the case and a disciplinary proceeding

be not ordered against the erring police officials, the SDPO,

Bhabua at Kaimur (respondent no. 2) has filed an affidavit on

behalf of the respondent nos. 2 to 4. All that is stated in the counter

affidavit on the point of inordinate delay may be found in

paragraph '12' of the counter affidavit and this Court finds it

significant to produce relevant part of the same as under:-

"12. That due to heavy engagement in official works I, O of thin case (Sri Prahalad Kumar) no further investigation was done by him. After his transfer from Bhabua to Patna as Rail DSP he handed over charges of this very case to the then SDPO Bhabua Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

Sri Surendra Lai Das but he was I.O. of this case for a short period i.e. 24.09.2005 to 19.12.2005. After his transfer several S.D.P.O. were posted..."

This Court has not incorporated the names of SDPOs and

for complete details paragraph '12' of the counter affidavit may be

referred to.

22. In subsequent paragraphs of the counter affidavit, it

would appear that a plea has been taken that the File/CD of

Bhabua P.S. Case No. 75 of 2005 was not produced/put up before

the IOs of this case as a result whereof they could not take up the

investigation of the case in their hands. The affidavit is, however,

silent as regards the procedures to be followed in the matter of

placement/put up of the case diary whenever an I.O. of the case is

transferred and a new I.O. joins in his place. The proposal for

sanction was sent by the I.O. vide Office Memo No. 1651 dated

09.07.2019 to the District Magistrate who sent it to the Principal

Secretary to the Department of Health only after about one year

vide Memo No. 1176 dated 10.06.2020. The fact remains that till

date of retirement (30.09.2019) of the petitioner no sanction for

prosecution was given.

23. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent

nos. 2 to 4 nowhere suggests that the petitioner has played any role

in causing inordinate delay in conclusion of the investigation. This

Court would, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that there has Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

been an inordinate delay in conclusion of the investigation in the

present case and the said delay, in the nature of the present case, is

totally unwarranted and no reasonable ground explaining the delay

could be brought to the notice of this Court.

24. Having reached to the aforementioned conclusion

on the point of delay, the next question which arises for

consideration in the present case is as to whether the balancing and

weighing several relevant factors would lead to a conclusion that

the right to speedy trial has been denied to the petitioner.

25. In the present case, the petitioner is said to have been

arrested while accepting tainted money. The gravity of the offence

alleged against the petitioner may be found from a bare reading of

the First Information Report. A disciplinary proceeding was also

initiated against him. He was placed under suspension on

30.04.2005. For revoking the said order of suspension, he had

moved this Hon'ble Court in CWJC No. 23538 of 2013. The

Hon'ble Court issued following directions:-

"In the considered opinion of this Court, the order of the petitioner cannot be revoked for a simple reason that the order of suspension of the petitioner was based on his being made accused in a criminal case and his being taken into custody in relation to taking bribe/illegal gratification. Such criminal case has not been disposed of as yet. If the petitioner was really concerned about his continuation of suspension on account of pendency of the criminal case, he had all the reason to move competent court for a direction for disposal of his criminal case...."

Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

26. The Hon'ble Writ Court proceeded further to direct

the concerned criminal court to ensure that the trial of the

petitioner must be expedited and conducted on day-to-day basis

and if the petitioner cooperates, the trial must be brought to an end

within a period of 9 months from the date of receipt of the order.

27. The Hon'ble Writ Court further observed that "so far

the pendency of the departmental proceeding is concerned, since

the charges against the petitioner has already been served and

reply of the petitioner has already been filed, it will be open for the

Enquiry Officer to proceed and conclude the departmental

proceeding but, a final decision on the same will be taken only

after the judgment in the pending criminal case".

28. In further paragraph, the Hon'ble Writ Court directed

the Principal Secretary of the Health Department to ensure that the

Enquiry Officer in the rank of Secretary or the above of the State

Government be appointed who shall get all the materials from the

Vigilance Department conducting the criminal prosecution as also

get the evidence of the witnesses of the criminal case including its

Investigating Officer for concluding the Departmental proceeding

against the petitioner. A sincere effort should also be made by the

Officials of the Vigilance department to cooperate with the

Principal Secretary of the Health Department for ensuring that the Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

departmental proceeding, relating to charge against the petitioner

for taking bribe, is also expedited and concluded preferably within

a period of nine months.

29. From the counter affidavit of respondent nos. 2 to 4

it appears that the petitioner was dismissed from service on

04.02.2016 and the petitioner moved this Court in contempt

application being MJC No. 2301 of 2017, the learned Coordinate

Bench of this Court took a prima-facie view that the order of

dismissal of the petitioner was contemptious because as per the

direction of the learned Writ Court the final decision in the

departmental proceeding was to be taken only after conclusion of

the criminal case. It appears that in the light of the view taken by

the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court in the contempt

jurisdiction, the respondent authorities withdrew the dismissal

order against the petitioner and the contempt application was

disposed of with an observation that the authorities are expected

that they shall proceed further in accordance with law and in the

light of the order passed. Thereafter the petitioner was reinstated in

service and over the period he retired on 31.08.2019. Later on, the

disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was converted in a

proceeding under Rule 45(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules and the

Disciplinary Authority has passed an order for forfeiture of Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

pensionary benefit of the petitioner but the same will be affected

by the decision in the criminal case.

30. From a bare reading of the order of the Hon'ble Writ

Court passed as back as of 17.12.2013, it is evident that the

learned Writ Court had pointed it out to the petitioner that if the

petitioner was really concerned about his continuation of

suspension on account of pendency of the criminal case, he had all

the reasons to move competent court for a direction for disposal of

the criminal case. Despite this observation and the subsequent

direction of the learned Writ Court, the petitioner maintained a

complete silence and did not move this Court for at least about 5

years thereafter. This writ application has been brought on or about

30.07.2018. This Court cannot loose sight of the directions of the

learned Writ Court that the Investigating Officer was also directed

to take all sincere efforts to ensure conclusion of the criminal

proceeding. As on today a chargesheet has already been filed. On

the face of the observations and directions of the learned Writ

Court in the writ proceeding which was registered at the instance

of this petitioner only, this Court is of the considered opinion that

the petitioner cannot be allowed to claim that he has been denied

the right to speedy trial. As has been noticed above, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has repeatedly held that no general and wide Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

proposition of law may be formulated that whenever there is a

delay on the part of the Investigating Agency in completing the

investigation, such a delay can be a ground for quashing the FIR.

There is no inflexible guidelines or rigid principles in determining

as to whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account

of delay or protracted investigation.

31. This Court is, therefore, not persuaded to quash the

First Information Report and the chargesheet.

32. The only direction which may be issued at this stage

in consonance with the observations and the directions of the

learned Writ Court as noticed above is that the learned court below

must proceed with the matter expeditiously and conclude the trial

as early as possible preferably within a period of 9 months from

the date of communication of this order failing which it will be

taken as a failure of the prosecution and the consequences thereof

may follow.

33. The records as noticed above clearly reveal that the

Investigating Agency remained sitting over the matter and after the

year 2005 in fact the I.Os. kept on changing their hands but the

case diary was not written. The counter affidavit of the SDPO,

Kaimur reveals that the case diary was not filed/put up before the

IOs. This Court finds that the counter affidavit contains only half-

Patna High Court CR. WJC No.1875 of 2018 dt.18-08-2022

hearted statements and no plausible reason leading to the huge and

inordinate delay in completion of investigation has been placed

before this Court. This aspect of the matter requires a proper

inquiry and the responsibility must be fixed upon the erring

officials.

34. This Court, therefore, directs the Director General of

Police, Bihar to look into the matter, examine the same and take

appropriate steps in the light of the observations of this Court.

35. This writ application stands disposed of accordingly.

(Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J)

avin/-

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 Uploading Date              18.08.2022
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Note: The ordersheet duly signed has been attached with the record. However, in view of the present arrangements, during Pandemic period all concerned shall act on the basis of the copy of the order uploaded on the High Court website under the heading 'Judicial Orders Passed During The Pandemic Period'.