Anubhav Mohanty And Others vs State Of Odisha And Another .... ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 761 Ori

Orissa High Court

Anubhav Mohanty And Others vs State Of Odisha And Another .... ... on 30 January, 2026

Author: B.P. Routray

Bench: B.P. Routray

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA
Reason: Authentication
Location: OHC, Cuttack
Date: 02-Feb-2026 19:14:40




                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                              CRLREV No.219 of 2024

                    (In the matter of an application under Section 397, read with Section
                    401 of Cr.P.C.)

                     Anubhav Mohanty and Others                    ....                       Petitioners
                                                                -versus-
                     State of Odisha and Another                    ....               Opposite Parties

                    Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-

                                 For Petitioners            : Mr. Vaibhav Nijhawan, Advocate
                                                              along with Ms. C. Tripathy,
                                                              Advocate

                                 For Opposite Parties       : Mr. T.K. Dash, AGA
                                                               Mr. D. Acharya, Advocate for
                                                               O.P. No.2


                                   CORAM: JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY

                                                      JUDGMENT

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            Date of Hearing                : 13th November, 2025
                            Date of Judgment               : 30th November, 2026

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- B.P. Routray, J.

1. Invoking revision jurisdiction of this court under Section 397

read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in

short „the Cr.P.C.), present revision has been filed with the prayer to

set aside order dated 8th May 2024 of learned J.M.F.C., Cuttack passed

in G.R. Case No.1544 of 2020 and consequently to discharge the

petitioners from the charged offences.

2. Three petitioners are there in present revision application and

learned J.M.F.C. in G.R. Case No.1544 of 2020 took cognizance

against them vide order dated 18th December, 2023. Petitioner No.1 has

been charged with offences under Section 498-A/506/341/294/509/

34/109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short „the I.P.C.‟) and

Petitioners No.2 and 3 are charge-sheeted for commission of offences

under Section 34/509 of the I.P.C. in connection with Purighat P.S.

Case No.0276 dated 19th December, 2020.

3. The background facts of the case are that, Petitioner No.1 and

Opposite Party No.2 (Complainant) are reputed cine stars of Odia Film

Industry and they married on 8th February, 2014. After their marriage

they lived as husband and wife and subsequently some matrimonial

dispute arose between them for which matrimonial cases for divorce

and restitution of conjugal right were filed respectively by both parties.

It is submitted in course of hearing that, in the meantime, the divorce

between Petitioner No.1 and Opposite Party No.2 has been granted by

this court in a separate proceeding. Several other cases including

criminal cases and domestic violence cases have been filed by the

parties and some of them have been disposed of while some are

pending. Petitioners No.2 and 3 are the close associates of Petitioner

No.1.

4. During pendency of a domestic violence case between Opposite

Party No.2 and Petitioner No.1 including his family members, an

interim direction was granted in favour of Opposite Party No.2 to stay

in her matrimonial house situated at Nandisahi within the jurisdiction

of Purighat P.S. Said house consists of three floors Viz. Ground, 1st and

2nd floor. Access to the 1st floor, where Petitioner No.1 was residing,

was granted to Opposite Party No.2 by the direction of learned

Magistrate in a proceeding under Protection of Women from Domestic

Violence Act, 2005 to stay therein during pendency of the proceeding.

Further, Opposite Party No.2 was granted with police protection

around the clock and she was to be protected by presence of a police

person with her. However, according to the allegations, Petitioner No.1

and his family members were not residing in the building after the

direction was given by the court in favour of Opposite Party No.2 to

stay in the 1st floor of said building and Petitioner No.1 as well as his

family members were staying separately after taking their necessary

belongings from the house.

5. On 18th December, 2020 when Opposite Party No.2 returned to

the house around 10 pm along with her protection officer (police

personnel) she found the petitioners present there at the entrance of the

building. Petitioner No.1 asked Opposite Party No.2 for the keys of the

1st floor. Opposite Party No.2 then without replying anything when

went to upstairs found that the main gate of 1st floor has been locked

with support of a chain and a new lock other than the lock used by

Opposite Party No.2. She then came down along with her protection

officer and found Petitioner No.1 had already left the place in his car

and Petitioner No.3 (Khagendra) standing there. The protection officer

then asked Petitioner No.3 to give key of the new lock put in the main

gate of the 1st floor, to which he denied to have with the key of said

lock. Then Opposite Party No.2 and her protection officer contacted

the Police Station as well as the Women Help Line to get rid of the

situation. Around 45 to 60 minutes thereafter Petitioner No.3 admitting

the key with him opened the lock and then Opposite Party No.2 could

able to enter in to the house.

It is so alleged that the petitioners deliberately subjected

Opposite Party No.2 to harassment with humiliation to stand on the

road in late winter night that everyone passing by had gaze on her to

demean her status in public view. This amounts to mental torture,

harassment and cruelty committed by the petitioners associated with

the previous tortuous actions of Petitioner No.1. This is the substance

of allegations made in the F.I.R. dated 19th December, 2020 lodged by

Opposite Party No.2 against the petitioners.

6. The matter was investigated by police and accordingly charge-

sheet dated 18th December, 2023 was submitted by police leading to

cognizance of such offences stated above against the petitioners.

7. It is submitted in course of hearing that two other proceeding

arising out of same F.I.R. and criminal proceeding have been filed by

the petitioners in CRLMC No.2529 of 2023 and CRLMC No.2530 of

2023, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying for quashing of the F.I.R.

& the charge-sheet and the order taking cognizance, respectively.

8. As stated earlier, present proceeding is regarding prayer for

discharge as per Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. In a criminal trial

concerning warrant procedure if the Magistrate comes to the opinion

after consideration, examination and hearing that there is ground for

presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the charge shall

be framed. As per Section 239, which comes before Section 240, if the

Magistrate thinks necessary upon consideration of the police report and

the documents sent along with it and making such examination, if any,

of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the

prosecution as well as the accused the opportunity of being heard,

considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall

discharge the accused. The law has been well settled and is no more res

integra on the question of discharge. In State of Orissa -Vrs.-

Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, it has been held that, there

can only be limited evaluation of materials and documents on record

and sifting of evidence to prima facie find out whether sufficient

grounds exists or not for the purpose of proceeding further with the

trial and the material as produced by the prosecution alone is to be

considered and not the one produced by the accused. So it is made

clear that an accused is not permitted or he has no right to produce any

additional material to be considered at the time of framing of charge.

In State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC

Supl. (1) 335, the guidelines postulated are as follows:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

9. In the afore-stated case, the Supreme Court has clarified that

though it may not be possible to laid down any precise, clearly defined

or sufficiently channelized and inflexible guideline or rigid formula or

to give an extensive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein power under

Section 482 of the Code for quashing of an F.I.R. should be exercised

but there are circumstances where the court may be justified in

exercising such jurisdiction.

10. It is to be reminded here that present application has been filed

under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. read with the powers under Section

401. Here the object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an

error of jurisdiction or law. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and

Another, (2012) 9 SCC 460, Honble Supreme Court has explained as

follows:-

"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or

interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.P.C.

xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx

16. The above-stated principles clearly show that inherent as well as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. If the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in relation to quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the factum and caution afore-noticed, in that event, the revisional jurisdiction, particularly while dealing with framing of a charge, has to be even more limited.

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18. It may also be noticed that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is in a way final and no inter court remedy is available in such cases. Of course, it may be subject to jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Normally, a revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of law. However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it must find place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the court. Merely an

apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a sufficient ground for interference in such cases."

11. In the matter of framing of charge or discharge, what is required

to be considered by the court is the record of the case and documents

submitted along with it, and after hearing the parties, may either

discharge the accused or where it appears to the court that in its

opinion there is ground for presuming the accused has committed the

offence, it shall frame the charge. Such presumption as provided for

framing of the charge is not a presumption of law but the satisfaction

of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence

and the existence of facts leading to that offence. It may be weaker

than a prima facie case and thus at the stage of framing of charge the

court should form an opinion that the accused may be guilty of

committing the offence. It is also observed by the Supreme Court in

Amit Kapoor's case (supra) as follows:-

"19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well settled

law laid down by this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39:

"4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-- ...

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard

of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. It the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the

scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."

20. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression „prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice‟, the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. The legality, proprietary or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, non-compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, Section 482 is based upon the maxim quando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder videtur id quo res ipsa esse non protest, i.e., when the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the thing itself would be unavoidable. The Section confers very wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the process of the Court is not permitted to be abused.

21. It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative examination of the powers exercisable by the Court under

these two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [(1980) 1 SCC 43]. In this very case, this Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This itself shows the fine distinction between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In this very case, the Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process

of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court‟s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction.

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24. If one looks at the development of law in relation to exercise of inherent powers under the Code, it will be useful to refer to the following details : as far back as in 1926, a Division bench of this Court In Re: Llewelyn Evans, (2003) 3 SCC 11, took the view that the provisions of Section 561A (equivalent to present Section 482) extend to cases not only of a person accused of an offence in a criminal court, but to the cases of any person against whom proceedings are instituted under the Code in any Court. Explaining the word "process", the Court said that it was a general word, meaning in effect anything done by the Court. Explaining the limitations and scope of Section 561A, the Court referred to "inherent jurisdiction", "to prevent abuse of process" and "to secure the ends of justice" which are terms incapable of having a precise definition or enumeration, and capable, at the most, of test, according to well-established principles of criminal jurisprudence. The ends of justice are to be

understood by ascertainment of the truth as to the facts on balance of evidence on each side. With reference to the facts of the case, the Court held that in the absence of any other method, it has no choice left in the application of the Section except, such tests subject to the caution to be exercised in the use of inherent jurisdiction and the avoidance of interference in details and directed providing of a legal practitioner.

25. Having examined the inter-relationship of these two very significant provisions of the Code, let us now examine the scope of interference under any of these provisions in relation to quashing the charge. We have already indicated above that framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the Court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents placed therewith before the Court. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the Court but framing of charge is a major event where the Court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. There are different categories of cases where the Court may not proceed with the trial and may discharge the accused or pass such other orders as may be necessary keeping in view the facts of a given case. In a case where, upon considering the record of the case and documents submitted before it, the Court finds that no offence is made out or there is a legal bar to such prosecution under the provisions of the Code or any other law for the time being in force and there is a bar and there exists no ground to proceed against the accused, the Court may discharge the accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither leaves any scope for an element of

criminality nor does it satisfy the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is charged. In such cases, the Court may discharge him or quash the proceedings in exercise of its powers under these two provisions.

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27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can

ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a „civil wrong‟ with no „element of criminality‟ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.

27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the requirements of the offence.

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30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression „there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence‟. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa & Ors., (1996) 4 SCC 659

referred to the meaning of the word „presume‟ while relying upon the Black‟s Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean „to believe or accept upon probable evidence‟; „to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming‟. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence."

12. Before reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is to be

again reminded here that this Court is exercising its jurisdiction here

under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. It is required to

be re-stated here that appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the

stage of framing of charge or discharge of the accused. The truth,

veracity and effect of the materials proposed to be adduced by the

prosecution in course of trial are not to be touched at this stage and

similarly the likelihood of the accused in succeeding to establish his

probable defence cannot also be the ground for his discharge.

Similarly, it is to be seen if the materials produced for consideration

are of such nature that if uncontroverted or un-rebutted would make

out a case to proceed against the accused.

13. The substance of allegation as revealed from the recitation of the

F.I.R. is that the petitioners have subjected Opposite Party No.2, who is

the ex-wife of Petitioner No.1, to harassment, mental cruelty,

confinement and nuisance and insulted to her modesty. It is denied by

the petitioners in course of hearing that the main gate of the 1st floor

was not locked by them, and as per the written reply given by

Petitioner No.1 to the police he put a new lock with chain in the main

gate of 1st floor sticking one key to the lock for Opposite Party No.2

and retaining the other duplicate key with him. Nevertheless, such

submission of Petitioner No.1 could not be appreciated at this stage as

a matter of rebuttal evidence.

14. As seen from the contents of the F.I.R. and the statement of

Opposite Party No.2 recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., it is clearly

found that a new lock was put in the main gate of 1 st floor to prevent

entrance of Opposite Party No.2 to the 1st floor when she returned to

the house. The on-duty police personnel namely Jyotshnarani Behera

and Padmalaya Patra have supported such allegations of Opposite

Party No.2 made in the F.I.R. in their statements recorded under

Section 161 of Cr.P.C. The copy of the charge-sheet along with the

statements of the witnesses is evident to that effect. It is of course true

that there was matrimonial discord between Petitioner No.1 and

Opposite Party No.2 and on the date of occurrence several cases

including matrimonial cases, domestic violence cases, criminal cases

were pending between the parties. These background situations are

required to be appreciated as matter of evidence in course of trial and

not at this stage. The allegations made by Opposite Party No.2 are clear

and unequivocal to attract such offences against the petitioners despite

taking note of the fact that Petitioner No.1 and Opposite Party No.2

were having the status of husband and wife, regardless of their

estranged relationship on the date of occurrence. Here it is not required

to read between the lines whether the complainant had made out the

constituents of several offences deliberately or cleverly but taking note

of the status of both parties, as their reputation is in the society, it

cannot be opined at the stage of framing of charge that no such offence

is attracted out of the allegations leveled against the petitioners.

15. Thus reminding the power of this court under Section 397 read

with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. and taking note of the overall

circumstances and the relationship between the parties, there would not

be any hesitation on the part of this court to opine that the learned trial

court has rightly refused the prayer of discharge of the petitioners. The

impugned order is thus confirmed and the revision application is

dismissed.

(B.P. Routray) Judge

M.K. Panda / P.A.