Trailoka Chandra Mohanta vs State Of Odisha (Vig.) .... Opp. Party
2026 Latest Caselaw 262 Ori

Orissa High Court

Trailoka Chandra Mohanta vs State Of Odisha (Vig.) .... Opp. Party on 13 January, 2026

Author: Chittaranjan Dash

Bench: Chittaranjan Dash

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                      CRLA No.11 of 2012
(An Appeal from the judgment and order dated 28.12.2011 passed
by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar in V.G.R. Case
             No.25 of 2000/T.R. Case No.28 of 2011)

 Trailoka Chandra Mohanta                ....              Appellant
                                          Mr. H. K. Mund, Advocate

                              -versus-
 State of Odisha (Vig.)                  ....              Opp. Party
                             Mr. M.S. Rizvi, Addl. Standing Counsel

                          CORAM:
     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
        Date of Hearing & Date of Judgment: 13.01.2026

Chittaranjan Dash, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.12.2011 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar, whereby the Appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 13(2) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter in short "P.C. Act"), and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand), in default whereof to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of six months, for the offence under Section 13(2), and to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand), in default to undergo S.I. for three months, for the offence under Section 7. Both sentences were

to run concurrently in V.G.R. Case No.25 of 2000/T.R. Case No.28 of 2011.

2. The prosecution case in brief is that on the basis of a written report lodged by one Rasika Munda (P.W.2), alleging demand of illegal gratification by the accused, who was then working as the Medical Officer-in-Charge of Basudevpur Primary Health Centre, a vigilance case was registered. It is the prosecution case that P.W.2 had applied for issuance of a death certificate in respect of his uncle, Sadan Munda, and that the accused demanded a sum of Rs.350/- as bribe for issuing the said certificate. The written report submitted by P.W.2 was treated as the F.I.R. and marked as Ext.8. Acting upon the said complaint, P.W.6 (Basanta Kumar Sahu), the then D.S.P., Vigilance, Keonjhar, arranged for laying a trap on 25.05.2000, during which phenolphthalein powder was applied to the tainted currency notes and a pre-trap demonstration was conducted in presence of official witnesses, culminating in the preparation of the pre-trap memorandum marked as Ext.1. It is further alleged that pursuant to the pre-arranged plan, P.W.2 handed over the tainted currency notes to the accused on demand at the P.H.C. premises, and upon receipt of the pre-arranged signal given by P.W.1 (Ashok Kumar Sahoo), the vigilance team rushed to the spot. The prosecution alleges that the hand wash and shirt wash of the accused yielded positive results, that the tainted currency notes were recovered from the possession of the accused, and that the post-trap proceedings were reduced into writing in the detection report marked as Ext.2, followed by seizure of the incriminating

articles under various seizure lists marked as Exts.3 to 7. Upon completion of investigation by P.W.5 (Dinajana Nayak) and after obtaining sanction for prosecution marked as Ext.9, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

3. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined six witnesses in all. Ashok Kumar Sahoo (P.W.1) was the overhearing witness. Rasika Munda (P.W.2) was the complainant. Jayasingha Munda (P.W.3) was acquainted with the accused and the functioning of the P.H.C. Arakhita Behera (P.W.4) was an official witness to the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings. Dinajana Nayak (P.W.5) was the Investigating Officer. Basanta Kumar Sahu (P.W.6) was the then D.S.P., Vigilance, who laid the trap.

4. The plea of the defence is one of complete denial and false accusations.

5. The learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, recorded a finding that the prosecution had successfully proved the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Appellant. The learned Trial Court placed reliance primarily on the testimony of Rasika Munda (P.W.2), treating him as the complainant, and further drew corroboration from the evidence of Ashok Kumar Sahoo (P.W.1), the alleged overhearing witness, and Arakhita Behera (P.W.4), the official witness to the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings. The learned Trial Court also relied upon the evidence of Dinajana Nayak (P.W.5) and Basanta Kumar Sahu (P.W.6), the vigilance officers, with regard to

the registration of the case, preparation of the trap, recovery of the tainted currency notes, and completion of investigation. On such appreciation, the learned Trial Court held that the phenolphthalein test, recovery of tainted money, and the documentary evidence including the preparation report (Ext.1), detection report (Ext.2), seizure lists (Exts.3 to 7), and sanction order (Ext.9) sufficiently established the guilt of the accused and accordingly recorded the conviction.

6. Mr. Mund, learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Mund, learned counsel for the Appellant, submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational ingredients of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification, which are sine qua non for constituting an offence under the P.C. Act. He contended that the entire prosecution case rests upon the testimony of the Complainant (P.W.2), who has categorically denied any demand or acceptance of bribe by the Appellant, thereby demolishing the prosecution case at its very inception. Learned counsel further submitted that the evidence of the overhearing witness (P.W.1), does not advance the prosecution case in any manner, as he has expressly admitted that he neither heard any demand made by the accused nor witnessed the actual handing over of money. It was argued that such an admission nullifies the very purpose for which an overhearing witness was requisitioned, rendering the alleged trap proceedings doubtful and unreliable. Mr. Mund further contended that the learned Trial Court erred in placing reliance on the testimony of official witnesses, namely Arakhita Behera (P.W.4),

Dinajana Nayak (P.W.5), and Basanta Kumar Sahu (P.W.6), whose evidence on demand and acceptance is purely derivative and hearsay, based on what was allegedly disclosed to them by the complainant during the pre-trap proceedings. It was submitted that such evidence cannot substitute direct and substantive proof of demand and acceptance, particularly when the complainant himself has exonerated the accused.

It was also submitted that mere recovery of tainted money and a positive phenolphthalein test, as reflected in the detection report vide Ext.2 and seizure lists, cannot by themselves establish the guilt of the accused in the absence of proof of demand and voluntary acceptance. Learned counsel emphasised that serious procedural lapses, including non-verification of seized articles by P.W.1, and P.W.4 to identify seized bottles or their markings, and unexplained custody of exhibits admitted by Dinajana Nayak (P.W.5), render the post-trap proceedings highly suspect.

Mr. Mund further argued that the sanction for prosecution vide Ext.9 is vitiated due to non-application of mind, as vital exculpatory material, including the categorical testimony of P.W.2, was not duly considered by the sanctioning authority. He also submitted that the investigation suffered from serious omissions, despite the alleged demand being linked to issuance of a death certificate. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court has misappreciated the evidence on record, ignored material contradictions and admissions, and has convicted the Appellants on conjectures and

surmises, warranting interference by this Hon'ble Court and allowing of the appeal.

7. Mr. Rizvi, learned Additional Standing Counsel, argued that the prosecution has successfully proved the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record. He submitted that the evidence of Ashok Kumar Sahoo (P.W.1), Arakhita Behera (P.W.4), Dinajana Nayak (P.W.5), and Basanta Kumar Sahu (P.W.6) clearly establishes the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings, recovery of tainted currency notes, and the positive phenolphthalein test, as reflected in the preparation report (Ext.1) and detection report (Ext.2). Learned Standing Counsel further argued that though Rasika Munda (P.W.2), the complainant, turned hostile, the prosecution case does not fail solely on that ground, as the remaining evidence sufficiently proves acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. He contended that the recovery of tainted money under the seizure lists (Exts.3 to 7), coupled with a valid sanction for prosecution (Ext.9), fully supports the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, and therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment is warranted.

8. In order to appreciate the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, it is necessary to independently scrutinise the evidence led by the prosecution. With that object, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is examined hereinbelow.

P.W.1, Ashok Kumar Sahoo, stated that on 25.05.2000, while he was working as a Choukidar at the P.W.D. Inspection Bungalow, Keonjhar, he was directed by the Executive Engineer to report at the Vigilance Office, Keonjhar, where the complainant and vigilance officials were present. He deposed that the complainant disclosed the demand of bribe of Rs.350/- by the accused doctor for issuance of a death certificate and produced the tainted currency notes, on which chemical powder was applied and a demonstration was given. He stated that he was instructed to accompany the complainant, overhear the conversation, and give a pre-arranged signal after witnessing the handing over of money. He further stated that he accompanied the complainant to Basudevpur P.H.C., where the accused demanded and accepted the tainted money and kept it in his chest pocket, after which he gave the signal and the vigilance officers apprehended the accused. He proved the preparation report, detection report, various seizure lists, and search list by identifying his signatures thereon.

In his cross-examination, P.W.1 admitted that he could not say the contents of the preparation report and that he stood at a distance when the complainant met the accused. He categorically admitted that he did not hear the demand or see the actual transaction of money and further admitted that he had not stated before the Investigating Officer that he witnessed the complainant handing over the money to the accused. He also stated that he signed the seizure lists without personally verifying the seized articles, though he denied the suggestion that he had deposed

falsely at the instance of the vigilance officials or out of fear of losing his job.

P.W.2, Rasika Munda, stated that he is the complainant in the case and that in the year 2000 the accused was working as the Medical Officer-in-Charge of Basudevpur P.H.C. He stated that he had applied for a death certificate in respect of his uncle, Sadan Munda, and that certain persons present at the P.H.C. advised him to submit a written report, which was dictated to him and written by him. He further stated that those persons gave him Rs.350/- and asked him to put both the money and the written report into the pocket of the accused. According to him, he pushed the money into the chest pocket of the accused at his residence, whereupon the accused returned the amount and subsequently issued the death certificate. He categorically stated that the accused had neither demanded any bribe from him nor accepted any money from him. As he resiled from his earlier statement, he was declared hostile and examined by the prosecution.

In his cross-examination by the prosecution, P.W.2 denied having made any statement before the Investigating Officer regarding demand of bribe by the accused, arrangement of trap, preparation of vigilance papers, or acceptance of money by the accused. He also denied the contents of the F.I.R. to the extent it alleged demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused. In his cross-examination by the defence, he reiterated that he met the accused on 24.05.2000 and that the accused had not demanded any bribe from him at any point of time.

P.W.3, Jayasingha Munda, stated that on 25.05.2000 he had been to Basudevpur Hospital, where the accused was working as the Medical Officer, and that he himself was under the treatment of the accused. He specifically stated that the accused never demanded any money from him for treatment. As he did not support the prosecution case, he was declared hostile and was permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution.

In his cross-examination by the prosecution, P.W.3 denied the suggestion that he had earlier stated before the vigilance police that the accused used to demand money from patients or refused treatment in the absence of payment. He also denied that he was concealing the truth at the instance of the accused. In his cross- examination by the defence, he reaffirmed that, to his knowledge, the accused never demanded money from any patient for treatment and stated that he could not definitely say the exact date on which he had visited the Basudevpur Hospital.

P.W.4, Arakhita Behera, stated that on 25.05.2000, while he was working as a Junior Clerk in the R & B Division, Keonjhar, he was directed by the Executive Engineer to report at the Vigilance Office, Keonjhar, where the complainant Rasika Munda and vigilance officials were present. He deposed that the complainant disclosed that the accused-doctor had demanded Rs.350/- for issuance of a death certificate. He stated that the complainant produced the tainted currency notes, on which phenolphthalein powder was applied and a demonstration was given, and that he had noted down the numbers and denominations of the currency notes.

He further stated that he was instructed to compare the numbers of the tainted currency notes after recovery and that P.W.1 was instructed to accompany the complainant and give the pre-arranged signal. He stated that after receipt of the signal, the raiding party rushed to the spot, conducted hand wash of the accused which turned pink, recovered the tainted money from the shirt pocket of the accused, compared the numbers which tallied with the preparation report, and seized the hand wash, shirt wash, tainted currency notes and other articles. He proved the preparation report, detection report, seizure lists and search list by identifying his signatures thereon.

In his cross-examination, P.W.4 admitted that the written order directing him to attend the vigilance office was not seized, that he had no prior acquaintance with the complainant, and that he could not state the number, quantity or identification marks of the seized solution bottles. He further stated that he was positioned at a distance from the quarter of the accused and could not say about the presence of gates or specific features of the premises. He also admitted that he could not specifically say about the contents of the seizure lists or the present whereabouts of the seized bottles, though he denied the suggestion that no bribe was demanded or recovered and that he was deposing falsely at the behest of the vigilance officials.

P.W.5, Dinajana Nayak, stated that on 24.05.2000 he was working as Inspector of Vigilance, Keonjhar Unit, and that on that day the complainant Rasika Munda lodged a written report which

was forwarded for registration of the vigilance case. He deposed about the registration of the case, the requisition for witnesses, and the preparation of the trap on 25.05.2000, including application of phenolphthalein powder on the currency notes, instructions given to the complainant and witnesses, and preparation of the pre-trap memorandum. He further stated that after reaching Basudevpur P.H.C., on receipt of the pre-arranged signal, the vigilance team entered the spot, conducted hand wash of the accused which turned pink, recovered the tainted money from the shirt pocket of the accused, compared the currency notes, seized the exhibits, and prepared the detection report. He also stated that he subsequently took over the investigation, sent the exhibits to the S.F.S.L., obtained sanction, and submitted the charge-sheet.

In his cross-examination, P.W.5 admitted that he could not say the exact date of demand of bribe or the date on which the complainant had applied for the death certificate. He further admitted that no identification mark was put on the paper in which the bribe money was kept, that he did not remember the name of the overhearing witness or the specific positions of vigilance officials at the spot, and that the exhibits remained in his custody for a considerable period before being sent to the S.F.S.L. He, however, denied the suggestion that the investigation was perfunctory or that he was deposing falsely.

P.W.6, Basanta Kumar Sahu, stated that on 24.05.2000 he was working as D.S.P., Vigilance, Keonjhar, when the complainant Rasika Munda appeared before him and submitted a written report

alleging demand of bribe by the accused for issuance of a death certificate. He stated that the said report was treated as the F.I.R. and, as per the direction of the S.P. (Vigilance), Balasore, he took up the investigation and made arrangements to lay a trap. He deposed that on 25.05.2000 a pre-trap preparation was held at the Vigilance Unit Office, Keonjhar, and a preparation report was prepared by him, whereafter the vigilance team proceeded to Basudevpur and trapped the accused at the P.H.C. He further stated that after the trap, the tainted money, hand wash solutions, the wearing shirt of the accused and other articles were seized, a detection report was prepared, witnesses were examined, and thereafter, as per the direction of the S.P. (Vigilance), Balasore, he handed over charge of investigation to P.W.5. He identified his signatures on the preparation report, detection report, seizure lists, and the seized material objects.

In his cross-examination, P.W.6 admitted that the complainant was not the legal representative of the deceased Sadan Munda and that the vigilance P.S. case number was not mentioned on the seized material objects. He further admitted that the manner in which the preliminary enquiry was conducted was not reflected in the preparation report and that he had not recorded the statements of the son, daughter or any relative of the deceased either during the preliminary enquiry or investigation. He also stated that he had no prior acquaintance with the complainant and that after the preparation was over, the constable who conducted the demonstration remained at the vigilance office, while the rest

proceeded to the spot. He, however, denied the suggestion that no F.I.R. was received or that a false case was foisted against the accused.

9. It is well settled that proof of demand of illegal gratification is the sine qua non for sustaining a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and that mere recovery of tainted money, in the absence of proof of demand, is insufficient. The said principle has been authoritatively reiterated by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731, wherein it has been held as follows:

"68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act.

Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the

prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

(f) In the event the Complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.

10. Further in the matter of Aman Bhatia vs. State (GNCT of Delhi), reported in [2025] 6 S.C.R. 64, while relying on Neeraj Dutta (Supra) and P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., reported in (2015) 10 SCC 152, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: -

"55.From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an

offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

56.The present case is not one of an "offer to pay by the bribe-giver" where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The expression "offer" indicates that there is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For such an acceptance to constitute an offence under Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification. In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of offer of bribe."

11. In the instant case, P.W.2, the Complainant has categorically deposed that the accused had never demanded any bribe from him nor accepted any money from him. He further stated that certain third persons present at the P.H.C. had dictated a report to him and provided him with Rs.350/-, which he mechanically pushed into the pocket of the accused, only for the accused to immediately return the same and thereafter issue the death certificate. Such categorical denial of demand by P.W.2, the sole person from whom demand is alleged, completely demolishes the prosecution case at its foundation. His testimony not only fails to support the allegation of demand but expressly negates it. The

prosecution declared the Complainant hostile and subjected him to cross-examination; however, even in such cross-examination, P.W.2 steadfastly denied having stated before the Investigating Officer about any demand of bribe by the accused, thereby rendering the contents of Ext.8 unsubstantiated by its maker. It is trite that the F.I.R. is not substantive evidence, and in the absence of its author supporting the prosecution version, the allegation of demand remains unproved.

12. The evidence of Ashok Kumar Sahoo (P.W.1), the alleged overhearing witness, also does not advance the prosecution case on demand. In his cross-examination, P.W.1 unequivocally admitted that he did not hear any demand made by the accused and that he did not witness the actual transaction of money. Such an admission strikes at the very purpose for which an overhearing witness was requisitioned, thereby rendering his testimony ineffective in proving demand. Jayasingha Munda (P.W.3), another witness examined by the prosecution, has also not supported the case of demand and has categorically stated that the accused never demanded any money from him or from any patient for treatment. His testimony further weakens the prosecution version by ruling out any consistent conduct of demand on the part of the accused.

13. The official witnesses, namely Arakhita Behera (P.W.4), Dinajana Nayak (P.W.5), and Basanta Kumar Sahu (P.W.6), have merely spoken about what was allegedly disclosed to them by the complainant during the pre-trap proceedings and the subsequent trap formalities. Their evidence, being derivative and hearsay in

nature insofar as demand is concerned, cannot substitute the direct and substantive evidence required to prove demand, particularly when the complainant himself has resiled from the prosecution case. In view of the categorical denial of demand by Rasika Munda (P.W.2), coupled with the admission of Ashok Kumar Sahoo (P.W.1) that he neither heard the demand nor witnessed the transaction, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational ingredient of demand of illegal gratification, rendering the conviction unsustainable in law.

14. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecution version of demand is taken, the evidence on record does not establish voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification by the Appellant. Acceptance must be conscious and pursuant to demand, and cannot be presumed merely from physical handling of currency notes.

15. P.W.2, the only witness alleged to have tendered the money, has categorically stated that the Appellant returned the amount pushed into his pocket and thereafter issued the death certificate. Such testimony negates the prosecution theory of acceptance. Significantly, P.W.2 did not state that the accused counted the money, retained it, or treated it as consideration for any official act. In the absence of such evidence, the element of voluntary acceptance remains unproved.

P.W.1, who was projected as the overhearing witness to the transaction, has admitted that he did not see the actual handing over of money. He further admitted that he was standing at a distance

and did not witness the transaction taking place between the complainant and the accused. This admission deprives the prosecution of any independent corroboration of acceptance. Furthermore, the evidence of Arakhita Behera (P.W.4) on acceptance is an afterthought. His testimony begins only after the pre-arranged signal was allegedly given and relates to the recovery and comparison of currency notes. His evidence does not establish that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money pursuant to any demand.

16. It is further noted that the prosecution has placed considerable emphasis on the recovery of tainted currency notes and the positive phenolphthalein test; however, it is well settled that recovery and chemical test are corroborative in nature and cannot, by themselves, prove the offence in the absence of proof of demand and acceptance.

17. Furthermore, P.W.1 has admitted that he signed the seizure lists without personally verifying the seized articles, which seriously undermines the credibility of the recovery proceedings. P.W.4 too admitted in his cross-examination that he could not state the number of bottles seized, their identification marks, or their present whereabouts, and could not specifically speak about the contents of the seizure lists, despite having signed them. Such admissions cast serious doubt on the sanctity of the post-trap proceedings and the chain of custody of the seized articles.

18. Moreover, the I.O. stated that no identification mark was put on the paper in which the tainted money was wrapped and that

he did not remember the name of the overhearing witness. He further admitted that the exhibits remained in his custody for a considerable period before being sent to the S.F.S.L., thereby rendering the possibility of tampering not excluded. Even P.W.6 also admitted that the vigilance P.S. case number was not mentioned on the seized material objects and that the manner of conducting the preliminary enquiry was not reflected in the preparation report (Ext.1). Such lapses assume significance in a trap case, where procedural safeguards are required to be strictly followed.

19. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the alleged offence beyond reasonable doubt. The foundational facts of demand and voluntary acceptance remain unestablished, and the recovery and phenolphthalein test, being merely corroborative, cannot sustain the conviction on their own. The learned Trial Court, in relying upon such infirm evidence, has failed to apply the settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in corruption cases, rendering the impugned judgment unsustainable in law.

20. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence brought on record in its proper perspective and in consonance with settled principles of law. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 28.12.2011 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar in in V.G.R. Case No.25 of 2000/T.R. Case No.28 of

2011, is hereby set aside. The Appellant stands acquitted of the charge under Section 13(2) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

21. In view of the acquittal of the Appellant, the bail bonds furnished by him pursuant to the interim orders passed in the present appeal stand discharged.

22. The Appeal is hence disposed of as allowed.

(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

A.K.Pradhan/Bijay/Sarbani

Designation: Junior Stenographer

Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 15-Jan-2026 10:36:29