Union Of India & Others vs Kalpana Nayak
2026 Latest Caselaw 223 Ori

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 223 Ori
Judgement Date : 12 January, 2026

[Cites 4, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Union Of India & Others vs Kalpana Nayak on 12 January, 2026

Author: Chittaranjan Dash

Bench: Chittaranjan Dash

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                               W.P(C). NO. 5592 OF 2019
             In the matter of an application under Articles 226 & 227 of the
             Constitution of India.
                                     --------------

           Union of India & Others                           ....              Petitioners
                                               -versus-
           Kalpana Nayak
                                                             ....              Opp. Party



                            Advocates Appeared in this case


                    For Petitioners        -        Mr. P.K. Parhi, DSGI along with
                                                    Mr. K.Panda, CGC

                    For Opp. Party         -        M/s. C.P. Sahani, P.K. Samal,
                                                    B.K.Samal & P.K. Beura, Advocates

                                               -----------
             CORAM

             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD
             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Date of Hearing & Judgment : 12.01.2026
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PER KRISHNA S. DIXIT,J.

Union Government and its entities are knocking at the doors of Writ

Court for assailing the order dated 03.01.2019, whereby OP's O.A. No.496 of

2016 having been favoured, her removal from service came to be set at naught

with a direction for reinstatement.

2. Learned DSGI- Mr. P.K. Parhi in his usual vehemence submits that as

on the date the appointment order was issued, i.e. 09.06.2014, the OP had

attained only the age of 17 years & 9 months, when the rule prescribes 18

years as the minimum age for engagement/appointment. Therefore, on coming

to know of true age of the OP, he has been removed from service. He also

submits that OP's representation for regularizing her service is also rejected.

Learned counsel representing the OP vehemently opposes the petition making

submission in justification of the impugned order of the Tribunal and reasons

on which it has been constructed. He adds that the removal of his client from

service, is without any opportunity of hearing and therefore, being in violation

of principles of natural justice, the same has been found fault with by the CAT.

So contending, he seeks dismissal of the petition.

3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the

petition papers, this Court declines indulgence in the matter broadly agreeing

with the reasoning part of the Tribunal and also for the following additional

reasons:

3.1. The OP's date of birth is admittedly 07.06.1996; the advertisement was

issued on 14.08.2013 calling for application for engagement. OP had staked

her claim for engagement by producing all necessary documents including the

Matriculation Certificate, which reflected her date of birth clearly. After

looking into all these documents and considering the candidature, OP was

issued appointment order on 09.05.2014. It is only on 18.04.2016, the order

removing OP from engagement came to be issued. Thus, as on the date the

removal was effected, OP had already attained majority and that there is no

complaint whatsoever against discharge of her duties. Thus, there is absolutely

no culpability attributable to the OP in anyway. Rightly, no culpability is laid

at her threshold, either.

3.2. In the matter of engagement, where all documents are produced by the

aspiring candidates, the process of engagement takes place indoor and

therefore, the doctrine of 'indoor management' comes into play. It is not the

case of Petitioners that OP had committed any fraud or fabrication or any act

of suppressio very suggestio falsi. It also cannot be assumed, even for the sake

of argument, that OP had suppressed her date of birth or had given a wrong

date of birth, either, inasmuch as OP had produced the Matriculation

Certificate, which apparently contained her correct date of birth, as has been

reflected in the application too. It hardly needs to be stated that the entry in the

Matriculation Certificate is entitled to strong presumption of validity, vide

Union of India v. C. Rama Swamy, AIR 1997 SC 2055. For the fault of

officials involved in accomplishing the recruitment process, an innocent

candidate cannot be put to prejudice. The fact that the guilty official, who had

granted appointment letter, even when the OP had shortage of minimum age

limit, has been punished in a disciplinary inquiry, does not advance the case of

Petitioners to the detriment of the OP. Guilty party is punished rightly. In the

disciplinary inquiry held against the delinquent official, no notice was issued

to the OP and no opportunity of participation was afforded to her, she being

neither a co-delinquent nor a witness. Being an innocent party, she could not

have been removed from service, especially years after attaining majority, the

shortfall being too short.

3.3. The contention that a minor's contract is void ab initio vide

Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, [1903] UKPC 12, does not much

avail to the Petitioners, inasmuch as OP then being the minor, is herself a

beneficiary of contract, which eventually travelled to one of status vide

Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, and more

particularly when the repudiation of contract is sought to be done long after

OP attained majority, having satisfactorily discharged the functions. The

very Mohori Bibee recognizes validity of minors' contracts when they are

substantially for their benefit. Contention of the kind ordinarily avails to

the minor to repudiate his/her agreement, that too subject to all just

exceptions. Mr. Parhi very fairly tells us that the case is not of civil service

and that he has no information as to any complaint about OP's discharge of

duty. In cases of this nature, arguably the maxim factum valet quod fieri

dabuit (what ought not to be done becomes valid when done) becomes

invocable. That being the position, impugned order of the CAT whereby

removal of OP is set at naught, is unassailable. It has brought about a just

result, regardless of arguable irregularity.

3.4. There would have been an arguable case for the Petitioners warranting

interference of this Court, if OP was too young, like 15 or 16 year old when

appointment order was issued on 09.05.2014 or that the order removing OP

was made within a short period of her attaining the majority or that the

performance of OP was unsatisfactory. For the long delay brooked in

removing the OP, no explanation is offered. It is not that for any other reason,

OP is ineligible to be engaged for service of the kind. Engagement of this

nature becomes handy for the poor in the rural areas, where poverty looms

large. Therefore, while removing a person from employment/engagement, a

strong case has to be made out. In view of all this, we are of the considered

opinion that the impugned order has brought home a just result and it is

pregnant with elements of justice. Therefore, our intervention is uncalled for.