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Orissa High Court

Kumar Raghvendra Singh vs State Of Odisha (Vigilance) ....... ... on 12 February, 2026

         THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                       CRLMC No.2568 of 2024
 (In the matter of an application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
                   Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)

Kumar Raghvendra Singh                            .......                      Petitioner

                                           -Versus-

State of Odisha (Vigilance)                      .......                Opposite Party


        For the Petitioner             : Mr. S.S. Das, Senior Advocate
                                         being assisted by
                                         Ms. S. Das, Advocate

        For the Opposite Party : Mr. Niranjan Moharana,
                                 ASC for Vigilance

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of Hearing: 13.01.2026 Date of Judgment: 12.02.2026

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

S.S. Mishra, J. The present petition has been filed under Section

528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 by the

petitioner seeking quashing of the order dated 20.05.2024 passed by

the learned Special Judge, Special Court, Bhubaneswar in T.R. No.

01/22 of 2013/2011, whereby the application filed by the petitioner

under Section 239 Cr.P.C. seeking discharge was rejected,

notwithstanding an earlier remand by this Court directing fresh

consideration of the said application in the light of the materials

available on record, which escaped the notice of the Court then.

2. Heard Mr. S.S. Das, learned Senior Advocate, being assisted

by Ms. S. Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.

Niranjan Maharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing

for the opposite party-Vigilance Department.

3. The facts of this case, in brief, is that an FIR came to be

registered against the petitioner on 08.01.1996 alleging commission

of offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the accusation that during

the check period from 01.05.1982 to 29.12.1995 the petitioner had

allegedly amassed assets disproportionate to his known sources of

income. In the FIR, it was alleged that the petitioner had acquired

assets worth Rs.12,90,129/- against known sources of income of

Rs.8,03,320/- and expenditure of Rs.3,85,815/-, thereby reflecting

disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs.8,72,624/-. Subsequently,

upon submission of the charge-sheet, the alleged disproportionate

assets were enhanced to Rs.14,38,435/-.

4. During investigation, it was revealed that the petitioner

commenced his public service career prior to the check period,

having initially served as a Lecturer under Magadh University from

16.01.1979. Thereafter, he joined the Bihar Administrative Service

and functioned as Deputy Collector from 20.11.1981 to 29.04.1982.

On 01.05.1982, he joined the Indian Forest Service and was

subsequently allotted the Odisha Cadre in the year 1984. After

completion of training at Dehradun, he served on probation and

thereafter held various posts during the check period, including as

Divisional Forest Officer (DFO), Parlakhemundi from 01.07.1986

to 30.09.1988, DFO, Baliguda from 01.10.1988 to 31.07.1989,

DFO, Baripada from 01.08.1989 to 31.07.1991, and as Deputy

Conservator of Forests (DCF) in the office of the Principal Chief

Conservator of Forests (Wildlife) from 01.08.1991 to 15.06.1992.

He thereafter functioned as Divisional Manager, Odisha Forest

Development Corporation Ltd. from 16.06.1992 to 26.02.1993,

followed by his posting as DFO, Chandaka Wildlife Division from

17.02.1993 to 31.05.1995, and subsequently as Planning Officer in

the office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Odisha,

Bhubaneswar from 22.08.1995 till the date of search. It is also a

matter of record that the petitioner continued in service thereafter,

was promoted to the rank of Additional Principal Chief Conservator

of Forests in due course, and ultimately retired from service on

31.01.2016 after completion of illustrious career.

5. After submission of the charge-sheet, the matter was posted

for consideration of charge. At that stage, the petitioner filed an

application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. seeking discharge, inter alia,

contending that substantial lawful income, particularly agricultural

income from ancestral properties, had been completely ignored by

the prosecution; that several assets which did not belong to the

petitioner were erroneously attributed to him; that the valuation of

certain immovable properties was grossly inflated; and that

expenditure had been calculated in an exaggerated and arbitrary

manner, despite availability of documentary evidence collected

during investigation itself.

6. The learned Special Judge, Special Court, Bhubaneswar, by

order dated 31.07.2023, rejected the discharge petition. Aggrieved

thereby, the petitioner approached this Court in CRLMC No. 4265

of 2023. This Court, by order dated 07.02.2024, after noticing that

several documents collected by the investigating agency and

forming part of the charge-sheet had not been adverted to by the

learned trial Court while deciding the discharge application, set

aside the order dated 31.07.2023 and remitted the matter to the

learned trial Court to consider the application under Section 239

Cr.P.C. afresh, after taking into consideration all materials placed

on record. A specific direction was also issued that the application

be decided within a stipulated period. The relevant portion of the

aforesaid order is extracted herein below for ready reference:-

"He has pointed out that the ancestral properties which were taken into account in the D.A. proceeding against him had already been partitioned by metes and bounds and those documents are available on record. However, learned trial Court recorded that no document is available with the charge sheet. There are other documents also which has not been taken into consideration, while dealing with the application. Therefore, he seeks remittance of this matter to the learned trial Court for deciding his application afresh by taking into consideration all the documents which were available on record and were filed along with the charge sheet.

4. Mr. Maharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department submits that all these issues could be appropriate raised and addressed at the trial stage. However, he could not controvert the fact that there are many documents which have not been taken into consideration by the learned Court below while dealing with the application under Section 239 Cr.P.C.

5. Without going into the details of the documents which were not adverted to by the learned trial Court, I feel it appropriate to relegate the parties to the Court below to argue the application afresh basing on the documents

which are placed on record by the investigating agency along with the charge sheet.

6. Accordingly, the order dated 31.07.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Special Court, Bhubaneswar in T.R. No.01/22 of 2013/2011 is set-aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned trial Court to deal 4 with the application under Section-239 Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner afresh."

7. Pursuant to the aforesaid remand, both parties appeared

before the learned trial Court and advanced arguments. However,

the learned Special Judge, by the impugned order dated 20.05.2024,

once again rejected the discharge application, primarily observing

that the materials collected by the prosecution disclosed a strong

prima facie case against the accused to face trial under Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988. It is this order that is the subject matter of challenge in

the present proceeding.

8. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the

impugned order dated 20.05.2024 rejecting the application under

Section 239 Cr.P.C. is vitiated by non-compliance with the specific

and limited remand directions issued by this Hon'ble Court on

07.02.2024. This Court had consciously refrained from examining

the merits and had remitted the matter with a clear mandate to

reconsider the discharge application based on the documents placed

on record by the Investigating Agency along with the charge-sheet,

which had earlier escaped notice of the Court for consideration. The

remand was thus not general or formal, but document-specific.

However, even after remand, the learned trial Court has confined its

analysis to only nine items and has failed to advert to several

material documents forming part of the court-supplied records,

including property statements at the time of joining service, bank

communications evidencing encashment of fixed deposits prior to

the check period, and income-tax returns seized during the

investigation itself.

9. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.

& Ors. in Criminal Appeal No. 5009 of 2024, wherein the Court

has cautioned against a mechanical approach in cases relating to

disproportionate assets accumulated over a long span of service.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in such cases, the

amounts under scrutiny cannot be examined in the manner of a bank

statement or daily ledger of income and expenditure, and that the

assessment process must necessarily allow a reasonable margin,

keeping in view economic fluctuations and the effect of time on

asset valuation, particularly when the check period spans several

decades. The Court emphasised the need for a nuanced and

contextual appreciation of materials, rather than a rigid or

arithmetical exercise. The learned counsel submitted that the refusal

of the learned trial Court to even advert to statutory returns,

property statements and contemporaneous financial records forming

part of the charge-sheet is wholly inconsistent with the aforesaid

principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

10. Further, the learned counsel submitted that the assets standing

in the name of the wife of the petitioner, who is not an accused, and

properties admittedly acquired prior to the check period, could not

have been mechanically included without even a prima facie

discussion in light of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872. When title deeds, bank records and statutory returns

form part of the charge-sheet, no extrinsic or presumptive

attribution could have been made at the stage of framing the charge.

Similarly, the adoption of an ad hoc 10% deduction towards DA

calculation, without statutory basis, stands directly contrary to the

principles laid down in State of Karnataka v. J. Jayalalitha

reported in (2017) 6 SCC 263.

11. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is submitted that the learned

trial Court has not fully complied with the limited remand direction

of this Hon'ble Court, inasmuch as all relevant documents forming

part of the charge-sheet have not been considered in their proper

legal perspective. The Petitioner, therefore, prays that this Hon'ble

Court may be pleased to remit the matter once again to the learned

trial Court for fresh consideration of the discharge application

strictly in accordance with law and in light of the documents

already on record, within a time-bound period.

12. Per contra, Mr. Moharana, learned Additional Standing

Counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department submitted that the

allegations disclose accumulation of assets far in excess of known

sources of income; that the defence put forth by the petitioner

involves disputed questions of fact which can only be adjudicated at

the stage of trial; and that at the stage of discharge, the Court is not

required to conduct a meticulous examination of the evidence.

13. I have considered the rival submissions advanced and have

carefully perused the impugned order dated 20.05.2024 as well as

the materials placed on record. The scope of consideration at the

stage of discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. is well settled. At this

stage, the Court is required to examine whether the allegations

taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, disclose the

commission of the alleged offence. The Court is not expected to

conduct a meticulous evaluation of evidence or to adjudicate upon

the probative value of the materials brought on record, by

embarking upon a kind of mini trial.

14. The legal position in this regard has been consistently

reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions,

including Sajjan Kumar v. C.B.I., reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368,

wherein it has been held that at the stage of framing of charge or

discharge, the Court has to see whether there is a strong suspicion

that the accused has committed the offence, and not whether the

materials are sufficient for conviction. The exercise of weighing the

defence version or embarking upon a roving enquiry into disputed

facts is clearly impermissible at this stage. The relevant portion of

the aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below for ready

reference:-

"19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is

challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.

20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."

15. In the present case, this Court, while disposing of CRLMC

No. 4265 of 2023 by order dated 07.02.2024, had issued a limited

and specific remand directing the learned trial Court to reconsider

the discharge application by adverting to certain documents forming

part of the charge-sheet which had not been taken into consideration

earlier. The remand order did not mandate an elaborate

reappreciation of the entire evidentiary material, nor did it require

the learned trial Court to return findings on the defence version as

projected by the accused.

16. Perusal of the written submission filed before the learned trial

Court as well as before this Court reveals that the petitioner sought

to argue the entire matter afresh and invited adjudication on each

and every item included in the charge sheet by the prosecution to

establish the disproportionate asset, which is contrary to the

mandate of the remand order. In the earlier round of litigation, the

petitioner had very emphatically pointed out certain documents,

which were not considered by the learned trial Court, while

rejecting his application for discharge. Therefore, this Court felt it

appropriate to remand the matter for consideration of those

documents. However, the petitioner attempted to re-argue the matter

in its entirety, which could be inferred from the voluminous records

placed before the learned trial Court as well as this Court in this

proceeding.

This Court pointedly asked the learned counsel to specify

which were the documents form part of the charge sheet, but were

not considered by the learned trial Court while deciding the

discharge application. Instead of high-lighting those documents in

particular, the petitioner sought to argue the matter afresh and

attempted to take this Court into the entire material on record.

However, in the written note of submission filed by the petitioner

fairly admits that the learned trial Court has evaluated as many as

nine documents and given the finding on those documents,

Paragraph-4 of the written note of submission reveals the same.

Apart from that, in paragraph-9 of the written note of submission,

the petitioner sought to high-light several other documents which

according to the petitioner have not been considered by the learned

trial Court. If the submission made by the learned counsel for the

petitioner is to be taken into consideration, it would tantamount to

embarking upon some short of mini trial. Primarily, learned counsel

for the petitioner submitted that all the documents placed by the

prosecution in the charge sheet ought to have been dealt with by the

learned trial Court and recorded the finding regarding each

document while deciding the application for discharge on remand of

the case. I am afraid the scope of deciding an application under

Section 239 of the Cr. P.C. is not to evaluate meticulously the entire

material on record to arrive at any conclusion regarding the

probative value of those materials, it is forbidden under law.

17. A perusal of the impugned order dated 20.05.2024 indicates

that pursuant to the remand, the learned trial Court has re-examined

the materials placed on record and has consciously adverted to the

fact that the prosecution documents, taken as a whole, disclose the

essential ingredients of the offence under Section 13(2) read with

Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The

learned trial Court has recorded its satisfaction that there exists a

prima facie case warranting the petitioner to face trial. The mere

fact that the petitioner disputes the correctness of the prosecution's

assessment of income, expenditure and assets cannot, by itself,

render the charge groundless within the meaning of Section 239

Cr.P.C.

18. It is trite law that in prosecutions under Section 13(1)(e) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, issues relating to the correctness

of valuation of assets, acceptability of explanations regarding

sources of income, and legitimacy of ownership are matters which

ordinarily fall within the domain of trial. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, reported in

(2014) 11 SCC 709, has cautioned that at the stage of framing of

charge, the Court should refrain from undertaking a mini-trial or

from evaluating the defence pleas which require evidence to be led.

It was held thus:-

"28. Yet another decision on which reliance has been placed is the decision of this Court in Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] , reference has been made to the following

paragraph of the said judgment: (SCC p. 140, para 12) "12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant. In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial...."

29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the

ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.

30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P. [(2013) 11 SCC 476 :

(2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52] , in which, after analysing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] : (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat case [(2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52] , SCC p. 482, para 15) "15. '11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the

accused in respect of the commission of that offence.' (Onkar Nath case [(2008) 2 SCC 561 :

(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] , SCC p. 565, para 11)"

31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] and Dilawar Balu Kurane [Dilawar Balu Kurane v.

State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] , relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial.

XXXX XXXX XXXX."

19. In the light of the aforesaid settled principles, this Court is of

the considered view that interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528

BNSS with the impugned order dated 20.05.2024 is not warranted

at this stage. The remand directed earlier by this Court was specific

and limited, and the learned trial Court, upon reconsideration, has

exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. This Court do not

find any patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the

impugned order so as to justify invocation of the inherent powers of

this Court.

20. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion

on the merits of the case and all contentions available to the parties,