Afr Dillip Kumar Ray .... Election vs Sarada Prasad Nayak
2026 Latest Caselaw 1063 Ori

Orissa High Court

Afr Dillip Kumar Ray .... Election vs Sarada Prasad Nayak on 6 February, 2026

Author: Sashikanta Mishra

Bench: Sashikanta Mishra

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                          I.A. No. 94 of 2024
                 (ARISING OUT OF ELPET No.-2 of 2024)

         (An application under Section 86 of the Representation of
          the People Act, 1951 read with Order 6 Rule 16, Order-7
           Rule-11 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure)

AFR     Dillip Kumar Ray                 ....   Election Petitioner

                                   -Versus-

        Sarada Prasad Nayak                   ....     Respondent



        Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
        __________________________________________________________
        For Election Petitioner: Mr. Samvit Mohanty, S.S. Tripathy,
                                 A. Satpathy, A. Mohanty, A. Mishra,
                                 N. Barik, P. Pradhan, S. Priyadarshini,
                                 & P.P. Das, Advocates.

        For Respondent          : Mr. U K Samal, M.R. Mohapatra, S.P.
                                  Patra & N. Samal, Advocates
        __________________________________________________________
             CORAM:
                      JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

                                JUDGMENT

06.02.2026

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.

The present application has been filed by the

sole Respondent of Election Petition No. 2 of 2024 invoking

the provisions of Section 86 of the Representation of the

People Act, 1951 read with Order VI Rule 16, Order VII

Rule 11 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In

this application, the Respondent has prayed for striking

out the pleadings contained in Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) of the

Election Petition and for dismissal of the Election Petition

at the threshold. It is the contention of the Respondent that

the said pleadings are wholly irrelevant, frivolous and

scandalous, and amount to a gross abuse of the process of

this Court. It is further urged that the Election Petition

suffers from absence of essential material facts and

particulars, fails to disclose a complete cause of action, and

does not raise any triable issue, thereby rendering it liable

to be dismissed at the preliminary stage itself.

2. Written objection has been filed by the Election

Petitioner opposing the present application. It is contended

that all material facts constituting a valid cause of action

raising triable issues have been duly and substantially

pleaded in the Election Petition. Accordingly, it is urged

that the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule

11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted and the

Election Petition cannot be dismissed at the threshold.

3. The Election Petition has been instituted by the

Election Petitioner seeking the following reliefs: a) to

declare the election of the sole Respondent, Sarada Prasad

Nayak to 12-Rourkela Assembly Constituency as void; b) To

direct a re-election/fresh poll in respect of the said

Constituency; and c) to declare that the affidavit filed by

the Respondent in Form-26 did not disclose complete and

true information with regard to his criminal antecedents as

well as details of immovable properties. The election of the

Respondent has been questioned principally on grounds

referable to Sections 100, 33A and 125A of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is specifically

alleged that the Returning Officer improperly accepted the

nomination of the returned candidate which is a ground

under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act, inasmuch as:

i) The Respondent, while filing his nomination

papers, failed to disclose material particulars in

the affidavit in Form-26, namely:

(a) non-disclosure of certain pending criminal

cases, and

b) non-disclosure of joint property holdings;

ii) such non-disclosure and suppression of material

facts are stated to constitute violations of the

mandatory requirements under Section 33A of the Act

read with Rule 4A of the Conduct of Elections Rules,

1961, thereby rendering the acceptance of the

nomination papers by the Returning Officer improper

and invalid.

4. Pursuant to issuance of notice, the sole

Respondent entered appearance and filed his written

statement. Along with the same, the Respondent has also

filed the present interlocutory application, the specific

grounds of which shall be adverted to in the succeeding

paragraphs. The Election Petitioner, on the other hand, has

filed a detailed objection traversing and controverting the

averments made therein.

5. For convenience, the parties are referred to as

per their original status in the Election Petition.

6. Heard Mr. U.K Samal, learned counsel for the

sole Respondent/Petitioner in the I.A and Mr. Samvit

Mohanty, learned counsel for the Election Petitioner/Opp.

Party in I.A.

7. At the outset, Mr. Samal, submitted that

paragraphs 1 to 7, paragraphs 9 to 12 and paragraphs 8-A

to 8-I of the Election Petition merely narrate the issuance of

statutory notifications, filing of nominations, declaration of

result, and a general background leading to the institution

of the petition. Except for references to official notifications

and election results, the remaining averments are stated to

be vague, bald and unsupported by any documentary

material. According to him, such unfounded and sweeping

allegations are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous and

vexatious, and amount to an abuse of the process of this

Court. It is further urged that in the absence of specific

material facts, the Election Petitioner cannot be said to

have made out any case for relief, and hence, the pleadings

are liable to be struck off.

8. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, submitted that the

pleadings contained in Paragraphs 1 to 7, 9 to 12, as well

as 8(A) to 8(I) of the Election Petition clearly disclose all

necessary material facts constituting a complete cause of

action. It is urged that the Election Petitioner has set out a

concise statement of material facts and particulars as

required in law, without entering into the realm of

evidence, in conformity with the settled principles

governing election pleadings. The objections raised on

behalf of the Respondent are contended to be premature

and misconceived. According to him, the pleadings are

neither vague, unnecessary, scandalous or vexatious, nor

do they amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Hence,

it is submitted that the present application is devoid of

merit and liable to be dismissed.

9. This Court, upon a careful consideration of the

pleadings and the averments contained in the Election

Petition, finds that the challenge to the election of the

Respondent has been principally founded on the ground of

improper acceptance of his nomination papers by the

Returning Officer, on account of alleged non-disclosure of

assets and criminal antecedents. Having examined the

pleadings, particularly Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I), this Court

deems it appropriate to consider those pleadings

collectively rather than individually, since all of them

pertain to the same issue and require to be appreciated in

a wholesome manner.

10. Paragraphs 1 to 7 (except Paragraph 4) of the

Election Petition are formal in nature. They set out general

averments concerning the subject matter of the election

petition, namely, 12-Rourkela Assembly Constituency, the

schedule of General Election, 2024, the names of the

candidates who contested from the said Constituency, the

dates of nomination, their respective party affiliations and

allotted symbols, the declaration of the election results,

and the reliefs claimed by the Election Petitioner.

11. Paragraph-4 primarily outlines a general

summary of the allegations, which are elaborated in detail

under the various sub-paragraphs of paragraph-8.

Therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition, this Court finds

it appropriate to address and examine those aspects at the

relevant stage.

12. As regards the averments contained in

Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) of the Election Petition, Mr. Samal

submits that the pleadings therein are wholly deficient and

do not disclose the material facts necessary to constitute a

complete cause of action. It is urged that the Election

Petitioner has neither produced nor even referred to the

Form-26 affidavit of the Respondent, nor has he specified

with clarity the particulars allegedly suppressed in relation

to criminal antecedents or immovable properties. No source

of information has been disclosed, nor have any supporting

documents such as certified copies of order sheets or

records of pending criminal cases been filed. According to

him, the petition is equally silent as to whether any

objection was raised before the Returning Officer at the

stage of scrutiny of nominations, the number of nomination

papers filed, or the orders, if any, passed by the Returning

Officer.

It is further contended that serious allegations

have been levelled against the Returning Officer without

impleading him as a party, and without specifying which

provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or

of the Constitution were allegedly violated. The pleadings, it

is argued, do not disclose in what manner the acceptance

of the Respondent's nomination was improper, why the

affidavit is alleged to be false, how the electorate was

misled, or in what way the result of the election was

materially affected. No distinction has been drawn between

curable and incurable defects, or between defects of

substantial and non-substantial character.

Reliance is placed by Mr. Samal on Udhav

Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia1, wherein the Supreme

Court held that 'all primary facts which must be proved at

trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action

or defence are material facts, and must be pleaded fully and

specifically.' Mr. Samal further relies on Azhar Hussain v.

Rajiv Gandhi2, where it was held that an election petition

lacking material facts is liable to be dismissed under Order

VII Rule 11 CPC. Reference is also made to Hari Shanker

Jain v. Sonia Gandhi3, where the Court reiterated that

(1977) 1 SCC 511

(1986) Supp SCC 315

(2001) 8 SCC 233

vague or bald allegations without proper factual foundation

cannot sustain an election petition.

In the absence of such foundational pleadings, it

is submitted, no legal basis is made out for declaring the

election void under Section 100(1) of the Act, and hence,

the impugned averments are liable to be struck off as

vague, frivolous, and untenable in law.

13. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, submits that the

present application is wholly misconceived. It is specifically

urged that the Respondent's nomination was liable for

rejection on account of a false and incomplete affidavit in

Form-26 dated 01.05.2024. The Election Petitioner has

categorically pleaded that the Respondent deliberately

suppressed his involvement in G.R. Case No. 1760 of 2002

arising out of Sector-7, Rourkela P.S. Case No. 130(16),

wherein charges under Sections 147, 341, 332, 336, 337

and 149 IPC were framed and are pending trial.

Significantly, while the same case was disclosed by the

Respondent in the 2019 General Election, its omission in

2024 demonstrates deliberate suppression.

It is further pleaded that the Respondent failed

to disclose his joint ownership interests in several

immovable properties situated in Mouzas Sankilo,

Gaudabishi, Tentalpur and Pithapada in Tahasil

Nischintakoili, District Cuttack, as reflected in the Bhulekh

land records. The Election Petitioner has already placed the

details of such properties, jointly recorded in the names of

the Respondent and his family members, on record.

According to Note 1 to Column 7(B) of Form-26, disclosure

of such joint ownership is mandatory, and intentional non-

disclosure constitutes a false affidavit of substantial

character.

Reliance is placed by Mr. Mohanty on the

judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v.

Association for Democratic Reforms4, People's Union

for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India5 and

Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar6 to submit that disclosure

of criminal antecedents, assets, and liabilities is a

mandatory requirement flowing from the voters' "right to

know" under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Non-

(2002) 5 SCC 294

(2003) 4 SCC 399

(2015) 3 SCC 467

disclosure amounts to a false declaration, which is a defect

of substantial character rendering the nomination invalid

in law.

It is accordingly contended that the Election

Petitioner has clearly set out a complete cause of action

supported by material facts and necessary particulars. At

this stage, there is no requirement to furnish evidence,

which will be adduced during trial. Therefore, the pleadings

cannot be described as vague, frivolous, or scandalous, nor

can the Election Petition be rejected at the threshold.

14. At the outset, this Court finds that it is not in

dispute that the object and purpose of requiring candidates

to file a complete and truthful affidavit in Form-26 is to

secure the fundamental 'right to know' of the electorate,

which has been judicially recognized as part of Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in

Resurgence India v. Election Commission of India7

emphatically held that any suppression or omission in

such affidavit frustrates the voters' right to information and

amounts to a direct infringement of constitutional

guarantees. The Court clarified that the filing of an affidavit

AIR 2014 SC 344

with blanks or incomplete particulars is impermissible, and

that the Returning Officer is duty-bound to ensure that all

disclosures relating to assets, liabilities, educational

qualifications, and criminal antecedents are properly

furnished.

15. In the present case, the Election Petitioner has

specifically alleged that the Respondent failed to disclose

his joint ownership interests in immovable properties

situated in Mouzas Sankilo, Gaudabishi, Tentalpur, and

Pithapada in Tahasil Nischintakoili, District Cuttack, as

reflected in Bhulekh records, and that he also withheld

details of certain movable assets and pending criminal

cases. These allegations have been pleaded with

particulars, including the nature of the properties and

documentary references relied upon by the Petitioner. Such

allegations clearly raise triable issues in the election

petition.

16. The ratio decided in Lok Prahari v. Union of

India 8 and Krishnamoorthy (Supra) is relevant to the

present case, wherein, the Supreme Court reiterated the

constitutional and statutory imperative of truthful

(2018) 4 SCC 699

disclosure of assets, income sources, and criminal

antecedents of a candidate, as well as those of his spouse

and dependents. The rationale is, suppression of such

information misleads the electorate and undermines the

purity of elections. The allegations in the present petition

are of the same character and cannot be brushed aside at

the threshold.

17. As regards the objection raised by the

Respondent that the Election Petitioner has not filed a

separate affidavit in Form-25 in support of allegations

relating to corrupt practices, this Court finds it appropriate

to first refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court in

G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar9, Thangjam

Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh10 and A. Manju

v. Prajwal Revanna11, which state that the requirement

under the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of the Act to file an

affidavit in Form-25 is directory and not mandatory.

Substantial compliance in the form of a sworn affidavit and

verification clause accompanying the petition, affirming the

truthfulness of allegations, including those relating to

(2013) 4 SCC 776

(2023) 17 SCC 500

(2022) 3 SCC 269

corrupt practices, is sufficient. Therefore, whether the

Election Petitioner has made substantial compliance is

required to be determined.

17.1. Mr. Samal, referring to the format of the affidavit

in Form-25 as appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules,

submits that the affidavit appended to the Election Petition

does not in the least satisfy the said requirements. He

contends that it is necessary to specify which alleged

corrupt practices are based on the Petitioner's own

knowledge and which are based on information received by

him. The affidavit specifies neither.

Elaborating his argument, Mr. Samal argues that

it has been generally stated in the affidavit that the same is

based on the Election Petitioner's knowledge and belief.

This does not at all satisfy the requirements of Form-25.

Since the Election Petitioner has not segregated as to which

allegations are based on his knowledge and which are

based on information received by him, it cannot be said

that there has been substantial compliance with the

requirement of Form-25.

17.2. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty emphatically argues

that the Election Petitioner has alleged that the

Respondent's nomination was liable to be rejected on

account of a false and incomplete affidavit in Form-26. He

further submits that the facts pleaded in Paragraphs 8(A)

to 8(I) are verified by the affidavit accompanying the

Election Petition, wherein the Petitioner has clearly stated

that the said facts have been pleaded being based on his

knowledge and belief.

17.3. This Court finds that the pleadings in

Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) involve allegations relating to

corrupt practices. Hence, it is deemed proper to examine

whether, in the absence of Form-25, the affidavit appended

to the Election Petition substantially complies with the

requirement as laid down in G.M. Siddeshwar (supra),

Thangjam Arunkumar (supra) and A. Manju (supra) or

not.

Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to

reproduce Form-25:

"FORM 25 (See Rule 94A) Affidavit I, ......................, the petitioner in the accompanying election petition calling in question the election of

Shri/Shrimati .................. (respondent No. ......... in the said petition), make solemn affirmation/oath and say--

(a) that the statements made in paragraphs ..................... of the accompanying election petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of* ..................... and the particulars of such corrupt practice mentioned in paragraphs ..................... of the same petition and in paragraphs ..................... of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to my knowledge;

(b) that the statements made in paragraphs ..................... of the said petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of* .....................

and the particulars of such corrupt practice given in paragraphs ..................... of the said petition and in paragraphs ..................... of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to my information;

(c)

(d) etc. Signature of the deponent Solemnly affirmed/sworn by Shri/Shrimati ..................... at ..................... on this ..................... day of ..................... 20...... Before me, Magistrate of the First Class / Notary / Commissioner of Oaths Here specify the name of the corrupt practice."

Thus, the requirement appears to be three-fold:

(i) To specify the corrupt practices;

(ii) To further specify which of the corrupt practices are true to the knowledge of the Petitioner; and

(iii) which are true to his information.

In order to test whether the affidavit accompanying the

Election Petition is in line with the above requirements of

Form-25 or not, it would be profitable to reproduce the

affidavit accompanying the Election Petition:

"AFFIDAVIT

IN THE MATTER OF:

1. Name -- Dilip Kumar Ray, aged about 71 years, R/o Hrusikesh Bhawan, Daily Market. Rourkela- 769001, P.S-Plantsite, Dist-Sundargarh

2. Father's Name- Late Hrusikesh Ray

3. Occupation-Business

4. Number of proceedings pending in the High Court or would be instituted - None

5. Statement of facts - As stated in the aforementioned Election Petition.

6. That the facts stated above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DECLARATION

I, Dilip Kumar Ray, aged about 71 years, S/o Late Hrusikesh Ray, R/o Hrushikesh Bhawan, Daily Market, Rourkela-769001, P.S-Plantsite, Dist- Sundargarh do hereby solemnly affirm and verify as follows:

1. That I am the Election Petitioner in this Election Petition.

2. The statements made in Paragraphs 1 to 6 of the Election Petition relate to facts regarding the schedule of the election, description of electors, nomination scrutiny, and statements of facts regarding events in chronology up to the date of counting, which are true to the best of my knowledge, based on information gathered from statutory notifications and official records, and I believe the same to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

3. That the statements made in Paragraph 7 are about the substantive reliefs sought with regard to various irregularities, and the statements made therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

4. That the averments made in Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I) are a concise statement of material facts on which the Election Petitioner relies and the law operating in the said field. These statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

5. That the averments made in Paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[Emphasis Added]"

17.4. The Election Petition also contains a verification.

Turning briefly to the pleadings, this Court finds that,

insofar as allegations relating to corrupt practices are

concerned, Paragraphs 8(B) and 8(C) contain references to

certain pending criminal cases said to have been registered

against the Respondent, and Paragraph 8(D) refers to the

alleged non-disclosure of assets by the Respondent.

Despite such pleadings in relation to criminal cases and

non-disclosure of assets, when the Election Petition is read

as a whole, the Election Petitioner has nowhere specified

the same as corrupt practices.

17.5. Thus, this Court shall first proceed to determine

whether the affidavit already on record substantially

complies with the requirement of Form-25 or not. As

already seen, the requirement is to specify the corrupt

practices and to further specify which allegations are

based on the personal knowledge of the Petitioner and

which are based on information. Paragraph 4 of the

affidavit filed along with the Election Petition, and

reproduced hereinabove, shows that although not

specifying each corrupt practice as such, the Petitioner

has referred to Paragraphs 8(A) to 8(I). The allegations of

corrupt practice, as already stated, are contained in

Paragraphs 8(B) to 8(D). Therefore, Paragraph 4 of the

affidavit can be said to relate to the said allegations as well.

It has been generally stated that the said allegations are

'based on law' and the Petitioner's 'knowledge and belief'.

17.6. As pointed out by Mr. Samal, there is in fact

no segregation as to which allegations are based on the

personal knowledge of the Petitioner and which are based

on information received by him. This Court finds the

argument of Mr. Samal valid; however, on that score alone,

the Election Petition cannot be dismissed at the threshold.

The said defect would amount to a defect in the Election

Petition which is curable, as the pleadings contained

therein raise a cause of action and triable issues, as held

by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Kimneo

Haokip Hangshing v. Kenn Raikhan12, wherein the

Supreme Court held as follows-

"7. Over the years, Election Petitions have been filed invariably on the grounds which are similar to the ones raised before this Court.

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2548

The only question is whether the Court can dismiss such a petition at the very threshold on an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or that the petition needs a detailed consideration by the Court. The answer to this will depend upon what kind of statutory compliances have been made in the Election Petition. The case of the present appellant before this Court is that if the provisions as referred above, wherein material details have to be given by the respondent and particularly the details of corrupt practices etc., has to be strictly construed and any deviation by the respondent on this requirement shall make the petition liable to be dismissed at the very threshold.

All the same, this is not what is the requirement of law. Rather the settled position of law here is that an Election Petition should not be rejected at the very threshold where there is a "substantial compliance" of the provisions.

8. Thus, we will have to see whether "substantial compliance" of Section 83(1)(a) and 83(1)(b) has been done by the respondent.

In para 15 of the Election Petition, the respondent has pleaded that construction worth approx. Rs. 2 crores has taken place on agricultural land of the appellant, however, the column for investment in land through construction has been left empty by the appellant. Thereafter, the respondent has also pleaded that the appellant was serving as a Committee Officer in the Assembly Secretariat, Manipur Legislative Assembly till 31.12.2021, yet, she has shown her income for FY 2021- 2022 as Rs. 0/-, which is untrue.

In para 16 of the Election Petition, the respondent has referred to Section 33 of RPA and alleged non-compliance with the requirement of furnishing true and correct information by candidates. Further, in ground A (as reproduced above) it is asserted that since the appellant has concealed her investment of Rs. 2 crores in her land, her nomination papers ought to have been rejected. On a perusal of the petition as a whole, including the averments reproduced above, it is clear that a cause of action has been disclosed by the respondent. Whether the appellant has concealed her investments and her income, and thus her nomination has been improperly accepted, is a triable issue.

9. Secondly, the affidavit, which is required as per the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of RPA has to be given in Form 25 as per the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, where Rule 94A reads as under:

"94A. Form of affidavit to be filed with election petition.-- The affidavit referred to in the proviso to subsection (1) of section 83 shall be sworn before a magistrate of the first class or a notary or a commissioner of oaths and shall be in Form 25."

xx xx xx

10. A question had come up before a three Judge Bench of this Court in G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 as to whether an Election Petition is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold even if the allegations of corrupt practices of a returned candidate have not been given by a petitioner in terms of the proviso in Section 83(1)(c) of RPA. The finding of this Court was that this cannot be done even if an affidavit is not filed in terms of the proviso. What is mandatory, however, is that there should be substantial compliance. In other words, if substantial compliance in terms of furnishing all that is required under the law has been given, the petition cannot be summarily dismissed.

11. In a more recent case also from Manipur (Thangjam Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1058), this Court upheld the dismissal of the returning candidate's Order VII Rule 11 application by the Manipur High Court in an Election Petition. The Court after referring to and applying the test laid down in Siddeshwar (supra) held as follows: "14. The position of law that emerges for the above referred cases is clear. The requirement to file an affidavit under the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) is not mandatory. It is sufficient if there is substantial compliance. As the defect is curable, an opportunity may be granted to file the necessary affidavit."

12. In view of the reasons stated above, we see no reason to interfere with the finding of the High Court of Manipur that the Election Petition discloses a cause of action and that there is substantial compliance of the requirements provided under provisions of RPA and thus the petition cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed."

[Emphasis added]

It is also apposite to refer to the observations made by the

Supreme Court in A. Manju (supra), wherein it was held as

follows: -

"We must begin at the inception by stating that intrinsically, election law is technical in nature. In the present matter, an election conducted under an independent body like the Election Commission is sought to be assailed, where the mandate of the public has gone in a particular way. The allegations must strictly fall within the parameters of the manner in which such a mandate can be overturned. The primary plea taken by the appellant is largely that success in the elections was obtained by concealment of material, which would have been germane in determining the opinion of the electorate. In effect, were such material to be available with the electorate, they would have exercised another option on the basis of it. However, while the requirements to be met in the election petition may be technical in nature, they are not hypertechnical, as observed in Ponnala Lakshmaiah case [Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788] . We have considered the aforesaid aspect by quoting the observations made therein which have received the imprimatur of a larger Bench."

[Emphasis added]

17.7. Moreover, it is not necessary always for the

candidate to state which of the allegation is based on

information received by him if it is his case that the same is

based on his knowledge as is in the case at hand. He has

specified the allegations by referring to the relevant

paragraphs of his pleadings and stated on oath that the

same are based on his knowledge which he believes to be

true. This, in the considered view of this Court

substantially satisfies the requirement of Form-25.

It would be profitable to refer to the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar (supra),

wherein it was observed as follows:

16. The position of law that emerges from the above referred cases is clear. The requirement to file an affidavit under the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) is not mandatory. It is sufficient if there is substantial compliance. As the defect is curable, an opportunity may be granted to file the necessary affidavit.

17. In the instant case, the election petition contained an affidavit and also a verification. In this very affidavit, the election petitioner has sworn on oath that the paragraphs where he has raised allegations of corrupt practice are true to the best of his knowledge. Though there is no separate and an independent affidavit with respect to the allegations of corrupt practice, there is substantial compliance of the requirements under Section 83(1)(c) of the Act.

18. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the High Court that there is substantial compliance of the requirements under Section 83(1)(c) of the Act and this finding satisfies the test laid down by this Court in Siddeshwar [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715] . Even the subsequent decision of this Court in Revanna [A. Manju v.

Prajwal Revanna, (2022) 3 SCC 269 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 95] supports the final conclusion arrived at by the High Court.

[Emphasis Added]

Therefore, this cannot be equated with a

complete absence of an affidavit, in which case it would

amount to a defect of form and not of substance. As such,

the defect being one of form and not of substance, the

Petitioner can be permitted to file the requisite affidavit at a

later stage.

17.8. On the issue of curability, it was argued by both

sides that, assuming the Court finds such defect, as to

whether it would attract limitation if Form-25 is permitted

to be filed at a later stage, and whether the Court

possesses the power to allow the same at a later stage.

17.9. On this point, Mr. Samal argues that such an

affidavit, if filed subsequently, must be treated as barred by

limitation.

17.10. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty argues that the

provision under Section 86(1), which empowers the Court

to dismiss an Election Petition at the threshold for non-

compliance of certain provisions, does not refer to Section

83. Therefore, any violation of Section 83 cannot be a

ground to invoke the power under Section 86(1). Mr.

Mohanty further argues that even otherwise, Section 86(5)

permits amendment of pleadings by way of furnishing

further particulars of corrupt practice. Therefore, this being

a curable defect, the law of limitation would not apply.

17.11. Admittedly, a period of 45 days is prescribed for

filing an Election Petition, to be reckoned from the date of

publication of the election result. There is no provision

whatsoever to extend the period of limitation under any

circumstances. There is no dispute that the Election

Petition was filed within the period of limitation. The

question now is whether, after the expiry of the period of

limitation, the Petitioner can be permitted to file a

supplementary affidavit.

17.12. This Court has already held that the defect of

non-filing of Form-25 is a curable defect, being a defect of

form and not of substance in view of the settled position of

law. Had it been a defect of substance, it would have

rendered the defect incurable and in such situation, it

would not have been permissible to file any supplementary

affidavit as it would amount to extending the period of

limitation. The defect however, being of form and therefore,

curable, the question of limitation would not apply as

otherwise, the very doctrine of curability would be

redundant. In such event, the affidavit subsequently filed

would relate back to the date of presentation of the election

petition. The question of extending the period of limitation

therefore, does not arise. In the case of Vidyawati Gupta

v. Bhakti Hari Nayak, (2006) 2 SCC 777, the Supreme

Court observed as follows:

"In this regard we are inclined to agree with the consistent view of the three Chartered High Courts in the different decisions cited by Mr Mitra that the requirements of Order 6 and Order 7 of the Code, being procedural in nature, any omission in respect thereof will not render the plaint invalid and that such defect or omission will not only be curable but will also date back to the presentation of the plaint. We are also of the view that the reference to the provisions of the Code in Rule 1 of Chapter 7 of the Original Side Rules cannot be interpreted to limit the scope of such reference to only the provisions of the Code as were existing on the date of such incorporation. It was clearly the intention of the High Court when it framed the Original Side Rules that the plaint should be in conformity with the provisions of Order 6 and Order 7 of the Code. By necessary implication reference will also have to be made to Section 26 and Order 4 of the Code which, along with Order 6 and Order 7, concerns the institution of suits. We are ad idem with Mr Pradip Ghosh (sic) on this score. The provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 Order 4 of the Code, upon which the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had placed strong reliance, will also have to be read and understood in that context. The expression "duly" used in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 Order 4 of the Code implies that the plaint must be filed in accordance with law. In our view, as has been repeatedly expressed by this Court in various decisions, rules of procedure are made to further the cause of justice and not to prove a hindrance thereto. Both in Khayumsab [(2006) 1 SCC 46 : JT (2005) 10 SC 1] and Kailash [(2005) 4 SCC 480] although dealing with the amended provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code, this Court gave expression to the salubrious principle that procedural enactments ought not to be construed in a manner which would prevent the Court from meeting the ends of justice in different situations."

[Emphasis added]

Thus, this Court holds that the Election

Petitioner can be permitted to file supplementary affidavit

complying with the requirement of Form-25 after filing of

the Election Petition or at least before commencement of

trial, so that the other side is not taken by surprise. It is

relevant to mention that in the instant case issues have not

yet been settled and therefore, the question of the other

side being prejudiced does not arise.

18. This Court, on a careful scrutiny of the pleadings

in this case is satisfied that the petitioner has indeed

pleaded material facts, including the nature and details of

the alleged suppression of assets and antecedents, together

with reference to records and particulars, which cannot, by

any stretch of imagination be treated as bald or vague.

19. As regards the contention that no copy of Form-

26 affidavit was annexed to the Election Petition and that

the source of information relating to alleged suppression of

facts has not been disclosed, this Court finds said

objections untenable. It is well settled that an election

petition is not required to annex every document in original

or certified form at the stage of pleadings. What is essential

is that the material facts are to be pleaded in sufficient

detail to disclose a cause of action, and supporting

documents, if relied upon, may be produced and proved

during trial.

The pleadings in the present petition clearly

specify the particulars of the properties allegedly

suppressed, including their description, location, and

reference to revenue records available in the Bhulekh

portal. Likewise, the allegations relating to non-disclosure

of criminal antecedents refer to G.R. Case No. 1760 of 2002

arising out of Sector-7, Rourkela P.S. Case No. 130(16).

These pleadings, when read as a whole, are sufficient to

put the Respondent to notice the precise case he has to

meet.

In Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar13

the Supreme Court clarified that an election petition

cannot be dismissed merely for want of annexures or

certified copies, so long as the pleadings disclose a triable

issue. Similarly, in F.A. Sapa and others vs. Singora

and others14 it was held that omission to annex

documents does not vitiate the petition when material facts

are otherwise pleaded.

1968 SCC OnLine SC 216

(1991)3 SCC 375

Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the

absence of Form-26, or non-disclosure of the precise

source of information, does not render the petition defective

or liable for summary dismissal.

20. As regards the contention that the Election

Petition is liable to be dismissed for non-impleadment of

the Returning Officer, this Court is of the considered view

that such objection is without merit. Section 82 of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951, exhaustively

specifies the parties who are to be joined in an election

petition, namely: (i) all contesting candidates, and (ii) any

other candidate against whom allegations of corrupt

practice are made. The Returning Officer does not fall

within either category, nor is he contemplated by the

statute as a necessary or proper party.

The Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi

Ghosal 15 categorically held that the category of parties

under Section 82 is exhaustive, and that no person beyond

those expressly mentioned therein can be joined as a

respondent to an election petition. Following the above

(1982) 1 SCC 691

ratio, this Court holds that the Returning Officer is not a

necessary party to the present petition, and his non-

impleadment cannot be a ground to dismiss the petition.

21. Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of facts,

the settled position of law, and the rival contentions

advanced, this Court is of the considered view that no

ground is made out by the Respondent to warrant exercise

of jurisdiction either under Order VI Rule 16 CPC to strike

out the pleadings, or under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject

the Election Petition at the threshold, or under Section 83

of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to dismiss

the same for want of material facts.

22. On the contrary, this Court holds that the

Election Petition, as framed and presented, discloses a

clear cause of action and raises substantial triable issues

touching the purity of the electoral process. It would,

therefore, be impermissible in law as well as inequitable in

principle to reject the Election Petitioner at the preliminary

stage without a full trial.

23. In the result, the I.A. stands dismissed. There

shall be no order as to costs.

24. The Election Petitioner is directed to file affidavit

in Form-25 in support of his allegations relating to corrupt

practice within two weeks from today, failing which

appropriate orders shall be passed with regard to

maintainability of the Election Petition.

...............................

Sashikanta Mishra, Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 6th February, 2026/A.K. Rana/P.A.

Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK

Date: 09-Feb-2026 17:15:48