[Cites 25, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Ranjit Kumar Das @ vs State Of Orissa .... Opposite Parties on 20 April, 2026

Author: V. Narasingh

Bench: V. Narasingh

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                 CRLREV No.04 of 2026

In the matter of an application under Section 397 read
with Section 401 of Cr.P.C.
                          ------------------

Ranjit Kumar Das @ .... Petitioner Ranjeet Kumar Das

-versus-

1. State of Orissa .... Opposite Parties

2. Informant/Victim

For Petitioner : Mr. L. Samantaray, Advocate Mr. D. Mohapatra, Advocate

For Opposite Parties : Mr. S. Panigrahi, ASC

CORAM:

JUSTICE V. NARASINGH

DATE OF FINAL HEARING : 16.01.2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT : 20.04.2026

V. Narasingh, J. Heard learned counsel for the

Petitioner and learned counsel for the State.

1. Assailing the order dated 15.12.2025 at

Annexure-7 passed by the learned District and

Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar, by which the prayer

of the Petitioner under Section 2501 of the BNSS to

discharge him for allegedly committing offences

under Section 64(2)(m)2 of the BNS, 2023 was

rejected, the present criminal revision has been

filed.

2. Admittedly, this is the third journey of the

Petitioner to this Court.

3. The Petitioner had filed CRLMC No.1847 of

20253 under Section 5284 of the BNSS for

250. Discharge.--(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under Section 232.

(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. Corresponding Law: S. 227 of Act 2 of 1974.

64. Punishment for rape.-- (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Whoever,-- (a) to (l) xxx xxx xxx

(m) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. Corresponding Law: S. 376(2) of Act 45 of 1860.

Ranjit Kumar Das v. State of Odisha, CRLMC No. 1847 of 2025, Order dated 23 June 2025 (Orissa High Court)

528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.--Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

quashing the criminal proceeding in C.T. Case

No.252 of 2025 on the file of the learned SDJM,

Bhubaneswar arising out of Mahila P.S. Case No.39

of 2025 for allegedly committing offences under

Sections 64(2)(m)2 and 351(2)5 of the BNS, 2023

and vide order dated 23.06.20253, this Court was

not inclined to entertain the same, giving liberty to

the Petitioner to raise all the grounds at the time

of framing of charge.

4. Subsequently, assailing the order dated

10.11.2025 passed in the aforementioned C.T.

Case by the learned Sessions Judge, Khurda

rejecting his application for discharge under

Section 2501 of the BNSS from commission of

offences under Section 64(2)(m)2 of the BNS, the

same was subject matter of challenge at the

Corresponding Law: S. 482 of Act 2 of 1974.

351. Criminal intimidation.-- (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Corresponding Law: S. 506 of Act 45 of 1860.

instance of the Petitioner in Criminal Revision

No.913 of 2025.

5. Considering the rival submissions, while

setting aside the impugned order therein, i.e.,

dated 20.11.2025, this Court directed

reconsideration of the contention for discharge,

specifically referring to the judgment of the Apex

Court in the case of Amol Bhagwan Nehul vs.

The State of Maharashtra and another6.

On such reconsideration, the impugned

order dated 15.12.2025 has been passed, as noted

above.

6. The learned counsel for the Petitioner, Mr.

Samantaray, and Mr. D. Mohapatra urged with

vehemence that even if the entire allegations of

the prosecution are accepted at their face value,

no offence under Section 64(2)(m)2 of the BNS,

2023 is ex facie made out. Hence, putting the

Amol Bhagwan Nehul vs. The State of Maharashtra; AIROnline 2025 SC

Petitioner through the rigors of trial for

commission of such offence would not only result

in his ignominy in defending such accusation, but

even on the materials on record, the trial would be

an exercise in futility, thereby resulting in a waste

of precious judicial time.

6-A. To fortify their submission, they relied on

the recitals of the charge sheet including the

statement of the victim and other materials on

record and the following decisions: -

"1. Gurmeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand & Another7

2. Manoj Kumar Munda v. State of Odisha8

3. Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra9

4. Samadhan Sitaram Manmothe v. State of Maharashtra & Anr10

Gurmeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIROnline 2025 UTR 313

Manoj Kumar Munda v. State of Odisha, AIROnline 2025 Ori 32

Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra, AIROnline 2025 SC 404

Samadhan Sitaram Manmothe v. State of Maharashtra, AIROnline 2025 SC 1099

5. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra11

6. Dhruvaram Sonar v. State of Maharashtra12

7. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal13

7. Learned counsel for the State while

opposing such prayer submits that the case at

hand does not merit consideration of this Court in

exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and to

substantiate his submissions, he has relied on the

following judgments: -

1. State of Orissa vrs. Pratima Behera14

2. State of Orissa vrs. Debendra Nath Padhi15

3. State of Delhi vrs. Gyan Devi & Ors.16

4. Tarun Jit Tejpal vrs. The State of Goa & Anr.17

Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608

Dhruvaram Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 327

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1993 SC 1348

State of Orissa v. Pratima Behera, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3805

State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568

State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi, (2000) 8 SCC 239

Tarun Jit Tejpal v. State of Goa, (2020) 17 SCC 556

5. Union of India V. Prafulla Kumar Samal18

8. The power of this Court to exercise

revisional jurisdiction is no longer res integra and

has been set at rest by the judgment of the Apex

Court in the case of Debendra Nath

Padhi(supra)15, and so also in the case of

Rukmini Narvekar vrs. Vijaya Satardekar and

Ors19.

For convenience of reference the relevant

paragraph of the said judgment is extracted

hereunder: -

"xxx xxx xxx

22. Thus in our opinion, while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi case, there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial

Union of India V. Prafulla Kumar Samal, AIR 1979 SC 366

Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar, (2008) 14 SCC 1

court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted.

               xxx               xxx                   xxx"
                                                (Emphasized)

9. The rival contentions of the parties on the

basis of materials on record have to be considered

in the backdrop of the law referred to hereinabove

in the light of the decision cited at the bar and the

contours of the revisional jurisdiction as noted

above.

10. It is the case of the prosecution that, in the

course of investigation of the FIR lodged by the

Opposite Party-victim, the Petitioner developed

acquaintance with the victim and on 17.06.2024

forcibly established physical relationship with her.

When she opposed, she and her children were

threatened, and the said physical relationship

continued for a period of time. During such period,

the Petitioner claimed himself to be a bachelor.

Subsequently, upon coming to know that he was

married, the victim lodged Bhubaneswar Mahila

P.S. Case No.39 of 2025 under Section 64(2)(m)

and 351(2) of BNS and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

11. During the course of investigation, the

statement of the victim was recorded under

Section 183 of BNSS which is on record. After

investigation final form was submitted under

Section 64(2)(m)2 and 351(2)5 of BNS, 2023

against the Petitioner as an accused. As already

noted, the prayer of the Petitioner "to quash the

proceeding was not entertained by this Court. But,

the earlier order of the learned Trial Court

rejecting his prayer for discharge dated

20.11.2025 was set aside" and the matter was

remanded for fresh consideration.

The prayer for discharge on such remand

having been negatived by the impugned order

dated 15.12.2025 vide Annexure-7, the same is

under challenge as noted above.

12. Much reliance has been placed by the

learned counsel for the Petitioner on the judgment

of the Apex Court in the case of Amol Bhagwan

Nehul (supra)9 which has been referred to by this

Court while remanding the matter for fresh

consideration.

In Paragraph No.8 (a) & (b) thereof9 special

features which persuaded the Apex Court in

quashing the proceeding have been noted. The

same are extracted hereunder: -

"(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from the record that the consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they interacted frequently and fell in love. The Complainant/Respondent no.

2 engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct.

(b) The consent of the Complainant/ Respondent no. 2 as defined under section

90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no material to substantiate "inducement or misrepresentation" on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise. Investigation has also revealed that the Khulanama, was executed on 29.12.2022 which the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties were already in a relationship and the alleged incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable that the Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant."

12-A. The Petitioner has also relied on the

judgment of the Samadhan Sitaram

Manmothe(supra)10, wherein the proceeding

under Section 376(2)(n)2 IPC was quashed and

after analysis of the material on record what

weighed with the Apex Court in quashing the

proceeding has been succinctly stated in Paragraph

No.40 thereof, which is culled out hereunder for

convenience of reference: -

"(40) In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In our opinion, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery."

Para 22 of the said judgment is also

relevant for adjudication, the same is extracted

hereunder;

"22. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation."

12-B. The other judgment relied upon by the

learned counsel for the Petitioner is the case of

Pramod Suryabhan Pawar(supra)11.

The FIR in the said case was quashed in the

backdrop of the facts which are stated in

Paragraph Nos.2.1 to 2.8.

For convenience of reference the said

Paragraphs are extracted hereunder: -

"2.1. According to the complainant, she and the appellant have known each other since

1998. She would speak to the appellant on the phone and met him regularly as early as 2004. In 2008 the appellant proposed marriage and assured her that their belonging to different castes would not be a hindrance. The appellant allegedly promised to marry the complainant after the marriage of his elder sister. On 23-1-2009 the appellant allegedly reiterated his promise to marry her at the Patnadevi Temple in Chalisgaon.

2.2. The complainant completed her BSc in Agriculture in 2002 and worked as a Junior Research Assistant. In 2007 she was selected as a Naib Tahsildar at Chalisgaon. In March 2009 she was appointed to the post of Assistant Sales Tax Commissioner at Mazgaon. The appellant would, it is alleged, come to meet her and lived with her in November 2009. During his visit, the complainant alleges that she refused to engage in sexual intercourse with the appellant, but "on the promise of marriage he forcibly established corporeal relationships".

2.3. The complainant alleges that throughout 2010, the appellant visited her

on multiple occasions and they engaged in sexual intercourse. When the appellant was posted in Gadchiroli, the complainant visited the appellant multiple times over the course of 2011. Each of these visits lasted four to five days during which the complainant resided with the appellant and they engaged in sexual intercourse. During these visits the complainant enquired about. marriage and the appellant responded in the affirmative. In December 2011 the appellant visited her and resided in her house for four days. 2.4. The appellant's elder sister was married on 5-2-2012. On 23-12 -2012 the appellant visited her and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. Afterwards, for the first time the appellant raised concerns about marrying her on the ground that their belonging to different castes would hinder the appellant's younger sister's marriage. In January 2013 the complainant visited the appellant in Nagpur, and the appellant also subsequently visited her. On both occasions they engaged in sexual intercourse. 2.5. During these years she missed her menstrual periods on several occasions. In 2013-2014 the complainant and appellant

jointly visited the hospital multiple times to check whether she was pregnant. In June 2013 the appellant was posted in Navi Mumbai and used to spend his weekends residing at the complainant's house. They regularly engaged in sexual intercourse during this period. Beginning in January 2014 the appellant raised concerns about marrying the complainant on the ground of her caste. This led to heated arguments. However, the appellant used to regularly visit her house at Panvel until March 2015, each time engaging in sexual intercourse with her.

2.6. On 27-8-2015 and 28-8-2015 and 22- 10-2015 the appellant sent the complainant certain WhatsApp messages. The complainant alleges that these messages were insulting and attacked her on the grounds of her caste. The messages stated:

"You are bad for society. If shoe is kept on head, then head would get dirty. Reservation did not add any intelligence; You have got government service with ease."

2.7. In November 2015 for the first time the complainant threatened to file a police

complaint against the appellant. The appellant promised to marry her after the marriage of his brother. At this time also they engaged in sexual intercourse. 2.8. On 9-3-2016 the appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant against her will. Subsequently, the complainant was apprised of the fact that the appellant was engaged to another woman. The appellant informed the complainant that the woman he was engaged to was demanding rupees two lakhs to break off the engagement. On 28- 3-2016 the appellant reiterated his promise to marry the complainant and arranged for her to speak to the woman he had been engaged to, to assure the complainant that the appellant was no longer in a relationship with her. Subsequently the complainant became aware that the appellant had married on 01.05.2016. On 17.05.2015 she filed the FIR."

12-C. Petitioner has pressed into service the

judgment of the Apex Court in the case of

Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar(supra)Error!

Bookmark not defined.. The FIR in the said case

was quashed. And, the factual matrix of the said

case as stated in Paragraph No.3 thereof is

extracted hereunder: -

"3. The Appellant is the Accused No. 1 in the aforesaid FIR, registered at the instance of the complainant/Respondent No. 4. At the relevant point of time, the Appellant was serving as a medical officer, Primary Health Centre at Toranmal, Radgona Nandurbar District, whereas the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse at the same establishment. The allegations made by the complainant in the FIR in brief are that her husband died on 05.11.1997, leaving behind her and her two children. During this time, the Appellant informed her that there have been differences between him and his wife, and therefore, he is planning to divorce his wife. Further, the Appellant informed the complainant that since they belong to different communities, a month is needed for the registration of their marriage. Therefore, she started living with the Appellant at his Government quarters. The FIR further states

that she had fallen in love. with the Appellant and that she needed a companion as she is a widow, Therefore, they started living together, as if they were husband and wife. They resided some time at her house and some time at the house of the Appellant. The Appellant acted as if he has married her and has maintained a physical relationship with her. However, he has failed to marry her as promised. When things stood thus, his brother, l.e. Accused No. 2. claims to have married her. Thereafter, in the year 2000, complainant received the information from the co-accused about the marriage of the Appellant with some other woman. Therefore, she filed the aforesaid complaint and FIR dated 06.12.2000 came to be registered against the Appellant and the co- accused."

12-D. Reliance placed on the judgment in the

case of Gurmeet Singh(supra)7 is also of no

assistance to the Petitioner.

In the said case, the Hon'ble Court has

observed thus;

"xxx xxx xxx Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire documents available on record, coupled with the fact that the respondent No.2 is 15 years' elder than the applicant and further she is major and on her consensus, the physical relations were established between her and the applicant, therefore, it is in the opinion of the this Court that the allegations made by the respondent No.2 in the FIR, appear to be nothing but an exaggeration.

xxx xxx xxx"

12-E. Similarly, the reliance placed on Manoj

Kumar Munda(supra)8 is misplaced as the same

is factually distinguishable.

In the said judgment, this Court noted thus;

"xxx xxx xxx

25. Upon careful perusal of the provisions outlined, the submissions made and the

case records, one incontrovertible truth emerges; the fulcrum upon which the adjudication of this case rests is "consent". In the jurisprudence of sexual offences, the absence or presence of consent is not merely a factual consideration but the very essence of criminal culpability. The law mandates that the prosecution must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that consent was either absent or vitiated by coercion, deception, or incapacity. Thus, in the final analysis, the outcome of this case shall turn solely on this cardinal question: was there free, voluntary and unequivocal consent?

26. The annals of jurisprudence are replete with deliberations on the concept of consent, a principle that has been scrutinised, refined and expounded upon in countless judicial pronouncements. Within the framework of Section 375 IPC, consent is not a mere nod of acquiescence, nor the absence of resistance, but an active and reasoned

understanding of the circumstances, the nature of the act and its attendant consequences.

xxx xxx xxx"

13. On perusal of the statements of the victim

under Section 180 of BNSS as well as under

Section 183 of BNSS, it is seen that it is the

consistent stand of the victim that the accused-

Petitioner had first acquaintance with her, in his

capacity as an Investigating Officer, while

conducting investigation into the complaint lodged

by her as a widow on account of theft of materials

from her office, which she was running after the

death of her husband.

Further, when the Opposite Party-Victim

requested the Petitioner for a gas cylinder, the

same was provided by the Petitioner and during

the course of his visits to the house, he tried to

overstep the limits of an Investigating Officer and

initially wanted to take rest in the house of the

Petitioner on one of the days, which was not

agreed to by the Opposite Party-victim.

Later on, on the date of occurrence, taking

advantage of the absence of the Petitioner's son

and daughter, against the will of the Opposite

Party no.1- victim, the Petitioner committed the

offence.

13-A. On bare analysis of the materials on record,

it is borne out that the transgression of limits by

the Petitioner, a Police Official, initially led to the

commission of the offence, and thereafter he took

advantage of his dominant position, and the

alleged subsequent conduct of the victim, which is

stated to be consensual, has to be viewed in the

background of the initial offence committed for the

first time against the will of the victim, as per her

statements.

It cannot be lost sight that the Petitioner,

being an Investigating Officer, was in a position to

dominate the will of the victim.

Viewed in this context, the initial resistance

of the victim as borne out from her statement

under Section 183 of BNSS, has to be given its due

weightage at the stage of framing of charge and

the veracity of it does not merit adjudication, at

the threshold, as being canvased by the Petitioner.