Orissa High Court
Registrar General Of The vs Malaya Ranjan Dash on 17 September, 2025
Author: S.K. Sahoo
Bench: S.K. Sahoo
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RVWPET No.160 of 2025
In the matter of an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Registrar General of the
Hon‟ble High Court of Orissa,
Cuttack and others ....... Petitioners
-Versus-
Malaya Ranjan Dash
and another ....... Opposite Parties
For the Petitioners: - Mrs. Pami Rath
(Senior Advocate)
Mr. Pratyasish Mohanty
Advocate
For the Opp. Party No.1: - Mr. Budhadev Routray
(Senior Advocate)
Mr. J. Biswal, Advocate
For the Opp. Party No.2: - Mr. Aurobinda Mohanty
Addl. Standing Counsel
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
AND
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of Hearing: 01.09.2025 Date of Judgment: 17.09.2025
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S.S. Mishra, J. Although the petitioners in the present Review
Petition have assailed the final judgment of this Court dated
02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.28874 of 2023, however,
prayer is being made by the petitioners attempting to explore
the following relief:-
"(a) allow the Review Petition;
(b) Restore the original writ petition and to re-
hear the original writ petition taking into
consideration the grounds mentioned in the
review petition;
(c) And pass any other/further Order(s) as this
Hon‟ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
interest of justice."
2. Heard Mrs. Pami Rath, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Budhadev Routray, learned
Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party No.1.
3. The main ground on the basis of which the Review
Petition has been instituted, is that this Court, while passing the
judgment under challenge has relied upon a fabricated set of
documents furnished before it, which led to the error apparent
on record.
Mrs. Rath, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
petitioners emphatically contended that, in fact, a fabricated and
parallel file was created and the said fabricated documents were
placed before this Court to persuade this Court to pass the
impugned judgment. Had the Court looked into the original
record; the result of the writ petition would have been different.
By taking us to the „so called fabricated records‟ placed with this
Review Petition at Annexure-16 series, Mrs. Rath, has pointed
out the following error stated to be apparently crept on record,
which is reproduced herein under:
"The Order dated 04.04.2025 in the
present writ petition indicates that the
Court had taken note of the original and
fabricated records under Sealed Cover. But
it has referred to the fabricated records
which do not contain the real facts.
Because of which it missed out the Order
dated 09.09.2021 found in the original
order sheet of the suo motu writ petition
disposing of the suo motu writ petition
No.7943/2021 wherein it was clearly
indicated by the three Judges that all the
three orders were dated 24.02.2021 i.e.
the Order of the Hon‟ble Presiding Judge,
the dissenting order of the Hon‟ble 2nd
Judge and the combined order referring
the matter to the then Hon‟ble Chief
Justice were unsigned even as on
09.09.2021.
Had the same been taken note of which is
a judicial finding, the Court could not have
relied upon Order dated 07.04.2021
passed in W.P.(C) No.11802 of 2020 or
any other order to come to the findings on
facts.
In any view of the matter the finding of
the Three-Judge Bench was binding on the
Writ Court."
In view of the aforementioned highlighted error, Mrs.
Rath, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the
writ petition needs to be re-heard and re-appreciated with
reference to the sequence of events in the light of the original
record pertaining to the registration of the Suo Motu Proceeding.
4. Before adverting to the various documents sought to
be relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate stating those to
be the original record, it would be apt to look into the
proceeding of this Court in the writ petition being W.P.(C)
No.28874 of 2023, which eventually led to passing of the final
judgment on 02.05.2025. On 31.01.2025, this Court has passed
the following order:
"After hearing the matter for some time, we feel
it necessary to peruse all the original records in
connection with case.
Let the learned counsel for the State keep ready
with all the original records in connection with
this case in a sealed cover and produce the
same for our perusal as and when required."
On 07.02.2025, when the matter was again heard,
the following order was passed:
"As per order dated 31.01.2025, learned counsel
for the State produced the documents in sealed
cover before us. The sealed cover was opened in
open Court and we perused the same.
During the course of such perusal, we find that
the complete records of Suo Motu W.P.(C) No.
7943 of 2021 is not available and accordingly,
we sent instruction to the learned Registrar
General of the Court to come. We asked the
learned R.G. to submit the entire case records of
Suo Motu W.P.(C) No.7943 of 2021. He sought
for time to provide the same in sealed cover
through the learned counsel for the State.
Learned Advocate General submitted that he
wants to peruse the entire records pertaining to
the cases and one of the officers in the rank of
Registrar of this Court may be asked to produce
the records before him for his perusal in order to
address the Court on the next date.
In view of such submission, we direct the
learned Registrar General to produce the
relevant records pertaining to the writ petitions
in sealed covers either by himself or by a
responsible officer of the Court in the rank of
Registrar, who is duly acquainted with the case
before the learned Advocate General on his prior
intimation for perusal and then keep the same in
sealed cover.
On consensus of all the parties, list this matter
on 21st February 2025. The matter will be taken
up at 10.30 a.m.
The documents produced in sealed covers,
which were opened today in Court for our
perusal, be re-sealed and handed over to the
learned counsel for the State, who in turn shall
handover the same back to the learned
Registrar General. The learned counsel for the
State shall keep all the original records in
connection with this case ready in sealed covers
and produce the same for our perusal as and
when required."
In view of the above referred proceedings preceding
the final judgment, the plea of the review petitioners that the
impugned judgment has blindsided by the original record holds
no water.
Again the proceeding went on and on 21.03.2025
this Court passed the following order:
"During course of argument, Mr. Routray,
learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner
placed a short note of submissions which is filed
by him in Court today and taken on record. In
paragraph no.7 of the note, he has stated and
also urged before us that there is no such
rule/law/procedure/standing order regarding
permission of the Hon'ble Chief Justice for
registration of suo motu case basing on an order
passed by the Hon'ble Court.
In this connection, we find that Mr. Suman
Kumar Mishra, the then Registrar (Judicial) was
examined as Department Witness No.1 on 16th
July 2022 and in paragraph no.36 of his
deposition, he has stated as follows:-
"36. It is a fact that no codified
procedure or rule is there requiring
prior intimation of the Hon'ble Chief
Justice before approving the note of
D.R. (Judicial) by the Registrar,
General....."
In the inquiry report, in paragraph no.11, the
Inquiring Authority has also mentioned as
follows:
"11.....Usually a suo Moto Writ
Proceeding is initiated by the order of
the Chief Justice or a Bench consisting
of the Chief Justice as one of the
member. As stated by Department
Witness No.1, who is the Registrar
(Judicial) of the Court, no such
precedence is there where a Suo Moto
Writ Proceeding was initiated by a
Bench other than the Chief
Justice.........."
Let the Special Officer (Administration), High
Court of Orissa, Cuttack, who has filed the
counter affidavit on behalf of the opp. party
nos.2, 3 and 4 in this writ petition, file an
affidavit indicating specifically as to whether
there is any rule/law/procedure/standing order
regarding permission of the Hon‟ble Chief Justice
for registration of suo motu case basing on an
order passed by the Hon‟ble Court.
Hearing is closed.
List this matter along with W.P.(C) No.28873 of
2023 on 25.03.2025 under the heading of "To
be mentioned" for the purpose of filing an
affidavit as directed."
5. Pursuant to the order dated 21.03.2025, the Special
Officer (Administration), High Court of Orissa, Cuttack filed an
affidavit.
The aforementioned proceedings indicate that before
this Court passed the final order, repeated directions were made
to the Review Petitioners to file the original documents in a
sealed cover. It was also directed that the entire documents put
in a sealed cover should be shown to the learned Advocate
General and appropriate instruction should be furnished to him.
6. Subsequent thereto, the records were placed before
us in a sealed cover. We have perused those documents and
persuaded ourselves to pass the impugned judgment. That
apart, in the writ petition, a detailed counter affidavit was filed
by the Special Officer (Administration), High Court of Orissa,
Cuttack. In the entire counter affidavit, there is not a single
whisper regarding existence of such parallel record. Even though
the same Officer pursuance to our order dated 21.03.2025 has
filed the affidavit, in the said affidavit as well, there is not a
single whisper regarding existence of such „parallel records‟ on
which much importance was placed.
We have also perused the article of charges and the
enquiry report as well as all other related documents pertaining
to the departmental enquiry. In the entire documents and
pleadings, nowhere it has come on record regarding existence of
such parallel record. It is for the first time in the Review Petition
that this point has been urged, on the basis of which, the Review
of the final judgment dated 02.05.2025 has been sought for.
7. Mrs. Pami Rath, learned Senior Advocate appearing
for the petitioners has urged that the impugned judgment
suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record as it failed
to appreciate the factual sequence in proper prospective. She
submitted that on 24.02.2021, the Division Bench assembled,
and the learned Presiding Judge directed initiation of a Suo Motu
proceeding. The learned 2nd Judge immediately expressed his
reservations in the open Court and refused to sign the order.
This is borne out by the note-sheet of the then Hon‟ble Chief
Justice as well as the subsequent letter dated 10.05.2021
written by the learned 2nd Judge to the Hon‟ble Chief Justice.
Learned Senior Advocate argued that on 26.02.2021,
despite the absence of a signed or authenticated order, the
Deputy Registrar (Judicial) placed a note-sheet accompanied by
an unauthenticated paper purporting to be the order of the
Division Bench. Acting upon such a document, Suo Motu W.P.(C)
No.7943 of 2021 was registered, though the roster for Public
Interest Litigations was vested solely with the then Hon‟ble Chief
Justice. On 01.03.2021, an unsigned order which also omitted
the dissent of the learned 2nd Judge was served upon Mr.
Manoranjan Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate appointed as one
of the Amicus Curiae. On 02.03.2021, the then Hon‟ble Chief
Justice, upon being informed, took custody of the original file
and directed that no further steps be taken in the Suo Motu
matter.
Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that on
07.04.2021, while hearing W.P.(C) No. 11802 of 2020, the
Division Bench of this Court adverted to the Suo Motu Writ
Petition and relied upon a fabricated order-sheet. The learned
2nd Judge being unaware that the original record was with the
Hon‟ble Chief Justice, was misled into signing his dissenting
order. On 10.05.2021, the learned 2nd Judge wrote a letter to
the Hon‟ble Chief Justice narrating the events of 24.02.2021,
26.02.2021 and 07.04.2021, reiterating that he had reserved his
view on the Suo Motu Proceedings in open Court and refused to
sign on 24.02.2021. On 20.05.2021, the Hon‟ble Chief Justice
issued a further note-sheet confirming the existence of
fabricated records and clarifying that W.P.(C) No.11802 of 2020
was wholly unrelated. Finally, on 09.09.2021, a Three-Judge
Bench disposed of Suo Motu W.P.(C) No. 7943 of 2021, holding
that in view of unsigned and differing orders dated ought not to
have been registered.
Basing upon such factual foundation, learned Senior
Advocate contended that the judgment under review erred in
recording that there was no dissent by the learned 2nd Judge.
The available record, the note-sheets of the Hon‟ble Chief Justice
and the learned 2nd Judge‟s letter dated 10.05.2021,
conclusively show that dissent was expressed. The order dated
24.02.2021 was not a judicial pronouncement but an
administrative direction. It is settled that the Hon‟ble Chief
Justice is the master of the roster, and registration of a Suo
Motu Petition in the nature of a PIL could only have been placed
before the Bench presided over by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice.
In support of this submission, reliance was placed on
State of Rajasthan -Vrs.- Prakash Chand1, wherein the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
(1998) 1 SCC 1
"59. From the preceding discussion, the following
broad CONCLUSIONS emerge. This, of course, is
not to be treated as a summary of our judgment
and the conclusions should be read with the text
of the judgment:
(1) That the administrative control of the High
Court vests in the Chief Justice alone. On the
judicial side, however, he is only the first
amongst the equals.
(2) That the Chief Justice is the master of the
roster. He alone has the prerogative to
constitute benches of the court and allocate
cases to the benches so constituted.
(3) That the puisne Judges can only do that
work as is allotted to them by the Chief Justice
or under his directions.
(4) That till any determination made by the
Chief Justice lasts, no Judge who is to sit singly
can sit in a Division Bench and no Division
Bench can be split up by the Judges constituting
the bench themselves and one or both the
Judges constituting such bench sit singly and
take up any other kind of judicial business not
otherwise assigned to them by or under the
directions of the Chief Justice.
(5) That the Chief Justice can take cognizance of
an application laid before him under Rule 55
(supra) and refer a case to the larger bench for
its disposal and he can exercise this jurisdiction
even in relation to a part-heard case.
(6) That the puisne Judges cannot "pick and
choose" any case pending in the High Court and
assign the same to himself or themselves for
disposal without appropriate orders of the Chief
Justice.
(7) That no Judge or Judges can give directions
to the Registry for listing any case before him or
them which runs counter to the directions given
by the Chief Justice....."
Learned Senior Advocate contended that in the
impugned judgment, reliance was placed on Surendra Singh
-Vrs.- State of UP2 and Vinod Kumar Singh -Vrs.- Banaras
Hindu University3 was wholly misplaced. Those decisions arose
in circumstances where lis existed and rights of parties were
finally determined. The present case involved neither parties nor
adjudication of rights but merely an administrative instruction.
In this regard, reliance was placed on Shankarlal Aggarwala
-Vrs.- Shankarlal Poddar4, wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court explained the distinction:
".........It is perhaps not possible to formulate a
definition which would satisfactorily distinguish,
in this context, between an administrative and a
judicial order. That the power is entrusted to or
wielded by a person who functions as a Court is
not decisive of the question whether the Act or
decision is administrative or judicial. But we
conceive that an administrative order should be
one which is directed to the regulation or
supervision of matters as distinguished from an
AIR 1954 SC 194
(1988) 1 SCC 80
1963 SCC OnLine SC 80
order which decides the rights of parties or
confers or refuses to confer rights to property
which are the subject of adjudication before the
Court. One of the tests would be whether a
matter which involves the exercise of discretion
is left for the decision of the authority,
particularly if that authority were a Court, and if
the discretion has to be exercised on objective,
as distinguished from a purely subjective
consideration, it would be a judicial decision. It
has sometimes been said that the essence of a
judicial proceeding or of a judicial order is that
there should be two parties and a lis between
them which is the subject of adjudication, as a
result of that order or a decision on an issue
between a proposal and an opposition. No
doubt, it would not be possible to describe an
order passed deciding a lis before the authority,
that it is not a judicial order but it does not
follow that the absence of a lis necessarily
negatives the order being judicial.......There were
thus two points of view presented to the Court
by two contending parties or interests and the
Court was called upon to decide between them.
And the decision vitally affected the rights of the
parties to property. In this view, we are clearly
of the opinion that the order of the Court was, in
the circumstances, a judicial order and not an
administrative one and was, therefore, not
inherently incapable of being brought up in
appeal."
It was urged by the learned Senior Advocate Mrs.
Rath that the order dated 07.04.2021 in W.P.(C) No.11802 of
2020 cannot be relied upon as it is founded on fabricated
records. Going by the settled principle, fraud vitiates everything,
such an order is a nullity in law. Reliance was placed on A.V.
Papayya Sastry -Vrs.- Govt. of A.P.5, wherein it was held
thus:
"21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if
any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it
cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law.
Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward
Coke proclaimed:
"Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical
or temporal."
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a
judgment, decree or order obtained by playing
fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a
nullity and non-est in the eyes of the law. Such
a judgment, decree or order by the first court or
by the final court has to be treated as nullity by
every court, superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal,
revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates
Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1
QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] Lord Denning
observed : (All ER p. 345 C)
"No judgment of a court, no order of a
Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been
obtained by fraud."
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading
Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature
of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a
judgment would be res judicata and not
(2007) 4 SCC 221
impeachable from within, it might be
impeachable from without. In other words,
though it is not permissible to show that the
court was "mistaken", it might be shown that it
was "misled". There is an essential distinction
between mistake and trickery. The clear
implication of the distinction is that an action to
set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the
ground that it has been decided wrongly,
namely, that on the merits, the decision was
one which should not have been rendered, but it
can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon
or tricked into giving the judgment.
25. It has been said : fraud and justice never
dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit
none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate
deception with the design of securing some
unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue
advantage of another. In fraud, one gains at the
loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings
stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud.
Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which
vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in
personam. The principle of „finality of litigation‟
cannot be stretched to the extent of an
absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of
oppression by dishonest and fraudulent
litigants."
Mrs. Rath, learned Senior Advocate has pointed out
that review jurisdiction is not barred merely because of
concession by counsel and she relied on Shivdev Singh -Vrs.-
State of Punjab6, wherein it was observed as under:
"10.......It is sufficient to say that there is nothing
in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a
High Court from exercising the power of review
which inheres in every court of plenary
jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or
to correct grave and palpable errors committed
by it.........."
In the case of Union of India -Vrs.- S.C.
Parashar7, on which reliance was placed, it is held as follows:
"13. However, there cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that the Disciplinary Authority never
intended to impose a minor penalty. The
concession of the learned Counsel appearing for
the appellant before the High Court was
apparently erroneous. It is now well-settled that
wrong concession made by a counsel before the
court cannot bind the parties when statutory
provisions clearly provide otherwise. [See Union
of India and Ors. -Vrs.- Mohanlal Likumal
Punjabi : (2004) 3 SCC 628]"
Further reliance was placed in the case of Yashwant
Sinha -Vrs.- CBI8, wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
underscored:
"54. It will be noticed that in criminal matters,
review lies on an error apparent on the face of
AIR 1963 SC 1909
(2006) 3 SCC 167
(2020) 2 SCC 338
record being established. However, it is
necessary to notice what a Constitution Bench of
this Court laid down in P.N. Eswara Iyer
-Vrs.- Registrar, Supreme Court of India :
(1980) 4 SCC 680.
"34. The Rule [Ed.: Order 40, Rule 1 of
the Supreme Court Rules], on its face,
affords a wider set of grounds for
review for orders in civil proceedings,
but limits the ground vis-a-vis criminal
proceedings to "errors apparent on the
face of the record". If at all, the
concern of the law to avoid judicial
error should be heightened when life or
liberty is in peril since civil penalties
are often less traumatic. So, it is
reasonable to assume that the framers
of the Rules could not have intended a
restrictive review over criminal orders
or judgments. It is likely to be the
other way about. Supposing an
accused is sentenced to death by the
Supreme Court and the "deceased"
shows up in court and the court
discovers the tragic treachery of the
recorded testimony. Is the court
helpless to review and set aside the
sentence of hanging? We think not. The
power to review is in Article 137 and it
is equally wide in all proceedings. The
Rule merely canalises the flow from the
reservoir of power. The stream cannot
stifle the source. Moreover, the
dynamics of interpretation depend on
the demand of the context and the
lexical limits of the test. Here "record"
means any material which is already on
record or may, with the permission of
the court, be brought on record. If
justice summons the Judges to allow a
vital material in, it becomes part of the
record; and if apparent error is there,
correction becomes necessitous.
35. The purpose is plain, the language
is elastic and interpretation of a
necessary power must naturally be
expansive. The substantive power is
derived from Article 137 and is as wide
for criminal as for civil proceedings.
Even the difference in phraseology in
the Rule (Order 40 Rule 2) must,
therefore, be read to encompass the
same area and not to engraft an
artificial divergence productive of
anomaly. If the expression "record" is
read to mean, in its semantic sweep,
any material even later brought on
record, with the leave of the court, it
will embrace subsequent events, new
light and other grounds which we find
in Order 47 Rule 1, Code of Civil
Procedure. We see no insuperable
difficulty in equating the area in civil
and criminal proceedings when review
power is invoked from the same
source.
xx xx xx
67. The foundations, which underlie the review
jurisdiction, has been examined by this Court at
some length in the judgment in S. Nagaraj and
Ors. -Vrs.- State of Karnataka and Anr. :
1993 Supp (4) SCC 595:
"18. Justice is a virtue which
transcends all barriers. Neither the
Rules of procedure nor technicalities of
law can stand in its way. The order of
the Court should not be prejudicial to
anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered
for consistency but it is not as inflexible
in Administrative Law as in Public Law.
Even the law bends before justice.
Entire concept of writ jurisdiction
exercised by the higher courts is
founded on equity and fairness. If the
Court finds that the order was passed
under a mistake and it would not have
exercised the jurisdiction but for the
erroneous assumption which in fact did
not exist and its perpetration shall
result in miscarriage of justice then it
cannot on any principle be precluded
from rectifying the error. Mistake is
accepted as valid reason to recall an
order. Difference lies in the nature of
mistake and scope of rectification,
depending on if it is of fact or law. But
the root from which the power flows is
the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is
either statutory or inherent. The latter
is available where the mistake is of the
Court. In Administrative Law, the scope
is still wider. Technicalities apart, if the
Court is satisfied of the injustice then it
is its constitutional and legal obligation
to set it right by recalling its order.
Here as explained, the Bench of which
one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did
commit an error in placing all the
stipendiary graduates in the scale of
First Division Assistants due to State's
failure to bring correct facts on record.
But that obviously cannot stand in the
way of the Court correcting its mistake.
Such inequitable consequences as have
surfaced now due to vague affidavit
filed by the State cannot be permitted
to continue.
19. Review literally and even judicially
means re-examination or re-
consideration. Basic philosophy
inherent in it is the universal
acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in
the realm of law, the courts and even
the statutes lean strongly in favour of
finality of decision legally and properly
made. Exceptions both statutorily and
judicially have been carved out to
correct accidental mistakes or
miscarriage of justice. Even when there
was no statutory provision and no
Rules were framed by the highest court
indicating the circumstances in which it
could rectify its order the courts culled
out such power to avoid abuse of
process or miscarriage of justice. In
Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury -Vrs.-
Sukhraj Rai : AIR 1941 FC 1, the
Court observed that even though no
Rules had been framed permitting the
highest Court to review its order yet it
was available on the limited and
narrow ground developed by the Privy
Council and the House of Lords. The
Court approved the principle laid down
by the Privy Council in Rajunder
Narain Rae -Vrs.- Bijai Govind
Singh [(1836) 1 Moo PC 117 : 2
MIA 181 : 1 Sar 175] that an order
made by the Court was final and could
not be altered:
"....nevertheless, if by misprision in
embodying the judgments, by errors
have been introduced, these Courts
possess, by Common law, the same
power which the Courts of record and
statute have of rectifying the mistakes
which have crept in.... The House of
Lords exercises a similar power of
rectifying mistakes made in drawing up
its own judgments, and this Court must
possess the same authority. The Lords
have however gone a step further, and
have corrected mistakes introduced
through inadvertence in the details of
judgments; or have supplied manifest
defects in order to enable the decrees
to be enforced, or have added
explanatory matter, or have reconciled
inconsistencies."
Basis for exercise of the power was stated in
the same decision as under:
"It is impossible to doubt that the
indulgence extended in such cases is
mainly wing to the natural desire
prevailing to prevent irremediable
injustice being done by a Court of last
resort, where by some accident,
without any blame, the party has not
been heard and an order has been
inadvertently made as if the party had
been heard."
Lastly, reliance was placed on Sanjay Kumar
Agarwal -Vrs.- State Tax Officer (1) and another9, wherein
(2024) 2 SCC 362
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court summarised the principles of review
thus:
"16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is
that:
16.1 A judgment is open to review inter alia if
there is a mistake or an error apparent on the
face of the record.
16.2 A judgment pronounced by the Court is
final, and departure from that principle is
justified only when circumstances of a
substantial and compelling character make it
necessary to do so.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
16.7 An error on the face of record must be
such an error which, mere looking at the record
should strike and it should not require any long-
drawn process of reasoning on the points where
there may conceivably be two opinions."
8. Thus, the core submission of Mrs. Rath, learned
Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners was that the order
dated 24.02.2021 was merely administrative; the registration of
the Suo Motu Writ Petition without the Hon‟ble Chief Justice‟s
approval was impermissible; the judgment under review wrongly
recorded absence of dissent by the learned 2nd Judge; and
reliance on fabricated records and misplaced precedents has led
to a miscarriage of justice which calls for correction in review.
9. On the contrary, Mr. Budhadev Routray, learned
Senior Advocate appearing for opposite party No.1, contended
that the review petition is not maintainable and the grounds
urged therein are untenable in law. He submitted that the
petitioners are seeking to create a new case in review, which is
beyond the limited scope of jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1
C.P.C.
With regard to the plea of oral dissent by the Hon‟ble
2nd Judge on 24.02.2021, it was argued that such a ground has
been taken for the first time in the Review Petition. It was never
part of the charge against the writ petitioner, nor raised in
counter affidavit or during arguments, and cannot now be
pressed in review. The letter dated 10.05.2021 of the Hon‟ble
2nd Judge, relied upon by the review petitioners, does not
disclose that the learned 2nd Judge orally dissented in open
Court. On the contrary, the learned 2nd judge has stated that he
penned down his dissenting opinion on 26.02.2021. Even in
para-12-D of the Review Petition, the petitioners admit that
there is no evidence on record to show what transpired in Court
on 24.02.2021.
As regards the order dated 09.09.2021 in Suo Motu
W.P.(C) No.7943 of 2021, Mr. Routray, learned Senior Advocate
argued that there is no conflict between the said order and the
impugned judgment dated 02.05.2025. The Three-Judge Bench
was concerned only with the issue whether the Suo Motu Writ
Petition was correctly registered, whereas the present writ
petition relates to the disciplinary proceeding (D.P. No.3 of
2021) against the petitioner. The question of misconduct by the
writ petitioner was never considered by the Three-Judge Bench.
Further, no binding ratio was laid down therein to govern the
present case. Reliance was placed on Central Board of
Dawoodi Bohra Community -Vrs.- State of Maharashtra10,
that the law laid down by a larger Bench is binding, but an
observation not amounting to ratio does not bind any
subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal Bench. He also cited
Goodyear India Ltd. -Vrs.- State of Haryana11 to submit that
a decision on a point not argued cannot be treated as precedent.
It was argued by Mr. Routray, learned Senior
Advocate that the order dated 07.04.2021 in W.P.(C) No. 11802
of 2020 was a judicial order, signed by both Judges, and formed
part of the record in D.P. No.3/2021 without objection. The
AIR 2005 SC 752
AIR 1990 SC 781
review petitioners themselves did not dispute the downloaded
copy in their counter affidavit, and even allowed the writ
petitioner to rely upon it. Moreover, the order was never
annulled by any Bench, even when the matter was later placed
before the then Hon‟ble Chief Justice. Hence, reliance on the
order dated 07.04.2021 in the impugned judgment was proper.
On the applicability of Surendra Singh (supra) and
Vinod Kumar Singh (supra), Mr. Routray, argued that these
decisions were applied correctly by this Court in its judgment
dated 02.05.2025. He submitted that whether the order dated
24.02.2021 was judicial or administrative was never the issue;
the only question was whether a judgment/order dictated in
open Court becomes operative. This Court categorically held at
paragraph-11 of its judgment that:
"......If a judgment/order is dictated in the open
Court by one of the Judges in a Division Bench
and if the other Judge does not agree with the
view expressed in open Court, he would have to
pronounce his view/dissent immediately in the
Court itself...."
Mr. Routray, learned Senior Advocate pointed out
that the Hon‟ble 2nd Judge in his own letter dated 10.05.2021
had referred to the order dated 24.02.2021 as a judicial order.
Therefore, the argument that it was merely administrative is
contrary to record.
As to the plea of fabrication in relation to Annexure-
16 series and the learned Advocate General producing the order
dated 07.04.2021, Mr. Routray argued that these documents
were never part of the charge, nor pleaded in counter affidavit,
and is being raised for the first time in review. The writ
petitioner had no role in the alleged fabrication of records. The
attempt to introduce new documents at the stage of review is
impermissible.
On the scope of review, Mr. Routray strongly relied
on a catena of decisions:
S. Murali Sundaram -Vrs.- Jothibai
Kannan12,
"16. While considering the aforesaid issue
two decisions of this Court on Order 47 Rule
1 read with Section 114 Code of Civil
Procedure are required to be referred to? In
the case of Perry Kansagra (supra), this
Court has observed that while exercising the
review jurisdiction in an application under
Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 Code
of Civil Procedure, the Review Court does
not sit in appeal over its own order. It is
(2023) 13 SCC 515
observed that a rehearing of the matter is
impermissible in law. It is further observed
that review is not appeal in disguise. It is
observed that power of review can be
exercised for correction of a mistake but not
to substitute a view. Such powers can be
exercised within the limits of the statute
dealing with the exercise of power. It is
further observed that it is wholly unjustified
and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a
judgment by which the controversy has been
finally decided.
17. After considering catena of decisions on
exercise of review powers and principles
relating to exercise of review jurisdiction
under Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil
Procedure this Court had summed upon as
under: (Perry Kansagra case, SCC pp. 768-
69, para 15.1)
"15.1...‟33.....(i) Review proceedings
are not by way of appeal and have to
be strictly confined to the scope and
ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil
Procedure.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised
when some mistake or error apparent
on the fact of record is found. But error
on the face of record must be such an
error which must strike one on mere
looking at the record and would not
require any long-drawn process of
reasoning on the points where there
may conceivably by two opinions.
(iii) Power of review may not be
exercised on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merits.
(iv) Power of review can also be
exercised for any sufficient reason
which is wide enough to include a
misconception of fact or law by a court
or even an advocate.
(v) An application for review may be
necessitated by way of invoking the
doctrine actus curiae neminem
gravabit." (As observed in: Inderchand
Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663,
p.675, para 33)".
It is further observed in the said
decision that an error which is required to be
detected by a process of reasoning can
hardly be said to be an error on the face of
the record.
18. In the case of Shanti Conductors (P)
Ltd. (supra), it is observed and held that
scope of review Under Order 47 Rule 1 Code
of Civil Procedure read with Section 114
Code of Civil Procedure is limited and under
the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be
permitted to reagitate and reargue questions
which have already been addressed and
decided. It is further observed that an error
which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the
face of record justifying the court to exercise
its power of review Under Order 47 Rule 1
Code of Civil Procedure.
xx xx xx xx
23. From the aforesaid, it appears that the
High Court has considered the review
application as if it was an appeal against the
order passed by the High Court in Writ
Petition No.8606 of 2010. As observed
hereinabove, the same is wholly
impermissible while deciding the review
application. Even if the judgment sought to
be reviewed is erroneous, the same cannot
be a ground to review the same in exercise
of powers under Order 47 Rule 1 Code of
Civil Procedure. An erroneous order may be
subjected to appeal before the higher forum
but cannot be a subject matter of review
Under Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil
Procedure."
Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. -Vrs.-
Assam State Electricity Board13,
"25. Insofar as other submissions of Dr.
Singhvi that Act, 1993 is retroactive in
nature and further amount due at the time
of the commencement of the Act ought to
attract interest of the Act, 1993, all these
submissions have been elaborately
considered in the judgment dated
23.01.2019, which have been considered on
merits. The scope of review is limited and
under the guise of review, the petitioner
cannot be permitted to reagitate and
reargue the questions, which have already
been addressed and decided. The scope of
review has been reiterated by this Court
from time to time. It is sufficient to refer the
judgment of this Court in Parsion Devi and
Ors. -Vrs.- Sumitri Devi and Ors.,
wherein in para 9 following has been laid
down: (SCC p.719)
"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil
Procedure, a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an
error apparent on the face of the record. An
error which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning, can
(2020) 2 SCC 677
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the
face of the record justifying the court to
exercise its power of review under Order 47
Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure. In exercise of
the jurisdiction Under Order 47 Rule 1 Code
of Civil Procedure, it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be "reheard and
corrected". A review petition, it must be
remembered has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in
disguise".
Pancham Lal Pandey -Vrs.- Neeraj
Kumar Mishra14,
"14. The provision of review is not to
scrutinize the correctness of the decision
rendered rather to correct the error, if any,
which is visible on the face of the
order/record without going into as to
whether there is a possibility of another
opinion different from the one expressed."
Shri Ram Sahu -Vrs.- Vinod Kumar
Rawat15,
"10. To appreciate the scope of review, it
would be proper for this Court to discuss the
object and ambit of Section 114CPC as the
same is a substantive provision for review
when a person considering himself aggrieved
either by a decree or by an order of court
from which appeal is allowed but no appeal
is preferred or where there is no provision
2023 SCC OnLine SC 143
(2021) 13 SCC 1
for appeal against an order and decree, may
apply for review of the decree or order as
the case may be in the court, which may
order or pass the decree. From the bare
reading of Section 114CPC, it appears that
the said substantive power of review under
Section 114CPC has not laid down any
condition as the condition precedent in
exercise of power of review nor the said
section imposed any prohibition on the court
for exercising its power to review its
decision. However, an order can be reviewed
by a court only on the prescribed grounds
mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC, which has
been elaborately discussed hereinabove. An
application for review is more restricted than
that of an appeal and the court of review has
limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit
mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC itself. The
powers of review cannot be exercised as an
inherent power nor can an appellate power
be exercised in the guise of power of
review.s of review are narrower than appeal;
not an inherent power."
Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik16,
"13. In order to appreciate the scope of a
review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but
this section does not even adumbrate the
ambit of interference expected of the court
since it merely states that it "may make
such order thereon as it thinks fit". The
parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC
and for the purposes of this lis, permit the
(2006) 4 SCC 78
defendant to press for a rehearing "on
account of some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the records or for any other
sufficient reason". The former part of the
rule deals with a situation attributable to the
applicant, and the latter to a jural action
which is manifestly incorrect or on which two
conclusions are not possible. Neither of them
postulate a rehearing of the dispute because
a party had not highlighted all the aspects of
the case or could perhaps have argued them
more forcefully and/or cited binding
precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed
a favourable verdict. This is amply evident
from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47
which states that the fact that the decision
on a question of law on which the judgment
of the court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a
superior court in any other case, shall not be
a ground for the review of such judgment.
Where the order in question is appealable
the aggrieved party has adequate and
efficacious remedy and the court should
exercise the power to review its order with
the greatest circumspection."
Parry Kansagra -Vrs.- Smriti Madan
Kansagra17,
"17. We have gone through both the
judgments of the High Court in the instant
case and considered rival submissions on the
point. It is well settled that an error which is
required to be detected by a process of
reasoning can hardly be said to be an error
(2019) 20 SCC 753
apparent on the face of the record. To justify
exercise of review jurisdiction, the error must
be self-evident. Tested on this parameter, the
exercise of jurisdiction in the present case
was not correct. The exercise undertaken in
the present case, in our considered view, was
as if the High Court was sitting in appeal over
the earlier decision dated 17.2.2017 [Smriti
Madan Kansagra -Vrs.- Perry Kansagra,
2017 SCC OnLine Del 7007 : (2017) 237
DLT 728]. Even assuming that there was no
correct appreciation of facts and law in the
earlier judgment, the parties could be left to
challenge the decision in an appeal. But the
review was not a proper remedy at all. In our
view, the High Court erred in entertaining the
review petition and setting aside the earlier
view dated 17.02.2017 [Smriti Madan
Kansagra -Vrs.- Perry Kansagra, 2017
SCC OnLine Del 7007 : (2017) 237 DLT
728].........."
Governing Body of Ispat College
-Vrs.- State of Orissa18,
"16. On an analysis of the aforesaid
decisions, it is seen that the law is well
settled that the power of review is available
only when there is a mistake or an error
apparent on the face of the record and not
for correcting an erroneous decision. Hence
the plea that the decision is erroneous on
merit due to wrong interpretation of law or
because of illegal and erroneous finding,
whether on fact or in law, cannot be a ground
2011 SCC OnLine Ori 212
for review. The said power of review cannot
be exercised for rehearing and correcting an
erroneous decision. The only remedy
available to the aggrieved party, is to assail
such erroneous decision in appeal. The power
to review is a restricted power which
authorizes the Court, which passed the
judgment sought to be reviewed, to look over
through the judgment not in order to
substitute a fresh or a second judgment but
in order to correct it or improve it, because
some material which it ought to have
considered had escaped its consideration or
failed to be placed before it for any other
reason.
17. In view of the above discussion, the law
of review can be summarized that it lies only
on the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII,
Rule 1 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court
that the matter or evidence discovered by it
at a subsequent stage could not be
discovered or produced at the initial stage
though it had acted with due diligence. A
party filing a review application on the
ground of any other "sufficient reason" must
satisfy that the said reason is analogous to
the conditions mentioned in Order XLVII,
Rule 1 CPC. Under the garb of review, a party
cannot be permitted to re-open the case and
to gain a full-fledged inning for making
submissions, nor review lies merely on the
ground that it may be possible for the Court
to take a view contrary to what had been
taken earlier. Review lies only when there is
error apparent on the face of the record and
that fallibility is by the over-sight of the
Court. If a counsel has argued a case to his
satisfaction and he had not raised the
particular point for any reason whatsoever, it
cannot be a ground of review for the reason
that he was the master of his case and might
not have considered it proper to press the
same or could have thought that arguing that
point would not serve any purpose. If a case
has been decided after full consideration of
arguments made by a counsel, he cannot be
permitted, even under the garb of doing
justice or substantial justice, to engage the
Court again to decide the controversy already
decided. If a party is aggrieved of a judgment
or order, it must approach the higher Court
by way of appeal or revision, as the case may
be, but entertaining a review to reconsider
the case would amount to exceeding its
jurisdiction, conferred for the very limited
purpose of review. Justice connotes different
meaning to different persons in different
contexts and therefore, Courts cannot be
persuaded to entertain a review application to
do justice unless it lies only on the grounds
permitted in law, as has been discussed
above."
10. Summing up, Mr. Routray, learned Senior Advocate
submitted that no ground for review has been made out. The
alleged oral dissent is unsupported by record, the order of the
Three-Judge Bench in Suo Motu Writ Petition does not bind the
present case. The order dated 07.04.2021 was a valid judicial
order, and the principles in Surendra Singh (supra) and Vinod
Kumar Singh (supra) were rightly applied. The attempt of the
review petitioners to reconsider the matter behind the veil of
review is impermissible.
11. Perusal of the Review Petition would reveal that the
Review Petitioners indeed seeks a complete re-hearing of the
writ petition in the guise of revisiting the judgment, which is
barred under Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. However, the ground-H
taken by the Review Petitioners need to be deliberated upon.
Ground-H is reproduced herein for the convenience of ready
reference:-
"H. For that an important aspect of the matter
which has emanated from a different record is
that there exists a parallel fabricated record
sheet of the Suo Motu W.P.(C) No. 7943 of
2021. On the basis of the said fabricated order
sheet, another Departmental Proceeding has
been initiated against two officers connected
with the office of Hon‟ble Senior Judge (name
withheld), wherein the document based on
which the writ petitioner has acted, has been
shown to have been signed by Hon‟ble Senior
Judge (name withheld). Duplicacy of such
order sheet and again signature of one of the
Judges being reflected upon it, clearly indicates
that one cannot rule out mala fide intention,
because the only beneficiary of such signed
order could have been the present writ
petitioner and Deputy Registrar Judicial.
A copy of the fabricated documents and
entire record maintained departmental
proceeding initiated against the subordinate
officers in the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa along
with all the note sheets of the then Hon'ble Chief
Justice and other officers including the letter of
the Puisne Judge (who dissented) (name
withheld) are annexed as ANNEXURE-16
Series.
This fabricated documents is the basis of
the order dated 07.04.2021 passed in W.P.(C)
No. 11802 of 2020 wherein one of the Amicus
Curiae have admitted to have received the copy
of the order dated 24.02.2021 with the
signature of Hon‟ble Senior Judge (name
withheld). But when this is compared with the
original order sheet of the Suo Motu Writ
Petition, such a combined order bearing of
signature of Hon‟ble Senior Judge (name
withheld) is nowhere to be found. This aspect
was not known to the present review petitioner
and came to light only after the judgment was
passed.
The records of this fabricated record of the
suo moto writ and the inquiry records of the
officers implicated in the said act have not been
perused. After creating such records it was
deliberately made part of the W.P.(C) No. 11802
of 2020 and order dated 07.04.2021 was made
that also without the whole thing being divulged
to the Puisne Judge. These aspects emanate
from the letter of the Puisne Judge which is part
of the inquiry records. Had these aspects been
before the Hon'ble the Court, this Court would
not have taken the view it took about the order
dated 07.04.2021, passed in W.P.(C) No. 11802
of 2020.
The order sheet as regards to these
fabricated records directing for enquiry clearly
indicate the background of the order dated
07.04.2021. It is also strange as to why the
fabricated order sheet of the Suo motu
proceeding was even attached to the record of
WPC No. 11802 of 2020, when WPC No. 11802
of 2020 has no reservation issue involved in the
matter. The inquiry report clearly shows the
reasons for which order dated 07.04.2021
should not be taken into consideration. On the
basis of such fabricated documents the
signatures of the 2nd Judge were taken on the
dissenting order in the fabricated record and
also on order dated 7.4.2021."
(Note: In the Review Petition, the names of the Hon‟ble Judges
have been mentioned everywhere. On the first date of hearing,
it was pointed out by us to the counsel for petitioners and was
suggested to redact the names of Hon‟ble Judges to maintain
decorous. However, the same has not been acceded to. In the
ground „H‟ which is reproduced above, the names of the Hon‟ble
Judges occurred. We have chosen to withhold their names rather
address them as Hon‟ble Senior Judge and Puisne Judge.
Similarly wherever, the names of the Hon‟ble Judges found
mentioned the same are withheld or replaced by addressing
them as senior judge, puisne judge, second judge alike. This is
done so as to maintain Judicial Propriety.)
12. The entire argument of Mrs. Rath, learned Senior
Advocate for the Petitioners is indeed revolving around the
aforementioned ground. The contention raised by the Review
Petitioners regarding the fabricated and parallel record, which
was stated to have been not looked into by us is based on a
letter written by the Puisne Judge on 10.05.2021, who was the
part of the Bench. Mrs. Rath, learned Senior Advocate has read
out the letter in extenso. However, nothing has come on record
to suggest what was the occasion for which the learned Puisne
Judge was required to write such a letter on the administrative
side discussing regarding the judicial function, he has carried
out.
Be that as it may, from reading of the letter, the
following aspects are emanating. Firstly, the order dated
24.02.2021 was a judicial order and secondly, he was not aware
of the fabricated and parallel file being created. Therefore, he
persuaded himself to sign the order dated 07.04.2021 in
W.P.(C) No.11802 of 2020 inter alia recording that he has
dissented in the order dated 24.02.2021 only on 02.03.2021. At
the same time, the learned Judge has admitted in the letter that
he has only recorded his dissent on 07.04.2021. The relevant
parts of the letters are reproduced hereunder:
".......However, on 26th February, 2021, I wrote
my dissenting opinion just below the order of
the Presiding Judge and forwarded the said draft
order sheet for her perusal and to intimate her
that I was not agreeable to the order dictated by
her. The copy of the order, which I sent to her
on 26th February, 2021 for perusal, without my
signature, is enclosed herewith as Enclosure-
„A‟......
xx xx xx xx
..........This appears to be startling and quite
unconventional as to how such an unsigned
judicial order of a Division Bench could be used
to issue notice without the signature of any of
the Judge of the Division Bench. The underbelly
of the callous and dysfunctional High Court
Registry stood exposed completely. The Registry
of the Hon‟ble High Court owes a spacious
explanation for resorting to such legerdemain
exercise while accommodating such play in the
joints.
When the matter stood thus, on 07.04.2021
while hearing another Writ Petition filed by the
Employees' Association of the High Court in W.P.
(C) No. 11802 of 2020, by both of us, the
Hon'ble presiding judge- Hon‟ble Senior Judge
(name withheld), once again, raked up the so
called suo motu proceedings in the open Court,
though the aforesaid suo moto proceedings was
not before the Bench on that date and has got
no connection with the issue involved in
Employees' Association Case. The suo motu
order was still unsigned by the Second Judge
(myself) since 24.02.2021. However, due to
constant bickering on this issue by the Presiding
judge, when Hon‟ble Senior Judge (name
withheld) personally handed over the said
unsigned Order Sheet dated 24.02.2021 and
said "since we are going to release the matter
from us, at least you may sign your dissenting
part of the order, so that it can be released and
placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for
placing the matter before the third Judge' as per
High Court Rules. I, ultimately, signed on the
dissenting part of the said unsigned draft order
dated 24.02.2021 only on 07.04.2021 with a
believe that the said order-sheet which I signed
was a part of the original file. It may be
mentioned here that only that particular order-
sheet containing my dissenting views was only
handed over to me on 7.4.2021 for my
signature and not the entire file. Further, at that
point in time, I was not aware of the fact that
the entire original file had already been taken
into the custody of Hon'ble Chief Justice since
the 1st week of March, 2020.
As a valued colleague and the senior most judge
of the High Court, I had no occasion to
disbelieve her and accordingly I signed only on
7.04.2021 on the dissenting portion of the draft
order though prepared backdated i.e. on
24.2.2021. When I came to understand that the
Presiding Judge has coaxingly got the signature
from me on an order sheet which was not part
of the original record, though I signed on the
dissenting portion of the said order on 7th April,
2021, I was aghast at witnessing such a novel
format of court manoeuvrings."
13. It is also apparent on record that the parallel and
fabricated file appears to have been created in the 1 st week of
March, 2020. By that time, the delinquent writ petitioner was
already released on 27.02.2021 from the post of Registrar
General. Therefore, the delinquent officer has no role to play
regarding the creation of the parallel record, if any. It is also
highlighted that a departmental proceeding has been initiated
against few officers regarding creation of such fabricated
document, which is not relevant for the purpose of the present
case. The ground so taken and analysed as above perhaps not a
sufficient ground for giving indulgence to the petitioners for
seeking review of the judgment. It is also emphasized that the
suo motu proceeding which was inappropriately registered on
the basis of approval by the writ petitioner was placed before the
three Judge Bench consisting of the then Hon‟ble Chief Justice,
the Disciplinary Authority, the Hon‟ble Second Judge, the
Enquiry Officer, the Hon‟ble Third Judge was the dissenting
Judge to the orders which gives rise to the present lis. Three
Judge Bench disposed of the Suo Motu Writ Petition being SUO
MOTU W.P.(C) No.7943 of 2021 clearly indicating that there was
two differing orders dated 24.02.2021 and all of them have
remained unsigned on 26.02.2021. Therefore, the Suo Motu Writ
Petition should not have been registered.
14. It is contended by Mrs. Rath, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the petitioners that the order passed by
the Three Judge Bench of this Court is binding on the present
Division Bench. Since the Three Judge Bench has concluded that
the Suo Motu Proceeding was wrongly initiated, the view taken
by the Division Bench may not sustain the scrutiny of law.
At this stage, Mr. Routray, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the opposite party No.1 has pointed out that even
if the argument of the Review petitioners are accepted that there
was a dissenting views amongst the two judges, under the High
Court Rules, it should have been placed before the third judge.
However, surprisingly, a larger bench of Three Judges was
constituted. Mr. Routray, has strongly questioned the very
constitution and composition of the Bench. He submitted that
the Bench was consisting of the then Hon‟ble Chief Justice, the
Disciplinary Authority, the Hon‟ble Second Judge, the Enquiry
Officer, and the Hon‟ble Third Judge, the Dissenting Judge to the
orders which gives rise to the present lis. Mr. Routray, learned
Senior Advocate further submitted that not only the composition
is inappropriate but also ex-facie contrary to the High Court
Rules.
15. We are not inclined to be drawn into this controversy
regarding the composition of Bench, but suffice it to say that the
order of the Lager Bench has no bearing on the facts of the
present case because in the writ petition, this Division Bench
was only deciding the issue arising out of the enquiry and the
disciplinary action taken against the delinquent officer. It would
be relevant to reproduce the statement of imputation of charges,
the delinquent officer was facing:-
"a. The Writ Petitioner while working as
Registrar General of the Hon'ble Orissa High
Court instructed for registration of a suo motu
writ petition without informing the then Hon'ble
Chief Justice of the Hon'ble High Court and that
also by giving his approval on a note sheet of
the then Deputy Registrar (Judicial) on the basis
of an unsigned order;
b. The said approval/instruction was granted on
the basis of an unsigned order of Hon'ble Senior
Judge (name withheld), Puisne Judge (name
withheld);
c. The said approval for registration of suo motu
writ petition has been done without any
authority as the same does not come within the
duty and authority of the office of Registrar
General of Hon'ble Orissa High Court, and that
also without the approval of the then Hon'ble
Chief Justice of Hon'ble Orissa High Court;
d. The further charges were that the suo motu
proceeding had been based on an unsigned
order and acted upon without the approval of
the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of Hon'ble Orissa
High Court;
e. Further, copies of the said unsigned order
have also been sent to the Ld. Advocate
General's office and to the office of one of the
Amicus Curiae, Ld. Senior Advocate Mr.
Manoranjan Mohanty as part of notice;
f. On the basis of the above, charges of gross
misconduct, dereliction of duty, administrative
indiscipline and failure to maintain absolute
honesty and integrity have been levelled."
Reading of the charges boils down to two issues
namely, (1) the delinquent officer has acted upon an unsigned
order of the Division Bench and (2) no approval was taken from
the Hon‟ble Chief Justice before according approval for the
registration of the Suo Motu Proceeding.
16. In so far as second issue regarding taking of
approval before registration of Suo Motu Proceeding is
concerned, this Court vide order dated 21.03.2025 has directed
the Review Petitioners to file an affidavit and pursuant to the
direction, the Special Officer (Administration), High Court of
Orissa, Cuttack filed an affidavit dated 04.04.2025, inter alia,
stating as under:
"2. As per direction of the Hon'ble Court, I
verified the Rules of the High Court of Orissa,
1948 regarding the existence of any rule /law/
procedure/standing order requiring permission
of the Hon'ble Chief Justice for registration of a
suo motu case basing on an order passed by the
Hon'ble Court but could not trace the same.
Thereafter, a request has been made to the
Registrar (Judicial) of the Court for furnishing
such rule/law/procedure/standing order. As per
his instruction the Superintendents, Rules
Section, List Section and Computerized Filing
Section of the Court to furnish were requested
the rule/law/procedure/standing order, if any,
requiring permission of the Hon'ble Chief Justice
for registration of suo motu case basing on an
order passed by the Hon'ble Court.
3. The Superintendent, Rules Section of the
Court enclosing copy of Judgment dated
05.04.2022 of Madurai Bench of the Madras
High Court in Suo-Motu W.P. (MD) No.5273 of
2022 wherein it has been laid down that though
Hon'ble Judge may form opinion to register suo
motu writ petition on a complaint received from
a citizen, he has no authority to direct the
Registry to register suo motu case, but to direct
the Registry to place the same before Hon'ble
the Chief Justice. However, he has submitted
that no rule/standing order of this Court is
available with regard to taking permission of the
Hon'ble Chief Justice for registration of suo motu
case basing on an order passed by the Hon'ble
Court. (Annexure-A).
4. The Superintendent, List Section of the Court
has submitted that as per usual practice any
order passed by the Hon'ble Court in this regard
are sent to concerned branch and the branch
places the matter before the Registrar (Judicial)
for further course of action regarding
registration of a suo motu case. List Section has
no role regarding registration of suo motu case
and also no such instruction is usual in the List
Section for registration of suo motu case.
(Annexure-B)
5. The Superintendent, Computerized Filing
Section of the Court has submitted that as per
previous practice, this Section receives the Suo
Motu Writ proceedings from the Registrar
(Judicial) for the purpose of registration, as such
with approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The
procedure is being followed by the concerned
section. Hence, such rule/law/
procedure/standing order has not been
encountered by this Section. (Annexure-C).
6. In the light of the above position, it is
forthcoming that no such rule/law/
procedure/standing order regarding obtaining
permission of Hon'ble the Chief Justice for
registration of suo motu case basing on an order
passed by the Hon'ble Court is available.
7. That, the facts stated above are true to the
best of my knowledge, belief and based upon
available official records."
In the absence of any Rules/regulation and/or
convention or judicial precedent to the effect that before
registration of Suo-motu proceeding, permission preceding the
registration from the Hon‟ble Chief justice is a condition
precedent, no fault of the writ petitioner could be established per
se.
17. In so far as the approval granted by the delinquent
officer for registration of Suo Motu Proceeding on an unsigned
order is concerned, the argument advanced by Mrs. Rath,
learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioners may assume some
importance. This aspect of the matter has been appropriately
dealt by us in the impugned judgment dated 02.05.2025, that
part of the judgment reads thus:-
"On 26.02.2021 the Deputy Register (Judicial)
put up a note before the petitioner for necessary
orders by verbatim reproducing the order dated
24.02.2021. The petitioner approved the note
routinely which according to the petitioner was
done in good faith and consequently the Suo
Motu proceeding was registered. It is borne out
of the record that the copy of the said order
dated 24.02.2021 was also dispatched to the
appointed Amicus Curiae, which was received by
one of the learned Amicus Curiae on the same
day. It is also apparent on record that the
original proceeding signed by one of the Hon‟ble
Judges was not placed before the petitioner on
26.02.2021. At least nothing contrary is coming
to the fore on record to suggest otherwise. The
note sheet dated 26.02.2021 which was put up
before the petitioner for approval on 26.02.2021
was approved on the same day."
The aforementioned finding cannot be faulted by
referring it to be an error relying upon the letter dated
10.05.2021 of the learned Puisne Judge, because even the
learned Judge in the letter has not spoken about expressing
dissent on 24.02.2021, rather he has mentioned that the judicial
proceeding dated 24.02.2021 was recorded by him only on
02.03.2021 and at one place he even says that he dissented on
07.03.2021. But in either case, admittedly on 26.02.2021, when
the writ petitioner approved for registration of the Suo Motu
proceeding, there was no dissent by the Second Judge on
record.
18. At this juncture, it is pertinent to examine the
contours of review jurisdiction. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in
its recent pronouncement in Malleeswari -Vrs.- K. Suguna
and Another19, after drawing guidance from earlier decisions in
Parsion Devi -Vrs.- Sumitri Devi20, Lily Thomas -Vrs.-Union
of India21, Inderchand Jain -Vrs.- Motilal22, Shivdev
Singh -Vrs.- State of Punjab (supra), Hari Vishnu Kamath
-Vrs.- Syed Ahmad Ishaque23, T.C. Basappa -Vrs.- T.
Nagappa24, Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde -Vrs.-
Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale25 and Chhajju Ram -Vrs.-
Neki26, has restated the scope and ambit of review under
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1927
(1997) 8 SCC 715
(2000) 6 SCC 224
(2009) 14 SCC 663
(1954) 2 SCC 881
(1954) 1 SCC 905
AIR 1960 SC 137
1922 SCC OnLine PC 11
Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Court crystallized the principles as follows:
"17. Having noticed the distinction between the
power of review and appellate power, we restate
the power and scope of review jurisdiction.
Review grounds are summed up as follows:
17.1 The ground of discovery of new and
important matter or evidence is a ground
available if it is demonstrated that, despite the
exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not
within their knowledge or could not be produced
by the party at the time, the original decree or
order was passed.
17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of
the record may be invoked if there is something
more than a mere error, and it must be the one
which is manifest on the face of the record.
Such an error is a patent error and not a mere
wrong decision. An error which has to be
established by a long-drawn process of
reasoning on points where there may
conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said
to be an error apparent on the face of the
record.
17.3 Lastly, the phrase „for any other sufficient
reason‟ means a reason that is sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified in
the other two categories."
The principles culled out in Malleeswari (supra),
read in conjunction with the earlier precedents referred to
therein, make it abundantly clear that the jurisdiction of review
is of a very limited nature. It is intended only to correct a
manifest error or to consider material which could not be
produced earlier despite due diligence. An error apparent on the
face of the record that is, a patent and self-evident mistake
which does not require elaborate reasoning, possibility as well
may also furnish a ground for review. Likewise, the phrase "any
other sufficient reason" has been judicially construed to mean
reasons analogous to the discovery of new evidence or error
apparent, and cannot be invoked to re-agitate settled issues.
Thus, the scope of review is restrictive and circumscribed,
standing in sharp contrast to the wider jurisdiction exercised in
appeal.
19. Having delineated the scope of review as settled by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, it becomes necessary to test the
present plea against these parameters.
In light of the above principles, even if the
submissions of learned Senior Counsel Mrs. Pami Rath are
accepted in toto, the most that could be contended is the
possibility of an alternative view. However, the existence of an
alternative view by itself does not fall within the limited grounds
of review as recognised by law. A review is not an appeal in
disguise, and re-evaluation of facts or law to substitute one
plausible view with another is outside the permissible scope.
Therefore, the view adopted by this Court in the impugned
judgment cannot be interfered within review jurisdiction merely
because a different perspective is sought to be urged.
20. For the forgoing reasons, the Review Petition
deserves no merit, hence the prayer made in the petition is not
acceded to. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
S.K. Sahoo, J. I agree.
(S.K. Sahoo)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Dated the 17th September 2025/Swarna
Designation: Senior Stenographer
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 17-Sep-2025 14:04:20
