Orissa High Court
Procedure Code) vs State Of Orissa on 9 September, 2025
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No. 377 of 2004
(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of Criminal
Procedure Code)
Satyajit Rout ....... Appellant
-Versus-
State of Orissa ....... Respondent
For the Appellant : Mr. Himanshu Bhusan Dash, Advocate
For the Respondent : Ms. R.B. Dash, ASC
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 14.08.2025 :: Date of Judgment: 09.09.2025
S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal arises out of the
judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 passed by the learned Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Rourkela in G.R. Case No.1536 of 2002,
whereby the learned trial Court convicted the accused-appellant under
Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Code" for brevity), sentencing him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months.
Prosecution Story
2. The prosecution alleged that during the absence of the informant,
the accused passed indecent comments towards his wife, which she later
reported to the informant. When the informant protested against such
conduct, the accused not only threatened him but also misbehaved with
his wife. In the evening of 12.09.2002, the accused allegedly conspired
to "teach a lesson" to the informant. At about 6:30 P.M., while the
informant was returning from duty, the accused lay in wait on the way,
intercepted him, and assaulted him. In the course of the scuffle, when the
informant attempted to escape, the accused bit his left thumb and
thereafter fled from the spot.
Subsequently, the informant lodged an F.I.R., which was marked
as Ext. 1 in the trial. Upon investigation, it was revealed that the accused
belonged to the general caste and had attempted to woo the wife of the
informant, thereby causing resentment among her family members. On
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facing objection, the accused allegedly assaulted the informant, causing
injury. Since the victims belonged to a Scheduled Tribe, the accused's
acts were found to have been committed with the intention to intimidate,
humiliate, and outrage their modesty. Subsequently the accused was
charged U/s 324/506/509 of the Code and U/s 3(1)(x) & (xi) of the S.C.
& S.T. (PoA) Act.
The defence, took the plea of complete denial. On this stance of
denial, the accused faced trial.
3. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined ten witnesses in
total, while the defence did not examine any. Among them, P.W.1 is the
informant-victim and P.W.2 is his wife. P.W.4 is the informant's brother,
and P.W.7 is the wife of P.W.4. P.W.8 and P.W.9 were the Investigating
Officers, while P.W.10 was the Medical Officer. The remaining
witnesses were residents of the locality; however, they did not support
the prosecution and claimed to have no knowledge of the incident.
Page 3 of 10
Trial Court's Analysis and Judgement
4. The learned Trial Court has categorically dealt with the evidence
to find out application of all the charges to the present case in para 8 of
the impugned Judgement, the same is reproduced here for the
convenience of ready reference:
8. P.W.1 is not one occurrence witness to the offence u/s
509 I.P.C. He learnt it from his wife P.W.2. P. W.2 had not
supported him. So, his evidence in passing of comments by
accused to his wife prior to the occurrence is meaningless.
P.W.7 his elder brother wife gave evidence that about 2
years back she found the accused winking to the wife of her
husband's elder brother (P.W.2) and also whistling her but
she had no courage to object, to it though she reported it to
her husband. Her evidence did not reveal if the aforesaid
acts of accused was to the annoyance or objection of P.W.
2. It simply hinted that it was with the consent of P.W 2 or
to her enjoyment indicating affair and that is why P.W.7
could not dare to object it. Therefore such act of whistling
and winking may not amount to punishable u/s 509 I.P.C.
as there was element of consensus and tecite approval of
P.W.2 to such act. Be that as it may it was not the
proscution case that the accused had whistled her or
winked at her. F.I.R story and claim of P.W.1 the informant
is to the effect that the accused was passing comments to
his wife during his absence and as he cautioned him, the
accused assaulted him and had bitten him, so, the
allegation of prosecution had been twisted by P.W.7 and
the evidence of P.W.7 is one new one and in this
circumstances when it is not supported by P.W. 2 or others
it cannot be the basis to act upon and therefore,
considering, as a whole, it can be held that the offence u/s
509 1.P.C. could not be brought home. As already
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mentioned there is no evidence in support of the offence u/s
506 I.P.C. All that the evidence of P.W.1 read with the
evidence of medical Officer (P.W.10) revealed that the
accused had committed an offence U/s. 324 IPC in biting
the left thumb of the informant. It is contended that
evidence of the informant is unsatisfactory and not
corroborated. P.W.1 had admitted that he was booked in
G.R Case No. 1537/2002 u/s.341/323/325/506/34 I.P.C.
with the allegation that he had assaulted the accused at 10
A.M. of 12.9.2002. So, it is a case of previous enmity in
respect of the Present case taking place in the evening of
12.10.2002. There is admitted case of ill feeling between
the parties as P.W.1 had alleged that the accused was
passing comments to his wife during his absence. It is well
settled that on the sole ground of enmity, interestedness etc.
the evidence of one witness cannot be brushed aside. In
such situation court is to scrutinise the evidence with
caution and in case it is found that such evidence is
trustworthy and credible conviction can be recorded. If
facts and circumstances warrant, court may demand
corroboration, circumstantial or direct from independent
source. Keeping the said principle in mind let it be seen
whether the evidence of P.W.1 is trustworthy and credible,
Nothing has been brought out in cross-examination to
discredit the witness. There is no significant contradiction
to impeach his credence. His evidence is well corroborated
by his F.I.R. Ext.1 and the Medical evidence though P.W.10
the Medical Officer. Merely because the other witnesses
did not come to support him or to bring home the rest part
of his evidence, his credibility is not at a stake. He is trust
worthy. His evidence is clear and cogent to show that the
accused had assaulted him and had bitten his left thumb in
the evening of 12.9.2002 and thereby, the accused had
committed one offence u/s 324 I. P.C. Though he is entitled
to be acquitted from the rest of the charges."
.
5. Further in para 9 of the impugned Judgement the learned Court
below while appreciating the evidence have found that the charge u/s
506/509 of the Code read with section 3(1)(x) and (xi) couldn't be
proved against the present accused-appellant, and concluded as under:
"9. In the result, the accused is held not guilty of the
offence u/s 506/509 I.P.C. read with section 3(1)(x) & (xi)
of SC/ST (PA) Act and acquitted from the said charges. I
further find that prosecution could well prove its case u/s
324 I.P.C. against him and accordingly I hold the accused
guilty and at convict him u/s 324 I.P.C."(To be corrected)
Submissions by the Counsel for the parties
6. Heard Mr. Himanshu Bhusan Dash, learned Counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Raj Bhusan Dash, learned Additional Standing
Counsel for the State.
7. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that even assuming
the prosecution case to be true, the conviction of the appellant under
Section 324 I.P.C. is wholly unsustainable in law. It is argued that the
essential ingredient of Section 324 I.P.C. is the use of any dangerous or
deadly weapon or means in causing hurt. In the present case, the
allegation against the appellant is that he bit the left thumb of the
informant. The act of biting, by no stretch of reasoning, can be held to
be the use of a weapon or dangerous means. Therefore, the conviction
under Section 324 I.P.C. cannot be sustained, even if the evidence
adduced by prosecution are taken at its face value.
Findings and Observation
8. This Court has considered the submission and perused the evidence
on record. From the discussion in paragraph 8 of the impugned
judgment, it is manifest that the finding of guilt recorded against the
appellant is based solely on the evidence of P.W.1, corroborated by the
medical report of P.W.10, to the effect that the appellant had assaulted
the informant and bitten his left thumb causing simple injury. While
this Court finds no reason to disbelieve the occurrence itself, the legal
issue raised requires consideration. Section 324 I.P.C. contemplates
causing hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or
cutting, or any instrument likely to cause death, or by fire or heated
substance, poison, corrosive substance, explosive, or by any other
means which is inherently dangerous. In the present case, no weapon or
such dangerous means has been used. The act of biting by the appellant
may constitute an offence of voluntarily causing hurt, but it does not
attract the ingredients of Section 324 I.P.C.
9. Accordingly, this Court holds that the conviction of the appellant
under Section 324 I.P.C. is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside.
However, since the act of assault and biting of the thumb has been duly
proved, the appellant is found guilty of committing an offence
punishable under Section 323 I.P.C.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the
appellant has already undergone custody for a period of nine days
during investigation and trial, which fact is not disputed by the learned
Additional Standing Counsel for the State. It is further submitted that
the occurrence relates back to the year 2002. The appellant, who was in
his mid-thirties at the relevant point of time, must now be in his late
fifties. Considerable time has elapsed in the meantime, and there is no
allegation of repetition of such offence by the appellant. In such
circumstances, it is urged that the appellant deserves to be treated under
the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, r/w. Section
360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Conclusion
11. Taking into consideration the submission made by the learned
Counsel at bar, although as mentioned in the above paragraphs, I hold
the accused person guilty of offence U/s.323 of the Code, but think it
appropriate to modify the sentence. Considering the entire features of
the case I could have dealt with the appellant U/s.4 of the P.O. Act.
However, when the Appellant has already suffered imprisonment for
nine days, injustice would be compounded if I now grant him the
treatment under the Probation of Offender's Act. I would, therefore,
while affirming conviction, reduce the sentence to the period already
undergone. However, in the fitness of the case, I feel it appropriate, to
affirm the fine amount of Rs.1,000/- , in default of which the appellant
shall undergo simple imprisonment for one week. The fine amount shall
be remitted to the victim (if alive) as per the procedure contemplated
U/s.357 Cr.P.C.
12. Accordingly, the CRLA is partly allowed.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Dated the 9th September, 2025/Ashok
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB MOHAPATRA
Location: High Court of Orissa
