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State Of Orissa vs Subash Chandra Subudhi .... Opposite ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 5840 Ori

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 5840 Ori
Judgement Date : 30 May, 2025

Orissa High Court

State Of Orissa vs Subash Chandra Subudhi .... Opposite ... on 30 May, 2025

                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                              CRLLP No.47 of 2009

             Arising out of the judgment dated 02.12.2008 passed by the learned
             Special Judge (Vigilance), Berhampur at Ganjam in G.R. Case No. 59
             of 2003 (V) - T.R. No. 40 of 2004.


               State of Orissa                                .... Petitioner


                                              -versus-

               Subash Chandra Subudhi                         .... Opposite Party

             Advocates appeared in this case through Hybrid Mode :


             For Petitioner                              : Mr. Sangram Das,
                                                          Standing Counsel (Vig.)

             For Opposite Party                          : Mr. Aswini Kumar Das,
                                                           Advocate on behalf of
                                                         Mr. Anupam Das, Advocate

                CORAM:
                     HON'BLE MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO

          ..................................................................................

Date of Judgment: 30.05.2025 ...................................................................................

Savitri Ratho, J. This Criminal Leave Petition has been filed under

Section 378 (1) and (3) of Cr.P.C. praying for grant of leave to file an

appeal against the judgment dated 02.12.2008 passed by the learned

Special Judge (Vigilance), Berhampur, Ganjam in G.R. Case No.59 of

2003 (V) - T.R. No. 40 of 2004 acquitting the opposite party from the

offence under Section 3/13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act.

PROSECUTION CASE

2. The prosecution case in brief is that the complainant

(decoy) was working as Voluntary Education Teacher of

Mardarajapur E.G.S. (Education guaranteed Scheme) Primary School

under Khallikote Block. For development of the school, the meeting

of Village Education Committee was held at the Primary School on

27.11.2003 and in the said meeting, it was decided to open a joint

Savings Account in the names of Lokanath Das, President of Village

Education Committee, Mardarajapur and decoy at Kanheipur branch

of Rusikullya Gramya Bank. As per the prevalent practice, the S.I. of

Schools of Khallikote Block has to attest the signatures of the

President and decoy and to recommend to the Bank for opening a

joint Savings Bank Account. On 02.12.2003 the decoy met the

opposite party, who was working as S.I. of Schools, Khallikote and

requested him for recommending their case, but the opposite party

demanded a bribe of Rs.2,000/- for the purpose. On 14.12.2003, the

decoy again met the opposite party at Khallikote and expressed his

inability to pay such a huge amount, but the opposite party told him

to meet him on 16.12.2003 with first instalment of Rs.500/- for

attesting their signatures and recommending to the Bank for opening

of the pass book. Exasperated, the decoy lodged a written report

before the Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Berhampur. On

receipt of F.I.R., S.P. (Vigilance), Berhampur directed Inspector-

R.N. Pradhan to lay the trap and instructed Inspector-B.K. Jena to

investigate the case. The trap laying I.O. made all arrangements for

pre-trap demonstration on 16.12.2003 at 8.00 A.M. in the Vigilance

Officer, Berhampur. Services of official witnesses of other

departments were requisitioned, who were also present during

demonstration. The complainant, disclosed about his grievance and

demand of bribe by the opposite party and produced Rs.500/- in

shape of ten numbers of fifty rupee G.C. notes. During

demonstration, the official witnesses noted down the numbers of the

G.C. notes and the tainted G.C. notes treated with phenolphthalein

powder were handed over to decoy. At 9.30 A.M. on completion of

preparation of preparatory report, signatures of the witnesses were

obtained and at 9.45 A.M. the trap party proceeded towards

Khallikote in the office jeep. At 11.15 A.M. the trap party reached

near Block Office, Khallikote. The decoy and the accompanying

witness-Jaya Narayan Nanda, Jr. Engineer of the Office of Executive

Engineer, Quality Control Division, Berhampur, proceeded ahead by

walk, while other vigilance staff followed the decoy maintaining a

reasonable distance, D.S.P. (Vig.)-T. Chandra Bhusan and official

witness-Mrutyunjay Das were sitting in the jeep parked at a distance

of 300 metres from the Block Office. At 11.40 A.M., the Inspector

got signal and rushed to the spot and while was proceeding found the

opposite party going away from the spot as a pillion rider on a motor

cycle. When the Trap Laying I.O. arrived near the decoy, who was

standing on the Block colony on a through-fare, he got information

from him that he has already handed over the G.C. notes to the

opposite party and he has gone to the Treasury Office. The I.O.

calling D.S.P. and other witnesses travelled in the jeep up to Sub-

Treasury, Khallikote where it was ascertained that the opposite party

had also left the place to Nodal U.P. School, Kairasi, where training

programme for teachers was going on. So the trap party proceeded to

Kairasi U.P. School and found that the opposite party had not arrived

by then. At about 12.50 P.M. opposite party arrived before the School

gate and the motor cycle leaving him went away. The decoy followed

the opposite party from the gate and they travelled 10 metres from the

main entrance and before reaching the school, the opposite party

signed the resolution book and also signed the resolution while

standing. At this juncture, the I.O. arrived there, disclosed his identity

and also the identity of other witnesses present there to the opposite

party and challenged the opposite party to have accepted the bribe, to

which the opposite party denied. Then the opposite party was taken

to the chamber of the Headmaster of Nodal School. Inside the office

room, solution of sodium carbonate was prepared in two glass bottles

and hand wash of opposite party was taken, but there was no colour

change. Then opposite party produced the tainted G.C. notes from his

pant pocket and it was found to be Rs.500/-. The official witnesses

verified the numbers of the G.C. notes with the numbers noted in the

preparation report and it tallied. Then pant pocket wash of the

opposite party was taken and there was change of colour to pink.

Sample was collected and preserved. The tainted G.C. notes wrapped

in a piece of paper and cotton swab of that paper covering was taken

and dipped into another solution of sodium carbonate and there was

change of colour and sample of the same was preserved. The I.O.

seized the tainted G.C. notes so also resolution copy and resolution

register and prepared seizure lists, followed by preparation of a

detection report. On 20.12.2003, Inspector-B.K. Jena took charge of

investigation and examined the trap laying I.O. and other witnesses

obtained chemical examination report from R.F.S.L., Berhampur and

also obtained sanction order from D.I. of Schools and submitted

charge sheet, which occasioned the trial.

DEFENCE PLEA

3. The defence plea was one of denial and false implication.

Then specific plea is that the counter signature of the accused-

opposite party (S.I. of Schools) was not required to open the account

and hence the occasion to demand bribe did not arise.

WITNESSES

4. In support of its case, the prosecution has examined 8

witnesses whereas defence has adduced three witnesses.

PROSECUTION WITNESSES

P.W. 1-Santosh Kumar Pradhan is the decoy, who speaks

about demand and acceptance of bribe by the School Sub-Inspector

(opposite party).

P.W.2-Mrutyunjaya Das is the Official witness, who had

accompanied the trap party and has stated how the opposite party was

trapped.

P.W.3-Nilambar Mishra is a witness, who was previously

working as S.I. of Schools has stated that how the Education

Volunteers, were being appointed basing on the recommendation of

the Village Education Committee. He has deposed that the Centre

was providing funds in the above scheme, which was being deposited

in the joint account of the President and Education Volunteers and

approval of B.D.O. or S.I. of School was not necessary for opening

the joint account.

P.W.4-Jaya Narayan Nanda is an accompanying witness.

He had been instructed to accompany the informant to over hear the

conversation between the opposite party and informant and to give

signal after payment, but he did not hear the conversation even

though the informant and the opposite party walked together on the

road inside Block colony by walk and according to P.W.4 he was

following them keeping a little distance. He has stated that after the

informant gave signal to him, he passed the same to other members of

the trap party. He has stated that after he gave the signal but before

the vigilance staff came to that place, the opposite party suddenly left

that place sitting on a motor cycle of a third person. He has stated that

as Koirasi School after the opposite party was challenged by the

Vigilance Inspector, he gave recovery of the tainted G.C. notes from

his pant pocket.

P.W.5-Prasanta Kumar Sahu is the D.I. of Schools, who

has passed the sanction order to prosecute the opposite party.

P.W.6-Udayanath Behera is the vigilance constable, who

had shown demonstration during pre-trap arrangement.

P.W.7-Rabindra Nath Pradhan is the Trap Laying I.O.

P.W.8-Bijaya Kumar Jena is the subsequent I.O., who

has submitted charge sheet in this case.

DEFENCE WITNESS

The defence has examined three witnesses. D.W.2-

Sashadhar Behera, an officer of Rushikulya Gramya Bank, Kanheipur

Branch, who was officiating as Branch Manager as D.W.2. D.W.2

has categorically stated that the Bank has opened accounts of other

E.G.S. Schools on the application of Headmaster and President and

there was no necessity of counter signature of any S.I. of Schools.

TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT

5. The learned trial court arrived at the following findings

while acquitting the accused:-

i) In a case of this nature, prosecution is to prove the demand and

acceptance of bribe.

ii) The evidence of the decoy requires corroboration as his status is

equivalent to an accomplice.

iii) Decoy has stated that for recommendation for opening of a

passbook in Rushikulya Gramya Bank, the accused had demanded

bribe.

iv) Examination of the Branch Manager of The Rushikulya Gramya

Bank would have proved that they had insisted for counter signature

of the S.I.

v) Defence has examined D.W.2, officer of Rushikulya Gramya

Bank who has stated that bank has opened accounts of other EGS

Schools without counter signature of any S.I. of Schools.

vi) Genesis of demand of bribe seems improbable.

vii) Examination of the President of the Village Education Committee

would have brought the real picture to light.

viii) Conduct of decoy does not inspire confidence.

ix) evidence of decoy is prevaricating and it is unsafe to lay credence

to his veracity.

x) Non catching of the accused soon after passing of the alleged

tainted money makes the whole affair fishy.

xi) The evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W. 4 does not corroborate

each other.

xii) The evidence regrading accused going to the treasury and Koirasi

School and conduct of the witnesses is improbable.

xiii) As per seizure list, accused produced ten numbers of fifty rupees

G.C. notes from left side pocket kept in folded written paper. So there

was no change in colour of his hand wash but strangely pocket wash

showed positive result.

xiv) Section 20 of the PC Act provides for presumption. But to draw

such presumption evidence of the prosecution should be

unimpeachable.

xv)Prosecution has introduced story of wrapping of notes in a piece

of paper, but P.W 1 does not say so.

xvi) P.W. 1 and P.W.2 differ in their evidence as to from which

pocket of the accused the money was recovered

xvii) The theory of insertion of the tainted G.C. notes in the pocket of

the accused without his knowledge, cannot be discarded.

xviii) Background created for demand of bribe seems far too remote

and unrealistic and far from truth.

SUBMISSIONS

6. I have heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel

(Vigilance) and Mr. Aswini Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the opposite party.

7. Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance)

has submitted that in view of the evidence of the decoy P.W.1 and as

there was colour change of the pant wash of the opposite party from

where the tainted notes were recovered, learned trial Court could not

have acquitted the opposite party. The learned counsel has relied on

the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dhaneshwar

Narain Saxena vs The Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1962

SC 195 in support of his submission.

8. Mr. Aswini Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the opposite party submits that the foundation of the

prosecution case is that the opposite party demanded bribe to counter

signature for the opposite party of the joint bank account, but in view

of the evidence of P.W.3 that his approval was not required, the

foundation of the prosecution case is destroyed. He has further

submitted that prosecution has not been able to prove either the

demand or the acceptance as P.W.4 could not see/hear the demand

and acceptance. Hand wash of the opposite party did not change

colour when tested. So the learned trial Court has rightly granted the

benefit of doubt to the opposite party. He further submitted that the

view of the learned trial Court is neither perverse nor based on

inadmissible evidence and was a possible view. He submitted that the

Court should not grant leave when there is no perversity or illegality

in the impugned judgment of acquittal. He has placed reliance on the

decisions in the case of (i) N. Vijayakumar vrs. State of Tamil Nadu

reported in (2021) 3 SCC 687 and the case of (ii) State of Odisha

(Vigilance) vrs. Nalinikanta Behera and others (CRLLP No. 156 of

2017 decided on 26.11.2021).

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT

9. The Privy Council in the case of Sheo Swarup v. King

Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, has held as follows :

"... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the

right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."

In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC

415, the Supreme Court has reiterated the legal position as under:

"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the 43 of 53 accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

In the case of N. Vijayakumar (supra), the Hon'ble Apex

Court held as follows:

"26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in the case of C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala (2009) 3 SCC 779 and in the case of B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC 55. In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections

7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.

27. The relevant paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in the case of B. Jayaraj (supra) read as under:

"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010)

15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI."

8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P- 11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.

9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent." The abovesaid view taken by this Court, fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cell phone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a

"possible view" as such the judgment of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record."

10. In the case of Dhaneshwar (supra), the Supreme Court

has held as under :-

"....The ingredients of the particular offence in clause

(d) of section 5(1) of the Act are; (1) that he should be a public servant; (2) that he should use some corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abuse his position as a public servant; (3) that he should have thereby obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; and (4) for himself or for any other person. In order to bring the charge home to an accused person under clause (d) aforesaid of the section, it not necessary that the public servant in question, while misconducting himself should have done so in the discharge of his duty. It would be

anomalous to say that a public servant has misconducted himself in the discharge of his duty. "Duty" and "misconduct" go ill together. If a person has misconducted himself as a public servant it would not ordinarily be in the discharge of his duty, but the reverse of it. That ''misconduct'', which has been made criminal by section 5 of the Act, does not contain the element of discharge of his duty, by public servant, is also made clear by reference to the provisions of clause (c) of section 5(1). It is well settled that if a public servant dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates property entrusted to him, he cannot be said to have been doing so in the discharge of his official duty (vide the case of Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown [1939] F.C.R. 159. An application for special leave to appeal from that decision was refused by the Privy Council in Hori Ram Singh v.

The King-Emperor [1940] F.C.R. 15. This Court therefore, misread the section when it observed that the offence consists in criminal misconduct in the discharge of official duty. The error lies in importing the description of the offence into the definition portion of it. It is not necessary to constitute the offence under clause

(d) of the section that the public servant must do something in connection with his own duty and thereby obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. It is equally wrong to say that if a public servant were to take

money from a third person, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing his official position, in order to corrupt some other public servant, without there being any question of his misconducting himself in the discharge of his own duty, he has not committed an offence u/s 5(1) (d). It is also erroneous to hold that the essence of an offence u/s 5(2), read with section 5(1) (d), is that the public servant should do something in the discharge of his own duty and thereby obtain a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage."

In the case of Nalinikanta (supra), the Court has held

that the order of acquittal should not be interfered with if there is no

illegality or perversity in the order.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

11. I have carefully gone through the judgment of the learned

trial court and considering the submissions of the learned counsel.

12. I find that the hand wash of the opposite party did not turn

pink for which the prosecution came up with the explanation that the

notes were wrapped in a paper and kept in his pocket. But his pant

wash turned pink. This should not have happened if it was kept

wrapped in a paper.

13. The accused's pant wash turning pink does not conclusively

prove the fact that the accused had accepted the bribe and placed it in

his pant. So plea of the accused that it was kept in his pocket with his

knowledge is not improbable.

14. There is discrepancy in the evidence of witnesses as to which

pant pocket the notes were brought out from (left or right). This

adversely affects the prosecution case.

15. P.W.4 the accompanying witness has not heard what was

spoken by P.W.1 and the opposite party and he gave signal after

receiving signal from P.W.1. As per his evidence there is a gap

between the signal and recovery of the tended notes.

16. P.W.3 has stated that approval of the BDO or S.I. was not

necessary for operative of bank account. This becomes important as

the defence case is that since counter signature of the S.I. was not

necessary, there was no occasion to demand bribe.

17. The evidence of the witnesses after alleged acceptance of the

bribe is discrepant and do not tally.

18. The conduct of the accused as well as the witnesses after

alleged acceptance of the bribe is strange and unnatural and difficult

to accept.

19. The view of the learned trial Court is a possible view. The

judgment of the learned trial Court cannot be considered to be

erroneous or perverse.

20. Almost sixteen years have elapsed since the opposite

party was acquitted.

21. In view of the above discussion, I do not consider it to be

a fit case to grant leave to the petitioner file appeal challenging the

judgment of acquittal and

22. The CRLLP is dismissed.

......................

(Savitri Ratho) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated 30th May, 2025/Puspa

Signed by: PUSPANJALI MOHAPATRA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court Date: 05-Jun-2025 21:24:56

 
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