1. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
2. Since the issue in the present batch of appeals is with
3. While the claim of the employees of different aided
Educational Institutions was allowed by the State
has rejected the claim. As and where such claim has been
concerned are before this Court in different appeals.
3.1. Since the core issue is with regard to entitlement of
3.2. In the appeals filed by the State challenging the order
the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate is the decision rendered
and Another Vrs. Anup Kumar Senapati and another,
4. It is the main contention of the learned Addl. Govt.
GIA Order, 1994 is not tenable in the eye of law. It is
4.1. It is also contended that though decision in the case
decision in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati.
4.2. Placing reliance on the decision in the case of Anup
Kumar Senapati, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate contended
that since Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994 was repealed w.e.f.
in the eye of law. Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate in support
"28. The next question which we take up for
consideration is concerning the effect of the repeal of
the Order of 1994, by the Order of 2004. The
provisions contained in Paragraph 4 of the Order of
2004 has repealed the Order of 1994 save for the
purposes in Paragraph 3(1). Paragraph 3(1) provides
every private educational institution being a Non-
Government College, Junior College or Higher
Secondary School which has become eligible by
1.6.1994 to be notified as aided educational
institution under the Order of 1994, shall be notified
by the Government as required under Section 3(b) of
the Act and shall be entitled to receive grant-in-aid by
way of block grant in the manner provided in
Paragraph 3(2). The proviso to Paragraph 3 makes it
clear that a college to be eligible as an aided
educational institution must not have more than two
ministerial staff and two peons. There is no other
saving of the Order of 1994. However, Paragraph 4(2)
of the Order of 2004 provides notwithstanding the
repeal of the Order of 1994, the private educational
institutions which are in receipt of any grant-in-aid
from the Government under the Order so repealed
shall continue to receive the grant-in-aid as if the
Grant-in-aid Order, 1994 had not been repealed.
Thus, it is clear that in case a college is receiving
grant-in-aid, with respect to a post, shall continue to
receive it under the Order of 1994, however, in case it
was not receiving the grant-in-aid as saving of the
Order of 1994 is only entitled for block grant under
Paragraph 3(1), not eligible for receiving the grant-in-
// 6 //
aid under the Order of 1994. The saving of Order of
1994 is for a limited purpose that the institution shall
continue to receive grant-in-aid concerning the posts
which had been sanctioned before the repeal of the
order of 1994.
Xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx
32. It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that
what is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a
right acquired or accrued and not mere hope or
expectation of or liberty to apply for acquiring a right.
There is a distinction in making an application for
acquiring a 19 Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand, AIR
1964 SC 1305, p. 1309 (para 10) : (1964) 5 SCR 647
; Ishverlal v. Motibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459, p.466 :
1966 (1) SCR 367. 20 By a subsequent statute a
penal section in an earlier statute ceased to have
effect and was also repealed. It was held that even
such a double repeal did not show a contrary
intention and prevent prosecution for an offence
committed before the repeal; Commissioner of Police
v. Simeon, (1982) 2 All ER 813 : (1983) 1 AC 234 :
(1982) 3 WLR 289 (HL). 21 State of Punjab v. Mohar
Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84, p.88 : (1955) 1 SCR 833
; Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of E.P., AIR 1956 SC
77, p. 83 : (1955) 2 SCR 1117 ; Brihan Maharashtra
Sugar Syndicate v. Janardan, AIR 1960 SC 794, p.
795 : (1960) 3 SCR 85; Mahadeolal v. Administrator
General of WB, AIR 1960 SC 936, pp.938, 939 (para
7) : (1960) 3 SCR 578; State of Kerala v. N. Sami Iyer,
AIR 1966 SC 1415, pp.1417, 1418; Jayantilal v.
Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 1193, p.1196 : (1972) 4
SCC 174; T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, AIR 1983 SC
150, p.156 : (1983) 1 SCC 177; Bansidhar v. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC 1614, p.1619 : (1989) 2 SCC
557; Manphul Singh Sharma v. Ahmedi Begum,
JT 1994 (5) SC 49, p.53 : (1994) 5 SCC 465; D.
Srinivasan v. The Commissioner, AIR 2000 SC 1250,
p.1255 : (2000) 3 SCC 548. For the construction of a
Saving Clause which opens with the words „Save as
expressly provided in this Act', see S.N. Kamble v.
Sholapur Municipality, AIR 1966 SC 538 : (1966) 1
SCR 618. For a saving clause which preserves old
rights but applies new procedure, see Ramachandra
v. Tukaram, AIR 1966 SC 557: 1966 (1) SCR
594. 22 Kalawati Devi v. CIT, AIR 1968 SC 162,
p.168 : (1967) 3 SCR 833; ITO, Mangalore v.
Damodar, AIR 1969 SC 408, p.412 : (1969) 2 SCR
29; Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh v.
// 7 //
Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 1 para 34 (f) : (2008) 13
Scale 398. But see Tiwari Kanhaiyalal v.
Commissioner of Incometax, AIR 1975 SC 902 :
(1975) 4 SCC 401, which holds that the detailed
savings contained in section 297, of the Incometax
Act, 1961 are not exhaustive. Recourse, in this case,
was taken to section 6, General Clauses Act for
holding that a person's liability for an offence under
section 52 of the Incometax Act, 1922 continued even
after its repeal. In Commissioner of Incometax, U.P. v.
Shah Sadiq and Sons, (1987) 3 SCC 516, p.524: AIR
1986 SC 1217. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
was again applied to continue the right of setoff
accrued under section 24(2) of the 1922 Act after its
repeal by the 1961 Act.
[Note: For convenience, the cases/citations in the
extracts has been renumbered.] right. If under some
repealed enactment, a right has been given, but on
investigation in respect of a right is necessary
whether such right should be or should not be given,
no such right is saved. Right to take advantage of a
provision is not saved. After repeal, an advantage
available under the repealed Act to apply and obtain
relief is not a right which is saved when the
application was necessary and it was discretionary
to grant the relief and investigation was required
whether relief should be granted or not. The repeal
would not save the right to obtain such a relief. The
right of pre-emption is not an accrued right. It is a
remedial right to take advantage of an enactment.
The right of a Government servant to be considered
for promotion under repealed rules is not a vested
right unless repeal provision contains some saving
and right has been violated earlier.
Xxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
34. In the present case, it is apparent that
there is no absolute right conferred under the Order
of 1994. The investigation was necessary for whether
grant-in-aid to be released or not. It was merely hope
and expectation to obtain the release of grant in aid
which does not survive after the repeal of the
provisions of the Order of 1994. Given the clear
provisions contained in Paragraph 4 of the Order of
2004, repealing and saving of Order of 1994, it is
apparent that no such right is saved in case grant-in-
aid was not being received at the time of repeal. The
provisions of the Order of 1994 of applying and/or
// 8 //
pending applications are not saved nor it is provided
that by applying under the repeal of the order of
1994, its benefits can be claimed. Grant was annual
based on budgetary provisions. Application to be filed
timely. As several factors prevailing at the relevant
time were to be seen in no case provisions can be
invoked after the repeal of the order of 1994. Only
the block grant can be claimed.
35. The High Court in Loknath Behera has rightly
opined that due to repeal, the provisions of the Order
of 1994 cannot be invoked to obtain grantinaid. The
High Court has rightly referred to the observations of
this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v.
Hirendra Pal Singh, and others, (2011) 5 SCC 305,
wherein it was observed:
"22. It is a settled legal proposition that whenever an
Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had
never existed. The object of repeal is to obliterate the
Act from the statutory books, except for certain
purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. Repeal is not a matter of mere
form but is of substance. Therefore, on repeal, the
earlier provisions stand obliterated/abrogated/wiped
out wholly i.e. pro tanto repeal (vide Dagi Ram Pindi
Lall v. Trilok Chand Jain, (1992) 2 SCC
13; Gajraj Singh v. STAT, (1997) 1 SCC 650; Property
Owners‟ Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 4 SCC
455 and Mohan Raj v. Dimbeswari Saikia, (2007) 15
SCC 115).
24. Thus, there is a clear distinction between repeal
and suspension of the statutory provisions and the
material difference between both is that repeal
removes the law entirely; when suspended, it still
exists and has operation in other respects except
wherein it has been suspended. Thus, a repeal puts
an end to the law. A suspension holds it in abeyance.
Xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx
37. Considering the various provisions of Section 7C
of the Act and the Order of 1994, it is apparent that
institutions which received grant-in-aid and post with
respect of which grant-in-aid was being released,
have been saved. The reference of the institution
means and includes the posts. They cannot be read
in isolation. It cannot be said that right to claim grant-
in-aid has been fixed, accrued, settled, absolute or
// 9 //
complete at the time of the repeal of the order of
2004. As per the meaning in Black‟s Law Dictionary,
vesting has been defined thus:
"vest, vb. (15c) 1. To confer ownership (of
property) upon a person.
2. To invest (a person) with the full title to property. 3.
To give (a person) an immediate, fixed right of present
or future enjoyment. 4. Hist. To put (a person) into
possession of land by the ceremony of investiture. -
vesting, n."
38. Thus, there was no vested, accrued or absolute
right to claim grant-in-aid under the Act or the Order
of 1994. Merely fulfilment of the educational criteria
and due appointment were not sufficient to claim
grant- in-aid. There are various other relevant
aspects fulfilment thereof and investigation into that
was necessary. Merely by fulfilment of the one or two
conditions, no right can be said to have accrued to
obtain the grant-in-aid by the institution concerning
the post or individual. No right has been created in
favour of colleges/individual to claim the grant-in-aid
under the Order of 1994, after its repeal. No claim for
investigation of right could have been resorted to
after repeal of Order of 1994.
39. It was lastly submitted that concerning other
persons, the orders have been passed by the
Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court and
grants-in-aid has been released under the Order of
1994 as such on the ground of parity this Court
should not interfere. No doubt, there had been a
divergence of opinion on the aforesaid issue. Be that
as it may. In our opinion, there is no concept of
negative equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
In case the person has a right, he has to be treated
equally, but where right is not available a person
cannot claim rights to be treated equally as the right
does not exist, negative equality when the right does
not exist, cannot be claimed.
Xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx
49. It is apparent on consideration of Paragraph 4 of
order of 2004 that only saving of the right is to
receive the block grant and only in case grant in aid
had been received on or before the repeal of the
Order of 2004, it shall not be affected and the Order
of 1994 shall continue only for that purpose and no
// 10 //
other rights are saved. Thus, we approve the decision
of the High Court in Lok Nath Behera (supra) on the
aforesaid aspect for the aforesaid reasons mentioned
by us."
4.3. It is accordingly contended that as and where claim
of the employees has been allowed by the Tribunal
directing the State-Appellant to extend the benefit of
Grant-in-Aid under GIA Order, 1994 is therefore liable to
be interfered with by this Court in view of the decision in
the case of Anup Kumar Senapati and where such claim
has been dis-allowed by the Tribunal and the employees
concerned are before this Court in different appeals, the
same be upheld by dismissing the appeals.
5. Mr. B. Routray and Mr. J.K. Rath, learned Senior
Counsels along with other learned counsels appearing for
the Respondents in those cases where the claim has been
allowed and for the appellants in those cases where the
claim has been dis-allowed by the Tribunal, on the other
hand contended that since by the time GIA Order, 1994
was repealed with Introduction of the (Odisha Non-Govt.
Colleges, Junior Colleges and Higher Secondary Schools)
under GIA Order, 2004, the employees and/or institution
were otherwise eligible to get the benefit of Grant-in-aid
// 11 //
under GIA Order, 1994, the Tribunal in some of the cases
while allowed such claim, but in some of the cases, the
tribunal dis-allowed the claim without proper appreciation
of the relevant provisions governing the field.
5.1. It is also contended that basing on the decision in the
case of Anup Kumar Senapati as cited (supra), the
Tribunal also rejected some claims, against which the
aggrieved employees and/or institution are before this
Court in different appeals.
5.2. It is contended that in the case of Anup Kumar
Senapati as cited (supra), the claim to receive Grant-in-
Aid under GIA Order, 1994 was made at a belated stage
i.e. after repealing of the GIA Order, 1994. Accordingly,
taking a view that after repealing of the 1994 GIA Order,
no claim is entertainable under the said order, Hon'ble
Apex Court decided the issue in the case of Anup Kumar
Senapati. But in Para-26 of the said judgment Hon'ble
Apex Court clearly observed as follows:-
"There is no material on record that the
institutions have duly applied in the particular
academic year and within the time fixed for making
application as per the 1994 Order and there is nothing
// 12 //
on the record indicating that the requisite information
was furnished."
5.3. Placing reliance on the aforesaid observation of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Para-26 of the decision in the case
of Anup Kumar Senapati, learned Senior Counsels for
the appellants and/or Respondents, contended that most
of the institutions though were eligible to receive grant-in-
aid under GIA Order, 1994 and their cases were also
recommended, but the claim to get the benefit of Grant-in-
Aid under GIA Order, 1994 was never considered and
thereby compelling the employees and/or institutions to
move the Tribunal seeking extension of the Grant-in-Aid
under GIA Order, 1994.
5.4. Placing reliance on the information provided by the
Directorate of Secondary Education, Odisha,
Bhubaneswar vide letter dated 21.01.2013, copy of which
was produced before this Court, it is contended that
Directorate of Secondary Education prior to repealing of
the 1994 Grant-in-Aid Order, had already submitted the
proposal to extend the benefit of Grant-in-Aid under GIA
Order, 1994 in favour of different recognized unaided
Schools of the State. But on the face of such
// 13 //
recommendation made by the Directorate of Secondary
Education, no action was taken by the State to extend the
benefit. Therefore, in view of the observation made by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Para-26 of the judgment in the case
of Anup Kumar Senapati, the decision in the said case
cannot be made applicable to each of the cases in the
present batch of appeals, where the employees are
employees of different unaided schools. Directorate,
Secondary Education vide letter dated 21.01.2013
furnished the following information under the RTI:-
"Sub:- Transfer of RTI application No.800/2012
under 6(3) of RTI Act, 2005.
Sir,
With reference to your RTI application dated
10.12.2012 addressed to PIO & under Secretary to
Govt. Deptt. School and Mass Education receive on
being transferred vide Govt. letter No.32144/SME
Dt.20.12.2012 to Directorate Secondary Education,
Odisha, on 27.12.2012. I am to furnish the required
information as sought for in your RTI application.
1) List of eligible High School (xerox copy) to
receive GIA submitted to Govt. vide this Directorate
letter No.5014/dt.31.01.2004.
2) The recommended schools have been notified
by Govt. vide Govt. their notification No.3325/SME
Dt.20.02.2004 to receive Block grant w.e.f. 1.1.2004 as
per GIA Order, 2004.
3) GIA have not been extended to the above
school under GIA Rule, 1994."
// 14 //
5.5. It is also contended that without proper appreciation
of the recommendation made by the Directorate vide his
letter No.5014 dated 31.01.2004, when the claim of the
institutions and/or employees working in un-aided
schools was not considered by extending the benefit of
Grant-in-Aid under GIA Order, 1994 or grant-in-aid was
extended relying on subsequent GIA Order, concerned
Institutions and/or employees moved different GIA
applications in terms of the provisions contained under
Section 24(b) of the Act, claiming extension of the benefit
of Grant-in-Aid under GIA Order, 1994. While such claim
in different GIA applications was allowed by the Tribunal
against which the State is before this Court in different
appeals, in some cases placing reliance on the decision in
the case of Anup Kumar Senapati as cited (supra), such
claim was rejected, against which the employees and/or
institutions are before this Court in different appeals.
5.6. However, since the claim in the present batch of
appeals were there prior to repealing of the 1994 Grant-in-
aid order, decision in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati
cannot be taken as a complete bar and such claim allowed
// 15 //
by the Tribunal is required to be upheld by dismissing the
appeals so filed by the State. Similarly, where the Tribunal
has negated such claim, appeals filed by the employees
and/or Managing Committee or Governing Body as the
case may be, are required to be allowed by directing the
State to extend the benefit of grant-in-aid under GIA
Order, 1994.
5.7. In addition to the aforesaid submissions made by the
learned counsels appearing for the Employees and/or
Institutions, it is contended that though challenging the
order passed by the Tribunal in allowing such claim, State
is before this Court in different appeals, but similar claim
allowed by the Tribunal has been complied with by the
State with passing of different orders, after the order was
upheld by this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
It is also contended that on the face of the order passed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anup Kumar
Senapati, Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the order passed by
the Tribunal wherein similar claim was allowed by the
tribunal.
// 16 //
5.8. To be specific, learned Sr. Counsels appearing for the
employees and/or institutions, contended that similar
claim allowed by the Tribunal when was upheld by this
Court vide judgment dated 28.10.2016 in FAO No.377 of
2016 and order dated 01.02.2019 passed in Review
Petition No.75 of 2018, State approached the Hon'ble Apex
Court by filing SLP (Civil) Diary No.41150 of 2019 (State
of Odisha and Another Vrs. Balaram Mohanta and
Others). Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 10.05.2024
dismissed the said Special Leave Petition and with an
observation that order passed by the Tribunal be
implemented, within a period of 3 (three) months from
today. Order dated 10.05.2024 is reproduced hereunder:-
"Delay condoned.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we
find that similarly situated persons have been
extended the benefit which can be extended to the
respondents in this case, therefore, we are not inclined
to entertain these special lave petitions. Accordingly,
the special leave petitions are dismissed.
On account of dismissal of the special leave
petitions, we observe that the order passed by the
Education Tribunal be now implemented within a
period of three months from today."
5.9. It is also contended that similar claim allowed by the
Tribunal in GIA Case No.172/2011 (Arnada Prasad
// 17 //
Tripathy Vrs. State of Odisha and Others) was not only
assailed by the State before this Court but also before the
Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP(Civil) Nos.19387-19388 of
2019. Hon'ble Apex Court not only dismissed the Special
Leave Petition vide order dated 13.08.2019 but also
dismissed the Review Petition filed in R.P.(C) Diary
No.46612 of 2019 vide order dated 12.02.2020. Curative
Petitions filed by the State in Curative Petition (Civil)
No.252-253 of 2021 was also dismissed vide order dated
25.08.2022. On the face of such order passed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in dismissing the SLP, Review Petition
as well as Curative Petition, similar order passed by the
Tribunal in GIA Case No.172 of 2011 was implemented by
the State vide office Order No.47866 dated 17.11.2022.
5.10. It is also contended that similar order passed by
the Tribunal on 02.11.2012 in GIA Case No.488 of 2011,
was also assailed by the State after dismissal of the appeal
by this Court in FAO No.276 of 2015 vide order dated
01.10.2015, in SLP (Civil) No.12548 of 2017. Hon'ble Apex
Court vide order dated 08.12.2017 when dismissed the
Special Leave Petition, Review Petition (C) No.2132 of 2018
// 18 //
was filed. The said Review Petition was also dismissed vide
order dated 17.07.2018. After such dismissal of such
Review Petition, State preferred Curative Petition (Civil)
No.129 of 2021 relying on the decision in the case of Anup
Kumar Senapati, and the same was also dismissed vide
order dated 08.09.2022. After such dismissal of the matter
by the Apex Court, the State vide office Order No.47409
dated 14.11.2022, implemented the order passed by the
Tribunal in GIA Case No.488 of 2011.
5.11. Similarly with regard to the implementation of
the order passed by the Tribunal on 12.08.2013 in GIA
Case No.218 of 2012, such order passed by the Tribunal
when was upheld by this Court vide order dated
31.07.2015 in FAO No.658 of 2014, the matter was carried
by the State to the Apex Court by filing SLP(Civil)
No.25421 of 2017. The Special Leave Petition was
dismissed by the Apex Court vide order dated 08.12.2017,
Review Petition filed in Review Petition (Civil) No.2134 of
2018, was also dismissed by the Apex Court vide order
dated 17.07.2018. Curative Petition filed in the said appeal
in Curative Petition (Civil) No.255 of 2021 relying on the
// 19 //
decision in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati was also
dismissed vide order dated 08.09.2022. After such
dismissal of the matter by the Apex Court, order passed in
GIA Case No.218 of 2012 was implemented by the State
vide office Order No.47403 dated 14.11.2022.
5.12. It is contended that all such orders passed by
the Apex Court were passed in Review as well as Curative
Petitions on the face of the order passed in the case of
Anup Kumar Senapati. It is also contended that similar
claim allowed by the Tribunal was assailed before this
Court in FAO No.427 of 2015. Against dismissal of the
FAO, State approached the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing
SLP(Civil) No.27713 of 2018. On the face of the order
passed in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati, Hon'ble
Apex Court vide order dated 12.02.2025 dismissed the
appeal. Order dated 12.02.2025 so passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court is re-produced hereunder:-
"1. This petition arises from the judgment and order
passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack dated 17-
05-2018 in FAO No. 427/2015 by which the High Court
dismissed the FAO filed by the State of Orissa and
thereby affirmed the order passed by the State Education
Tribunal (for short "the SET"). The High Court while
dismissing the appeal filed by the State has observed in
its impugned order as under:-
// 20 //
"In the above premises, I do not find any illegality or
infirmity in the order of the learned Tribunal in allowing
the claim of the respondent no. 1 holding that she is
entitled to receive the Grant-in-Aid as per Grant-in-Aid
Order, 1994 and for that the earlier approval order dated
17.04.2010 calls for modification.
10. In course of hearing, the respondent no. 1 has
cited that recently in view of the concession of the State
in cases before the Apex Court, the institutions notified
under the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2008 have been extended
with the benefits admissible under the GIA Order, 1994.
In this connection he has placed the copy of the order of
the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2403 of 2017 and 62
others in batch as well as the order of clarification in I.A.
No. 2 of 2017 and a large number of Govt. orders in
carrying out those orders in so far as those similarly
situated institutions and the employees are concerned.
This is countered by saying that those cannot be taken
as precedent for being followed in the present case in
ruling in favour of the respondent no.1 in so far as her
claims are concerned.
When, the State Govt. has already extended the
benefit to several similarly situated institutions and the
employees of said institutions have already been allowed
with the benefits in consonance with the GIA Order 1994,
it does not stand to reason that in so far as the present
respondent no.1 is concerned, she would be not treated
as like them, being not granted with the benefits as have
been extended to them, which is clearly discriminatory,
arbitrary and unreasonable.
11. In the result, the appeal being devoid of merit,
stands dismissed. No order as to cost."
2. Thus, the High Court took notice of the fact that the
Government had already extended the benefit to several
similarly situated institutions and the employees of said
institutions had already been allowed to derive the
benefits in consonance with the GIA Order, 1994 and
therefore, it would not stand to reason for the State to
say that the respondent herein would not be treated at
par with similarly situated employees.
3. We find no error not to speak of any error of law in
the impugned order passed by the High Court.
4. The petition stands disposed of.
5. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of."
// 21 //
5.13. It is also contended that placing reliance on the
decision in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati when the
State filed a Review Petition seeking review of order dated
02.04.2018 so passed in SLP(Civil) Diary No.3441 of 2018
(State of Odisha and Others Vs. Managing Committee
of Durgacharan High School, Aswasthapada), the
same was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide
order dated 05.05.2020. Stand taken in Para-3-A, B and C
of the Review Petition reads as follows:-
"3. That the present review petition is being filed
on the following grounds:-
(A) The petitioner state is envoking the jurisdiction
of this Hon‟ble Court contemplated under article 137 of
the Constitution of India seeking review of the impugned
order because the impugned order has fall in error in
view of the subsequent pronouncement of this Hon‟ble
Court in Civil Appeal No.7295/2019. This Hon‟ble Court
has now conclusively held that after the repealment of
GIA Order 1994 by GIA Order 2004 it is beyond the
jurisdiction of Tribunal or Hon‟ble High Court to direct
grant of benefit of GIA Order to any incumbent.
On the basis of the facts narrated in paragraph 2 of
this petition it would be a case of review of the impugned
order as it squarely covered under order 47 Rule 1 of
CPC. This is a case whereby on the basis of subsequent
pronouncement of this Hon‟ble Court the impugned order
is liable to be recalled.
(B) Because the issue as to whether benefit under
GIA Order, 1994 could be extended by the Tribunal/High
Court after repealment of GIA Order, 1994 by GIA Order,
2004 is no more res integra and has been conclusively
decided by this Hon‟ble Court vide its order dated
16.09.2019 in SLP Civil No.8343 of 2019, whereby it has
been held by this Hon‟ble Court that after repealing of
// 22 //
GIA Order 1994 by GIA Order 2004 no benefit can be
granted under GIA Order 1994 in following observation:-
"Given the clear provisions contained in
Paragraph-4 of the Order of 2004, repealing and
saving of Order of 1994, it is apparent that no
such right is saved in case grant in aid was not
being received at the time of repeal. The
provisions of the Order of 1994 of applying
and/or pending applications are not saved nor
it is provided that by applying under the repeal
of the order of 1994, its benefits can be claimed.
Grant was annual based on budgetary
provisions.
Application to be filed timely. As several
factors prevailing at the relevant time were to be
seen in no case provisions can be invoked after
the repeal of the order of 1994. Only the block
grant can be claimed."
C) Because it is again settled by this Hon‟ble Court in the
matter of State of Orissa vs. Prabhabati Padhiari in Civil
Appeal No.796 of 2008 that the cutoff date i.e.
01.06.1994 fixed in the GIA Order 1994 is sacrosanct
and any institution or incumbent qualify to get grant
under GIA Order 1994 has to fulfill the eligibility criteria
by that cutoff date and not beyond. In any case, after the
repealment of the GIA Order, 1994, the benefit of the
grant cannot be extended."
5.14. It is also contended that similar claim to get the
benefit of grant-in-aid under GIA Order, 1994 when was
allowed by this Court in FAO No.949 of 2019 vide order
dated 12.04.2023 (Sucharita Jena and Others Vrs.
State of Odisha and Others), State challenging the said
order, approached the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing
SLP(Civil) Diary No.32258 of 2023. But the said Special
Leave Petition was dismissed vide order dated 19.03.2024.
Order dated 19.03.2024 reads as follows:-
// 23 //
"Delay condoned.
We find no ground to interfere with the impugned
order passed by the High Court. The Special Leave
Petition is, accordingly dismissed.
Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are
disposed of."
5.15. It is accordingly contended that since Hon'ble
Apex Court on the face of the order passed in the case of
Anup Kumar Senapati, declined to review the order
passed in upholding the order passed by the Tribunal as
well as by this Court, the stand taken by the State in
different appeals that in view of the decision in the case of
Anup Kumar Senapati, no claim can be made to get the
benefit of Grant-in-Aid under GIA Order, 1994, cannot be
taken as a Bar for such extension of the benefit.
5.16. It is also contended that since similar claim to
get the benefit of grant-in-aid under GIA Order, 1994 after
being allowed by the Tribunal so upheld by this Court as
well as by the Hon'ble Apex Court as cited in the above
mentioned paragraphs, benefit of grant-in-aid under GIA
Order, 1994 was extended. Employees in the present
batch of appeal being similarly situated, they cannot be
discriminated by the State in view of the decision of the
// 24 //
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. Vrs.
Arvind Kumar Sribastab as well as in the case of State
of Karnataka and Others Vrs. C. Lalitha. Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Arvind Kumar Sribastab In Para-22
has held as follows:-
"22 . Holding that the respondents had also
acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the appeal
of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with the following
reasons:
"13. In view of the statement of law as summarised
above, the respondents are guilty since the
respondents have acquiesced in accepting the
retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If
they would have been vigilant enough, they could
have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter.
Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants
lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the
occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in
such cases, the court should be very slow in
granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has
also to be taken into consideration the question of
acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent
whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if
the relief is granted. In the present case, if the
respondents would have challenged their retirement
being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps
the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to
raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not
asserting their rights the respondents have allowed
time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years,
they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for
two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to
raise funds which is going to have serious financial
repercussions on the financial management of the
Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of
such persons when they themselves are guilty of
waiver and acquiescence?"
Similarly, Hon'ble Apex Court in Para-29 of the decision in
the case of C. Lalitha has held as follows:-
// 25 //
"29. Justice demands that a person should not be
allowed to derive any undue advantage over other
employees. The concept of justice is that one
should get what is due to him or her in law. The
concept of justice cannot be stretched so as to
cause heart-burning to more meritorious
candidates. Moreover, at the end of the day, the
Respondent has got what could be given to her in
law. As of now, she had already been enjoying a
higher scale of pay than what she would have got
if she was to join the post of Assistant Controller.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that interest of
justice would be sub-served if she is allowed to
continue in her post and direct the Appellant to
consider her seniority in the Administrative Service
in terms of the order of this Court dated 15th
March, 1994 that she would be the last in the
seniority list of the appointees in the post of
Category I Assistant Commissioner (Karnataka
Administrative Service)."
5.17. Learned Senior Counsels appearing for the
employees and/or institutions in the present batch of
appeals relying on a recent judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447
in the case of A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation
Vrs. Tahsildar and Others (in Civil Appeal Nos.4526-
4527 of 2024) contended that judgment delivered in a
particular case must be read as applicable to the
particular facts proved or assumed to be proved in that
case. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para-35 has held as follows:-
"35. If two decisions of this Court appear inconsistent
with each other, the High Courts are not to follow one and
overlook the other, but should try to reconcile and respect
them both and the only way to do so is to adopt the wise
suggestion of Lord Halsbury given in Quinn v. Leathern,
// 26 //
[1901] A.C. 495 and reiterated by the Privy Council in
Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Commr. of Income Tax,
Lahore AIR 1940 PC 230:
"..... every judgment must be read as
applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed
to be proved, since the generality of the expressions,
which may be found there, are not intended to be
expositions of the whole law, but governed or
qualified by the particular facts of the case in which
such expressions are to be found" and follow that
decision whose facts appear more in accord with
those of the case at hand.
5.18. It is accordingly contended by the learned
counsel appearing for the concerned employees and/or
Institutions that since on the face of the order passed in
the case of Anup Kumar Senapati, similar claim allowed
by the Tribunal further confirmed by this Court has been
upheld by the Apex Court with dismissal of the Special
Leave Petition, Review Petition as well as Curative Petition,
the stand taken by the State that in view of the decision in
the case of Anup Kumar Senapati, no further claim
under the GIA Order, 1994 is entertainable is not legally
tenable.
5.19. It is accordingly contended that in view of the
nature of order passed by the Hon'ble Apex court on the
face of the order passed in the case of Anup Kumar
Senapati, extension of the benefit of Grant-in-Aid in
// 27 //
favour of the concerned employees/institution in the
present batch of appeals under GIA Order, 1994 is
required to be upheld by rejecting the appeals filed by the
State. Similarly in such appeals where the rejection of the
claims is under challenge, the same is required to be
allowed. It is also contended that in view of the decision in
the case of Arvind Kumar Sribastab and Shree Lalitha,
the employees in the present batch of appeals cannot be
discriminated.
5.20. It is also contended that since such claim of the
employees and/or Institutions were there prior to
repealing of the GIA Order, 1994 as admitted by the
Directorate of Secondary Education while furnishing the
information under RTI on 21.01.2013 in respect of
employees of Secondary Schools, appeals filed by the State
against the orders of the Tribunal, is required to be
rejected and appeals where similar claim has not been
allowed, are required to be allowed by this Court.
6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after
going through the materials available on record, it is found
that all the present batch of appeals have been filed either
// 28 //
by the State-Appellants where the Tribunal has allowed
the claim of the concerned employees and/or Institutions
to get the benefit of Grant-in-Aid under GIA Order, 1994
and by the employees and/or institutions where such
claim has been rejected by the Tribunal placing reliance on
the decision in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati as cited
(supra).
6.1. This Court after going through the decision in the
case of Anup Kumar Senapati, though is of the view that
no such claim after repealing of the Grant-in-Aid Order,
1994 is entertainable, but placing reliance on the RTI
information provided by the Directorate of Secondary
Education vide his letter dated 21.01.2013, it is view of
this Court that in those cases where the recommendation
has been made in favour of Secondary schools prior to
repealing of the GIA Order, decision in the case of Anup
Kumar Senapati cannot be treated as a complete bar
absolutely.
6.2. Not only that similar claim allowed by the Tribunal
and upheld by this Court, on the face of the decision in the
case of Anup Kumar Senapati, was not interfered with by
// 29 //
the Hon'ble Apex Court while dismissing appeals preferred
against those orders by the State. It is also found that
Review Petitions and/or Curative Petitions filed seeking
review of the earlier order passed by the Apex Court
relying on the decision in the case of Anup Kumar
Senapati, was also not entertained by the Apex Court. It
is also found that similar claim allowed by this Court in
FAO No.949 of 2019 and FAO No.602 of 2019 was not
interfered with by the Apex Court while dismissing the
Special Leave Petitions vide order dated 11.01.2024 and
19.03.2024.
6.3. Therefore, it is the view of this Court that decision in
the case of Anup Kumar Senapati cannot be taken as a
complete Bar in those cases where the employees and/or
institutions were otherwise eligible to get the benefit of
grant-in-aid under GIA Order, 1994 and recommendation
has been made by the respective Directorate prior to such
repealing of GIA Order, 1994 in respect of unaided
Schools, Girls Schools or Higher Secondary Schools and
Colleges.
// 30 //
6.4. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court while is
not inclined to interfere with the judgments of the tribunal
wherein claim of the employees and/or institutions has
been allowed and dismiss the appeals accordingly, but is
inclined to quash the impugned judgments wherein such
claim of the concerned employees and/or institutions has
been rejected by the Tribunal by allowing the appeals.
However, such dismissal & allowing of the appeals is with
the condition that, claim of the concerned employees
and/or institutions in the present batch of appeals will be
subject to verification to be made by the concerned
Directorate dealing with the issue. The State Authorities
are directed to verify as to whether prior to repealing of the
Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, which was notified in the
Gazette on 05.02.2004, claim of the employees and/or
institutions in the present batch of appeals was
recommended by the concerned Directorate. This Court
also directs the State authorities to take into consideration
the benefit of Grant-in-aid under GIA Order, 1994
extended after dismissal of the appeal filed by the State in
FAO No.949 of 2019 and FAO No.602 of 2019 and so also
the orders passed by the Apex Court in various Review
// 31 //
Petitions as well as Curative Petitions on the face of the
order passed in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati and
extension of the benefit under GIA Order, 1994. On such
verification and appreciation of the orders passed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court, appropriate order be passed to extend
the benefit of Grant-in-Aid under GIA Order, 1994 in
favour of the employees and/or institutions in the present
batch of appeals. This Court directs the State authorities
to complete the entire exercise, within a period of 6 (six)
months from the date of receipt of this order. The issue
framed is accordingly decided.
7. The present batch of appeals are accordingly disposed
of with the aforesaid observation and direction.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated the 19th of March, 2025/Basudev
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
