Orissa High Court

P. Laxmi Patra @ Palia Laxmi @ vs State Of Odisha And Others ....... Opp. ... on 4 March, 2025

                     THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                 CRLMC No. 3652 of 2024

         (In the matter of an application under Sections 528 of the Bharatiya
         Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)


         P. Laxmi Patra @ Palia Laxmi @                   .......             Petitioners
         P. Laxmi and another
                                             -Versus-

         State of Odisha and others                          .......        Opp. Parties


                  For the petitioners : M/s. A.K. Pandey, D.N. Mishra,
                                          N. Acharya, V.V.B. Suryaprakash,
                                          Advocates
                  For the opp. Parties : Mr. U.R. Jena, A.G.A. (O.P. No.1)
                                          Mr. S.K. Mohanty, Advocate
                                         (For O.P. No.s.2 & 3)

         CORAM:

              THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA


          Date of Hearing: 07.12.2024         ::      Date of Judgment: 04.03.2025

S.S. Mishra, J.         The   present   petitioners   have    invoked   the   inherent

         jurisdiction of this court under Sections 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

         Suraksha Sanhita, 2023         seeking quashing of criminal proceedings

         arising out of Baidyanathpur P.S. Case No. 140 of 2022 corresponding
 to G.R. Case No.942 of 2022 registered against the opposite parties no.2

and 3 by the petitioner no.1.

2.       The petitioner no.1 is the informant and petitioner no.2 is the

victim of the present case, approached this Court for quashing of the

criminal prosecution initiated by them against the opposite parties no.2

and 3.

         The allegations made by the petitioners against the opposite

parties no.2 and 3 are that on 11.05.2022 at 10.30 P.M. the petitioner

no.1 being the complainant/informant lodged a written report before the

police alleging therein that the daughter of her younger sister, P.

Mohalaxmi's (petitioner no.2 herein) has married with one A. Hadu

Patra, elder son of A. Narayan Patra of Radhamatha Sahi Lanjipalli,

Berhampur since last three years as per Hindu custom and ritual. After

the marriage, husband A. Hadu Patra and mother-in-law, A. Mahalaxmi

of the petitioner no.2 subjected her to torture both physically and

mentally. In the meantime the couples have also been blessed with two

children. Though a complaint was filed at Mahila Police Station against

the husband and mother-in-law on 19.02.2022, subsequently the matter


                                                          Page 2 of 16
 was compromised in presence of IIC, Mahila Police Station. It is alleged

that on 09.05.2022 the husband and mother-in-law of the petitioner no.2

(P. Mahalaxmi), namely, A. Hadu Patra and A. Mahalaxmi assaulted her

and poured kerosene and set her on fire with an intention to kill her. The

petitioner no.2 was shifted to MKCG Medical College and Hospital,

Berhampur for treatment with the help of the complainant and others.

The F.I.R. has been registered on the aforementioned allegation.

3.    Opposite party no.2 was in custody till 04.12.2024 and it is

informed to this Court that subsequent thereto, opposite party no.2 has

been enlarged on bail. Opposite party no.3, is the mother-in-law of the

victim-petitioner no.2, who is 87 years old, has already been admitted to

bail in the present case. The trial of this case is in progress. As many as

nine witnesses have already been examined. The petitioner no.1 has been

examined as P.W.2, whereas petitioner no.2 has been examined as

P.W.1. The other vital witnesses of the prosecution have also been

examined. At this stage, the informant and victim have approached this

Court seeking quashing of the entire prosecution initiated by them

against the opposite parties no.2 and 3.


                                                            Page 3 of 16
 4.               Heard Mr. A.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners;

Mr. U.R. Jena, learned Additional Government Advocate for State-

opposite party no.1; and Mr. S.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for opposite

parties no.2 and 3.

5.               Mr. A.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners

submitted that owing to the peculiarity of the present case this Court

even at this stage should give indulgence and quash the entire criminal

prosecution because the informant and victim have approached this

Court and have filed the affidavit wriggling out of their statement made

to the police as well as before the Court. He has relied upon the

judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G. Sagar Suri

and another v. State of U.P. and others1 and K. Bharati Devi and

another v. State of Telengana and another2.

          In G. Sagar Suri (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:
               "It was submitted by Mr. Lalit, learned counsel for the second
               respondent that the appellants have already filed an application

in the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate for their discharge and that this Court should not interfere in the

(2000) 2 SCC 636

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2695

criminal proceedings which are at the threshold. We do not think that on filing of any application for discharge, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. In this connection, reference may be made to two decisions of this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400] and Ashok Chaturvedi v. Shitul H. Chanchani [(1998) 7 SCC 698 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1704] wherein it has been specifically held that though the Magistrate trying a case has jurisdiction to discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against them when no offence has been made out against them and still why must they undergo the agony of a criminal trial."

Similarly, in K. Bharati Devi and another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has held as under:-

"The reference was answered by the learned three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] . Speaking for the Bench, R.M. Lodha, J. (as his Lordship then was), observed thus : (SCC pp. 340-43, paras 57-61)

"57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a

criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not

quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.

59. B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] , Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 :

2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] , Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non- compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.

60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [Dharampal v. Ramshri, (1993) 1 SCC 435 :

1993 SCC (Cri) 333] , Arun Shankar Shukla [Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146 : 1999

SCC (Cri) 1076] , Ishwar Singh [Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], Rumi Dhar [Rumi Dhar v. State of W.B., (2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638] . The principle propounded in Simrikhia [Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal [Dharampal v. Ramshri, (1993) 1 SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333] the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] . In Ishwar Singh [Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [Rumi Dhar v. State of W.B., (2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani [Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 :

(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638] was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 :

2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 :

(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638] was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani [Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638] supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline

engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc. cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and

whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

Relying upon the aforementioned two judgments, Mr. Pandey, learned

counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the plea of quashing of the

F.I.R. remains maintainable despite substantial examination of the

prosecution witnesses. Therefore, keeping in view the stand taken by the

victim as well as the informant in the present case, this Court may quash

the entire proceeding. He has also submitted that the present proceeding

is arising out of a matrimonial discord; hence there is no legal

impediment to interfere and quash the F.I.R.

6. Mr. S.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for opposite parties

no.2 and 3 has reiterated the stand taken by Mr. Pandey, learned counsel

for the petitioners and submitted that the parties have now settled the

dispute amongst themselves and on the settlement terms the present

petition has been filed. Hence, this Court may give indulgence to the

petitioners and quash the criminal proceeding initiated against his

clients.

7. Mr. U.R. Jena, learned Additional Government Advocate

for State-opposite party no.1 on the contrary submitted that trial in the

present case is at advance stage therefore, at this stage, invocation of

inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the

informant and the victim is forbidden particularly when they themselves

have already deposed before the trial Court against the opposite parties

no.2 and 3. He has also read out the evidence of the witnesses to

substantiate his case.

8. I have gone through the contentions raised by the petitioners

in the present petition and also carefully gone through the evidence

recorded by the prosecution in the trial of the accused opposite parties

no.2 and 3. The present petitioners have been examined as P.W.s 1 and 2

on 25.09.2024 & 10.10.2024 respectively. Both the petitioners in their

examination before the court below being the prosecution witnesses have

in detailed narrated the incident and implicated the opposite parties no.2

and 3 by specifically attributing overt act. They sustained extensive

cross-examination; however the defence counsel could not create any

doubt on the trustworthiness of the witnesses. Similarly, there are other

witnesses have also been examined and all the witnesses have supported

the prosecution case. Therefore, while exercising the extra-ordinary

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court should not abruptly

scuttle the ongoing trial. This Court is also conscious of the facts that the

dispute is arising out of a matrimonial discord. However, the offences for

which the opposite parties no.2 and 3 are being tried are grave offences.

Therefore, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition at the

instance of the present petitioners because it is well settled principle of

law that when the trial is at advance stage and the offence involving are

heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, the High Court while

exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. shall not interfere

and abruptly cut-short the trial. This principle is well established by the

judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of

Punjab3, in which the apex court held thus:

"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding

(2012) 10 SCC 303

the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. ......"

It will be apposite to refer to the Judgment of Narinder Singh v. State of

Punjab4 where similar principles relating to an offence involving

charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code are reiterated, where

the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to

(2014) 6 SCC 466

proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship."

9. In light of the well-settled legal principles propounded in the

judgments of Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra), this

Court has carefully considered all the attending circumstances

surrounding the present case. It is evident that the offences involved are

of a grave and serious nature, which warrants a thorough examination

and judicial scrutiny. While it is acknowledged that the parties have

reached a compromise, it is crucial to recognize that the trial has already

progressed to an advanced stage. Furthermore, the victims-petitioners

have duly recorded their evidence with the learned trial court, which

constitutes an important part of the evidence. It is also apposite to note

that the crime is not merely directed at any individual, but rather at the

State and the society at large. Given these facts, this Court is of the