Orissa High Court
Paradip Port Trust And Another vs Keshab Chandra Sethy on 23 June, 2025
Author: Murahari Sri Raman
Bench: Murahari Sri Raman
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.A. No.191 of 2025
Paradip Port Trust and another .... Appellants
Mr. Gautam Misra, Senior Advocate
-Versus-
Keshab Chandra Sethy .... Respondent
Mr. Swapnil Roy, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
ORDER
Order No. 23.06.2025
02. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and
order dated 17th December, 2024 passed by the single Bench in
W.P.(C) No.14144 of 2016 filed by the writ petitioner-respondent
seeking the issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus upon the
appellants to issue the letter of appointment to the post of
Attendant which was earmarked for the candidate belonging to a
reserved category.
2. It is beyond cavil of doubt that pursuant to the
advertisement floated by the appellants to fill up the post of
Attendant, the writ petitioner-respondent offered his candidature
within the time stipulated therein. The conditions enshrined in the
said advertisement includes the submission of a First-Aid
Certificate as well as the Caste Certificate as the said post was kept
for a reserved category, which according to the writ petitioner-
respondent, was duly complied with. The writ petitioner-
respondent was adjudged as a suitable candidate, but it was
subsequently detected that the First-Aid Certificate submitted by
the writ petitioner-respondent being one of the requisite condition
in the said advertisement has lapsed by passage of time and a letter
was issued on 13th May, 2016 by the Secretary, Paradip Port Trust
to submit the renewed/updated First-Aid Certificate within fifteen
days from the date.
3. Indubitably, the renewed/updated First-Aid Certificate was
produced, but later on, the appellants proceeded to reject the
candidature of the writ petitioner-respondent on the score that the
certificate subsequently submitted by the writ petitioner-
respondent was issued beyond the last date of submission of the
application and, therefore, the candidature of the writ petitioner-
respondent is liable to be cancelled and/or rejected.
4. The single Bench proceeded on the footing that the
moment the time to file the certificate is extended by the recruiting
authority, it cannot take a rebound and reject the application
thereof. The single Bench further found that there has been an
unjust enrichment upon the legal right accrued in favour of the writ
petitioner-respondent at the behest of the appellants and, therefore,
the writ petition deserves to be allowed with exemplary costs of
Rs.5,00,000/-.
5. The bone of contention in the instant appeal on behalf of
the appellants is restricted to a point that there was no occasion to
extend the period for submission of the certificate issued
subsequent to the last date of submission of an application and,
therefore, even if the authorities have permitted the writ petitioner-
respondent to submit the renewed/updated First-Aid Certificate, it
does not confer any right into him for being considered to such
post. It is further submitted that the single Bench has wrongly
construed the letter dated 13th May, 2016 as an extension of the
period for submission of the application or the certificate being the
requisite conditions in terms of the said advertisement and,
therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with.
6. The certificate which was appended along with the original
application issued by the competent authority with regard to the
First-Aid was valid for a period of three years from the date of the
examination. The said certificate reveals that the examination was
conducted on 31st October, 2007 and, therefore, the validity of the
said certificate is three years from the said date, which admittedly
expired in the midnight of 30th October, 2010. Though the
advertisement does not specifically indicate that the certificate to
be submitted must be valid as on the date of last date of the
submission of the application by the intending candidates, but
normally the certificate having a lifespan must remain alive as on
the date of offering the candidature by the intending candidates.
Precisely for such reason, the appellants caused a letter dated 13th
May, 2016 inviting the attention of the writ petitioner-respondent
in this regard and permitting him to deposit the renewed/updated
First-Aid Certificate within fortnight from the said date. None of
the intending candidate has approached the Court challenging such
letter issued by the appellants, but subsequently, the appellants
proceeded to reject the candidature solely on the ground that the
certificate submitted within the extended period cannot be termed
as a due compliance of the conditions enshrined in the said
advertisement.
7. An authority cannot approbate and reprobate at the same
time. The moment the authority detected that the certificate
submitted along with an application has a limited duration and
expired by efflux of time, the decision may be taken to reject the
candidature of the writ petitioner-respondent. The moment the
authority decided to extend the time for submission of the said
certificate and a due compliance is secured by the intending
candidate, it is too late in a day to take a rebound and reject the
candidature of a candidate who ultimately emerged successful in
the recruitment process.
8. We do not find any express fetter having put in the
advertisement in extending the period for submission of the
certificates and, therefore, the moment the recruiting agencies have
extended the time to submit the said certificate, it cannot take a
contrary view and, therefore, is estopped by their own conduct and
representation. The doctrine of estoppel has received recognition in
the legal parlance and the authorities cannot be permitted to act
contrary to the stand already taken and duly communicated either
by their conduct or representation. The single Bench has construed
the letter dated 13th May, 2016 as an extension of time for valid
participation in the recruitment process which cannot be said to be
infirm and/or opposed to the legal jargon.
9. We appreciate the contention raised by the appellants that
the imposition of the exemplary costs in a routine manner should
be eschewed and sufficient safeguard should be taken in this
regard. We have been reminded of the observations made by the
Supreme Court in Satyapal Singh v. Union of India and another,
(2010) 12 SCC 70 that the imposition of the exemplary costs could
only be made in the event the claim is founded upon a falsity or an
outcome of a fraud, misrepresentation or suppression of the fact,
but when a debatable point is raised inviting the adjudication by
the Court which does not appear to be vexatious or of such
magnanimity amounting to a wastage of the judicial hours, the
Court should not venture to impose an exemplary costs. The
enlightening observation of the above report is reproduced as
under:
"8. Exemplary costs are levied where a claim is found
to be false or vexatious or where a party is found to
be guilty of misrepresentation, fraud or suppression
of facts. In the absence of any such finding, it will be
improper to punish a litigant with exemplary costs.
When the appellate court did not choose to levy any
costs while dismissing the appeal filed by the
petitioner after nine years of pendency with interim
stay, the High Court, while dismissing the writ
petition at preliminary hearing, ought not to have
levied exemplary costs with reference to the period of
pendency before the appellate Court. We do not find
any ground on which the exemplary costs of
Rs.50,000 could be sustained.
9. Levy of exemplary costs on ordinary litigants, as
punishment for merely approaching courts and
securing an interim order, when there was no fraud,
misrepresentation or suppression, is unwarranted. In
fact, it will be a bad precedent. Even if any costs are
to be levied on a petitioner, for any default or
delaying tactics, where the respondents have entered
appearance, costs should be ordered to be paid to the
respondents, who were the affected parties on
account of the litigation. There is no justification for
levying costs of Rs.50,000 on the petitioner payable to
the High Court Legal Services Committee. There is
also no justification for directing the State
Government to act as the collecting agent for the
costs payable to the Legal Services Committee.
Directing a government servant, an ordinary
employee, to pay Rs.50,000 as costs within one month
and further directing the use of coercive process for
recovery of costs as arrears of land revenue was
unwarranted."
10. In view of the legal pronouncement in the above noted
decision, we have no hesitation that the single Bench ought not to
have imposed an exemplary costs while allowing a writ petition
filed by the writ petitioner-respondent. We hasten to add that at
times when the claim is defeated by a delay, the Court may impose
costs as a compensatory measure, but after recording the proper
reasons relating to the conduct and the action of the authorities
which resulted into a deprivation without any reasonable cause or
the grounds.
11. We do not find any such element in the instant matter and,
therefore, we are unable to persuade ourselves to countenance the
imposition of exemplary costs against the appellants. The order
impugned is modified to the extent that the portion by which the
costs is imposed upon the appellants, the same is hereby set aside.
The remaining portion of the order impugned in the instant appeal
is hereby affirmed.
12. The writ appeal is accordingly disposed of.
(Harish Tandon)
Chief Justice
(M.S. Raman)
Judge
S.K. Guin/PA
Designation: Personal Assistant
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 25-Jun-2025 11:05:47
