Ghasiram Behera
Aged about 59 years
Son of Anirudh Behera
At: Boinda, P.S.: Handipada
District: Angul. ... Appellant
1. State of Odisha
Represented through
Under Secretary to Government
Finance Department, Odisha
Bhubaneswar
District: Khordha.
2. Directorate of Treasuries and Inspection
Odisha, Bhubaneswar
At/P.O.: Bhubaneswar
District: Khordha.
3. The Assistant Directorate of Treasuries
and Inspection, Odisha, Bhubaneswar
At/P.O.: Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha.
4. District Treasury Officer, Dhenkanal
At/P.O./District: Dhenkanal ... Respondents
"3. The present writ petition has been filed by the
Petitioner with the following prayers:
„Under such circumstance it is therefore prayed that
your Lordship‟s would be graciously pleased to
admit this writ application, call for records and after
hearing the parties, may be pleased to issue a
writ/s/order/s/direction/s in the nature of
mandamus directing the opposite parties to re-
instate him in service along with all service benefits
admissible to him under law, forthwith, preferably
within a stipulated period as this Hon‟ble court
deem fit and proper.
And further may pass any other
order/s/directions/s as this Hon‟ble Court deems fit
and proper to extend relief to the petitioner.‟
***
4. *** He also submitted that the Opposite Party No.2
has sought for clarification from the vigilance
authorities. Since no clarification has been received
by the Opposite Party No.3, the Opposite Party No.2
has not taken any final decision with regard to the
reinstatement in service of the Petitioner after his
acquittal in criminal case. Learned counsel for the
Petitioner further referred to the judgment of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal Vrs.
State of Rajasthan and Others, Civil Appeal
No.7935 of 2023, arising out of SLP (C)
No.33423 of 2018, decided on 4th December,
2023. Referring the aforesaid judgment, learned
counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the case of
the Petitioner is squarely covered by the ratio laid
down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the above
noted judgment. Therefore, the Opposite Parties be
directed to reinstate the Petitioner in service by
following the aforesaid judgment of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court.
***
6. Considering the submissions of the learned counsels
appearing for the respective parties, this Court
deems it proper to dispose of the writ petition at the
stage of admission by directing the Opposite Party
No.2 to consider the representation of the Petitioner
under Annexure-4 to the writ petition and dispose of
the same within a period of two months from the
date of communication of a certified copy of this
order by the Petitioner by passing a speaking and
reasoned order. It is further made clear that if any
clarification is required by the Opposite Party No.2,
the same shall be furnished by the Opposite Party
No.3 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within
a period of four weeks from the date of
communication of a certified copy of this order by the
Petitioner. The final decision so taken by the
Opposite Party No.2 be communicated to the
Petitioner within ten days thereafter."
2.6. The Director of Treasuries and Inspection vide Office
Order in File No.PRS-50/2017/Lt. No.10897, dated
03.09.2024 in compliance of aforesaid direction of this
Court reinstated the petitioner in service without
allowing any pay or allowances to him for the dismissal
period and directed that "the period of his absence from
duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty
under Rule 91 of the Odisha Service Code".
2.7. Dissatisfied thereby, the petitioner knocked the doors of
this Court again by way of writ petition, being W.P.(C)
No.25707 of 2024, which stood dismissed by a
Judgment dated 30.01.2025 of the learned Single Judge
with the following observations:
"13. The perusal of the aforementioned judicial
precedents, when juxtaposed with the facts of the
present case, leaves no ambiguity in the conclusion
that the petitioner‟s entitlement to back wages
hinges upon the discretionary powers vested in the
competent authority under Rule 91 of the Orissa
Service Code. The petitioner was acquitted on
grounds that the prosecution failed to prove
the charges beyond reasonable doubt, with
specific observations by this Court that the
recovery of bribe money was a doubtful feature
and the defense plea was established by a
preponderance of probability. Such a finding falls
within the category of acquittals rendered on the
benefit of doubt, rather than one that fully
exonerates the petitioner of the allegations.
14. The authority exercised its discretion, as
empowered under Rule 91, to deny back wages
for the period of dismissal, citing the absence
of complete exoneration. Such an exercise of
discretion cannot be deemed arbitrary or capricious,
given the context of the acquittal and the
precedential guidance. The petitioner, while
reinstated in service, cannot claim an automatic
entitlement to back wages unless it is demonstrably
established that his suspension and dismissal were
wholly unjustified, which is not the case here.
15. Beyond the issue concerning the nature of the
petitioner‟s acquittal, his claim for back wages is
constrained by the well-established principle of "no
work, no pay." This doctrine, rooted in equity and
the moral fabric of service jurisprudence, dictates
that one cannot seek the fruits of labour not
rendered, particularly when the absence from duty
stems from one‟s own actions or mis-judgments.
16. When an individual becomes entangled in criminal
proceedings as a consequence of his own deeds,
and later secures an acquittal based on the benefit
of doubt rather than a clean exoneration, the claim
for full salary and allowances cannot be asserted as
an inherent right.
17. In this context, the Supreme Court, in Reserve Bank
of India, New Delhi Vrs. Bhopal Singh Panchal,
(1994) 1 SCC 541 addressed the application of
the principle of "no work, no pay" within the
framework of service jurisprudence, particularly
concerning a bank employee. The Court further
emphasized that when an employee is unable to
discharge their responsibilities due to circumstances
attributable to their own actions, such as
involvement in legal or disciplinary proceedings, the
claim for back wages cannot be asserted as a matter
of right. The relevant excerpts of the judgment is
produced below:
„The competent authority while deciding whether an
employee who is suspended in such circumstances
is entitled to his pay and allowances or not and to
what extent, if any, and whether the period is to be
treated as on duty or on leave, has to take into
consideration the circumstances of each case. It is
only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is
treated by the competent authority as being on duty
during the period of suspension that such employee
is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said
period. In other words, the Regulations vest the
power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of
such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise.
The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged.
During this period, the employee renders no
work. He is absent for reasons of his own
involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is
in no way responsible for keeping him away
from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be
saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and
allowances for the period. That will be against
the principle of „no work, no pay‟ and
positively inequitable to those who have to
work and earn their pay.‟
18. Akin to the aforementioned judicial precedents,
the present petitioner‟s case is similarly
governed by the principle of "no work, no pay."
In the present case, the petitioner‟s absence from
service was a direct consequence of his involvement
in criminal proceedings. While this Court
subsequently acquitted the petitioner, the acquittal
was not one of unequivocal honour but rather based
on the benefit of doubt, leaving the charges
unproven beyond reasonable doubt.
V. Conclusion:
19. In light of the foregoing discussion and the
established principles of law, this Court finds no
merit in the petitioner‟s claim for back wages. The
competent authority lawfully exercised its
discretion to deny back wages, given the
nature of the petitioner‟s acquittal, which was
rendered on the benefit of doubt. Granting such
relief would contravene the principle of "no
work, no pay" and undermine the discipline
and equity integral to public service.
20. This Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed."
2.8. Still dissatisfied, the Appellant preferred the present
appeal questioning propriety of non-extension of
legitimate dues by application of "no work, no pay"
principle.
Hearing:
3. The matter came up before this Court for consideration
for admission of the writ appeal.
3.1. Since the application of principle of "no work, no pay"
vis-à-vis Rule 91 of the Odisha Service Code ("OSC", for
short) to deny service benefits upon being reinstated in
service on the facts and in the circumstances where the
prosecution failed to prove the charges levelled against
the appellant under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, is involved, on consent of counsel for the
respective parties, the writ appeal is heard finally for
disposal on merits.
3.2. Heard Sri Chitta Ranjan Pattnaik, learned Advocate
representing the appellant and Sri Bimbisar Dash,
learned Additional Government Advocate for the
respondents.
3.3. Upon conclusion of hearing, the matter was kept
reserved for preparation and delivery of Judgment/
Order.
Contentions and submissions of rival parties:
4. Refuting application of the principle "no work, no pay",
as held by the learned Single Judge, it is vehemently
contended by the learned counsel that when the
prosecution has failed to establish the charges against
the appellant and the appellate Court having appreciated
the evidence on record acquitted him from all charges
under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
there is no scope for the respondents to say that the
appellant-petitioner was responsible for his absence
from duty during the period of suspension as well as the
period between date of acquittal and reinstatement in
service. Therefore, Sri Chitta Ranjan Pattnaik, learned
Advocate would urge that the appellant is entitled to the
relief(s) claimed for.
4.1. He strenuously argued that the learned Single Judge
omitted to have regard to provisions of sub-rule (2) of
Rule 91 of the OSC; rather emphasis being laid on sub-
rule (3) ibid. is misplaced. Drawing attention of this
Court to the finding returned by the appellate Court in
CRLA No.379 of 2017, vide Judgment dated 09.10.2023,
it is submitted that "the prosecution cannot derive any
advantage from the falsity or other infirmities of the
defence version, so long as it does not discharge its
initial burden of proving its case beyond all reasonable
doubt" is indicative of fact that the acquittal of the
appellant is clean and honourable. Therefore, he argued
that the approach of the learned Single Judge is
erroneous inasmuch as he considered the Judgment in
criminal appeal as if the order of acquittal by the learned
appellate Court was on account of "benefit of doubt" as
distinguished from connotation of "fully exonerated".
4.2. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in the case of Ram Lal Vrs. State of Rajasthan,
(2023) 15 SCR 808 = 2023 INSC 1047 Sri Chitta Ranjan
Pattnaik, learned Advocate buttressed his argument by
stating that without being biased by the use of the
terminologies like "benefit of doubt" and "honourably
acquitted", the learned Single Judge ought to have
considered that in the criminal appeal, the appellant was
acquitted of all charges as the prosecution has failed to
bring home charges levelled against him under the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore,
he vociferously submitted that the appellant was not
only to have been reinstated, but also should have been
extended all consequential service benefits including
pay, allowance, seniority, promotions, fitment of salary
and the like.
5. Per contra, Sri Bimbisar Dash, learned Additional
Government Advocate, supporting the findings and
observations of the learned Single Judge vide Judgment
dated 30.01.2025, sought to justify the decision
contained in the Office Order dated 03.09.2024 of the
Director of Treasuries and Inspection, Odisha,
Bhubaneswar.
5.1. Referring to Rule 91(3) of the OSC, he would submit that
the learned Single Judge was correct in arriving at the
conclusion for by way of the Judgment the appellate
Court in criminal appeal did not observe that the
acquittal was clean one, but the same was tainted with
infirmity in the defence version and the trial Court, in
fact, convicted him and awarded sentence. Therefore, the
Judgment in CRLA No.379 of 2017 cannot be construed
to have completely exonerated the appellant of all the
charges. As a consequence thereof, in view of
unambiguous provisions contained in Rule 91(3)(a) of
the OSC, it could not have been stated that the
competent authority utilized his judicious discretion by
denying pay and allowances as claimed by the appellant.
Thus, fervently praying to dismiss the writ appeal, he
submitted not to show indulgence in the Judgment
dated 30.01.2025 of the learned Single Judge.
5.2. The learned Additional Government Advocate cited a
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India rendered
in Union of India Vrs. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 to
contend that the appellant is rightly not allowed by the
learned Single Judge arrear pay and allowances and he
emphatically urged that the appellant is not entitled to
any relief.
DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS:
6. The pleadings, grounds of appeal and arguments of
counsel for the respective parties takes this Court to
consider whether the appellant can be said to be "fully
exonerated" in terms of Rule 91(2) of the OSC.
6.1. The provisions of Rule 91 of the Odisha Service Code are
reproduced herein below for better comprehension of the
issue at hand:
"Rule 91.--
(1) When a Government servant who has been
dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or
suspended is reinstated or would have been
reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation
while under suspension the authority competent to
order the reinstatement shall consider and make a
specific order:
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to
the Government servant for the period of his
absence from duty or for the period of
suspension ending with the date of his
retirement on superannuation, as the case may
be, and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated
as a period spent on duty.
(2) Where such competent authority holds that the
Government servant has been fully exonerated
or in the case of suspension, that it was wholly
unjustified, the Government servant shall be
given the full pay to which he would have been
entitled had he not been dismissed, removed,
compulsorily retired or suspended, as the case may
be, together with any allowances of which he
was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or
suspension.
(3) (a) In the case of dismissal, removal and
compulsory retirement when a Government
servant who is not completely exonerated
of the charges, is reinstated in service, it shall
be open to the competent authority to decide
not to allow any pay or allowances to him.
(b) In the case of suspension when a Government
servant, not having been exonerated of the
charges fully, is reinstated in service, he may
be allowed subsistence allowance only for the
period of suspension as admissible under Rule
(4) In a case falling under clause (2) the period of
absence from duty shall be treated as a period
spent on duty for all purposes.
(5) In a case falling under clause (3) the period of
absence from duty shall not be treated as a period
spent on duty, unless such competent authority
specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any
specified purpose:
Provided that if the Government servant so desires,
such authority may direct that the period of absence
from duty shall be converted into leave of any kind
due and admissible to the Government servant."
6.2. Perusal of record relating to writ petition reveals that:
i. The appellant was suspended by Office Order dated
27.11.2003 issued by the Director of Treasuries
and Inspection, for having remained in custody for
more than forty-eight hours in view of Rule 12(2) of
the CCA Rules.
ii. The appellant due to dismissal from Government
service was relieved from duties by Office Order
vide Memo No.3090, dated 20.10.2017, issued by
the Treasury Officer, Dhenkanal.
iii. After order of acquittal in criminal appeal, the
petitioner was reinstated in Government service
and posted as Junior Assistant at District
Treasury, Dhenkanal by Office Order dated
03.09.2024 issued by the Directorate of Treasuries
and Inspection, Odisha, Bhubaneswar.
6.3. By rendering Judgment dated 09.10.2023, the criminal
appeal, being CRLA No.379 of 2017, stood allowed with
the following pertinent observations:
"16. *** It is not in dispute that an accused is not
supposed to establish his defence plea by proving it
beyond reasonable doubt like the prosecution but by
preponderance of probability. Inference of
preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not
only from the materials brought on record by the
parties but also by reference to the circumstance
upon which the accused relies. The burden can be
discharged by an accused adducing cogent and
reliable evidence which must appear to be
believable or by bringing out answers from the
prosecution witnesses or showing
circumstances which might lead the Court to
draw a different inference. The prosecution
cannot derive any advantage from the falsity
or other infirmities of the defence version, so
long as it does not discharge its initial burden
of proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
If the defence version is incorrect, it does not
mean that the prosecution version is
necessarily correct. The prosecution must stand or
fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength
from the weakness of the defence. The learned trial
Court seems to have not considered the defence plea
of the appellant on the touchstone of preponderance
of probability.
Conclusion:
17. In view of the foregoing discussions, when the
prosecution has not successfully established
the demand aspect of bribe by the appellant
beyond all reasonable doubt, the acceptance of
bribe money by the appellant and the recovery of
bribe money from the possession of the appellant is
a doubtful feature and moreover the defence plea
put forth by the appellant has been established by
preponderance of probability, it would not be legally
justified to hold the appellant guilty of the offences
charged. Accordingly, the criminal appeal
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment
and order of conviction of the appellant under
Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act and the sentence passed
thereunder is hereby set aside and the appellant
is acquitted of all the charges. The appellant is
on bail by virtue of the order of this Court. He is
discharged from liability of his bail bond. The
personal bond and the surety bond stand
cancelled."
6.4. To come to such conclusion as extracted above, the
appellate Court analysed the evidence of witnesses and
weighed the veracity of defence version as also the
burden which lay on the prosecution vis-à-vis gravamen
of offences under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is
held by the learned appellate Court on merit that there
has been "failure of the prosecution to prove the demand
for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery
of the amount from the person accused of the offence
under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his
conviction". On the issue whether there was occasion for
the appellant to demand bribe with respect to any
pending work, if any, on threadbare discussion with
regard to material on record, the appellate Court came to
hold that there was no occasion for the appellant to
demand any bribe as there was no work pending with
the appellant as on 14.11.2003. The learned appellate
Court inter alia observed that:
"*** Exhibit 14 reveals that it was received only on
11.11.2003 in the Sub-Treasury which would be evident
from the official seals and signatures. Therefore, there is
neither any oral evidence or documentary evidence that
any bills of the mother of P.W.1 had come to Sub-Treasury
Office, Pallahara prior to 11.11.2003. *** P.W.5, the
Treasury Officer also deposed that the bills file dealt by
the appellant was sent to the accountant on 12.11.2003
and it was approved by him on 14.11.2003 on being
placed by the accountant. *** Therefore, I am of the
humble view that there was no occasion on the part of the
appellant prior to 11.11.2003 to demand bribe and there
was no pending work of P.W.1 as on 14.11.2003 with the
appellant to make demand of bribe."
6.5. With respect to acceptance of bribe by the appellant, it is
observed in the Judgment in criminal appeal as follows:
"14. P.W.1 has stated that he brought out the tainted
money of Rs.1,100/- from his left side chest pocket
and gave the same to the appellant which was
accepted by the appellant and was kept it in his left
side pocket of his wearing shirt and then the
appellant kept the money below some files in the
Office steel almirah. In the cross-examination,
however P.W.1 has stated that he himself had kept
the money in the shirt pocket of the appellant, but he
did not remember the exact pocket in which he kept
the money. He further stated that the GC notes were
recovered from the pocket of the appellant.
Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 in the chief
examination is contrary to the evidence in the cross-
examination. The overhearing witness P.W.3 is
completely silent regarding acceptance of bribe
money by the appellant from P.W.1. The word
„acceptance‟ connotes receipt or acknowledgment
with consenting mind. It is a deliberate act by which
one was willing to receive or acknowledge something
for the act/favour he intends to show. Accidental,
unintentional receipt or receipt under
misrepresentation or planting of money
clandestinely without the knowledge of the person or
thrusting of money into the possession of the
accused would not be „acceptance‟ as is required to
constitute one of the ingredients of offence under
Section 13(1)(d) or Section 7 of 1988 Act. If as per the
evidence of P.W.1, he himself thrust the money into
the shirt pocket of the appellant, it cannot be said
that the appellant voluntarily accepted the money.
Therefore, the prosecution has not successfully
established that on the date of trap, there was
acceptance of bribe money by the appellant from
P.W.1."
6.6. From aforesaid material particulars discussed in the
Judgment rendered in criminal appeal, this Court
reached at the clear and untrammelled conclusion that
the appellant is completely cleared of all charges. Thus,
it can be said that the appellant is "fully exonerated".
6.7. The background factual matrix when read juxtaposed
with provisions contained in Rule 91 of the OSC, it is
crystal clear that when the Government servant is held
to be cleared from all charges due to laxity of the
prosecution, no fault can be attributed to the accused/
delinquent; thereby sub-rule (2) thereof would attract in
such situation, but not sub-rule (3). The present case,
hence, falls squarely within the ambit of sub-rule (2)
read with sub-rule (4) of Rule 91 of the OSC.
6.8. In Ram Lal Vrs. State of Rajasthan, (2023) 15 SCR 808,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe
that,
"25. Expressions like "benefit of doubt" and "honorably
acquitted", used in judgments are not to be
understood as magic incantations. A court of law
will not be carried away by the mere use of such
terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge
has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet
carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same
has also been proved by the witnesses examined on
behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the
acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after
full consideration of the prosecution evidence
and that the prosecution miserably failed to
prove the charge can only be arrived at after a
reading of the judgment in its entirety. The
court in judicial review is obliged to examine the
substance of the judgment and not go by the form of
expression used.
26. We are satisfied that the findings of the
appellate judge in the criminal case clearly
indicate that the charge against the appellant
was not just, "not proved"-- in fact the charge
even stood "disproved" by the very prosecution
evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be
"disproved" when, after considering the matters
before it, the court either believes that it does not
exist or considers its non-existence so probable that
a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
does not exist. A fact is said to be "not proved" when
it is neither "proved" nor "disproved" [See Vijayee
Singh and Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC
190]."
6.9. In the case of Union of India Vrs. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1
SCC 121, relied on by the learned Additional
Government Advocate, it has been observed as follows:
"4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the
materials on record, including the judgment and
orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that
it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special
leave petition at the threshold without detailed
reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration
of law by this Court or constitute a binding
precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by
the appellant is one on merits and for reasons
specifically recorded therefor it operates as a
binding precedent as well. On going through the
same, we are in respectful agreement with the view
taken in Ranchhodji, (1996) 11 SCC 603. If
prosecution, which ultimately resulted in
acquittal of the person concerned was at the
behest of or by the department itself, perhaps
different considerations may arise. On the
other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a
public servant got involved in a criminal case
and if after initial conviction by the trial court,
he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the
department cannot in any manner be found
fault with for having kept him out of service,
since the law obliges a person convicted of an
offence to be so kept out and not to be retained
in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the
decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only
convincing but are in consonance with
reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to
that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot
be sustained and the respondent has to be
reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier
discharge was on account of those criminal
proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are
well within their rights to deny back wages to the
respondent for the period he was not in service. The
appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the
period for which they could not avail of the services
of the respondent. The High Court, in our view,
committed a grave error, in allowing back wages
also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects
and considerations. Consequently, the order of the
High Court insofar as it directed payment of back
wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside."
6.10. The present case is a case where the criminal case was
instituted by the department and, therefore, it was for
the prosecution to prove the charges to the hilt;
nonetheless, by virtue of appellate Court Judgment, the
charges levelled against the appellant in criminal case
under the Prevention of Corruption Act ultimately
resulted in acquittal. In such circumstance, the view
expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaipal Singh
(supra) is different considerations would arise. Thus, the
said case instead of aiding the submission of the
respondents assists the cause of the appellant.
6.11. Under the aforesaid premise, as the appellant is held to
be "fully exonerated" in view of tenor of Judgment dated
09.10.2023 in criminal appeal and ratio of decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal (supra) and
Jaipal Singh (supra) it can safely be said that the learned
Single Judge has mistaken the fact as if the instant case
is a case where the appellant has "entangled" himself.
Such erroneous perception as flagged at paragraph 16 of
the impugned Judgment landed the learned Single
Judge to arrive at wrongful conclusion.
6.12. As this Court comes to the conclusion that the nature
and tenor of the Judgment dated 09.10.2023 rendered
in CRLA No.379 of 2017 leads to construe that the
appellant is "fully exonerated" as envisioned in sub-rule
(2) of Rule 91, the absence of the appellant from duty is
required to be treated "as a period spent on duty for all
purposes" in terms of sub-rule (4). Further, the
provisions of sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (4) read
conjointly leads this Court to construe the appellant
"fully exonerated", he would be entitled to "full pay to
which he would have been entitled had he not been
dismissed" or "suspended" together with all allowances
of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal or
suspension.
7. On a careful reading of Judgment dated 09.10.2023 in
CRLA No.379 of 2017 it is given to understand that this
Court has discussed evidence and material available on
record relating to trial Court and came to the positive
conclusion that the prosecution could not discharge its
burden to prove the charges levelled against the
appellant and consequently, the appellant was acquitted
of all charges.
7.1. Scrutiny of Office Order dated 03.09.2024 issued by the
Directorate of Treasuries and Inspection emanates that
the authority has misconstrued the acquittal of the
appellant as if it was on account of "benefit of doubt".
Relevant portion of the said Office Order reads as
follows:
"9. The Hon‟ble High Court, Orissa while disposing of
the CRLA No.379 of 2017 vide Order dated
09.10.2023 set aside the Order of the conviction
dated 19.05.2017 passed by the Special Judge
(Vigilance), Cuttack in Vigilance in PS Case No.
64/2003, sentence passed thereunder Section 7 and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the 1988
Act, acquitting Sri Behera from all the charges on the
benefit of doubt."
7.2. It may not be out of place to have a reference to Delhi
Police Vrs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 to appreciate
the concept of "honourable acquittal"/"acquitted of
blame"/"fully exonerated". In the said case it has been
observed that,
"25. The expression "honourable acquittal" was
considered by this Court in Inspector General of
Police Vrs. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598. In that
case this Court was concerned with a situation
where disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against a police officer. Criminal case was pending
against him under Section 509, IPC and under
Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted
in that case because of the non-examination of
key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the
conduct of the criminal case. Two material
witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the
judgment of this Court in RBI Vrs. Bhopal Singh
Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541, where in somewhat
similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank‟s
action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service
on the ground that in the criminal case he was
acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and,
therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal,
this Court held that the High Court was not justified
in setting aside the punishment imposed in the
departmental proceedings. This Court observed
that the expressions "honourable acquittal",
"acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated"
are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or
the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is
meant by the expression "honourably
acquitted". This Court expressed that when the
accused is acquitted after full consideration of
the prosecution case and the prosecution
miserably fails to prove the charges levelled
against the accused, it can possibly be said
that the accused was honourably acquitted.
26. In light of the above, we are of the opinion that since
the purpose of the departmental proceedings is to
keep persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct
or dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave
cases of moral turpitude, out of the department, if
found necessary, because they pollute the
department, surely the above principles will apply
with more vigour at the point of entry of a person in
the Police Department i.e. at the time of recruitment.
If it is found by the Screening Committee that
the person against whom a serious case
involving moral turpitude is registered is
discharged on technical grounds or is
acquitted of the same charge but the acquittal
is not honourable, the Screening Committee
would be entitled to cancel his candidature.
Stricter norms need to be applied while appointing
persons in a disciplinary force because public
interest is involved in it."
7.3. In Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla Vrs. State of J&K, (2023) 19 SCC
588 it has been reiterated that:
"13. In State (UT of Chandigarh) Vrs. Pradeep Kumar,
(2018) 1 SCC 797 also it was reiterated that if a
person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot
obviously be inferred that he was falsely involved, or
he had no criminal antecedents. The precise
observations made therein are reproduced
hereunder:
„10. The acquittal in a criminal case is not
conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in
the post concerned. If a person is acquitted or
discharged, it cannot always be inferred that
he was falsely involved or he had no criminal
antecedents. Unless it is an honourable
acquittal, the candidate cannot claim the
benefit of the case. What is honourable
acquittal, was considered by this Court in
Inspector General of Police Vrs. S. Samuthiram,
(2013) 1 SCC 598, in which this Court held as
under:
„24. The meaning of the expression
"honourable acquittal" came up for
consideration before this Court in RBI Vrs.
Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541.
In that case, this Court has considered
the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing
with honourable acquittal by a criminal
court on the disciplinary proceedings. In
that context, this Court held that the mere
acquittal does not entitle an employee to
reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it
was held, has to be honourable. The
expressions "honourable acquittal",
"acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated"
are unknown to the Code of Criminal
Procedure or the Penal Code, which are
coined by judicial pronouncements. It is
difficult to define precisely what is meant
by the expression "honourably acquitted".
When the accused is acquitted after
full consideration of prosecution
evidence and that the prosecution
had miserably failed to prove the
charges levelled against the accused,
it can possibly be said that the
accused was honourably acquitted.‟
11.-12. ***
13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a
criminal case does not automatically entitle him
for appointment to the post. Still, it is open to
the employer to consider the antecedents and
examine whether he is suitable for appointment
to the post. From the observations of this Court
in Delhi Police Vrs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC
685 and State of M.P. Vrs. Parvez Khan, (2015)
2 SCC 591 cases, it is clear that a candidate to
be recruited to the police service must be of
impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this
category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged,
it cannot be presumed that he was honourably
acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision
of the Screening Committee must be taken as
final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The
Screening Committee also must be alive to the
importance of the trust reposed in it and must
examine the candidate with utmost character.‟
***"
7.4. Ex facie the perception of the authority concerned is not
borne on record as the Judgment in the criminal appeal
recorded that "Accordingly, the criminal appeal succeeds
and is allowed. The impugned Judgment and order of
conviction of the appellant under Section 7 and Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act and the
sentence passed thereunder is hereby set aside and the
appellant is acquitted of all the charges". It seems the
Director of Treasuries and Inspection added the words
"benefit of doubt" to the conclusion arrived at in the
criminal appeal. Such interpretation of the Judgment of
this Court by the respondent-authority concerned is
unwholesome. As it appears such addition is made only
to thwart the financial liability and extension of other
service benefits to the appellant. For failure of the
prosecution to prove the charges, the appellant could
not be saddled with liability and thereby denied of his
legitimate status and entitlement to the service benefits.
7.5. This Court may fruitfully refer to the following view
expressed by a 3-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India rendered in the case of Sudha Shrivastava
Vrs. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, (1995)
Supp.4 SCR 797:
"Even otherwise, if the husband of the appellant was not
to be promoted, he would certainly be entitled to receive
salary in the lower post till the date of his death in
October 1981. In Union of India Vrs. K.V. Jankiraman,
(1991) 4 SCC 109, it was observed by this Court that
when an employee is completely exonerated and is not
visited with penalty, then he has to be given the benefit of
salary of the higher post along with the other benefit on
the date on which he would normally have been promoted
but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. Moreover,
this is not a case where the acquittal of the
deceased was as a result of his being given the
benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of
evidence. In the instant case, the High Court has held,
while allowing the criminal appeal and setting aside the
conviction that „one cannot but hold that late S.S.
Shrivastava had not done anything, which would justify a
charge of corruption against him, much less a charge of
conspiracy‟."
7.6. In the present matter as has already been stated the
Judgment in the criminal appeal clearly reveals that the
appellant was acquitted of all charges on analysis of
merit of the matter and appreciation of details of
evidence available on record. It is not a case of acquittal
on account of paucity of evidence so as to hold the
acquittal on benefit of doubt.
7.7. With respect to entitlement to back wages on
reinstatement in service upon order of conviction being
set aside, this Court is not unaware of following
observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vrs.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik, (2025) 3 SCR 100:
"43. We cannot but endorse our wholehearted
concurrence with the views expressed in the
aforesaid decisions. Taking a cue therefrom, it can
safely be concluded that ordering back wages to be
paid to a dismissed employee-- upon his dismissal
being set aside by a court of law-- is not an
automatic relief; grant of full or partial back wages
has to be preceded by a minor fact-finding exercise
by the industrial adjudicator/court seized of the
proceedings. Such exercise would require the
relevant industrial court or the jurisdictional
High Court or even this Court to ascertain
whether in the interregnum, that is, between
the dates of termination and proposed
reinstatement, the employee has been gainfully
employed. If the employee admits of any gainful
employment and gives particulars of the employment
together with details of the emoluments received, or,
if the employee asserts by pleading that he was not
gainfully employed but the employer pleads and
proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the court, the
quantum of back wages that ought to be awarded on
reinstatement is really in the realm of discretion of
the court. Such discretion would generally
necessitate bearing in mind two circumstances:
the first is, the employee, because of the order
terminating his service, could not work for
a certain period under the employer and
secondly, for his bare survival, he might not have
had any option but to take up alternative
employment.
It is discernible from certain precedents, duly noticed
in Deepali Gundu Surwase Vrs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyala, (2013) 9 SCR 1, that the
courts are loath to award back wages for the period
when no work has been performed by such an
employee. Such a view is no doubt debatable,
having regard to the ratio decidendi in Hindustan
Tin Works (P) Ltd. Vrs. Employees, (1979) 1 SCR
563, Surendra Kumar Verma Vrs. Central
Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
(1981) 1 SCR 789 and Deepali Gundu Surwase
(supra). Though the latter decision was cited before
the coordinate bench when it decided Rajasthan
State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur Vrs. Phool
Chand, (2018) 11 SCR 448, any thoughtful
discussion appears to be absent.
44. There is one other aspect that would fall for
consideration of the court. In certain decisions,
noticed in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), it has
been opined that whether or not an employee has
been gainfully employed is within his special
knowledge and having regard to Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof is on him.
What is required of an employee in such a case? He
has to plead in his statement of claim or any
subsequent pleading before the industrial
tribunal/labour court that he has not been gainfully
employed and that the award of reinstatement may
also grant him back wages. If the employee
pleads that he was not gainfully employed, he
cannot possibly prove such negative fact by
adducing positive evidence. In the absence of any
contra-material on record, his version has to be
accepted. Reference in this connection may be made
to Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
which confers a right on an employee to seek "full
wages last drawn" from the employer while the
challenge of the employer to an award directing
reinstatement in a higher court remains pending.
There too, what is required is a statement on
affidavit regarding non-employment and with such
statement on record, the ball is in the court of the
employer to satisfy the court why relief under such
section ought not to be granted by invoking the
proviso to the section. We see no reason why a
similar approach may not be adopted. After the
employee pleads his non-employment and if the
employer asserts that the employee was gainfully
employed between the dates of termination and
proposed reinstatement, the onus of proof would
shift to the employer to prove such assertion having
regard to the cardinal principle that „he who asserts
must prove‟. Law, though, seems to be well
settled that if the employer by reason of its
illegal act deprives any of its employees from
discharging his work and the termination is
ultimately held to be bad in law, such employee
has a legitimate and valid claim to be restored
with all that he would have received but for
being illegally kept away from work. This is
based on the principle that although the
employee was willing to perform work, it was
the employer who did not accept work from
him and, therefore, if the employer‟s action is
held to be illegal and bad, such employer
cannot escape from suffering the consequences.
However, it is elementary but requires to be
restated that while grant of full back wages is
the normal rule, an exceptional case with
sufficient proof has to be set up by the
employer to escape the burden of bearing back
wages.
45. We hasten to add that the Courts may be confronted
with cases where grant of lumpsum compensation,
instead of reinstatement with back wages, could be
the more appropriate remedy. The courts may, in
such cases, providing justification for its approach
direct such lumpsum compensation to be paid
keeping in mind the interest of the employee as well
as the employer."
7.8. It is case of nobody in the instant matter that during the
period of absence on account of suspension and
subsequent dismissal from Government service till his
reinstatement in such service, the appellant was
gainfully employed. Further, with regard to the
entitlement to full pay and allowances to which the
appellant would have been entitled to had he not been
suspended and/or dismissed, the authorities,
particularly Director of Treasuries and Inspection,
Odisha, Bhubaneswar ought to have adhered to what
has been stipulated in sub-rule (2) read with sub-rule (4)
of Rule 91 of the Odisha Service Code.
8. As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs it has been
evinced from the documents available on record that the
respondents have not considered the case of the
appellant in proper perspective and failed to appreciate
that the matter should have been decided in conformity
with the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) read with
sub-rule (4) of Rule 91 of the OSC. Since no plea is
advanced by the respondents that the appellant was in
gainful employment during the period of suspension and
from date of dismissal till his reinstatement in service,
the principle of "no work, no pay" does not apply in the
fact-situation of the present case.
8.1. Noteworthy to have reference to Punjab National Bank
Vrs. Virender Kumar Goel, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 193,
wherein it has been observed that,
"17. *** The applicants shall be reinstated into their posts
with continuity in service, back wages and all
consequential benefits as are entitled to them under
the law. They shall, however, refund the entire
amount deposited into their bank accounts with
interest accrued, if any, to the Bank. Full refund of
the amount by the applicants would be the condition
precedent for reinstatement. Mr Mukul Rohatgi,
learned Additional Solicitor General submits that
applying the principle of "no work no pay", back
wages should not be allowed to them on their
reinstatement. We are unable to accept this
contention. The applicants were out of their jobs for
no fault of theirs. Even otherwise, party in breach of
contract can hardly seek for any equitable relief."
8.2. In a contempt matter relating to non-extension of other
consequential benefits on reassignment of seniority in
Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board Vrs. C.
Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689 the perspective of principle
of "no work, no pay" has been discussed illuminatingly
in the following manner:
"34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence
of statutory provision, normal rule is "no work no
pay". In appropriate cases, however, a Court of law
may, nay must, take into account all the facts in
their entirety and pass an appropriate order in
consonance with law. The Court, in a given case,
may hold that the person was willing to work but
was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so.
The Court may in the circumstances, direct the
authority to grant him all benefits considering "as if
he had worked". It, therefore, cannot be contended
as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of
payment of consequential benefits can be granted by
a Court of law and if such directions are issued by a
Court, the authority can ignore them even if they had
been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the
country (as has been done in the present case). The
bald contention of the appellant Board, therefore,
has no substance and must be rejected."
8.3. In the case of Gowramma Vrs. Manager (Personeel),
Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd., (2022) 1 SCR 734 it has
been observed in the context where the employee was
completely blameless in the matter and if the employee
is not at all at fault and was kept out of work by reasons
of the decision taken by the employer with respect to
payment of back wages as follows:
"9. It is true that no work no pay is a principle which is
apposite in circumstances where the employee does
not work but it is not an absolute principle, which
does not admit of exceptions. In this regard we may
notice that in one of the judgments relied upon by
the respondents, namely, State of Kerala Vrs. E.K.
Bhaskaran Pillai, (2007) 6 SCC 524 which, in fact,
dealt with issue as to monetary benefits when
retrospective promotion is given, this Court held:
„... So far as the situation with regard to monetary
benefits with retrospective promotion is concerned,
that depends upon case to case. There are various
facets which have to be considered. Sometimes in a
case of departmental enquiry or in criminal case it
depends on the authorities to grant full back wages
or 50 per cent of back wages looking to the nature of
delinquency involved in the matter or in criminal
cases where the incumbent has been acquitted by
giving benefit of doubt or full acquittal. Sometimes in
the matter when the person is superseded and he
has challenged the same before court or tribunal and
he succeeds in that and direction is given for
reconsideration of his case from the date persons
junior to him were appointed, in that case the court
may grant sometimes full benefits with retrospective
effect and sometimes it may not. Particularly when
the administration has wrongly denied his due then
in that case he should be given full benefits
including monetary benefit subject to there being
any change in law or some other supervening
factors. However, it is very difficult to set down any
hard-and-fast rule. The principle "no work no pay"
cannot be accepted as a rule of thumb. There are
exceptions where courts have granted monetary
benefits also.‟
10. In the decision in P.V.K. Distillery Ltd. Vrs.
Mahendra Ram, (2009) 5 SCC 705 again relied upon
by respondent, the matter arose out of an award by
the Labour Court where exercise of power under
Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act was made.
This is also a case where incidentally the court
noted that the appellant-employer remained closed
for years together and it was declared as a sick unit.
In this regard, a fact which weighed with the court is
found reflected in following statement:
„18. Although direction to pay full back wages on a
declaration that the order of termination was
invalid used to be the usual result but now,
with the passage of time, a pragmatic view of
the matter is being taken by the Court realising
that an industry may not be compelled to pay
to the workman for the period during which he
apparently contributed little or nothing at all to
it and/or for a period that was spent
unproductively as a result whereof the
employer would be compelled to go back to a
situation which prevailed many years ago,
namely, when the workman was retrenched.‟
11. In regard to interference in such matters, i.e., cases
relating to back wages, we find similar approach
adopted in other decisions which no doubt the
respondent lays store by [see in this regard (2007) 5
SCC 742]. Though the decision reported in Canara
Bank Vrs. Damodar Govind Idoorkar, (2009) 4 SCC
323 again relied upon by the respondent did involve
the service of the employee being terminated as he
had secured employment in the reserved category
using a false caste certificate and the Court modified
direction of the High Court which ordered full back
wages by substituting the order by reducing it to
50%, we do not find that any principle has been laid
down which could be treated as constituting it as a
precedent. The decision in Deepali Gundu Surwase
Vrs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)
and Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 involved the High
Court setting aside the award of back wages on the
ground that the appellant had not proved the factum
of non-employment. The Court inter alia laid down
as follows:
„(vi) In a number of cases, the superior courts have
interfered with the award of the primary
adjudicatory authority on the premise that
finalization of litigation has taken long time
ignoring that in majority of cases the parties re
not responsible for such delays. Lack of
infrastructure and manpower is the principal
cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For
this the litigants cannot be blamed or
penalized. It would amount to grave injustice to
an employee or workman if he is denied back
wages simply because there is long lapse of
time between the termination of his service and
finality given to the order of reinstatement. The
courts should bear in mind that in most of
these cases, the employer is in an
advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee
or workman. He can avail the services of best
legal brain for prolonging the agony of the
sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can
ill-afford the luxury of spending money on a
lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore,
in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the
course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P)
Ltd., (1979) 2 SCC 80.
12. The most important question is whether the
employee is at fault in any manner. If the employee
is not at all at fault and she was kept out of work by
reasons of the decision taken by the employer, then
to deny the fruits of her being vindicated at the end
of the day would be unfair to the employee. In such
circumstances, no doubt, the question relating to
alternative employment that the employee may have
resorted to, becomes relevant. There is also the
aspect of discretion which is exercised by the Court
keeping in view the facts of each case. As we have
already noticed, this is a case where apart from the
charge of the employee having produced false caste
certificate, there is no other charge. Therefore, we
would think that interests of justice, in the facts of
this, would be subserved, if we enhance the back
wages from 50% to 75% of the full back wages,
which she was otherwise entitled. The appeals are
partly allowed. The impugned judgments will stand
modified and the respondents shall calculate the
amount which would be equivalent to 75% of the
back wages and disburse the amount remaining to
be paid under this judgment within a period of six
weeks from today to the additional appellants."
8.4. In Shobha Ram Raturi Vrs. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran
Nigam Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 663 the observation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India runs as follows with
respect to consideration of fault of employer:
"3. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the
controversy, we are satisfied, that after the
impugned order of retirement dated 31.12.2002 was
set aside, the appellant was entitled to all
consequential benefits. The fault lies with the
respondents in not having utilised the services
of the appellant for the period from
01.01.2003 to 31.12.2005. Had the appellant
been allowed to continue in service, he would
have readily discharged his duties. Having
restrained him from rendering his services with
effect from 01.01.2003 to 31.12.2005, the
respondent cannot be allowed to press the self-
serving plea of denying him wages for the period in
question, on the plea of the principle of „no work no
pay‟."
8.5. Taking into account the view expressed in State of
Kerala Vrs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai, (2007) 6 SCC 524 =
AIR 2007 SC 2645, in the case of Ramesh Kumar Vrs.
Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 2904, it has been observed
as follows:
"13. We are conscious that even in the absence of
statutory provision, normal rule is "no work no pay".
In appropriate cases, a court of law may take
into account all the facts in their entirety and
pass an appropriate order in consonance with law.
The principle of "no work no pay" would not be
attracted where the respondents were in fault
in not considering the case of the appellant for
promotion and not allowing the appellant to
work on a post of Naib Subedar carrying higher
pay scale. In the facts of the present case when the
appellant was granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000
with the ante-dated seniority from 01.08.1997 and
maintaining his seniority alongwith his batchmates,
it would be unjust to deny him higher pay and
allowances in the promotional position of Naib
Subedar."
8.6. Conspectus of aforesaid decisions would leave no
manner of ambiguity that where the employee was
denied or the conduct of the employer rendered the
Government servant unable to discharge duty as the
fault lies with the employer, the rule of "no work, no pay"
may not attract and, as such the principle "no work no
pay" cannot be accepted as a rule of thumb. The
imprimatur in aforesaid discussed cases shed light to
demonstrate that said proposition is subject to variation
"in appropriate cases", and discretion has been left open
to be exercised by the Court of law which "may take into
account all the facts in their entirety".
8.7. On a cursory glance at the Office Order dated
03.09.2024 of the Director of Treasuries and Inspection,
it is transpiring that the Disciplinary Authority has
considered reinstatement of the appellant in service
without allowing any pay or allowances to him for the
dismissal period and the period of his absence from duty
was not treated as a period spent on duly under Rule 91
of OSC. As has already been observed hitherto that sub-
rule (2) read with sub-rule (4) of Rule 91 does not render
any scope to the authorities but to say that the appellant
is entitled to full pay together with any allowances to
which he would have been entitled to had he not been
suspended and dismissed inasmuch as the period of
absence from duty is required to be treated as a period
spent on duty for all purposes.
CONCLUSION & DECISION:
9. Having concluded in the Judgment rendered in the
criminal appeal on appreciation of evidence on record to
hold that the appellant is acquitted of all charges, there
can arise no manner of doubt that the appellant is not
"fully exonerated" and, thereby the instant case attracts
provisions of sub-rules (2) and (4) of Rule 91 of the
Odisha Service Code. Hence, the Office Order dated
03.09.2024 issued from Directorate of Treasuries and
Inspection, Odisha, Bhubaneswar so far as it denied any
pay or allowances to the appellant during the dismissal
period by treating the period of his absence from duty as
a period spent not on duty as if the case falls within the
ambit of sub-rule (3) of Rule 91 of the Odisha Service
Code cannot be countenanced, which warrants
interference.
9.1. Under the above precinct, the Judgment dated
30.01.2025 of learned Single Judge passed in W.P.(C)
No.25707 of 2024 is not in consonance with evidence
available on record on the anvil of sub-rules (2) and (4)
of Rule 91 of the OSC and the approach of the learned
Single Judge by proceeding to uphold the Office Order
dated 03.09.2024 as if the case falls within the ken of
sub-rule (3) is erroneous.
9.2. Ergo, this Court intervening in such Judgment of
learned Single Judge does set aside with direction to the
Signature Not respondents to consider the pay and the allowances
Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR along with all service benefits as admissible in
SETHY
Designation: Personal Assistant
(Secretary-in-Charge)
Reason: Authentication
consonance with provisions in sub-rule (2) and sub-rule
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 10-Jul-2025 17:18:10 (4) of Rule 91 of the Odisha Service Code.
9.3. As the appellant has already been reinstated in service,
the above exercise shall have to be completed within a
period of three months from date.
10. In fine, the writ appeal is allowed and, as a consequence
thereof the writ petition also stands allowed, but in the
circumstances without any order as to costs. All pending
interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of
accordingly.
I agree.
(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
The 10th July, 2025//Bichi/Laxmikant
