"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy.
Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as
"statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of
limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of
limitation is essential for public order. The principle is
based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there
should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of
limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for
legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in
his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."
8.8. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India investigated if "to
condone, or not to condone" four days‟ delay, besides
examining as to "whether or not to apply the same
standard in applying the „sufficient cause‟ test to all the
litigants regardless of their personality" in Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vrs. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC
107 = (1987) 2 SCR 387 and laid down the following
dicta:
Why not every hour‟s delay, every second‟s delay?
The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause
of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or
on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a
serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing
injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective,
there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the „State‟
which was seeking condonation and not a private party
was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before
law demands that all litigants, including the State as a
litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the
„State‟ is the applicant praying for condonation of delay.
In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal
machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or
hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal)
and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with
the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand
though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State
which represents the collective cause of the community,
does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts
therefore have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression „sufficient cause‟. So also
the same approach has to be evidenced in its application
to matters at hand with the end in view to do even
handed justice on merits in preference to the approach
which scuttles a decision on merits."
8.9. In absence of showing deliberate delay as a dilatory
tactic, the manner of use of discretion in favour of
condonation of delay in filing appeal by the State
machinery with due regard to „sufficient cause‟ has been
enumerated in N. Balakrishnan Vrs. M. Krishnamurty,
(1998) 7 SCC 123 in the following terms:
Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal
remedy for the redress of the legal injury so
suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time
would never revisit. During efflux of time newer
causes would sprout up necessitating newer
persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the
courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy may lead
to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy.
The law of limitation is thus founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the
parties. They are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy
promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must
be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would
result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his
cause. There is no presumption that delay in
approaching the Court is always deliberate. This
Court has held that the words „sufficient cause‟
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive
a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vrs. Kuntal
Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 = (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and
State of West Bengal Vrs. The Administrator,
Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 = (1972) 1
SCC 366.
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay
there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down
his plea and to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not
put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court
must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But
when there is reasonable ground to think that the
delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to
gain time then the Court should lean against
acceptance of the explanation. While condoning
delay the Court should not forget the opposite party
altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a
looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large
litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline
that when Courts condone the delay due to laches
on the part of the applicant the Court shall
compensate the opposite party for his loss."
8.10. It is significant to notice the decision of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Sheo Raj
Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives Vrs.
Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 wherein while
explaining the term "sufficient cause", the nature of
approach of the Court and the methodology in deciding
the application for condonation of delay have been
discussed with reference to earlier precedents. The said
Court in the mentioned reported case held as follows:
34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated
21st December 2011. It was rendered at a point of
time when the decisions in Mst. Katiji (supra),
Ramegowda (supra), Chandra Mani (supra),
Tehsildar (LA) Vrs. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC
634 and State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok AO, (2005) 3
SCC 752 were holding the field. It is not that the
said decisions do not hold the field now, having
been overruled by any subsequent decision.
Although there have been some decisions in the
recent past [State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654 is one such decision apart from University
of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745]
which have not accepted governmental lethargy,
tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals
within time as sufficient cause for condonation of
delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High
Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and
justice oriented approach expounded in the
aforesaid decisions which have been referred to
above.
***
40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur Vrs.
Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 ... where the
same Bench of three Hon‟ble Judges of this Court
which decided University of Delhi Vrs. Union of
India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the
impersonal nature of the State‟s functioning should
be given due regard, while ensuring that individual
defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective
interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:
„7. But while concluding as above, it was
necessary for the Court to also be conscious of
the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in
reaching a Government decision and the
routine way of deciding whether the State
should prefer an appeal against a judgment
adverse to it. Even while observing that the law
of limitation would harshly affect the party, the
Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by
the State, should not be condoned.
8. Regard should be had in similar such
circumstances to the impersonal nature of the
Government‟s functioning where individual
officers may fail to act responsibly. This in
turn, would result in injustice to the
institutional interest of the State. If the appeal
filed by the State are lost for individual default,
those who are at fault, will not usually be
individually affected.‟
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival
contentions, we feel that the High Court‟s decision to
condone the delay on account of the first
respondent‟s inability to present the appeal within
time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not
suffer from any error warranting interference. As the
aforementioned judgments have shown, such an
exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal
and justice-oriented approach by the Courts, where
certain leeway could be provided to the State. The
hidden forces that are at work in preventing an
appeal by the State being presented within the
prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a
higher court to pronounce upon the legality and
validity of an order of a lower court and thereby
secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored.
Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of
governmental functions have to be removed by
taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the
competing interests."
8.11. In a case, being Union of India Vrs. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his Lr., (2024) 4 SCR 76 = 2024
INSC 262, certain observations are made which are given
hereunder with respect to a case where there was
inordinate delay had occurred in filing appeal:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very
clear that we are not going to look into the merits of
the matter as long as we are not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for condonation
of such a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party
or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the Court long after
the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around
and say that no prejudice would be caused to either
side by the delay being condoned. ***
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the Court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned
or not. From the tenor of the approach of the
appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation.
Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have
the matter considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the
case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the Court must not start with the merits of the
main matter. The Court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is
not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep
the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of
the respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants."
8.12. It may be of benefit to have reference to Esha
Bhattacharjee Vrs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy, (2013) 9 SCR 782, wherein the following
principles are culled out:
"15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that
can broadly be culled out are:
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay,
for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms „sufficient cause‟ should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy
and purpose regard being had to the fact that
these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining
fact-situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not
be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the
part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note
of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the courts are required
to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate
there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsule the conception of reasonableness
and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few
days, for to the former doctrine of
prejudice is attracted whereas to the
latter it may not be attracted. That apart,
the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration.
It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and
the said principle cannot be given a total go by
in the name of liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation
by taking recourse to the technicalities of law
of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinized and the approach
should be based on the paradigm of
judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual
perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario.
They are:
(a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern
and not in a half hazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are
required to condone delay on the bedrock
of the principle that adjudication of a lis
on merits is seminal to justice
dispensation system.
(b) An application for condonation of delay should
not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is
basically subjective.
(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down
regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant
manner requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters."
8.13. In Amalendu Kumar Bera Vrs. State of West Bengal,
(2013) 4 SCC 52 the consideration of "sufficient cause"
qua official business has been perceived in the following
manner:
"There is no dispute that the expression "sufficient cause"
should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented
approach rather than the technical detection of "sufficient
cause" for explaining every day‟s delay. However, it is
equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally
considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in
some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay
inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep
watch whether the contesting respondent further put the
matter in motion. The delay in official business requires
its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a
recent decision in Union of India Vrs. Nripen Sarma,
(2013) 4 SCC 57 = AIR 2011 SC 1237 the matter came up
against the order passed by the High Court condoning the
delay in filing the appeal by the appellant-Union of India.
The High Court refused to condone the delay on the
ground that the appellant-Union of India took their own
sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment
should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed
its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts
the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same
became operational and barred by limitation."
8.14. In State of M.P. Vrs. Pradeep Kumar, (2000) 7 SCC 372,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that if an appeal is time
barred, the Court should either return the memorandum
of appeal to the appellant to submit it along with an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or
should provide a chance to file application for
condonation of delay. The Court cannot, under such
circumstances, dispose of the appeal on merit. In S.V.
Matha Prasad Vrs. Lalchand Meghraj, (2007) 14 SCC 722,
it has been clearly held that while dealing with an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
Court cannot dispose of an appeal on merit and such a
course has been disapproved by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court of India.
8.15. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. Vrs. The
Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 = 2024
INSC 286 it has been observed as follows:
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by
forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the
right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must
come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to
be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause
of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the
same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law
of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation
Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established
for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled
to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with
the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay
and condoning the delay for the reason that the
conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision.
27. It is in the light of the above legal position that now
we have to test whether the inordinate delay in filing
the proposed appeal ought to be condoned or not in
this case.
28. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners
is that in somewhat similar situation, delay in filing
appeal for the enhancement of compensation had
been condoned by this Court. He placed reliance
upon the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal
Representatives & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana &
Ors., (2014) 14 SCC 127. In this case, delay in filing
appeal was condoned as in other appeals
compensation awarded at the rate of Rs.200/- per
sq. yd. was upheld and the proposed appellants
were also held entitled to the same benefit of
compensation at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd.
instead of Rs.101/- per sq. yd. as awarded but with
the rider that they will not be entitled for interest for
the period of delay in approaching the High Court.
29. The other decision relied upon in this regard is the
case of Imrat Lal & Ors. Vrs. Land Acquisition
Collector & Ors., (2014) 14 SCC 133. In this case
also the matter was regarding determination of
compensation for the acquired land and there was a
delay of 1110 days in filing the appeal for
enhancement of compensation. Despite findings that
no sufficient cause was shown in the application for
condoning the delay, this Court condoned the delay
in filing the appeal as a large number of similarly
situate persons have been granted relief by this
Court.
30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as
imposition of conditions are not warranted when
sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning
the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be
condoned merely because some persons have been
granted relief on the facts of their own case.
Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in
violation of the legislative intent or the express
provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay
merely for the reason that the claimants have been
deprived of the interest for the delay without holding
that they had made out a case for condoning the
delay is not a correct approach, particularly when
both the above decisions have been rendered in
ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of
Basawaraj Basawaraj Vrs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, (2013) 8 SCR 227 = (2013) 14 SCC 81."
8.16. It is trite that the rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties; yet it is to be seen that the
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly and diligently. Thus, condonation of
delay being a discretionary power available to the Court,
exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the
sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of
acceptability of the explanation. If the explanation
offered does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth
as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show
utmost consideration to the suitor.
Conclusion:
9. Thus being delineated legal perspective for consideration
of petition for condonation of delay, the decisions of the
courts as referred to supra, it is to be seen whether the
learned District Judge while allowing the petition under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act has applied his
conscientious mind by utilising discretion aptly so as to
say that he has exercised his jurisdiction by recording
his satisfaction on analysis of merit of the matter.
9.1. On the factual matrix it is emanating from the record
that various civil miscellaneous applications have been
dismissed either for default on the part of the opposite
parties or non-removal of defects by the opposite parties
right since 28.10.2009. The opposite parties have filed
CMA No.12 of 2021 after disposal of CMP No.1466 of
2019 on 17.12.2020. Such glaring impact and effect of
relevant factor have not been taken into consideration by
the learned District Judge while passing the impugned
Order dated 28.02.2023.
9.2. The position of law as discussed with regard to
condonation of delay in Office of the Chief Post Master
General Vrs. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 1 SCR 1045 =
2012 INSC 105 relied on by Sri Amit Kumar Bose,
learned Advocate for the petitioner may throw light on
the issue at hand. In the said case the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court of India was considering with respect to inordinate
delay of around 427 days caused by functionaries of the
Government in filing SLPs and the said Hon‟ble Court
held as follows:
"12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for
taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they
have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a
party before us. Though we are conscious of the
fact that in a matter of condonation of delay
·when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government.
13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
Government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red-tape in the process. The Government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception
and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. The law shelters everyone
under the same light and should not be swirled for
the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there
was no proper explanation offered by the
Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has
miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent
reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.
Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed
on the ground of delay."
9.3. The learned District Judge, though was directed by this
Court vide Order dated 17.12.2020 in CMP No.1466 of
2019 failed to record reasons which went into his
decision making process and no satisfaction has been
reduced to writing. It seems the learned District Judge
missed to take note of direction of this Court to consider
"other grounds" as reflected in the said order.
9.4. In the present case as has already been impressed upon
that there was delay in filing CMA No.12 of 2021 which
was filed seeking to restore CMA No.13 of 2018. The
learned District Judge was considering the petition for
condonation of delay in filing CMA No.12 of 2021. The
learned District Judge in his Order dated 28.02.2023
has noted down the following:
"Learned Advocate for the opposite party No.4 (Pramod
Kumar Singh) averred that the Title Appeal No.20 of 1996
out of which this CMA No.12 of 2021 under Section 5 of
Limitation Act arises was dismissed for default of the
appellants/petitioners; that there was no Covid-19
pandemic situation which prevented the petitioners to
prefer this petition and there was no Government
notification restricting the hearing of the Civil nature
proceedings; that the delay of 104 days from 17.12.2020
to 31.03.2021 in view of the Order dated 17.12.2020 of
the Hon‟ble High Court of Orissa in CMP No.1466 of 2019
has not been mentioned in the petition for condonation of
delay with sufficient cause along with supporting
document;***."
9.5. However, without discussing the plausibility of reason
caused for the delay for having filed the CMA and such
circumstances which are stated to be beyond their
control that prevented them to approach the Court for
ventilating remedy at appropriate point of time, the
learned District Judge, Kalahandi could not have
jumped to the conclusion that there were circumstances
in existence. To reiterate, it may be apt to refer to
following observation of the learned District Judge in the
impugned Order:
"In the present case also taking a liberal view of the
matter, and more particularly, in view of the order of the
Hon‟ble High Court of Orissa passed on dated 17.12.2020
in CMP No.1466 of 2016, I am satisfied that the delay
caused in preferring the appeal was not intentional,
rather for reasons beyond control of the petitioner and in
the interest of justice, the same deserves to be condoned."
9.6. The learned District Judge was supposed to apply his
discretion with judicial acumen and record his
satisfaction along with other grounds as directed to be
taken into account in the Order dated 17.12.2020
passed in CMP 1466 of 2019 by this Court.
9.7. The plea of pandemic situation that prevailed during
2020-22 would not come to the rescue of the opposite
parties; moreso, when they have not demonstrated the
circumstances which prevented them to approach the
Court concerned within reasonable period. Therefore,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned
District Judge has not exercised his jurisdiction in
application of his discretion vis-a-vis sufficient cause.
This Court finds sufficient force in the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that the necessary
ingredients of Section 115 of the CPC being not satisfied,
the Order dated 28.02.2023 passed in CMA No.12 of
2021 by the learned District Judge, Kalahandi becomes
vulnerable and does require indulgence.
9.8. Reading of Orders of this Court in CMP No.1466 of 2019
it transpires that in no ambiguous terms this Court
stated in the Order dated 17.12.2020 that "the delay in
filing the restoration application shall be construed
liberally taking into consideration the pendency of the
CMP from 24.12.2019 till date along with other
grounds". Nonetheless, the learned District Judge
having not considered "other grounds" available on
record, the learned District Judge failed to exercise his
jurisdiction recording his satisfaction with reference to
other grounds.
2.1. The underlying principle couched in the matters of
condonation of delay is the cause shown is to be
sufficient and reasonable. The satisfaction of the learned
Court concerned is required to be reduced to writing and
reflected in the Order itself, as it is well-established that
reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces
clarity in an order and without the same it becomes
lifeless. Where the fact finding has been made without
any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not
reasonably be entertained or the facts found were such
that no person acting judicially and properly instructed
as to the relevant law could have found, the Court is
entitled to interfere. Reference can be had to Nareshbhai
Bhagubhai Vrs. Union of India, (2019) 15 SCC 1 and
Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. Vrs. Masood Ahmed Khan,
(2010) 9 SCC 496.
9.9. The expression "consideration" does not mean incidental
or collateral examination of a matter by the Authority in
the process of assessment/adjudication/determination.
There must be something in the order to show that the
Authority applied his mind to the particular subject-
matter or the particular source of information with a
view to arriving at its conclusion. See, Additional
Commissioner of Income Tax Vrs. Gurjargravures Pvt.
Ltd., AIR 1978 SC 40 = (1978) 2 SCR 169 = 1977 INSC
215. The word „consider‟ is of great significance. Its
dictionary meaning of the same is, „to think over‟, „to
regard as‟, or „deem to be‟. Hence, there is a clear
connotation to the effect that there must be active
application of mind. In other words, the term „consider‟
postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a
matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory
Authority should reflect intense application of mind with
reference to the material on record. The order of the
Authority should reveal such application of mind. The
Authority cannot simply adopt the language employed in
the document before it and proceed to affirm the same.
[Vide, Chairman, LIC of India Vrs. A. Masilamani, (2013)
6 SCC 530; Nilamani Jal Vrs. Collector, 2016 (II) OLR 190
(Ori)].
9.10. The chequered history of the appeal compels this Court
to observe that the learned District Judge should have
considered pertinent facts on the material available on
record. As has already been noticed herein above, the
petition for restoration of TA No.20 of 1996 stood
dismissed for default long since and the possible effect of
valuable right being accrued in favour of the petitioner
should have been considered. But the attempts made by
the opposite parties to revive said appeal, got dismissed
in the year 2009, and successive civil miscellaneous
applications also got dismissed either on account of
default or non-removal of defects. While passing the
impugned order by condoning the delay in filing CMA
No.12 of 2021, what has been ignored by the learned
District Judge is this, that while passing the Order dated
17.12.2020 that this Court in CMP No.1466 of 2019 has
not only hinted at taking liberal view, but also to take
into consideration "other grounds". Even though records
reveal that successive civil miscellaneous applications
were dismissed for default or non-removal of defects for
the purpose of restoration of appeal since long, which is
much prior to advent of COVID-19 pandemic, such
factor, being relevant, could have been weighed for the
purpose of consideration of petition for condonation of
delay in filing CMA No.12 of 2021. The learned District
Judge should have considered whether the petition to
restore CMA No.13 of 2018 is on account of dilatory
tactics adopted by the opposite parties.
10. This Court taking into consideration the holistic view as
enshrined in the decisions referred hitherto hastens to
say that the Order dated 28.02.2023 passed in petition
for condonation of delay in filing CMA No.12 of 2021 in
connection with the Order dated 17.12.2020 passed in
CMP No.1466 of 2019 requires intervention and this
Court does so by setting aside said Order of the learned
District Judge, Kalahandi at Bhawanipatna.
11. In the wake of the above, the Order dated 28.02.2023
passed by the District Judge, Kalahandi at
Bhawanipatna in condoning the delay in filing CMA
No.12 of 2021 is hereby set aside and the learned
District Judge may consider the petition for condonation
of delay in filing CMA No.12 of 2021 for restoration of
CMA No.13 of 2018 afresh in the light of the discussions
made supra.
12. With the above observation, the Civil Revision Petition
stands disposed of, but in the circumstances there shall
be no order as to costs.
(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
JUDGE
Digitally Signed High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
MOHAPATRA The 13th January, 2025//MRS/Laxmikant/Suchitra
Designation: Senior Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa,
Cuttack
Date: 13-Jan-2025 16:18:25
