Orissa High Court
Suprava Dash vs University Of Madras & .... Opposite ... on 12 February, 2025
Author: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
Bench: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.13997 of 2016
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 & 227 of
the Constitution of India, 1950
..................
Suprava Dash .... Petitioner
-versus-
University of Madras & .... Opposite Parties
Others
For Petitioner : M/s. Mr. M.K. Mishra, Advocate.
For Opp. Parties : Mr. R.N. Acharya, Adv. for O.P.1.
PRESENT:
THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
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Date of Hearing:12.02.2025 and Date of Judgment:12.02.2025
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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid
Arrangement (Virtual/Physical) Mode.
2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties.
3. Pursuant to the order dtd.10.02.2025, learned
counsel for the Petitioner with regard to the
maintainability of the Writ Petition against the University
// 2 //
of Madras, contended that since Petitioner took the
examination so conducted by the University of Madras at
the center at Bhubaneswar as reflected in the Admit Card
issued in her favour under Annexure-3-Series in Gourav
College of Management & Science Plot No.1564/7828,
Palasuni Satyavihar NH-5, Bhubaneswar, Orissa and
Petitioner also deposited the required fees through a
coordinator approved by the University of Madras namely
Liberty Education, part cause of action arose in the State
of Orissa and accordingly in view of the provisions
contained under Article -226(2) of the Constitution of
India, this Court has got jurisdiction to issue writ against
the University of Madras.
4. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned
counsel appearing for the Petitioner relied on the
following decisions:-
1. Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union of India &
Others (2014) 9 SCC-329, Para-9 & 16.
2. Om Prakash Srivastav vs. Union of India &
Another (2006) 6 SCC-207, Para-7 to 16.
3. Navichandra N Maijithia vs. State of
Maharastra & Others (2000) 7 SCC 640, Para-
17,18, 27 & 37.
4. Rajendran Chingaravelu vs. R.K. Mishra
Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax & Others (2010)
1 SCC 457, Para-9 & 11.
// 3 //
4.1. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nawal Kishore
Sharma in Para-9 & 16 has held as follows:-
"9. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the
citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, clause (1-A) was
inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth) Amendment
Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as clause (2) by the
Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended
clause (2) now reads as under:
"226.Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.--(1)
Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall
have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases any Government, within those
territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders
or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be
exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the
seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories.
(3)-(4)***"
On a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause (2), it is
clear that now the High Court can issue a writ when the person
or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside
its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or
partially arises within the court's territorial jurisdiction. Cause of
action for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all
intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as
envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the
Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is
bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the
suit before he can succeed. The term "cause of action" as
appearing in clause (2) came up for consideration time and again
before this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
16. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there
cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of
action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within
// 4 //
the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the
light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the
petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has
been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of
the Court's jurisdiction".
4.2. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash
Srivastav in Para-7 to 16 has held as follows:-
"7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part
for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of
any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and
character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner
has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie
either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the
respondent within the territorial limits of the Court's jurisdiction
and such infringement may take place by causing him actual
injury or threat thereof.
8. Two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution on plain reading
give clear indication that the High Court can exercise power to
issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for
any other purpose if the cause of action wholly or in part had
arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or
authority or the residence of the person against whom the
direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories.
(See ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] .
9. By "cause of action" it is meant every fact, which, if traversed,
it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support
his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of
facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to
succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal
Desai [(1994) 6 SCC 322] .)
10. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of action" means every fact,
which it is necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a
judgment. (See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar
[(1998) 6 SCC 514 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1471] .)
11. It is settled law that "cause of action" consists of a bundle of
facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in
a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken
// 5 //
with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim
relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the
defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action
would possibly accrue or would arise. [See South East Asia
Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3
SCC 443]
12. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially
settled meaning. In the restricted sense "cause of action" means
the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the
immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means
the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including
not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled
with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the
expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the
judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be
proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is
necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action".
(See Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India
[(2001) 2 SCC 294] .)
13. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been
employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances
which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right
and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has
been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a
plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those
essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in
his suit. (See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh [(1977) 1 SCC 791]
.)
14. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to
mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain
an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts
giving rise to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that
entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another
person (see Black's Law Dictionary). In Stroud's Judicial
Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of
facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises
every fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to
obtain judgment. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning
attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal
parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to
judicial interference on his behalf. (See Navinchandra N.
Majithia v. State of Maharashtra [(2000) 7 SCC 640 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 215] .)
15. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated
as follows:
// 6 //
" „Cause of action‟ has been defined as meaning simply a factual
situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain
from the court a remedy against another person. The phrase has
been held from earliest time to include every fact which is
material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every
fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. „Cause of
action‟ has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the
part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of
complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action,
not merely the technical cause of action."
16. As observed by the Privy Council in Payana Reena
Saminathan v. Pana Lana Palaniappa [(1913-14) 41 IA 142] the
rule is directed to securing the exhaustion of the relief in respect
of a cause of action and not to the inclusion in one and the same
action or different causes of action, even though they arise from
the same transaction. One great criterion when the question
arises as to whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit is
identical with that in the first suit, is whether the same evidence
will maintain both actions. (See Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mahbub
Ali Mian [(1947-48) 75 IA 121 : AIR 1949 PC 78] .)
4.3. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Navichandra N
Maijithia in Para-17, 18, 27 & 37 has held as follows:-
17. From the provision in clause (2) of Article 226 it is clear that
the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High
Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same
arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that
Court.
18. In legal parlance the expression "cause of action" is
generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that
entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a
group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for
suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a
remedy in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary)
27. Tested in the light of the principles laid down in the cases
noted above the judgment of the High Court under challenge is
unsustainable. The High Court failed to consider all the relevant
facts necessary to arrive at a proper decision on the question of
maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction. The Court based its decision on the sole
consideration that the complainant had filed the complaint at
Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had prayed
for quashing the said complaint. The High Court did not also
// 7 //
consider the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a
writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer
the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not
take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the
complaint at Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the
complainant to harass and pressurise the petitioners to reverse
the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ
petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of
the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter.
On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been
noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action
for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Bombay High Court.
37. The object of the amendment by inserting clause (2) in the
article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in
Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao [(1953) 1 SCC
320 : AIR 1953 SC 210 : 1953 SCR 1144] and to restore the view
held by the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus the
power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as
well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which "the cause of action,
wholly or in part, arises" and it is no matter that the seat of the
authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the
jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at
widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by
different High Courts.
4.4. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajendran
Chingaravelu in Para-9 & 11 has held as follows:-
9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the
Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the
seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the appellant could
not maintain the writ petition before it. The High Court did not
examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra
Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the High
Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have
jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the
cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a
right to sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the
High Court of that State will have jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
// 8 //
11. Normally, we would have set aside the order and remitted the
matter to the High Court for decision on merits. But from the
persuasive submissions of the appellant, who appeared in person
on various dates of hearing, two things stood out. Firstly, it was
clear that the main object of the petition was to ensure that at
least in future, passengers like him are not put to unnecessary
harassment or undue hardship at the airports. He wants a
direction for issuance of clear guidelines and instructions to the
inspecting officers, and introduction of definite and efficient
verification/investigation procedures. He wants changes in the
present protocol where the officers are uncertain of what to do
and seek instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances from
higher-ups for each and every routine step, resulting in the
detention of passengers for hours and hours. In short, he wants
the enquiries, verifications and investigations to be efficient,
passenger-friendly and courteous. Secondly, he wants the
Department/officers concerned to acknowledge that he was
unnecessarily harassed".
4.5. Considering the submissions made by the learned
counsel appearing for the Petitioner and the decisions
cited (supra), it is the view of this Court that in the
present Writ Petition part cause of action arose in the
State of Orissa and this Court has got jurisdiction to
issue writ against the University of Madras.
5. Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition inter
alia challenging the cancellation of the examination so
taken by her in the month of May / June, 2011 in paper
No.2 and 3 i.e. PHND & PHNE.
5.1. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner
contended that Petitioner took the examination in all the
five papers in the examination held in the month of May /
June, 2011. But without providing any opportunity of
hearing by issuing a show cause, the result of two papers
// 9 //
i.e. PHND & PHNE were cancelled on the ground that the
Petitioner is involved in the Mal Practice.
5.2. It is contended that in view of the provisions
contained under the University of Madras Students
Conduct Rules, more particularly Rule-13(a), no students
shall be punished without giving him / her a reasonable
opportunity of being heard by the authorities. Rule-13(a)
of the aforesaid conduct rules reads as follows:-
"13(a). No student shall be punished without giving him /
her a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the
authorities".
5.3. It is contended that since prior to cancelling the
examination of paper II and III of the examination taken
by the Petitioner in May / June, 2011 no opportunity of
hearing was given to the Petitioner by the University,
cancellation of the result of those two papers is not
sustainable in the eye of law.
5.4. It is also contended that subsequently Petitioner
though took the aforesaid two papers and passed the
same along with other papers in the subsequent
examination, but the University is not issuing the pass
certificate as well as the mark sheet. In support of
passing the aforesaid two papers, learned counsel for the
Petitioner brought to the notice of this Court, the
statement of marks issued by the University under
Annexure-6.
// 10 //
6. Mr.R.N. Acharya, learned counsel appearing for the
University on the other hand made his submission basing
on the stand taken in the counter affidavit so filed by
Opposite Party No.1 and the addl. Affidavit filed by the
self-same Opposite Party Nos.1 to 3. Placing reliance on
the stand taken in the counter affidavit and addl.
Affidavit, it is contended that though initially the
University cancelled two papers i.e. paper II and III of the
MA, Hindi Degree Examination, May / June, 2011 vide
Annexure-A, but subsequently the University decided to
cancel the whole examination (all five papers) of ten
numbers of candidates which includes the present
Petitioner with Roll No.A10486 PHI 5001.
6.1. It is contended that since all the papers of the
aforesaid examination was cancelled, Petitioner
subsequently though passed the two papers originally
cancelled vide Annexure-A, but unless and until
Petitioner pass the rest three papers of that examination,
final mark sheet and pass certificate cannot be issued.
6.2. It is accordingly contended that since the entire
examination of the aforesaid examination which consist of
five papers were cancelled, Petitioner though
subsequently has passed 2 of the papers as found from
Annexure-6, but unless and until he pass the rest three
papers, it cannot be held that Petitioner has passed the
M.A Hindi Degree Examination. But with regard to the
// 11 //
stand taken by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that
prior to taking such a step to cancel the whole
examination vide Annexure-C/1 and so also the
cancellation of the two papers vide Annexure-A, Petitioner
was never given an opportunity of hearing, learned
counsel contended that basing on the decision of the
Syndicate, such a decision was taken.
7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the
Parties and considering the submissions made and the
materials available on record, this Court finds that
Petitioner took the MA, Hindi Degree Examination May /
June, 2011 so conducted by the University. As found
from Annexure-A, the University decided to cancel paper
II and III of the Petitioner on the ground of having
involved in Mal Practice. But as found from Annexure-
C/1 basing on the decision taken by the Syndicate, the
whole examination consist of five papers of the said
examination was cancelled. In Annexure-C/1, Roll
Number of the Petitioner finds placed at Sl. No.2. Since it
is not disputed that such a cancellation of the whole
examination has been made without providing an
opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner, placing reliance
on the provisions contained under Rule-13(a) of the
aforesaid Conduct Rules, this Court is of the view that the
matter requires a fresh decision by the University and by
giving an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner.
// 12 //
7.1. This Court accordingly while disposing the Writ
Petition directs Opposite Party No.1 to issue a show cause
inter alia indicating the reason for cancelling the whole
examination of the aforesaid examination so taken by the
Petitioner. Such a show cause be issued within a period
of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of this order.
Petitioner be allowed four weeks time to file her reply. On
receipt of the reply, a lawful decision be taken by the
Opposite Party No.1 within a period of four (4) weeks from
the date of receipt of the reply. Such a decision be
communicated to the Petitioner within the aforesaid time
period.
8. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands disposed of.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated the 12th February, 2025/Subrat
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
