[Cites 21, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

The Director vs The Presiding .... Opposite Parties on 22 December, 2025

Author: V. Narasingh

Bench: V. Narasingh

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

               W.P.(C) No.23220 of 2015

In the matter of an application under Article 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India.


   The Director,
   Directorate of
   Printing, Stationery       ....           Petitioner
   and Publication,
   Odisha, At/P.O.
   Madhupatna, Dist.-
   Cuttack

                                   Mr. C.R. Swain, AGA

                        -versus-

    1. The Presiding       ....       Opposite Parties
       Officer, E.P.F.
       Appellate Tribunal,
       New Delhi
    2. The Assistant
       Provident fund
       Commissioner,
       Bhubaneswar
    3. Bhikari Charan
       Dalua
    4. Niranjan Jena
    5. Rabindra Kumar
       Mohapatra
    6. Snadhananda Dei
    7. Santosh Kumar
       Kar
    8. Lalit Mohan
       Routray
    9. Prasant Kumar


                                                    Page 1 of 18
     Nayak
10. Santilata Das
11. Arjun Kumar
    Sahoo
12. Shesadev Sahoo
13. Ranjan Kumar
    Parida
14. Kuber Mohapatra
15. Pravat Kumar Kabi
16. Sarata Chandra
    Sahoo
17. Sudhir Kumar
    Swain
18. Smt. Basanti Dash
19. Ranjiti Ku. Das
20. Susil Kumar Rout
21. Niranjan Prasad
    Nayak
22. Bijay Kumar
    Behera
23. Braja Sundar
    Mishra
24. Ramesh Chandra
    Sahoo
25. Baikunta Nath
    Mohanty
26. Narayan
    Mohapatra
27. Bijay Kumar
    Behera
28. Pravat Mohanty
29. Surendra Nath
    Swain
30. Bijay Ku. Sahoo
31. Dhanajaya Jena
32. Niranjan Bhoi
33. Md. Akil
                         Mr. S. Das, Advocate
                        Mr. B. Barik, Advocate



                                           Page 2 of 18
            CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH

           DATE OF FINAL HEARING : 19.09.2025
           DATE OF JUDGMENT      : 22.12.2025


V. Narasingh, J.

1. Heard Mr. Swain, learned Additional

Government Advocate for the Petitioner and Mr. Das

and Mr. Barik for the Opposite Parties.

2. This writ petition has been filed under article

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the

order dated 17.09.2015 passed by the Employees

Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi

(Opposite Party No.1) in ATA No.1011(10)/2015

refusing to admit the appeal filed by the Petitioner-

Establishment against the order dated 12.11.2014

passed under Section 7-A of the Employees'

Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,

1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act 1952') on the

ground of limitation.

3. Before considering the rival contentions, it

would be apposite to refer to the relevant provisions

of Act 1952;

"7A. Determination of moneys due from employers.- [(1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order,--

(a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute; and

(b) determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the 3[Pension] Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be, and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary.] (2) The officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall, for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:--

(a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;

(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;

and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

(3) No order [***] shall be made under

sub-section (1), unless [the employer concerned] is given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case.

[(3A) Where the employer, employee or any other person required to attend the inquiry under sub-section (1) fails to attend such inquiry without assigning any valid reason or fails to produce any document or to file any report or return when called upon to do so, the officer conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or determine the amount due from any employer, as the case may be, on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and other documents available on record.] [(4) Where an order under sub-section (1) is passed against an employer ex parte, he may, within three months from the date of communication of such order, apply to the officer for setting aside such order and if he satisfies the officer that the show-cause notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the inquiry was held, the officer shall make an order setting aside his earlier order and shall appoint a date for proceeding with the inquiry:

Provided that no such order shall be set aside merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of the show-cause notice if the officer is satisfied that the employer had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear before the officer.

Explanation.--Where an appeal has been preferred under this Act against an order passed ex parte and such appeal has been disposed of otherwise than on the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this sub-section for setting aside the ex parte order.

(5) No order passed under this section shall be set aside on any application under sub-

section (4) unless notice thereof has been served on the opposite party.]] xxx xxxx xxx [7-I. Appeals to Tribunal.--(1) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government or any authority, under the proviso to sub-section (3), or sub-section (4), of section 1, or section 3, or sub-section (1) of section 7A, or section 7B [except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section (5) thereof], or section 7C, or section 14B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order. (Emphasized) (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed.] xxx xxxx xxx

(Emphasized)

[7Q. Interest payable by the employer.-- The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment:

Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank.]

7(2) of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997:-

"7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.-- (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.

Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by a Tribunal unless he has 1[deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing]

75 per cent of the amount due from him as determined under Section 7-A. Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section 7-O."

(Emphasized)

4. Admittedly, this is the third journey of the

Petitioner-the State Establishment to this Court.

5. Liability of the Petitioner-Establishment was

determined by an enquiry held under Section 7A of

the Act, 1952 on 27.02.2013. The said order was

issued on 01.03.2013. The Petitioner employer filed

an application on 04.04.2013 under Section 7B of the

Act, 1952 for review of the said order. Such

application was rejected on 12.11.2013. The

Petitioner employer filed W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2014

before this Court for quashing of the orders dated

27.02.2013 and 07.11.2013 and this Court by order

dated 04.08.2014 quashed the said order and

remanded back the matter for fresh hearing and after

adjudication, the following order dated 12.11.2014

under Section 7A was passed which is culled out

hereunder for convenience of reference;

"Therefore, I, S.N. Bhuyan, Asst. Provident Fund Commissioner, Orissa having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having considered all the matters involved therein hereby determine the following dues against M/s. Director, Printing, Stationery & Publication, Odisha on account of Provident Fund, Pension Fund and Insurance Fund contribution and Administrative Charges towards Provident Fund and Insurance Fund for the period from 01/1994 to 02/2012 in accordance with the provisions of the EP.F. & M.P. Act, 1952 and the Schemes framed there under.


Account                  Dues (Rs.)       Deposit       Balance
                                          (Rs.)         (Rs.)
Account No.1 EES         2206333          872554         1333779
             ER          731104                           731104
Account No.10            1548072          ---            1548072
Account No.2             197262           ---             197262
Account No.21            98461            ---               98461
Account No.22            1970             ---                 1970
Total:                   4783202          872554         3910648

In addition to the above, the establishment is liable to pay interest under Section 7Q of the Act @ 12% as on date of remittance of dues/date of assessment of dues which continues to accrue till its actual payment and is exclusive of Penal Damages under Section 14B of the Act Further if I have reason to believe in future that any amount has escaped determination, I shall reopen the and pass appropriate orders

determining the amount due from the employer u/s-7C of the Act.


                 Interest U/s 7Q
      Account No.1                 2787673

      Account No.10                1521135

      Account No.2                  190418

      Account No.21                  91312

      Account No.22                   1822

      Total                        4592360

I further order, that the aforesaid amount shall be paid by the establishment in respective accounts within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this order and the receipted copy of the challans/D.Ds be produced in support thereof failing which, the same shall be recovered in the manner prescribed in Section 8B to 8G of the Act. Further, the establishment is required to submit the statutory returns as prescribed for the entire period. This will be without prejudice to any other action that may lie under the provisions of the law for which the establishment has already rendered itself liable. This order is without prejudice to action u/s 7C & 14B of the Act.

xxx xxx xxx"

6. Instead of availing the statutory remedy of

appeal as detailed above, the Petitioner challenged

the aforesaid order passed under 7A of the Act, 1952

and interest under Section 7Q of the said Act to the

tune of RS.39,10,648/- and Rs.45,92,360/-

respectively by filing W.P.(C) No.12001 of 2015.

7. This Court by order dated 10.07.2015 taking

note of the schematic arrangement of the Act

providing effective statutory remedy disposed of the

same by the following order;

"Challenge is made to the order dtd. 12.11.2014 passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner under Section 7-A of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 1952") Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner.

Against the said order, appeal lies to the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi under Section 7-I of the Act.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner will file an appeal under Section 7(I) of the Act before the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi and till disposal of the same, the

Opp.Parties may be directed not to take any coercive action against it.

In view of the same, this Court disposes of the writ application granting liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal before the learned Tribunal. For the said purpose the petitioner will send a copy of the appeal memo along with the certified copy of this Order and all the documents to the learned Tribunal, New Delhi by registered post within a period of fifteen days from today. After receipt of the same, the learned Tribunal shall do well to assign the number and dispose of the appeal on merit after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner at its Circuit Bench to be held at Bhubaneswar. For a period of thirty days, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner."

(Emphasized)

8. It would be apt to note that this Court while

relegating the Petitioner to invoke the statutory

remedy directed that no coercive action shall be

taken for a period of 30 days in the light of its order

extracted herein above that the appeal shall be filed

"within a period of fifteen days from today".

9. Admittedly, the appeal was filed on

01.09.2015 after expiry of 15 days prescription as

imposed by this Court. Admittedly no extension of

time was sought from this Court.

10. By the impugned order at Annexure-1, since

the appeal was not preferred within the time frame as

stipulated by this Court, the same was rejected at the

threshold thereby affirming the order passed under

Section 7A and also interest component as imposed

in terms of Section 7Q of Act, 1952.

11. It is submitted by the learned State counsel

appearing for the Petitioner that certified copy of the

order of this Court granting 15 days time was

received on 04.08.2015 and the appeal was

admittedly filed on 01.09.2015 and the same ought

to have been entertained on merits without adopting

hyper technical pedantic approach of dismissing it on

the ground of limitation.

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the EPF, Mr.

Das, as well for the beneficiary employees, Mr. Barik,

who were allowed to intervene, submit that there is

no infirmity in the impugned order at Annexure-1

passed by the Appellate Tribunal. Hence, the writ

petition does not merit consideration. And, it is their

further submission that taking into account the

beneficial nature of the legislation, the limitation has

to be applied strictly and the same cannot be

extended in any way.

13. To fortify their submission that this Court has

no power to condone the delay, the parimeteria

provisions of the Central Excise Act were relied upon

referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the

case of M/s Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner

of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others1 and

to buttress their argument that the delay cannot be

condoned by invoking provisions of Limitation Act

reliance has been placed on the following precedents

of the Delhi High Court;

i. Assistant Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and others2

(2008) 3 SCC 70

(2006) 2 LLJ 388

ii. Prudential Spinners Ltd. Vs. The Employees P.F. Appellate Tribunal3

14. There cannot be two opinions that the Act

1952 is a beneficial legislation and the same has been

succinctly stated in the "statement of object" of the

said Act. Reference can also be gainfully made to the

dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Regional

Provident Fund Commissioner (II) West Bengal

vs. Vivekananda Vidyamandir and others4.

15. So far as condonation of delay is concerned,

this Court respectfully refers to the recent dictum of

the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v.

Karnataka Housing Board5 and contentions as

raised have to be examined in the context of the

judgment of the Apex Court also in the case of

Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow vs.

M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur6 laying

down that where power of condoning delay is

specified under any special statute, the general

142 (2007) DLT 361

(2020) 17 SCC 643

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969

AIR 1975 SC 1039

provisions of Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act

would have no application in cases where appellate

and revisional authority is not a Court.

16. Admittedly, in the case at hand even excluding

the period of pendency before this Court as per

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period of delay

comes to 289 days. Undisputedly, the appeal was not

filed within the time line "15 days" fixed by this

Court.

17. Be that as it may, the another distinguishing

feature which is of seminal importance and cannot be

lost sight of is that, it can be reasonably concluded

that this Court being conscious of the limitation

prescribed notwithstanding the schematic

arrangement of effective statutory remedy having

been bypassed in preferring writ petition under article

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and there

being no exceptional cause to entertain the same in

exercise of its plenary jurisdiction still, taking a liberal

view granted 15 days time to the Petitioner-State

establishment to prefer the statutory appeal. But

admittedly, the same was not filed within the time as

stipulated, as noted by the impugned order

17.09.2015 and quoted hereunder for convenience of

reference;

"xxx xxx xxx Appeal actually filed on behalf of appellant on 01.09.2015. It becomes clear that appellant not adhered order dated 10.07.2015 passed by Hon'ble High Court, so again and again, appellant can not be allowed to take benefits of its own wrong/fault, so accordingly present appeal is hereby dismissed being time-barred.

xxx xxx xxx"

18. There being no prayer for extension of time

stipulated by this Court, the Tribunal could not have

entertained such appeal. And, considering the matter

on merits in the factual matrix of the case at hand

would have been contumacious.

As such, this Court does not find any infirmity

in the order passed by the tribunal warranting

interference by this Court.

The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.

Costs made easy.

The order of 17.09.2015 passed in Section 7A