Narahari Das vs State Of Orissa
2025 Latest Caselaw 11248 Ori

Orissa High Court

Narahari Das vs State Of Orissa on 16 December, 2025

        THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                          CRA No.231 of 1991

(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)

Narahari Das                               .......               Appellant

                                    -Versus-

State of Orissa                      .......                   Respondent


      For the Appellant         :        Mr. Shyamananda Mohapatra,
                                         Senior Advocate

      For the Respondent        :        Mr. A.K. Apat,
                                         Additional Government Advocate
CORAM:

 THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

 Date of Hearing: 04.12.2025        ::      Date of Judgment: 16.12.2025

S.S. Mishra, J.    The present Criminal Appeal assails the judgment

and order dated 13th August, 1991, passed by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Bhadrak in S.T. No. 12/55 of 1991, whereby the

appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections

304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the
 Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned Trial Court sentenced the

appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the

offence under Section 304-B IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three

years for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, and rigorous

imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 4 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act, directing that all the sentences shall run

concurrently.

2.    Heard Mr. Shyamananda Mohapatra, learned Senior Counsel,

for the appellant and Mr. A.K. Apat, learned Additional Government

Advocate for the State.

Brief Facts of the Case

3. The prosecution asserts that the present matter concerns an

alleged incident of dowry death. The deceased, Gedi @ Kaikei, was

the daughter of P.W.3 Gayadhar Das of village Orada under Tihidi

Police Station and was married to accused Narahari Das of village

Senabad, under the same police station, on the 20th day of Falguna,

1990, corresponding to 3rd March, 1990. Accused Pakeli, the mother

of Narahari and mother-in-law of the deceased, and accused Ahalya,

the wife of Narahari's elder brother, were inmates of the deceased in

the matrimonial home. According to the prosecution, soon after the

marriage, the accused persons began subjecting the deceased to

persistent harassment and cruelty on the allegation that she had not

brought an almirah and a palanka as part of the dowry. It is alleged

that such ill-treatment continued unabated, compelling the father,

uncle and other relatives of the deceased to visit the matrimonial

home on several occasions to pacify the situation and to request the

accused persons not to torture her, assuring them that the aforesaid

dowry articles would be provided at a later stage. The prosecution

further states that on the night preceding the death of the deceased,

her relatives again came to take her to her parental home but were

persuaded not to do so and returned. On the following morning, they

received information about her death, and upon reaching the house of

the accused, found her lying dead in the courtyard with burn injuries.

P.W.3, being unable to bear the sight, had to be taken away. He

lodged the written report (Ext.1) on the next day, whereupon a police

case was registered, investigated, and finding a prima facie case, the

Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Sections 498-A

and 304-B of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Separately, on the report of D.W.1 (Ext.7), a U.D. case was also

registered and an inquest was conducted over the dead body.

4. The defence, on the other hand, has denied all allegations of

harassment or cruelty and has asserted that the accused persons are

innocent. According to them, the deceased had been suffering from a

medical condition locally known as "Akash Mari Bata," a form of

epileptic seizure. They contended that on the night of the occurrence,

the deceased had gone outside to answer the call of nature carrying a

lantern, and at that moment, she suffered a sudden seizure resulting in

her collapse and death by burning, after which the lantern is stated to

have fallen upon her body, causing burn injuries. The defence thus

maintains that the death was accidental and unconnected with any

alleged acts of cruelty or dowry demand.

5. The prosecution, in order to establish the charges against the

accused persons, examined thirteen witnesses. P.W.1, Bhaskar Barik,

deposed regarding the demand of dowry made at the time of the

marriage between accused Narahari and the deceased. P.W.2, Durga

Charan Naik, similarly spoke about the dowry demands and further

stated that the deceased was subjected to torture and ill-treatment by

the accused persons for non-fulfilment of such demands. P.W.3,

Gayadhar Naik, the informant and father of the deceased,

corroborated these assertions and deposed that his daughter was

harassed and ill-treated for not providing a palanka and an almirah as

part of the dowry.

P.W.4, Nanda Das, the priest who solemnised the marriage,

testified that a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and a gold chain were paid by the

father of the deceased to accused Narahari towards dowry. P.W.5,

Dukhi Barik, also stated that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by

the accused for non-fulfilment of the dowry articles, namely a palanka

and an almirah. P.W.6, Bijoya Kumar Parida, likewise deposed about

the dowry demand and the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased on

account of the same.

P.W.7, Bayani Naik, mother of the deceased, confirmed the

dowry demands made on behalf of the accused at the time of marriage

and testified to the subsequent torture inflicted upon her daughter for

failure to provide the palanka and almirah. P.W.8, Bhagirathi

Grahacharya, the astrologer associated with the marriage ceremony,

also stated that the father of the deceased had paid Rs. 2,000/- and a

gold chain to accused Narahari towards dowry.

P.W.9, Dr. Suratha Kumar Biswal, conducted the post-mortem

examination on the body of the deceased and proved the medical

report. P.W.10, Ankura Barik, deposed regarding the seizure of

blood-stained earth, saree, and other articles by the Investigating

Officer in his presence. P.W.11, the Tahasildar of Tihidi, attended the

inquest over the body of the deceased and proved the inquest report,

Ext.6, bearing his signature marked as Ext.6/1 and his endorsement

marked as Ext.6/2. P.W.12, Prafulla Kumar Mohapatra, submitted the

charge-sheet, and P.W.13, Sarbeswar Pattnaik, was the Investigating

Officer, who carried out the investigation.

All these witnesses collectively supported the prosecution case

on the aspects of dowry demand, cruelty, unnatural death, and the

investigative steps undertaken.

Three witnesses were examined on behalf of defence.

Trial Court Judgement

6. The learned Trial Court, upon a comprehensive appraisal of the

oral and documentary evidence and after meticulously scrutinising the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in the light of the defence

plea, proceeded to record its findings. The Court, having evaluated

the credibility of each witness and the consistency of the material

placed on record, ultimately concluded as under:

"To sum up the evidence of the witnesses as discussed above, has well proved that there was demand for dowry in the marriage of accused Narahari with deceased Gedi and that accused Narahari was harassing the deceased all the while some time after her marriage for not bringing the Palanka and almirah as part of dowry and she was treated cruelly. On consideration of the evidence I find that the prosecution has been able to establish that accused Narahari subjected his wife to cruelty for almirah and Palanka, as a part of dowry and this cruelty by the husband has culminated in murder of the deceased.

23. In the result, accused Narahari Das is found guilty of the charge U/ss. 498-A,304(B) of the I.P.C and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted thereunder U/s 235, Cr. P. C. and accused Pakili Das and Ahaly Das are found not guilty of the charge levelled against them and they are acquitted on benefit of doubt U/s 235 Cr. P. C. They be set at liberty forthwith."

7. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned findings of the learned

trial court leading to the conviction and sentence passed against the

appellant, the appellant has filed the present appeal.

Submission on behalf of Appellant

8. Mr. Shyamanand Mohapatra, learned Senior Counsel submitted

for the appellant that the very substratum of the prosecution case is

vitiated as the first information regarding the death of the deceased

was the written report lodged by D.W.1 Baidhar Padhiary (Ext.7), on

the basis of which U.D. Case No.34/1990 was registered, followed by

inquest and seizure. It is contended that the subsequent written report

of P.W.3 (Ext.1), lodged nearly 36 hours after the occurrence, was

during the pendency of investigation and is, therefore, hit by Section

162 Cr.P.C., capable only of use for contradiction and not as an FIR

for registration of a fresh case.

Reliance is placed on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala1, wherein

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no second FIR lies in respect of

the same occurrence and any further information can only be treated

as a statement under Section 162 Cr.P.C. The paragraph relied is

reproduced here under for the convenience of ready reference:

"...This Court indicated that the real question was whether the two conspiracies were in truth and substance the same and held that the conspiracies in the two cases were not identical. It appears to us that the Court did not repel the contention of the appellant regarding the illegality of the second FIR and the investigation based thereon being vitiated, but on facts found that the two FIRs in truth and substance were different -- the first was a smaller conspiracy and the second was a larger conspiracy as it turned out eventually. It was pointed out that even under the Code of 1898, after filing of final report, there could be further investigation and forwarding of further report..."

(2001) 6 SCC 181

9. It is further submitted that even P.W.3, the informant, admitted

that he was present at the time of inquest; this is corroborated by

P.W.11, the Executive Magistrate, who specifically recorded his

presence. Thus, the prosecution has offered no satisfactory

explanation for the delayed lodging of the F.I.R (Ext.1). According to

the appellant, the unexplained delay, coupled with contradictory

versions, renders Ext.1 an afterthought and creates serious doubt on

the prosecution story, particularly in light of the settled principle that

delay in lodging FIR invites suspicion of embellishment or

fabrication, as noted in State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao2.

10. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that

several material prosecution witnesses named in Ext.1, including the

deceased's brother Surendra Naik, who alone was claimed to have

knowledge of alleged torture and witnesses such as Baidhar Padhiary,

Maheswar Jena, Kalandi Barik, Brundaban Malik, and others, were

not examined, despite being cited. Their non-examination amounts to

suppression of material evidence, warranting an adverse inference in

view of the principle laid down in Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore

(2008) 15 SCC 582

Kubersing Chamansing3, that withholding material witnesses who

could unfold the genesis of the occurrence undermines the

prosecution case.

11. It is argued that the evidence led regarding alleged demand of

dowry and cruelty is wholly inconsistent, contradictory, and largely

hearsay. PW-1 denies any dowry demand; PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-

5, PW-6, PW-7 and PW-8 made improvements for the first time in

court, which were not stated under Section 161 Cr.P.C., as admitted

by the Investigating Officer. The alleged articles, palanka and almirah

were never demanded as dowry, and even according to PW-3, these

items were volunteered by him. It is submitted that such

improvements render their testimony unreliable, and that no

consistent or direct evidence exists connecting the accused with any

harassment "for or in connection with" dowry.

12. The appellant also contended that the deceased was suffering

from a mental disorder locally known as "Akashmari Bata" (fits), for

which she frequently received treatment at her parental home. D.W.1

AIR 2001 SC 2328

and D.W.2, both independent witnesses, have supported the existence

of the illness and the fact that the accused regularly informed the

parental family whenever she suffered episodes. On the night of the

incident, the deceased is stated to have gone out with a lantern and

suffered a seizure, and the burn injuries resulted from the lantern

falling upon her. It is argued that this explanation is probable and has

not been effectively rebutted by the prosecution.

13. The investigation is also alleged to be defective by the learned

Senior Counsel for the appellant. The seizure lists describe certain

articles as "blood-stained", yet the chemical examiner's report

(Ext.11) found no blood on key items such as the lungi, dhoti, and

earth. There is inconsistency in the seizure of lantern and kerosene

bottles. Prosecution witnesses stated these were near the body in the

courtyard, whereas the I.O. claimed they were seized from inside the

bedroom. The inquest report places the dead body "in front of the

door of the room", contradicting the prosecution case that it was in

the courtyard. These discrepancies, it is urged, make the investigation

suspect and the prosecution version unreliable.

14. It is further argued that the medical evidence does not support

the prosecution case. PW-9, the doctor, opined that the death was due

to "violent asphyxia", possibly caused by smothering; however, no

corresponding external injuries were found. The forensic report did

not detect kerosene residues on the body or clothing. These

inconsistencies weaken the allegation of dowry death or homicidal

burning.

15. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the

essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC namely, that the deceased

was subjected to cruelty or harassment "soon before her death" in

connection with dowry demand has not been proved. Relying on

Kesab Ch. Panda v. State4, he contended that the "proximity test" is

not satisfied, and alleged incidents are remote and unconnected. It is

urged that hearsay statements attributed to the deceased are

inadmissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act for an offence

under Section 498-A IPC, as held in Gananath Pattnaik v. State of

Orissa5.

1995 CriLJ 174 (Ori)

(2002) 2 SCC 619

16. It is finally contended that the case rests entirely on

circumstantial evidence, and the chain of circumstances is incomplete

and incapable of pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant.

Reliance is placed on Birendra Poddar v. State of Bihar6, wherein

the Supreme Court reiterated the principles governing conviction

based on circumstantial evidence. The presumption under Section

113-B of the Evidence Act is rebuttable, and in the present case, the

defence explanation is reasonable and supported by evidence.

Therefore, conviction under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC is

unsustainable.

On these grounds, the appellant prays that the impugned

judgment be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of all charges.

Submission on behalf of Respondent

17. Learned AGA for the State, Mr. A.K. Apat, on the contrary,

supported the judgment of conviction and submitted that the

prosecution has duly proved all ingredients of the offences under

Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act. It is urged that the deceased Kaikai @ Gedi Das died

(2011) 6 SCC 350

an unnatural death within four months of her marriage, the occurrence

having taken place on 08.07.1990, whereas the marriage was

solemnised on 03.03.1990. The FIR was lodged on 10.07.1990, and

the medical evidence establishes that the cause of death was violent

asphyxia, possibly due to smothering.

18. It is submitted that the prosecution examined thirteen

witnesses, while the defence examined only three, whose evidence

was limited to asserting the alleged medical condition of the deceased

and did not touch upon the material facts relating to the allegations of

dowry demand or cruelty. The plea of denial taken by the defence

does not hold, in the face of consistent evidence of prosecution

witnesses regarding the demand for dowry and the torture inflicted

upon the deceased.

19. Learned AGA for the State, submitted that PWs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7

and 8 have categorically testified to the demand of dowry both at the

time of marriage negotiations and after the marriage. PW-1, the

mediator, clearly stated that cash and other articles were demanded by

the accused and that though many items were provided at the time of

marriage, the almirah and palanka remained unfulfilled, leading to

persistent harassment. He further accompanied the father of the

deceased on two occasions to resolve the disputes arising out of such

demands. The statements of PW-2, the paternal uncle of the deceased,

and PW-6, a co-villager, fully corroborate the testimony of PW-1.

PWs 3 and 7, the parents of the deceased, have also spoken not only

about the initial dowry demands but also about continued harassment

thereafter.

20. It is also urged that PWs 1 to 3, 5, 6 and 7 have consistently

deposed regarding the cruelty and ill-treatment inflicted on the

deceased. PW-3 and PW-7 have specifically stated that the deceased

was subjected to mental and physical torture for non-fulfilment of

dowry articles such as palanka and almirah. PW-7, who had stayed at

the matrimonial home shortly before the occurrence, learnt from the

deceased herself about fresh acts of cruelty. Soon thereafter, PW-3

visited the matrimonial house to bring back his daughter but was

prevented from meeting her. On the very next day, the deceased was

found dead. These circumstances, taken together, clearly establish

that the deceased was subjected to harassment "soon before her

death", thus satisfying the statutory requirement under Section 304-B

IPC. The proximity between torture and death is therefore firmly

established on the record.

21. Learned counsel submitted that the death of the deceased

occurred within seven years of marriage and was unnatural, as borne

out from the medical evidence of PW-9, the doctor who conducted the

post-mortem examination. According to him, the cause of death was

severe asphyxia due to smothering, thereby ruling out natural causes.

The defence has not furnished any plausible explanation for the

circumstances leading to such death, nor has it rebutted the statutory

presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Once the

prosecution has proved (i) an unnatural death, (ii) within seven years

of marriage, and (iii) cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before

death, the burden shifts to the accused to furnish a credible

explanation. The defence evidence, limited to assertions of illness,

does not meet this burden and fails to displace the presumption

arising against the accused.

22. It is argued that the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined

at length, but nothing substantial was elicited to discredit their

testimony regarding dowry demand, torture or the unnatural

circumstances of death. The defence witnesses have merely spoken of

the deceased suffering from fits, without addressing the core issue of

cruelty or giving any explanation consistent with the medical opinion

of homicidal asphyxia.

23. In view of the consistent and cogent evidence establishing

demand of dowry, repeated cruelty and harassment, and the unnatural

death of the deceased occurring within a short span after marriage, the

ingredients of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC stand fully satisfied.

The Trial Court, therefore, committed no error in recording

conviction and imposing sentence. It is, accordingly, prayed that the

impugned judgment be affirmed and the appeal dismissed

Analysis and Observations

24. The Court has carefully considered the rival submissions

advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the State, and has

meticulously examined the evidence on record, the findings of the

learned Trial Court, and the legal principles governing offences under

Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC read with Section 113-B of the

Evidence Act.

25. The principal contentions of the appellant relate to the alleged

invalidity of the FIR, unexplained delay in lodging the same,

suppression of material witnesses, inconsistencies in the evidence

regarding dowry demand and cruelty, alleged medical condition of the

deceased, and defects in investigation. The respondent, on the other

hand, contended that the prosecution has proved all essential

ingredients of dowry death, namely, dowry-related cruelty soon

before death, unnatural death within seven years of marriage, and a

consistent chain of oral and medical evidence thus shifting the burden

under Section 113-B, which the defence has failed to discharge.

26. Upon scrutiny of the material, this Court finds no substance in

the appellant's plea that the written report of P.W.3 (Ext.1) is hit by

Section 162 Cr.P.C. Merely because an earlier information resulted in

registration of a U.D. Case does not preclude registration of a regular

police case when material suggesting a cognizable offence

subsequently comes to light. The reliance placed by the appellant on

T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (supra) is misplaced, as the gravamen

of the two reports is not identical. Ext.7 merely conveyed information

of an unnatural death under suspicious circumstances; Ext.1,

however, disclosed specific allegations of dowry-related torture,

thereby furnishing the foundational facts for investigation into

cognizable offences. The learned Trial Court has rightly treated Ext.1

as the FIR.

27. As to the delay of roughly 36 hours, the Court is mindful that

delay in lodging the FIR is not, by itself, fatal if adequately explained

by surrounding circumstances. Evidence shows that P.W.3 was in a

state of shock and had stayed at the spot, and the sequence of events

following the recovery of the body provides a plausible explanation.

More importantly, the substratum of the prosecution case does not

rest solely upon timing of the FIR but on the cumulative weight of the

consistent testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding dowry

demand and cruelty, read with the medical evidence.

28. The contention of suppression of witnesses is equally

unpersuasive. The law does not mandate that the prosecution must

examine each and every witness; what is required is that the witnesses

examined must be credible and sufficient to establish the case. The

evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 provides a coherent,

consistent account of demand of dowry at the time of marriage,

continued insistence on supplying palanka and almirah, and the

consequent ill-treatment meted out to the deceased. Minor

discrepancies or omissions in Section 161 statements, when weighed

against the overall consistency of material facts, do not dilute the

prosecution case. The omissions pointed out by the defence pertain

more to peripheral details rather than the core prosecution narrative.

29. The defence plea that the deceased suffered from "Akashmari

Bata" (fits) and accidentally died when a lantern fell on her is

improbable and unsupported by medical evidence. The post-mortem

report conclusively attributes the cause of death to violent asphyxia,

possibly due to smothering, which rules out accidental burning. The

absence of kerosene residues on the body further weakens the theory

of accidental fire. The defence witnesses have only spoken of the

alleged illness of the deceased; none offered any account consistent

with the homicidal features noted by the doctor. Thus, the

presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act stands

unrebutted.

30. The principal defence plea raised by the learned Counsel for the

Appellant to establish on record that the death of deceased is not

homicidal rather due to her diseased suffering of the epileptic attack

has not found favour by the Trial Court, which is emanating from the

observation of the learned Court, as reproduced hereunder:

"21. In the above mentioned circumstances both section 304(B) of I.P.C. and Section 113(B) of the Indian Evidence Act contemplate that the court shall presume that the accused has caused the death of the deceased. The accused examined defence witnesses to rebut the presumption and to show that the deceased suffered from epilepsy. D.W.l is Baidhar Padhiary has deposed that he has got visiting term with the house of accused persons and that in his bari, there is 'Gada' plant and that in the month of Chaitra the female accused 'Pakili' came to her Bari to take 'gada' telling that her daughter in law had fallen down so he followed her and he found that her daughter-in-law was lying down near a palm tree of their bari and that he also found that her limbs were stiff etc. and he also states that that disease is called 'Akasmari Bata' He further deposes that he saw Gedi suffering from that disease 4 to 5 times. In his chief examination he has also admitted to have reported the death of deceased before the police vide Ext. 7 wherein his signature is Ext. A. The evidence of D. W.1 does not show that the deceased suffered from epilepsy on the date of occurrence and died out of that. Ext.7 also does not breathe a word with regard to this aspect. D.W.2 also state that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy for which there was ill-feeling between the family of P.W.3 and of the accused persons. But he does not speak that the deceased was attacked with that disease and died out of that.

The learned counsel for the prosecution submits that the defence plea is totally false and this false defence adds to the guilt of the accused. According to him Ext. 7 is the report lodged by D.W.1 at police station after the death of Gedi and he is a close relative of accused Narahari which is apparent from Ext. 7. and that it has not been mentioned in Ext, 7 that Gedi was suffering from epilepsy and that she suffered from that disease while she was going to pass urine and that the lantern fell on her body and got burnt. He further contends that on the other hand it has been mentioned in Ext. 7 that there were domestic problem and she was under great mental shock and there was conciliation on four to five occasions and that the

father and uncle of deceased came to the house of the accused persons on the previous day of the death of Gedi and consoled her and that she committed suicide.

It is further submitted on behalf of the Prosecutions that P.W.9 the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased in his report opined that the death was due to asphyxia possibly by smothering and the further contention of the prosecution is that if actually she was suffering from epilepsy she would have been treated at nearby hospital situated at Pirahat and Tihidi within a distance of 3 Kilometres from the house of the accused persons. D.W. Kalandi has stated that whatever he has stated in the court in his evidence he has not disclosed before anyone else.

22. On a careful perusal of the evidence of P.Ws. in my view the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the deceased died out of epilepsy. The evidence of doctor that asphyxia may be caused due to epilepsy does not in any way prove the defence case in absence of any ocular or circumstantial evidence that the deceased was attacked by that disease in that fateful night and died out of that. It is needless to mention that evidence of doctor is a supporting evidence to corroborate the ocular evidence. In these circumstances the theory of natural death cannot be accepted. Had it been a natural death the deadbody of the deceased would not have been lying in the courtyard in that pitiable condition. She should have been brought to the room and she must have been attended up to by the inmates and they must have called a doctor and attempt must have been made to save her life. But no such thing has been done in this case which is apparent from the evidence on record. It is also nobody's case that it was accidental death and the defence has also not proved that the death is accidental. In the result, the death of Gedi is homicidal."

31. Regarding the evidence of "soon before her death" to attract the

offence, the testimony of P.Ws. 3 and 7 are particularly significant.

P.W.7, the mother of the deceased, stayed in the matrimonial home

shortly before the occurrence and heard directly from the deceased

about fresh acts of cruelty for dowry. P.W.3's attempt to bring back

his daughter was thwarted by the accused, and within a day of his

return the deceased was found dead. This clearly establishes the live-

link or proximate connection between dowry-related harassment and

the death. The appellant's reliance on the doctrine of remoteness is

misplaced, as the evidence manifests proximity in both time and

continuity.

32. The argument regarding alleged investigative lapses such as

discrepancies in seizure memos, bloodstain reports, or location of

articles does not materially affect the prosecution case. Defects in

investigation, unless they go to the root of the prosecution case and

cause prejudice to the accused, cannot by themselves justify rejection

of credible ocular and medical evidence. In the present case, the core

of the prosecution case rests upon direct and consistent testimony

regarding dowry demand and cruelty, corroborated by medical

opinion indicating homicidal asphyxia. Such material remains

unaffected by peripheral lapses in investigation.

33. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution has successfully

proved:

(i) the death of the deceased occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances and within seven years of marriage;

(ii) she was subjected to cruelty and harassment; and

(iii) such cruelty was directly connected with dowry demands and was inflicted soon before her death.

Once these foundational facts are established, the statutory

presumption under Section 113-B operates, shifting the burden upon

the accused to rebut. The defence has not furnished any credible or

convincing explanation to substantiate the plea of innocence. In this

context, it will be appropriate to rely upon the recent Judgement of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vrs. Ajmal Beg Etc.7,

wherein the Hon'ble Court held thus:

"20. The position of law being clear, as referred supra let us now consider the evidence. The demand for dowry, and in particular, a motorcycle, a colour TV and Rs.15,000/- in cash, have been established beyond reasonable doubt, with such a version not to have been shaken at all. Equally so, in no manner could it be disputed that the said demand had been reiterated just a day prior to the deceased passing away. This ties in with the fact that PW1 and PW 2, both have testified to the effect of continuous harassment of the deceased. The expression "soon before her death", as explained in Ashok Kumar (supra) would, in the considered view of this Court, be met and all the essentials, as noted in Pavan Kumar (supra) would be satisfied. Here itself, it may then be noted that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 came into effect as soon as it stood proved that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty soon before her death, and went unrebutted by the defence, since no evidence was led by them."

2025 INSC 1435

34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the facts of

aforesaid judgment in State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg & Ors. (supra),

undertook a broader socio-legal examination of the pervasive practice

of dowry and its corrosive impact on the fabric of Indian society. The

Court did not confine itself merely to the facts of the case but

adverted to empirical data, reports, and judicial experience to

underscore that dowry-related cruelty and deaths continue to be a

grim reality despite the existence of a comprehensive statutory

framework. It is observed that the Dowry Prohibition Act and allied

penal provisions were enacted with the salutary object of eradicating a

deeply entrenched social evil and protecting married women from

exploitation, harassment, and violence. However, the Court candidly

acknowledged the complex dualities confronting the justice delivery

system, namely, that while the legislative intent is progressive and

remedial, the ground-level enforcement often remains inadequate, and

at the same time, instances of misuse of dowry-related provisions

cannot be altogether ignored. It is in this contextual backdrop of

competing concerns, social menace, legislative purpose, enforcement

challenges, and allegations of misuse, that the Hon'ble Supreme

Court made the following pertinent observations:

"XXX XXX XXX While on the one hand, the law suffers from ineffectiveness and so, the malpractice of dowry remains rampant, on the other hand, the provisions of this Act have also been used to ventilate ulterior motives along with Section 498-A, IPC. This oscillation between ineffectiveness and misuse creates a judicial tension which needs urgent resolution. While this urgent resolution cannot be stressed upon enough, at the same time it is necessary to be recognized that particularly when it comes to the giving and taking of dowry, this practice unfortunately has deep roots in society, hence, it not being a matter of swift change, instead needs concentrated effort on part of all the involved parties, be it Legislature, law enforcement, Judiciary, civil society organizations etc."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid decision, did not

rest its analysis merely on general observations but proceeded further

to crystallize its concern into concrete and actionable directions aimed

at addressing the deep-rooted social evil of dowry in a comprehensive

manner. Taking note of the persistent prevalence of dowry-related

offences, the inadequacy of effective enforcement mechanisms, and

the inordinate delays that often plague such prosecutions, the Apex

Court deemed it necessary to lay down guidelines to ensure both

preventive and remedial intervention at multiple levels. These

directions were intended to operate not only as legal mandates but

also as instruments of social transformation, involving the

Legislature, executive machinery, judiciary, and civil society at large.

The Court was particularly conscious of the fact that such cases

frequently remain pending for decades, thereby diluting the object of

the law and causing prolonged hardship to all stakeholders. It is in

this backdrop, and with a view to facilitating systemic reform,

sensitization of institutions, and expeditious disposal of long-pending

cases, including those, like the present one, which have remained

pending since as far back as 1991, that the Hon'ble Supreme Court

issued the following directions:

"26. With an intent to further this change, we issue the following directions: -

(a) to ensure that the change brought in is able to make an impact on the efforts to eradicate this evil, it is to be ensured that the future generation, youngsters of today, are informed and made aware about this evil practice and the necessity to eschew it. As such, it is directed that States and even the Union Government consider changes as are necessary to the educational curricula across levels, reinforcing the constitutional position that parties to a marriage are equal to one another and one is not subservient to the other as is sought to be established by giving and taking of money and or articles at the time of marriage;

(b) The law provides for the appointment of Dowry Prohibition Officers40 in States. It is to be ensured that these officers are duly deputed, aware of their responsibilities and given the necessary wherewithal to carry out the duties entrusted to them. The contact details (name, official phone number and email ID) of such an officer designated to this position are disseminated adequately by the local authorities ensuring awareness of citizens of the area;

(c) the police officials, as also the judicial officers dealing with such cases, should periodically be given training, equipping them to fully appreciate the social and psychological implications which are often at the forefront of these cases. This would also ensure a sensitivity of the concerned officials towards genuine cases versus those which are frivolous and abusive of the process of law;

(d) it is not lost on us that the instant case began in 2001 and could only be concluded 24 years later by way of this judgment. It is but obvious that there would be many such similar cases. The High Courts are requested to take stock of the situation, ascertain the number of cases pending dealing with Section 304-B, 498-A from the earliest to the latest for expeditious disposal; and

(e) in furtherance of (a) above, we also recognize that many people today are/have been outside the education fold, and that it is equally, if not more so, important to reach them and make accessible and comprehensible, the relevant information regarding the act of giving or taking of dowry as also other acts sometimes associated therewith, other times independent thereof (mental and physical cruelty) is an offence in law. The District Administration along with the District Legal Services Authorities, by engaging and involving civil society groups and dedicated social activists, is requested to conduct workshops/awareness programs at regular intervals. This is to ensure change at the grassroot level."

35. In view of the above discussion, the grounds urged by the

appellant do not create any doubt on the prosecution case. The learned

Trial Court has appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective,

and this Court finds no reason to interfere with the findings so

recorded. The appeal, therefore, does not hold any water and is liable

to be dismissed.

36. At this point, Mr. Mohapatra, learned Senior Counsel further

submitted that the matter pertains to the year 1990, the accused-

appellant has already undergone the rigors of trial for about an year

and the appeal has been pending since 1991. The appellant, who was

about 26 years, then is about 60 years of age now. It is further

submitted that the appellant has already been incarcerated for a period

of about five months. Citing the long passage of time and the

incarceration already undergone by the appellant, it is prayed that the

sentence of the appellant be reduced to the period already undergone.

37. At this juncture, this Court finds merit in the plea advanced by

the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, particularly in view of

the considerable passage of time and the advanced age of the

appellant. Nevertheless, it would not be just or proportionate to

reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. Accordingly, the

appellant is sentenced to undergo a substantive term of Two years for

all the offences, additionally to balance the scale of justice, a fine of

Rs.30,000/- is imposed, to be paid within a period of one month,

which shall be disbursed to the parents of the victims or their legal

representatives in accordance with Section 357 Cr.P.C. In the event of

failure to pay the fine the appellant shall undergo R.I. for further six

months.

The convict-appellant shall appear before the learned Trial

Court within one month from today to serve the remainder of the

modified sentence, failing such appearance, he may be taken into

custody in accordance with law.

38. In the result, the appeal, insofar as it challenges the conviction,

stands dismissed. The appeal is, however, conditionally allowed to the

limited extent of modification/reduction of the sentence as indicated

above.

39. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.

(S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.

Dated the 16th of August 2025/Ashok

Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB MOHAPATRA

Location: High Court of Orissa