[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Sri Sri Madan Mohan Dev vs Pritilata Jana And Ors on 12 December, 2025

Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 18-Dec-2025 15:04:30

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

F.A.O. No. 298 of 2025

(From the order dated 09.02.2024 passed by the learned District Judge,
Puri in Revocation Misc. Case No.148 of 2016)

Sri Sri Madan Mohan Dev, Bije .... Appellant (s)
Mohinipur, Madan Mohan Matha,
Puri
-versus-

Pritilata Jana and Ors. .... Respondent (s)

Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:

For Appellant (s) : Mr. Santosh Kumar Nanda, Adv.

For Respondent (s) : Mr. Amit Prasad Bose, Adv.

CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

DATE OF HEARING:-17.11.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-12.12.2025
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.

1. In this appeal, the Appellant seeks a direction from this Court to set

aside the order dated 09.02.2024 passed by the learned District Judge,

Puri condoning over twelve years of delay, reject Revocation Misc. Case

No. 148 of 2016 as time barred under Article 137, and uphold the finality

of the 2002 probate grant.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

(i) The present First Appeal is instituted under Section 299 of the Indian

Succession Act read with Section 104 and Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC,

assailing the order dated 09.02.2024 passed by the District Judge, Puri in

Revocation Misc. Case No. 148 of 2016, whereby delay of more than

twelve years was condoned and the revocation petition directed against

the Letters of Administration granted on 08.04.2002 in Probate Misc.

Case No. 25 of 1998 (Old No. 10 of 1996) was admitted for hearing.

(ii) The revocation proceedings were initiated by the respondents, who

claim to be the legal heirs of Late Rajkishore Jena, son of the testator Late

Sarbeswar Jena @ Sarbananda Das @ Guruji. The respondents pleaded

that they became aware of the probate order on 08.10.2014 upon inquiry

with the Revenue Inspector and thereafter ascertained that Probate Misc.

Case No. 10 of 1996 had been filed by one Manmohan Jena, asserting

himself to be the Chela of the testator and Marfatdar of a deity

associated with an alleged Matha.

(iii) The respondents asserted that the Will dated 21.10.1995, forming the

basis of the probate, was fraudulent, and that the testator was not in a

condition to execute it before his death on 04.11.1995. They alleged that

in the original probate proceedings no general or special citations were

issued, no notice was served on the legal heirs or local authorities, and

that mandatory procedural requirements under the Succession Act were

not complied with.

(iv) According to the respondents, Late Sarbeswar Jena had purchased land

in Mohinipur in the late 1960s, constructed a residence, lived there, and

cultivated land. They contended that the family continued visiting the

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

property and paying land revenue and that the land remained recorded

in his name for several years.

(v) Upon discovering the probate order, the respondents filed CMA No. 247

of 2014 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Puri seeking revocation.

The said CMA was dismissed on 05.07.2016 on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction in view of Section 264 of the Indian Succession Act and

judicial precedent. Thereafter, on 27.07.2016, the respondents filed

Revocation Misc. Case No. 148 of 2016 before the District Judge, along

with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

(vi) The appellant opposed the condonation of delay, stating that the probate

had been granted after publication and proclamation, including beat of

drum and newspaper notice, and that the respondents were aware of the

proceedings earlier as they used to visit the property and access land

records. The appellant also stated that the probate was a judgment in

rem, granted in 2002, under which the appellant and his predecessor

had managed the Matha property for over two decades.

(vii) After hearing both sides, the District Judge held that the respondents

had sufficiently proved that they acquired knowledge of the probate

order only on 08.10.2014, and, having acted promptly thereafter, the

delay deserved to be condoned. Consequently, the revocation petition

was admitted for adjudication.

(viii) The appellant earlier challenged the condonation order in W.P.(C) No.

10431 of 2024. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that an

appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act was the proper

remedy. An interlocutory application for recall/modification was

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

disposed of on 02.05.2025 with similar observations. The present First

Appeal has been filed thereafter.

II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:

3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following

submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The appellant contends that the impugned order is illegal and

unsustainable because the revocation petition filed in 2016 was

hopelessly barred by limitation, as Article 137 of the Limitation Act

mandates that proceedings for revocation must be filed within three

years from the date of the grant, not from alleged discovery of the grant

many years later.

(ii) The appellant argues that the respondents' plea of first knowledge on

08.10.2014 is false, contradictory, and unsupported, especially given

their own admissions of regularly visiting the Mohinipur property and

paying land revenue, which necessarily implies awareness of mutation

records and ongoing possession by the Matha for more than two

decades.

(iii) It is contended that the probate case received wide publicity through

proclamation by beat of drum, newspaper publication, and general

notice, and therefore the respondents cannot feign ignorance merely to

escape the bar of limitation; the District Judge erred in accepting their

claim without verifying the veracity of the alleged date of knowledge.

(iv) The appellant asserts that the District Judge ignored binding Supreme

Court precedents, including Lynette Fernandes v. Gertie Mathias 1and

(2018) 1 SCC 271

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat v. Dr. Surendra Parakhe2, which hold that

grants of probate are judgments in rem, bind the world, and that

limitation runs from the date of grant; that revocation cannot be sought

after inordinate delay in the absence of fraud, undue influence, or

procedural illegality.

(v) The appellant maintains that the respondents have shown no evidence

of fraud, suppression, or material irregularity in the original probate

proceedings, nor any just cause under Section 263 of the Succession Act;

the Will remained unchallenged for more than a decade and mere

dissatisfaction with the grant does not constitute grounds for revocation.

(vi) The appellant submits that condoning a delay exceeding 12 years

without any sufficient or bona fide explanation destroys the finality of

probate proceedings, undermines settled succession rights of the Matha,

and results in serious prejudice, as the appellant has been managing

religious and administrative affairs based on a valid probate for more

than twenty years.

(vii) The appellant contends that the revocation petition is an abuse of

process, motivated by personal interest in the Matha property, filed only

after mutation and land registration proceedings were completed in

favour of the deity and Math; the respondents remained silent for years

and have approached the court with unclean hands and fabricated

pleadings.

(viii) The appellant also asserts that the respondents, as alleged legal heirs of

the Mahant, lack locus standi to challenge the Will, because property of

AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 4948

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

a Math is not heritable under personal law, and any Will in favour of the

presiding deity does not require recognition from successors; therefore,

the revocation petition is fundamentally misconceived.

(ix) The appellant argues that the District Judge mechanically accepted the

respondents' version without proper judicial inquiry into sufficiency of

cause, misapplied the principles of limitation, and ignored the statutory

bar under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Article 137, thereby

causing grave miscarriage of justice.

(x) The appellant finally contends that the impugned order has unlawfully

reopened a judicially concluded proceeding, disturbed the rights of a

religious institution, and infringed the appellant's right to property

under Article 300A, warranting appellate interference to set aside the

order and dismiss the revocation petition as time-barred.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondents earnestly made

the following submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) Supporting the impugned order, it is contended that the Respondent

No.l is the widow daughter-in-law of Sarbeswar Jena and Respondent

Nos. 2 to 7 are his grandchildren and Respondent No.8 is his daughter.

Said Sarbeswar Jena died on 04.1 1.1995 at his residence and one

Manmohan Jena had managed to obtain Letter of Administration on the

strength of a fraudulent Will created by him vide order dated 08.04.2002

passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.,), Puri without impleading the

legal heirs of Late Sarbeswar Jena. Based upon such order, said

Manmohan Jena mutated the case land in his name. Such fact came to

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

the knowledge of Rajkishore Jena, the son of Sarbeswar Jena on

08.10.2014. After due inquiry on 13.10.2014 he could know about the

disposal of the Probate Misc. Case in which he and his sister Kamini

Majhi being the legal heirs of the said Manmohan Jena, have not been

impleaded as parties. Thereafter, he filed Revocation Misc. Case vide

C.M.A. No.247/2014 in the court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri

on 14.10.2014 to revoke the Probate Misc. Case No.25/10 of 1998/1996.

But, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri dismissed the C.M.A vide order

dated 05.07.2016 holding the same to be not maintainable in view of the

statutory provision of Section 264 of the Indian Succession Act.

Thereafter, the Respondents had come up with that Revocation Misc.

Case with a prayer to admit the Misc. Case by condoning delay.

(ii) Having heard both the parties and taking into account the materials

available in that case, learned District Judge, Puri has passed the

impugned order with an opinion that the Respondents had approached

that court immediately after knowing about the issuance of the probate

and had shown sufficient cause i.e. the date of knowledge in the year,

2014.

(iii) In such view of the matter, it is contended that the appeal filed by the

Appellant may be dismissed.

IV. ANALYSIS AND REASONING OF THE DISTRICT JUDGE:

5. The Court's reasoning hinges on the principle that when legal heirs are

not impleaded in probate proceedings, especially where the grant is ex

parte, the absence of notice substantially affects their ability to challenge

the grant within the ordinary limitation period. By recognizing that the

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testator's son and daughter were omitted from the original probate case,

the Court treats the omission as a material irregularity significant

enough to justify examining the date of knowledge in condonation

proceedings.

6. The Court distinguishes the authorities cited by the opposite party by

emphasizing the factual context: the probate remained unknown to the

legal heirs for more than a decade due to their non-impleadment and the

absence of any citation. Unlike cases where limitation strictly applies

from the date of grant, the Court implicitly applies the doctrine that

fraud, suppression, or lack of notice postpones limitation until the date

of knowledge, thereby validating the petitioners' delay explanation

anchored in October 2014.

7. The timeline presented, discovery on 08.10.2014, inspection on

13.10.2014, filing of CMA on 14.10.2014, dismissal on jurisdiction on

05.07.2016, and refiling before the District Judge on 27.07.2016, is treated

by the Court as evidence of consistent diligence. The Court frames the

petitioners' conduct as prompt and bona fide, thereby countering the

opposite party's argument that the revocation is an afterthought or

barred by a rigid three-year period.

8. The Court gives weight to the fact that probate was granted ex parte, the

Will was allegedly created by a legatee who benefitted from the

mutation, and the legal heirs were not impleaded at any stage. This

cumulative assessment leads the Court to infer a prima facie justification

for permitting the revocation case to proceed and for exercising

discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

9. Ultimately, the Court adopts a justice-oriented approach, holding that

the petitioners demonstrated sufficient cause based on delayed

knowledge, prompt legal action, and procedural exclusion in the

original probate. This results in condonation of the delay and admission

of the revocation petition, reflecting a judicial preference for

adjudicating allegations of fraudulent probate on merits rather than

foreclosing them on limitation alone.

V. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:

10. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents

placed before this Court.

11. The appellant was granted probate/letters of administration on

08.04.2002 in respect of the estate of Late Sarbeswar Jena, based on a Will

dated 21.10.1995. The respondents, claiming to be the omitted legal heirs

(the testator's son and daughter), discovered this grant only in October

2014. They then filed a petition for revocation of the grant, alleging the

Will was fraudulently obtained and that no notice was given to them in

the original probate proceedings. The District Judge, however, condoned

the 12-year delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground

that the respondents had acted promptly upon first learning of the grant

and that their omission as parties was a material irregularity. This First

Appeal by the grantee of probate challenges the condonation order,

contending the revocation petition is barred by limitation and legally

untenable.

12. The Indian Succession Act does not specify a limitation period for

revocation of probate. The residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

applies, prescribing a three-year period for such petitions. In Lynette

Fernandes (Supra), the Supreme Court unequivocally held that a grant

of probate/letters of administration is a judgment in rem, effective from

the date of grant. The Court stated:

"One must keep in mind that the grant of probate by a Competent Court operates as a judgment in rem and once the probate to the Will is granted, then such probate is good not only in respect of the parties to the proceedings, but against the world. If the probate is granted, the same operates from the date of the grant of the probate for the purpose of limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in proceedings for revocation of probate. In this matter, as mentioned supra, the appellant was a minor at the time of grant of probate. She attained majority on 09.09.1965. She got married on 27.10.1965. In our considered opinion, three years limitation as prescribed under Article 137 runs from the date of the appellant attaining the age of majority i.e. three years from 09.09.1965. The appellant did not choose to initiate any proceedings till the year 25.01.1996 i.e., a good 31 years after she attained majority. No explanation worthy of acceptance has been offered by the appellant to show as to why she did not approach the Court of law within the period of limitation. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the appellant failed to produce any evidence to prove that the Will was a result of fraud or undue influence. The same Will has remained un-challenged until the date of filing of application for revocation. No acceptable explanation is offered for such a huge delay of 31 years in approaching the Court for cancellation or revocation of grant of probate."

13. Thus, the limitation clock starts to run from the grant date. The

claimant's knowledge or ignorance of the grant is irrelevant to

limitation. This principle was reinforced in Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat

(supra). In that case the Supreme Court observed that the grant itself

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

(25.11.1994) constitutes notice to the world, and a revocation petition

filed on 29.7.1999 (over 5 years later) was clearly time barred. The Court

dismissed the appeal, holding that the petition for revocation could not

be entertained after expiry of the three-year period from the grant.

14. The District Judge's reliance on the respondents' "first knowledge" in

2014, and application of Section 5 Limitation Act, is at odds with these

authorities. Once a grant is made (here in 2002), Article 137 commences.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot extend the residuary three-year

period beyond reason. In Lynette Fernandes (supra) the appellant

waited 31 years with no valid excuse and the Court refused to condone

any delay. Likewise, in Ramesh Bhagwat (supra), a 5-year delay was

held fatal. Here the respondents admit a delay of over 12 years from the

date of grant. They have shown no extraneous fraud or continuous

disability that would defer limitation. Their ignorance, if true, is a result

of their own lack of diligence rather than any legal disability. This Court

is bound by the Supreme Court's mandate that limitation runs from the

grant. Hence, on limitation grounds alone the revocation petition must

be rejected.

15. The respondents contend they were not impleaded in 2002, which they

say deprived them of notice and constitutes "just cause" under Section

263. It is true that explanation (ii) to Section 263 of the Succession Act

recognizes as just cause "the grant was made without citing parties who

ought to have been cited". However, this is not an absolute entitlement

to annulment. As held in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Latika Bala Dassi3,

1955 AIR 566

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

failure to cite legal heirs may be a ground for revocation, but the court

has discretion to refuse revocation if on the facts no substantial prejudice

ensued. The Supreme Court explained:

"The omission to issue citations to persons who should have been apprised of the probate proceedings may well be in a normal case a ground by itself for revocation of the grant. But this is not an absolute right irrespective of other considerations arising from the proved facts of a case. The law has vested a judicial discretion in the Court to revoke a grant where the court may have prima facie reasons to believe that it was necessary to have the will proved afresh in the presence of interested parties."

16. In the aforementioned case itself, the Court declined revocation because

the will's validity was unchallenged and the omission did not affect the

proceedings: revoking the grant would serve no useful purpose. Here,

similarly, the respondents have never challenged the genuineness or

execution of the Will since 1995. The Will remained on record and

unchallenged until they belatedly appeared. In effect, they seek to

overturn a grant after a long acquiescence, merely because they were not

named parties. Even if the District Judge viewed this as a "material

irregularity," it does not automatically override the law on limitation.

17. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Lynette Fernandes (supra) that

in the absence of evidence of fraud or undue influence, a probate grant

will not be set aside after unexplained delay, applies squarely. No

evidence has been furnished to show any fraud or collusion in the

probate proceedings.

18. The District Judge found that respondents acted promptly from October

2014 onward. However, promptness after discovery cannot cure the

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inordinate prior delay once the three-year period is over. Section 5 of the

Limitation Act permits condonation for continuous "sufficient cause,"

but this is not a license to ignore a hard limitation rule for judgments in

rem. Multiple precedents have cautioned that allegations of suppression

or fraud must be supported by evidence, and long delay is generally

fatal to such claims.

19. Here, the respondents' own behaviour undermines their plea of

ignorance. They had visited the property regularly, engaged with

revenue authorities, and presumably saw mutation records. The records

(or at least the appellant's assertions) suggest the land was under the

Matha's management, which should have put them on inquiry. Public

proclamation of probate by drum and newspaper is also said to have

occurred. Thus, even on their own case, the respondents' claim to have

learned of the grant only in 2014 is suspect. But more importantly, even

accepting their knowledge date, Article 137 does not reset. The judgment

in Ramesh Bhagwat (Supra) makes it clear that the "original grant itself"

serves notice of its existence to all. One cannot indefinitely delay a

revocation petition on the pretext of having been unaware. To hold

otherwise would render finality of probate grants illusory

20. Even were limitation not fatal, the respondents have not demonstrated

any substantive "just cause" under Section 263. Mere dissatisfaction

with the probate or the omission of their names does not suffice. As

noted, they have adduced no proof of forgery, fraud, or

misrepresentation in obtaining the Will or grant. In Lynette Fernandes

(supra), the Supreme Court observed that unsupported allegations of

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

fraud in procurement of probate, raised after a gap of decades, were

insufficient. The court held as follows:

"At the cost of repetition, we observe that the Appellant failed to produce any evidence to prove that the Will was a result of fraud or undue influence. The same will has remained unchallenged unitl the date of filing of application for revocation. No acceptable explanation is offered for such a huge delay of 31 years in approaching the Court for cancellation or revocation of grant of probate."

21. Here similarly, the Will has stood untouched until this petition. The

explanation clauses in Section 263 deal with true defects (e.g. forged

will, illegal grant, failure to exhibit account, etc.), none of which have

been established. The sole defect alleged is absence of notice.

22. But as the Supreme Court held in Latika Bala Dassi (Supra) if the Will

is valid and the omitted heirs had no realistic prospect of disproving it,

revocation would be pointless. There is no material irregularity that

"substantially affect[ed] the regularity and correctness" of the probate

proceedings. On the contrary, the respondents' long acquiescence and

failure to challenge the Will until now suggest this petition is an

afterthought.

23. CONCLUSION: